AIMEE BODGE & Others v. COMMONWEALTH & Others

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

AIMEE BODGE[1] & others[2] vs. COMMONWEALTH & others[3]

Docket:

SJC-13567

Dates:

May 6, 2024 - September 13, 2024

Present:

Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, & Wolohojian, JJ.

County:

Suffolk

Keywords:

Family & Medical Leave Act. Employment, Employee benefit plan. Statute, Construction. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. State Police.

Civil action commenced in the Superior

Court Department on March 10, 2022.

A motion to dismiss was heard by Robert L.

Ullmann, J., and the case was reported by him to the Appeals Court.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own

initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Samuel Davis for the plaintiffs.

Anne M. McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney

General, for the defendants.

BUDD, C.J.

General Laws c. 175M, the Paid Family and Medical Leave Act (PFMLA or

act), enables eligible employees to take paid leave to, among other things,

bond with their child during the first year after the child's birth, adoption,

or placement in foster care. The

plaintiffs, all State troopers, brought suit against the Commonwealth and the

heads of the State Police and the State Board of Retirement, claiming that the

defendants' policy of denying the accrual of benefits, including seniority,

length-of-service credit, and vacation and sick time while on PFMLA leave, was

a violation of the act. In addition, the

plaintiffs claimed the policy discriminated against female employees in

violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4, and G. L. c. 93,

§ 102. A Superior Court judge

dismissed so much of the complaint alleging violations of the PFMLA. For the reasons explained infra, we affirm.

Background. In reviewing the allowance of a motion to

dismiss, we "accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw

every reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiff." Heath-Latson v. Styller, 487 Mass. 581 , 584

n.8 (2021). Since 2019, the PFMLA has

permitted an eligible employee to take leave to bond with his or her child

during the first year after the child's birth, adoption, or placement in foster

care; arising out of a family member's covered active duty in the armed forces;

or to care for a sick family member. See

St. 2018, c. 121, §§ 29 (inserting G. L. c. 175M), 37 (effective

date). Each of the plaintiffs sought to

take leave in connection with the birth of a child. The defendants informed the plaintiffs that

if they took leave under the PFMLA, they would lose their seniority[4] and

would not accrue vacation and sick time, or length-of-service credit while on

leave. As a result of these policies, a

number of plaintiffs took advantage of other leave options instead, or decided

not to take leave at all. Although the

policy divesting troopers of their seniority ended in February 2022,[5] the

policy of denying accrual of vacation time, sick time, and length-of-service

credit during leave remained in place.

On March 10, 2022, the plaintiffs

commenced this action, alleging, among other claims, that denying their right

to accrue employment benefits while on leave violates the PFMLA. The defendants thereafter filed a motion to

dismiss. The motion judge allowed the

defendants' motion, concluding that the act does not guarantee the accrual of

benefits during PFMLA leave. However,

the judge stayed the proceedings and allowed the plaintiffs' motion to report

the order to the Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended,

423 Mass. 1403 (1996), seeking clarification on the interpretation of the act.[6] We transferred the matter to this court sua

sponte.

Discussion. Whether the PFMLA requires that certain

benefits accrue while employees are on leave is a question of statutory

interpretation that we review de novo.

See Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enters., Inc., 481 Mass. 625, 627

(2019). "Our analysis begins with

the plain language of the statute, which is the 'principal source of insight

into legislative intent'" (citation omitted). Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 478

Mass. 710, 712 (2018).

Section 2 (e) of the PFMLA guarantees that

"[a]n employee who has taken family or medical leave shall be restored to

the employee's previous position or to an equivalent position, with the same

status, pay, employment benefits,[7] length-of-service credit and seniority as

of the date of leave." G. L. c.

175M, § 2 (e) (§ 2 [e]).

Simply put, when an employee returns from PFMLA leave, he or she is to be

put back in the same (or equivalent) position as when he or she left, with no

loss of accrued length-of-service credit and vacation and sick time.

Despite the plain language of § 2

(e), the plaintiffs contend that the subsection that follows, G. L.

c. 175M, § 2 (f) (§ 2 [f]), provides for the continued accrual

of length-of-service credit and vacation and sick time to employees while on

PFMLA leave. It states:

"The taking

of family or medical leave shall not affect an employee's right to accrue

vacation time, sick leave, bonuses, advancement, seniority, length-of-service

credit or other employment benefits, plans or programs. During the duration of an employee's family

or medical leave, the employer shall provide for, contribute to or otherwise

maintain the employee's employment-related health insurance benefits, if any,

at the level and under the conditions coverage would have been provided if the

employee had continued working continuously for the duration of such

leave."

G. L. c. 175M, § 2

(f). The plaintiffs point to the first

sentence of the provision to argue that § 2 (f) entitles employees to

continue to accrue benefits while on leave because taking leave "does not

affect" the employee's previously held right to accrue those benefits.

However, the first sentence of § 2

(f) does not confer accrual rights.

Instead, it ensures that any such rights that the employee already has

are "not affect[ed]" while the employee is on leave. Had the Legislature intended for employees to

continue to accrue seniority, length-of-service credit, and sick and vacation

time during their leave, it specifically would have provided for it. See Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Auth., 470

Mass. 117, 129 (2014) ("It is well established that we do not read into

[a] statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put there

. . ." [citation and quotations omitted]). See, e.g., G. L. c. 176G, § 5

("interest on such benefits . . . shall accrue").

The second sentence of § 2 (f)

supports our interpretation. It

specifies that employees do continue to benefit from health insurance during

PFMLA leave, thereby drawing a distinction between health insurance benefits

and all other benefits. See Arthur D.

Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Cambridge, 395 Mass.

535, 541 (1985) ("[W]here the Legislature has employed specific language

in one [portion of a statute], but not in another, the language should not be

implied where it is not present" [citation omitted]).

Moreover, the plaintiffs' reading of

§ 2 (f) is at odds with § 2 (e).

See Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527, 532 (2015) (to ascertain legislative

intent, we may "consider . . . other sections of the statute

. . . and examine the pertinent language in the context of the entire

statute"). Section 2 (e) makes

clear that the level of benefits remains unchanged during PFMLA leave. That is, an employee returning from leave

receives no less (and no more) of each enumerated benefit than what he or she

had at the start of the leave. Under the

plaintiffs' reading of § 2 (f), employees would accrue vacation and

sick time while on leave and, thus, would return from leave with more accrued

time than when they began. We decline to

adopt an interpretation that creates an internal contradiction. See DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454

Mass. 486, 491 (2009) (we read subsections of statutes "in harmony with

another, recognizing that the Legislature did not intend internal contradiction").

The plaintiffs make a number of additional

arguments, which we address briefly.

First, the plaintiffs argue that the PFMLA regulation subverts

legislative intent by improperly inserting a "temporal restriction"

–- "upon reinstatement" and "previously held" -- around the

accrual of benefits that does not appear in the statute. The regulation at issue states, in part:

"Upon

reinstatement, taking family or medical leave under [G. L. c. 175M] shall not

affect an employee's previously held right to accrue vacation time, sick leave,

bonuses, advancement, seniority, length-of-service credit or other employment

benefits, plans or programs. Leave

periods under [G. L. c. 175M] need not be treated as credited service for

purposes of benefit accrual, vesting and eligibility to participate."

458 Code Mass.

Regs. § 2.16(1) (2023). Because, in our

view, the regulation is in line with our interpretation of the act, we reject

this argument. See Buckman v.

Commissioner of Correction, 484 Mass. 14 , 24 (2020) ("we look first to the

language of the statute, and where it speaks clearly on the topic in the

regulation, we determine whether the regulation is consistent with or contrary

to the statute's plain language").

The plaintiffs also argue our

interpretation contravenes G. L. c. 175M, § 9 (c), which provides

that, while on leave, "[a]ny negative change in the seniority, status,

employment benefits, pay or other terms or conditions of employment . . . shall

be presumed to be retaliation." We

do not consider the temporary pausing of benefit accrual during leave as a

"negative change" in an employee's benefits. Cf. MacCormack v. Boston Edison Co., 423

Mass. 652, 663 (1996) (retaliation claim rejected where plaintiff failed to

show material "disadvantage[] . . . in respect to salary, grade, or other

objective terms and conditions of employment"); Gu v. Boston Police Dep't,

312 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Material changes include 'demotions,

disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted

negative job evaluations, and toleration of harassment by other

employees'" [citation omitted]).

Finally, we are unpersuaded by the

plaintiffs' claim that our interpretation contravenes G. L. c. 175M, § 8

(h), which requires that the PFMLA be "liberally construed," with

"[a]ll presumptions . . . made in favor of the availability of

leave and the payment of family and medical leave benefits." Our reading of the PFMLA does not prevent

employers from offering the accrual of benefits during leave; we simply

conclude that they are not required to do so under the act.

Conclusion. As the plain language of the G. L.

c. 175M does not require an employer to guarantee the accrual of vacation

and sick time during an employee's PFMLA leave, we affirm the order dismissing

so much of the plaintiff's complaint as alleged violations of the PFMLA, and we

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

footnotes

[1] On behalf of

herself and all others similarly situated.

[2] Joao

Christian Barros, Hanna Chamberland, Katie Lorenco, Cynthia Pham, and Serena

Trodella, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.

[3] Colonel of

the State Police and Executive Director of the State Board of Retirement.

[4] For the

plaintiffs, seniority affected the likelihood that their requests for preferred

work locations, schedules, and vacation time would be granted.

[5] Because the

policy of divesting troopers of their seniority during PFMLA leave has been

discontinued, we consider only whether the act requires employers to offer

accrual of vacation time, sick time, and length-of-service credit while

troopers are on leave.

[6] The judge

posed the following question: "Does

[§ 2 (f)] of the Paid Family and Medical Leave Act, G. L. c. 175M,

§§ 1-11, provide that state employees covered by the Act shall accrue

seniority, length-of-service credit, vacation time and sick time while they are

on family or medical leave?"

[7] The PFMLA

defines the term "employment benefits" as "all benefits . . .

including, but not limited to, group life insurance, health insurance,

disability insurance, sick leave, annual or vacation leave, educational

benefits and pensions." G. L. c.

175M, § 1. Therefore, relevant for

the purpose of this opinion, § 2 (e) covers sick leave, vacation leave,

and length-of-service credit.