confirming that a school district may be liable for damages only by “remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge”
How later courts described this case
- confirming that a school district may be liable for damages only by “remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge”
- assessing harassment in the Title VII context
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
ASHEVILLE DIVISION
1:24-cv-245-MOC
MALEENA RECTOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
VS. ) ORDER
)
)
ROBERT DENNIS BURNETTE, ITI, )
in his individual capacity, )
MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, )
)
Defendants. )
□□
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendant
Madison County Board of Education. (Doc. No. 3). Defendant moves, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for an order dismissing Plaintiffs claim under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Maleena Rector was a ninth-grade student at Madison High School during the
2020-2021 school year. (Doc. No. 1-1 1, 9). Defendant Robert Burnette was Rector’s math
teacher for the fall semester. (Id. § 10). On or about September 18, 2020, Rector believed she
saw Burnette take a photo of her during class. (Id. § 13). Rector confronted Burnette and reported
the incident to her mother. (Id. JJ 14, 17). Rector’s mother reported the incident to the school
principal. (Id. 17). The principal told Rector's mother he would investigate the incident. (Id. 4]
18). Burnette lied to Rector and the principal about taking a photo of Rector. (Doc. No. 1-1 § 55).
About two weeks after Rector's mother’s report, the principal notified Rector’s mother of
his investigation findings, which did not find a basis for disciplining Burnette. (Id. 20). Rector
did not report any incidents involving Burnette other than her September 18, 2020 report. (Id. J
9-36). In May 2022, Burnette was arrested and criminally charged for taking photos of students
on his cell phone. (Id. §/] 32-33).
Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit in state court, naming Burnette and Madison County
Board of Education (“the Board”) as Defendants. On September 26, 2024, Defendants removed
the action to this Court. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff alleged three claims against the Board: liability
under Title IX based on sexual harassment; negligence under state law; and negligent
supervision under state law. On October 7, 2024, the Board filed the pending motion to dismiss.
(Doc. No. 3). On October 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a response, in which Plaintiff agreed to the
dismissal of the state law claims against the Board. (Doc. No. 8). Thus, only the Title IX claim
remains against the Board.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must
accept as true all of the factual allegations in the Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007). However, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” with the complaint having “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “[T]he tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,”
and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” are insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555). A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if it “states a plausible claim for
relief’ that “permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based
upon “its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citations omitted).
I. DISCUSSION
Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1681 □□□□
To allege a claim under Title [X against an institution based on sexual harassment in the Fourth
Circuit, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the plaintiff was a student at an educational institution
receiving federal funds, (2) the plaintiff was subjected to harassment based on their sex, (3) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment in an educational
program or activity, and (4) there is a basis for imputing liability to the institution. Jennings v.
Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007). The fourth element requires showing a basis
for imputing liability to the Board, which requires factual allegations that an official with
authority to address sexual harassment through corrective action had actual knowledge of it and
acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 700.
The Supreme Court has clearly articulated an intentionally narrow standard for “actual
knowledge” for purposes of Title IX. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the
Supreme Court confirmed that a school district may only be liable for harassment where “the
funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or
activities.” 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A school district may be liable only if it had “actual
knowledge” of “harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Id. at 633, 642. In
citing its landmark ruling on Title [X liability in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 290 (1998), the Davis Court explained that it not only had rejected the use of agency
principles to impute liability to a school district for teacher misconduct, but it also had “declined
the invitation to impose liability under what amounted to a negligence standard — holding the
district liable for its failure to react to teacher-student harassment of which it knew or should
have known.” 526 U.S. at 642. Moreover, the Davis Court made clear that school officials must
subjectively know about “acts” of harassment before liability may attach. Id. That is, the Court
held that mere allegations, or risks, or rumors of sexual harassment are insufficient for liability.
E.g., id. (confirming that a school district may be liable for damages only by “remaining
deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had actual knowledge”).
In Baynard v. Malone, the Fourth Circuit applied Gebser and Davis to clarify the actual
notice an educational institution must receive to incur monetary liability under Title IX. 268 F.3d
228 (4th Cir. 2001). Baynard expressly rejected the premise that “actual notice of a substantial
risk of ongoing sexual abuse” is sufficient to show actual knowledge of harassment. Id. at 237—
38 (emphasis in original). Rather, the Baynard Court confirmed that “Title [X liability may be
imposed only upon a showing that the school district officials possessed actual knowledge of the
discriminatory conduct in question.” Id. The Court also emphasized that Davis foreclosed
institutional liability for “failure to react to teacher-student harassment of which [the school
district] knew or should have known,” and, instead, limited liability to cases involving sexual
harassment about which school officials have “actual knowledge[.]’’ Id.
The Court finds that, for several reasons, the Title [X claim against the Board must be
dismissed. First, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges negligence, at most, by the Board. Plaintiff's
Complaint does not allege that the school principal subjectively knew in 2020 that any alleged
sexual harassment had actually occurred. Plaintiff's Complaint even alleges that Defendant
Burnette lied to the school principal when the principal was investigating Rector's mother's
report. (Doc. No. 1-1 455). The Complaint alleges the principal followed up with Rector and her
mother after investigating and let them know he could not find a basis to substantiate disciplining
Rector. (Id. 20).
Additionally, and in any event, the acts alleged to violate Title VII do not amount to
sexual harassment as that term is legally defined. The Supreme Court has described harassment
as “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (assessing
harassment in the Title VII context)). The Fourth Circuit has articulated a similar standard in the
context of Title IX claims, stating that “[s]exual harassment occurs when the victim 1s subjected
to sex-specific language that is aimed to humiliate, ridicule, or intimidate.” Jennings, 482 F.3d at
695. The EEOC defines harassment as “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature... .” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a)
(2015). “Taken together, a claim of sexual harassment must allege sex-specific conduct aimed to
humiliate, ridicule, intimidate, or insult.” Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 107 F. Supp. 3d 481, 488 (D.
Md. 2015). Here, the initial report made in September 2020 was limited simply to an allegation
that Defendant Burnette took a photograph of Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1-1 4 17). Plaintiff does not
allege any “sex-specific conduct aimed to humiliate, ridicule, intimidate, or insult,” nor did the
Complaint contain an allegation of an unwelcome sexual advance, request for a sexual favor, or
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. Thus, the Title [X claim is subject to
dismissal for this additional reason.
Finally, in the context of student-teacher sexual harassment, the “authority to take
corrective action” under Title LX means the ability to fire or discipline the teacher in question.
Baynard, 268 F.3d at 238-39. When addressing the question of whether a school principal is an
appropriate “official” under Title [X, the Fourth Circuit found in Baynard that, under Virginia
law, “no rational jury could find that [the principal] was invested with the power to take
corrective action on behalf of the [school board] . . . [W]hether a supervisory employee may be
viewed as the proxy of the school district depends upon whether the district has delegated to that
employee the traditional powers of an employer, e.g., the authority to hire and terminate
employees.” Id. As in Baynard, “[c]ritically absent from the scope of a principal’s authority” in
North Carolina “are the powers that would make a principal the proxy of the school district: the
power to hire, fire, transfer, or suspend teachers.” Id. at 239; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-276(j)
(stating it is the duty of the superintendent to recommend and the Board of Education to elect all
school personnel). Rather, only a school superintendent may make recommendations regarding
such matters to local boards of education. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-276(G), 115C-325.6 (stating
that “[a] teacher may not be dismissed, demoted, or reduced to part-time employment for
disciplinary reasons . . . except upon the superintendent's recommendation based on one or more
grounds in G.S. 115C-325.4”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325.5 (providing that only a board of
education can order a disciplinary suspension without pay against a teacher); Trivette v. Yount,
366 N.C. 303, 310-11 (2012).
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the school principal had authority to take corrective
action to address sexual harassment under Title IX. (See Doc. No. 1-1 56). Under North
Carolina law, however, as the school principal, Burnette did not have authority to hire and
terminate employees. Thus, under Baynard, no school official with authority to take corrective
action had actual knowledge of sexual harassment of Plaintiff. The Title IX claim against the
Board must be dismissed for this additional reason.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff relies on Doe v. Fairfax County School
Board, | F.4th 257 (4th Cir. 2021) to argue that the Board had actual knowledge of a report of
sexual harassment when Plaintiff’s mother reported to the school principal that Defendant
Burnette may have taken a photo of Plaintiff during class. (Doc. No. 1-1 4 17). Fairfax County
School Board involved student-on-student harassment and is factually distinguishable from this
action. Here, in contrast to the allegations in Fairfax, the Complaint does not allege that
Plaintiff's mother reported “sexual harassment” to the principal, as that term is legally defined.!
Thus, Fairfax County School Board does not save Plaintiff from dismissal of the Title [X claim
against the Board.
For all these reasons, the Court grants Defendant Board’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's
Title IX claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's
Title IX claim against Defendant Board. Thus, Defendant Board is dismissed from this action.
' This Court recently discussed Fairfax, stating:
This dicta by the Fourth Circuit ought not be construed to mean that allegations
indicating a possibility of harassment are enough to put an employer on notice.
The Fourth Circuit was simply recognizing that if the allegations are insufficient
to even indicate a possibility of sexual harassment, those allegations are certainly
insufficient to constitute actual notice of a plaintiff's claim of harassment. Instead,
as per the Fourth Circuit's actual holding, the focus is whether '[the] report . . . can
objectively be taken to allege sexual harassment.
Strickland v. United States, No. 20-66, 2024 WL 4122889, at *4 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 2024)
(quoting Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 1 F.4th at 263).
ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant Board’s Motion to Dismiss, (Doc.
No. 3), is GRANTED, and the Board is dismissed from this action.
Signed: November 22, 2024
peeve
Max O. Cogburn i &
United States District Judge Fete