The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DEBORAH MANEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 3:24-cv-01132
v. )
)
DOUG KREULEN, CEO BNA Main )
Nashville Airport, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Maney filed this complaint against Doug Kreulen, who Plaintiff
identifies as the Chief Executive Office of “the Nashville airport.” (Doc. No. 1).
I. FILING FEE
Plaintiff submitted an Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Application”). (Doc. No. 2). According to Plaintiff’s IFP Application, her monthly income totals
$923 from Supplemental Social Security (“SSI”) payments, she has $120 in cash, her monthly
expenses are covered by SSI, she has no discretionary income, and she does not expect any
major changes to her monthly income or expenses in the next 12 months (Id.) Plaintiff did not
provide a residential address. It appears that Plaintiff may be unhoused. Because her IFP
Application reflects that she lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the full filing fee without
undue hardship, the IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. The Clerk therefore is
DIRECTED to file the complaint in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
II. INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which requires
sua sponte dismissal of an action upon certain determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999). Under
§ 1915(e), the Court is required to screen in forma pauperis complaints and dismiss any
complaint, or any portion thereof, if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain: (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for the
relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although allegations in a pro se complaint are held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972), “liberal construction . . . has limits.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citing Franklin, 765 F.2d at 85). And pro se litigants are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608,
613 (6th Cir. 2011).
III. ALLEGED FACTS
As best the Court can discern,1 the complaint alleges that, on an unspecified date, an
unidentified person used an airplane intercom to call Plaintiff names, harass her, “talk of her
personal business out loud,” and “injure” her; an unidentified person used a body double of
Plaintiff; and acts against “human spirit soul” have been committed. (See Doc. No. 1 at 3). The
complaint lists words and phrases such as “Degraded,” “Embarrassed,” “Civil rights,” “Cussed
out” (id.), but provides no elaboration.
IV. SCREENING OF THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS COMPLAINT
After conducting the initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s complaint does not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 and cannot
survive screening under Section 1915(e)(2). The allegations set forth in the complaint are
frivolous and/or delusional.
Additionally, there is no basis for federal jurisdiction. “[F]ederal courts have a duty to
consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua
sponte.” Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465
(6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). There are two basic types of subject-matter jurisdiction:
federal-question jurisdiction and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. A
plaintiff properly invokes federal-question jurisdiction under Section 1331 when he pleads a
colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of the United States. Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006) (citation omitted). A plaintiff invokes diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction when he presents a claim between parties who are citizens of different states and the
value of that claim exceeds the required jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §
1 Plaintiff’s handwritten complaints are so skeletal and nonsensical that it is difficult to distill her statements into
coherent narratives and causes of action.
1332(a). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a plaintiff fails to establish jurisdiction, the
Court must dismiss the case without prejudice. Emst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 366 (6th Cir.
2005); Revere v. Wilmington Fin., 406 F. App’x 936, 937 (6th Cir. 2011).
Here, Plaintiff checked the box for “Federal Question” jurisdiction. (Doc. No. | at 3). In
elaborating, she provides no statutes or provisions of the United States Constitution that are at
issue in this case, nor can the Court discern any.
V. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Plaintiffs in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal as
frivolous and delusional under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e). Additionally, the complaint fails to establish a
basis for federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, this action is hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED. Whe
Qshe
cael
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE