Henry Komosa v. Board of Assessors of Montague

APPEALS COURT

HENRY KOMOSA vs. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF MONTAGUE

Docket:

23-P-454

Dates:

April 17, 2024 - November 8, 2024

Present:

Vuono, Rubin, & Walsh, JJ.

County:

Suffolk

Keywords:

Real Property, Agricultural or horticultural use, Tax. Taxation, Assessors, Appellate Tax Board: appeal to Appeals Court, Real estate tax: classification of property. Administrative Law, Agency's interpretation of statute. Statute, Construction.

Appeal from a decision of the Appellate

Tax Board.

J. Mark Dickison for the taxpayer.

Ellen M. Hutchinson for board of assessors

of Montague.

VUONO, J.

The taxpayer, Henry Komosa, appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax

Board (tax board), affirming the town of Montague's board of assessors'

(assessors) refusal to assess his land, consisting of 5.6 acres on some of

which he grows and harvests hay ("haying"), pursuant to G. L.

c. 61A, commonly known as the Agricultural Classification Act (c. 61A

or the statute).[1] Land which is

classified under c. 61A receives a lower tax assessment because it is

valued on the basis of its agricultural or horticultural use rather than its

full and fair value. See Adams v.

Assessors of Westport, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 180-181 (2010). "Essentially, c. 61A provides a tax

break for landowners who devote at least five acres of their property to

agricultural or horticultural use."[2]

Id. at 181 . The tax board

determined that haying is a horticultural use,[3] but that Komosa devoted an

insufficient amount of its land, only approximately 3.6 acres of the 5.6 acres

at issue, to haying and that the remaining area did not have a reasonable

relationship to the haying operation.

Consequently, the tax board concluded that the use of the property did

not meet the five-acre requirement to qualify for c. 61A classification. Komosa challenges the tax board's

interpretation of the statute. He

contends that the statute requires only that the property at issue exceed five

acres, produce $500 in income annually, and that some portion of the land be

devoted to horticulture use. We conclude

that the tax board's interpretation of the statute is correct, and that its

decision is based on substantial evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Procedural and factual background.[4] Komosa owns several parcels of land totaling

6.6 acres in Montague, a small town located in Franklin County. The parcels are identified by the parties and

on the relevant applications and decisions as parcels 51-96, 51-97, 51-98, and

51-100.[5] Komosa purchased the parcels,

which were formerly known as the "Podlensky Farm," in 2007. Soon thereafter, he began to grow and harvest

hay, which he sold to local farms as feed for animals. Komosa asserted that this activity generated

between $750 and $925 annually, and as noted by the tax board, the town

conceded that it at least generated over $500.

Komosa's property was classified as land

devoted to horticultural use and taxed at the reduced rate permitted by the

statute through fiscal year 2020. In

early 2020, Komosa notified the assessors that he was changing the use of one

of the parcels, 51-100, from horticultural use to residential use, thereby

reducing the property he designated as being in horticultural use to 5.641

acres.[6] This change prompted the

following chain of events. First, the

assessors imposed roll-back taxes on parcel 51-100.[7] That assessment is not at issue in this

appeal. Second, the assessors conducted

an investigation into the use of the remaining three parcels, 51-96, 51-97, and

51-98 (the parcels at issue). Following

that investigation, which included a visit to the property, the assessors

concluded that due to the topography of the parcels at issue, which included

trees, slopes, and wetlands, only 3.6 of the 5.6 acres were devoted to

haying. Because c. 61A requires

that at least five acres be actively devoted to a horticultural use, the

assessors determined that the parcels at issue no longer qualified for the

reduced tax rate under c. 61A and voted to disallow or revoke the c. 61A

classification for fiscal year 2021.[8]

For reasons not relevant here, this tax year is not at issue in this

appeal.[9] Next, following the same

reasoning, the assessors denied Komosa's application seeking c. 61A

classification for the tax year 2022.

Komosa filed a request for modification pursuant to G. L.

c. 61A, § 19, which the assessors denied. Komosa then appealed to the tax board, also

pursuant to G. L. c. 61A, § 19, which ruled in favor of the

assessors. The tax board issued findings

of fact and report at Komosa's request.

That decision is the subject of this appeal.

Following an evidentiary hearing, at which

Komosa and Assessor Karen Tonelli testified, the tax board found that the

assessors provided "credible, detailed testimony and

documentation." Assessor Tonelli,

who had thirty years of experience as an assessor in Montague and other rural

towns, testified that she used a "sophisticated mapping system" to

measure those portions of the property that were not conducive to haying. Based on her prior visit to the property, she

confirmed that some of the land was heavily treed or had significant slopes

thereby preventing those areas from being hayed. She asserted that horticultural use took

place on only 3.6 acres of the 5.641-acre parcel. The tax board found Tonelli's testimony

credible and agreed that Komosa failed to meet the five-acre requirement.

Komosa provided a significantly different

description of his property and the haying operation. Komosa acknowledged that the parcels at issue

contained some steep slopes and that not all the land was used for haying,

however, he asserted that land not used for haying was used for access roads,

bad hay compost, and brush piles, all of which supported horticulture. In addition, Komosa challenged the assessors'

calculation of which portions of the parcels at issue were being used to grow

hay and argued that by relying on satellite imagery the assessors failed to

account for how land hidden under a canopy of trees was being used.

The tax board rejected Komosa's claim that

the land not used for growing hay still supported horticulture, describing his

testimony on this point as "unsubstantiated." The tax board further found that Komosa's

documentary evidence provided "no mechanism to distinguish property

lines" and that he "offered no reliable measurements" regarding

what portion of the land was comprised of trees. The tax board thus concluded that Komosa had

failed to meet his burden of establishing that his land qualified for the lower

tax rate and that the assessors had properly denied Komosa's application for c.

61A classification. In reaching its

conclusion, the tax board observed that while Komosa did not have to establish

that "every square inch of five acres were primarily and directly

cultivating hay to meet the requisite of G. L. c. 61A, § 4, he

had the burden of proving that portions not dedicated to haying had some

reasonable relationship to the primary use, some customary and necessary use in

raising such products and preparing them for market."

Standard of review. A decision by the tax board will not be

modified or reversed if it "is based on both substantial evidence and a

correct application of the law."

Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443

Mass. 276, 285 (2005). "Although

the proper interpretation of a statute is for a court to determine, we

recognize the [tax] board's expertise in the administration of tax statutes and

give weight to the [tax] board's interpretations." Raytheon Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 455

Mass. 334, 337 (2009), citing Bell Atl. Mobile of Mass. Corp., Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Revenue, 451 Mass. 280, 283 (2008). See Veolia Energy Boston, Inc. v. Assessors

of Boston, 483 Mass. 108, 112 (2019), quoting AA Transp. Co. v. Commissioner of

Revenue, 454 Mass. 114, 119 (2009) ("because the board is an agency

charged with administering the tax law and has expertise in tax matters, we

give weight to its interpretation of tax statutes, and will affirm its

statutory interpretation if that interpretation is reasonable"); Northeast

Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 395 Mass. 207, 213 (1985) (describing

court's "traditional deference to the expertise of the [tax] board in tax

matters involving interpretation of the laws of the Commonwealth"). In addition, where, as here, Komosa is

challenging the assessment of his property, he bears the burden of proving his

entitlement to a reduced tax rate under c. 61A.

See Raytheon Co., supra at 339 & n.11; General Elec. Co. v.

Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 599 (1984).

Discussion. The assessors argue that the tax board

reasonably interpreted c. 61A and correctly concluded that Komosa's

property does not qualify for the tax relief afforded by c. 61A. The tax board determined that c. 61A is

unambiguous and requires that a taxpayer must establish that at least five

acres of land is actively devoted to a horticultural use to qualify for

c. 61A classification. The tax

board pointed first to G. L. c. 61A, § 4, which states in

relevant part:

"For general

property tax purposes, the value of land, not less than five acres in area,

which is actively devoted to agricultural, horticultural or agricultural and

horticultural uses during the tax year in issue . . . shall, upon

application of the owner of such land and approval thereof, be that value which

such land has for agricultural or horticultural purposes" (emphasis

added).

Next, the tax

board observed that "horticultural use" is defined in G. L.

c. 61A, § 2, as land that is "primarily and directly used"

for a stated horticultural purpose, including, as is the case here, growing

feed for animals, or when "primarily and directly used in a related manner

which is incidental to those uses . . . ."[10]

Based on the plain language of these two

sections of the statute, the tax board concluded that Komosa was required to

prove that at least five acres of his land were "actively devoted" to

haying. In other words, five acres must

be "primarily and directly" used for haying or uses reasonably

related to haying -- it is not enough that "a portion of the five acres"

is "actively devoted" to horticultural use.

Komosa contends that the tax board's

conclusion is incorrect. He claims that

the statute is ambiguous, and points to the language of G. L. c. 61A,

§ 3, which, he contends, provides a different way to qualify land as

agricultural for tax purposes. That

section provides in relevant part:

"Land not

less than five acres in area shall be deemed to be actively devoted to

agricultural or horticultural uses when the gross sales of agricultural,

horticultural or agricultural and horticultural products resulting from such

uses together with the amount, if any, payable under a soil conservation or

pollution abatement program of the federal government or the commonwealth total

not less than five hundred dollars per year . . . ."

Komosa asserts

that, based on the language quoted above, the statute merely requires that he

prove that his property (1) exceeds five acres, (2) generates $500 in annual

sales, and (3) is, at least in part, devoted to haying "and is not

otherwise devoted to residential, commercial, or industrial use."

Although there is no doubt that G. L.

c. 61A, § 3, imposes an additional requirement of a minimum annual

income, Komosa's reliance on G. L. c. 61A, § 3, alone is

misplaced because we do not read each section of the statute in isolation. "All the words of a statute are to be

given their ordinary and usual meaning, and each clause or phrase is to be

construed with reference to every other clause or phrase without giving undue

emphasis to any one group of words, so that, if reasonably possible, all parts shall

be construed as consistent with each other so as to form a harmonious enactment

effectual to accomplish its manifest purpose" (citation omitted). Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465

Mass. 134, 139 (2013). We conclude, as

did the tax board, that read harmoniously, the plain language of the statute

requires that a minimum of five acres must be actively devoted to a

horticultural use or uses, or ones reasonably related thereto, to receive

c. 61A classification. Furthermore,

the minimum income requirement set forth in G. L. c. 61A, § 3, on

which Komosa relies, is an additional, not an alternative, criterion that the

landowner must meet to qualify for c. 61A classification. The interpretation advanced by Komosa ignores

the language of G. L. c. 61A, §§ 2 and 4, and places undue

emphasis on § 3. As such, it is

inconsistent with a harmonious interpretation of the statute.[11]

In addition, contrary to Komosa's

assertion, the tax board's interpretation is consistent with the intent of the

Legislature.[12] As the Supreme Judicial

Court explained in Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. 288, 299 (2003), the statute was

enacted because "[t]he Legislature was concerned with the rapidly

decreasing number of farms in the Commonwealth during the 1940's and 1950's,

and the resulting loss of a vital resource for the people of the

Commonwealth." Therefore, the

Legislature commissioned several studies between 1955 and 1970, which proposed

as a solution the assessment and taxation of land used for agricultural and

horticultural purposes at a reduced rate.

Id. The studies "were

unanimous in recognizing that real estate taxation contributed to the demise of

farms," but also voiced concern that the proposed lowered assessments,

while alleviating some of the economic burden on farmers, could also

"accelerate the worrisome loss of farmland to speculators and developers

who would acquire and hold agricultural property at a low rate of taxation

while awaiting the opportunity to convert or sell the land for

development." Id. at 299-300 . Accordingly, certain provisions, including

the roll-back tax discussed above, were included to address these

concerns. Id. at 300-301 & n.17.

The tax board's interpretation recognizes

the need to alleviate economic burden on farmers and protect farmland from

speculators and developers. Komosa's

interpretation, which focuses on ownership of a minimum parcel of five acres

rather than the number of acres that are put to horticultural use, does not

achieve these goals. In fact, Komosa's

interpretation would permit a landowner to devote a tiny portion of land to

horticultural use and still receive the benefit of c. 61A

classification. We are confident that

such a result was not one intended by the Legislature.

Lastly, we are not persuaded by Komosa's

argument that the tax board erred in concluding that he failed to meet his

burden of demonstrating that the portions of his property not devoted to haying

were, in fact, devoted to other purposes incidental to the haying operation. "The decision of the [tax] board shall

be final as to findings of fact," G. L. c. 58A, § 13,

although it may be challenged as "not supported by 'substantial

evidence'" (citation omitted).

Schussel v. Commissioner of Revenue, 472 Mass. 83, 86 (2015). Here, the tax board specifically found that

Komosa's testimony and documentary evidence did not support his assertion that

the remainder of the property was devoted to such incidental uses. Komosa, himself, characterized such uses as

infrequent. The tax board weighed the

conflicting evidence regarding the manner in which those portions of the

property not devoted to haying were used and found the evidence presented by

Komosa insufficient to support a finding that the requisite amount of that land

was devoted to incidental uses. The tax

board's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 89-90 .

Conclusion. We agree with the reasoning of the tax board

in all material respects and affirm the decision denying Komosa's application

to classify the parcels at issue pursuant to c. 61A.

So ordered.

footnotes

[1] Chapter 61A

is entitled "Assessment and Taxation of Agricultural and Horticultural

Land."

[2] Additional

requirements include that the land had been actively devoted to agricultural or

horticultural use for at least the two years immediately preceding the tax year

in issue and that the horticultural use had generated more than $500 of income

annually. G. L. c. 61A,

§§ 4 and 3, respectively. There is

no dispute that Komosa met these two requirements.

[3] The tax board

noted that "the parties did not dispute that haying is considered a

horticultural use under G. L. c. 61A, § 2.

[4] The

procedural history and facts are taken from the tax board's findings of fact

and report promulgated on February 24, 2023.

We supplement our summary with undisputed facts from the record where

necessary to provide context to our discussion.

[5] The record

suggests that the parcel numbers derive from assessors' map 51 and lot numbers

96-98 and 100.

[6] There are no

residential, industrial, or commercial structures on the remaining parcels.

[7] Roll-back

taxes are the difference between the taxes actually paid under c. 61A and what

would have been paid if the land had been assessed at its fair and full value

for up to the preceding five tax years.

See Sudbury v. Scott, 439 Mass. 288 , 295 n.8 (2003).

[8] This decision

appears to be a change in how the assessors viewed the property. The record indicates that the parcels at

issue received c. 61A classification for tax year 2013 without the

inclusion of parcel 51-100.

[9] Komosa

appealed this decision to the tax board; however, the appeal was dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction. The taxpayer has

made no argument here that the tax board erred in dismissing that appeal.

[10] General laws

c. 61A, § 2, provides in relevant part:

"Land shall

be considered to be in horticultural use when primarily and directly used in

raising fruits, vegetables, berries, nuts and other foods for human

consumption, feed for animals, tobacco, flower, sod, trees, nursery or

greenhouse products, and ornamental plants and shrubs for the purpose of

selling these products in the regular course of business . . . or

when primarily and directly used in a related manner which is incidental to

those uses and represents a customary and necessary use in raising these

products and preparing them for market" (emphases added).

[11] We note that

the tax board's interpretation is further supported by additional language

included in G. L. c. 61A, § 4, regarding "contiguous

land." That portion states:

"For the

said tax purposes, land so devoted shall be deemed to include such contiguous

land under the same ownership as is not committed to residential, industrial or

commercial use and which is covered by application submitted pursuant to

section six. . . . All such

land which is contiguous or is deemed contiguous for purposes of this chapter

shall not exceed in acreage one hundred per cent of the acreage which is

actively devoted to agricultural, horticultural or agricultural and

horticultural uses."

The distinction

between contiguous land and the primary land (five acres) which is actively

devoted to a horticultural use means contiguous land (under the same ownership)

may receive the tax benefit of c. 61A only when five acres are actively devoted

to a horticultural use.

[12] "Where

the words [of a statute] are plain and unambiguous in their meaning, we view

them as conclusive as to legislative intent" (quotations and citation

omitted). Dorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC,

479 Mass. 265, 271 (2018). Where a statute

contains seemingly conflicting language, we strive to make it "an

effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound

reason" and consistent with "the legislative intent" (citations

omitted). Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass.

699, 704 (2004).