School Board of Marion County A/K/A the Marion County School Board, D/B/A Marion County Public Schools v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2023-2963

LT Case No. 2023-SC-002253

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SCHOOL BOARD OF MARION

COUNTY a/k/a THE MARION

COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD

d/b/a MARION COUNTY

PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

COMPANY,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the County Court for Marion County.

LeAnn Patrice Mackey-Barnes, Judge.

Robert H. McLean, of DGHLegal, PLLC, Ocala, for Appellant.

Marcy Levine Aldrich, Joni Armstrong Coffey, and Nancy A.

Copperthwaite, of Akerman LLP, Miami, for Appellee.

November 21, 2024

LAMBERT, J.

The question that we confront in this appeal is whether a

private motor vehicle insurer, in this case the appellee, State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), may sue

a school board under section 627.7405(1), Florida Statutes (2019),

for reimbursement of personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits

that it paid to cover injuries that its insured sustained in a school

bus accident. The answer depends on whether a school board, in

this case, the appellant, Marion County School Board (“School

Board”), is entitled to immunity from being sued, which in turn

depends on whether the Florida Legislature has waived the

sovereign immunity of school boards in this circumstance.

Two of our sister courts have written opinions directly

addressing this issue. In Lee County School Board v. State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance, 276 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019),

the Second District held that chapter 627 of the Florida Statutes

clearly and unequivocally had waived sovereign immunity and

that an insurer’s action seeking reimbursement from the school

board for PIP benefits that it had paid was thus not barred by

sovereign immunity. Id. at 353–54.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal very recently reached the

contrary conclusion. In School Board of Broward County v. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 390 So. 3d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA

2024), the court held that a school board’s sovereign immunity was

not waived in such circumstances because the finding of such a

waiver could only be reached by inference and chapter 627 did not

clearly and unequivocally waive the sovereign immunity of school

boards from PIP reimbursement claims made by private insurers.

Id. at 33–34. The Fourth District explained that such an inference,

however reasonable, cannot form the basis of a sovereign

immunity waiver, id. at 33–34; and it certified conflict with the

Second District’s decision in Lee County School Board.

For the following reasons, we agree with the Fourth District

and hold that sovereign immunity for public school boards from

PIP reimbursement suits has not been clearly and unequivocally

waived by statute. We therefore reverse the final judgment entered

in favor of State Farm.

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I.

The facts in this case are undisputed. State Farm’s insured

was an occupant on a school bus owned by School Board, and she

sustained injuries when the bus was involved in a motor vehicle

accident. The insured submitted a PIP claim under her policy to

State Farm for payment of the reasonable and necessary medical

expenses that she incurred resulting from the accident, and State

Farm paid the sum of $7,062.26 to resolve the PIP claim. It

thereafter filed suit against School Board under section 627.7405

seeking reimbursement of this sum, plus costs.

School Board moved to dismiss the suit with prejudice. It

asserted that, as a governmental agency, it had immunity from the

suit because sovereign immunity had not been clearly and

unequivocally waived by the Florida Legislature for the PIP

reimbursement claim. State Farm disagreed and, relying

primarily upon Lee County School Board, moved for final judgment

in its favor.

When the matter came before the trial court, counsel for the

respective parties commendably conceded that the Second

District’s decision in Lee County School Board was the only

binding precedent at the time and thus dictated the result. See

Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992) (providing that “in

the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all

Florida trial courts” (citing Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682,

684 (Fla. 1985))); see also State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1976) (holding that “[t]he proper hierarchy of decisional

holdings would demand that in the event the only case on point on

a district court level is from a district other than the one in which

the trial court is located, the trial court be required to follow that

decision” but “if the district court of the district in which the trial

court is located has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to

follow it”).

The trial court properly followed this principle and entered

final judgment in favor of State Farm and against School Board in

the sum of $7,062.26, plus costs. The final judgment expressly

acknowledged School Board’s concession that Lee County School

Board was the only binding precedent, but that School Board

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reserved the right to maintain its sovereign immunity defense.

School Board thereafter timely appealed.

II.

We begin our analysis of this appeal with the recognition that

“[s]overeign immunity is a common law principle that provides

that ‘a sovereign cannot be sued without its own permission.’”

Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh. v. Hightower, 306 So. 3d 1193,

1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of Health v. S.A.P.,

835 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 2002)). The authority to grant this

permission comes from article X, section 13 of the Florida

Constitution, which states that “[p]rovision may be made by

general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities

now existing or hereafter originating.” The Florida Legislature is

thus constitutionally empowered to enact statutes waiving the

sovereign immunity of the State and its subdivisions and agencies,

see Irwin v. Signal Safe, Inc., 382 So. 3d 766, 770 (Fla. 3d DCA

2024), such as a county school board. See Buck v. McLean, 115 So.

2d 764, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959) (“County boards of public

instruction are agencies of the State . . . .” (citing Bragg v. Bd. of

Pub. Instruction of Duval Cnty., 36 So. 2d 222, 222 (Fla. 1948))).

Section 627.7405(1), upon which State Farm filed suit for the

subject PIP reimbursement, provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding ss. 627.730-627.7405, an insurer

providing personal injury protection benefits on a private

passenger motor vehicle shall have, to the extent of any

personal injury protection benefits paid to any person as

a benefit arising out of such private passenger motor

vehicle insurance, a right of reimbursement against the

owner or the insurer of the owner of a commercial motor

vehicle, if the benefits paid result from such person

having been an occupant of the commercial motor vehicle

....

§ 627.7405(1), Fla. Stat. (2019).

For purposes of this statute, the term “commercial motor

vehicle” is defined in section 627.732(3)(b), Florida Statutes. It

reads:

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A “commercial motor vehicle,” . . . is any motor vehicle

which is not a private passenger motor vehicle.

The term “motor vehicle” does not include a mobile home

or any motor vehicle which is used in mass transit, other

than public school transportation, and designed to

transport more than five passengers exclusive of the

operator of the motor vehicle and which is owned by a

municipality, a transit authority, or a political

subdivision of the state.

§ 627.732(3)(b), Fla. Stat.

Consistent with its position below, State Farm argues that

the Second District in Lee County School Board correctly

interpreted these two statutes as the Legislature having clearly

and unequivocally waived sovereign immunity for school boards

under the facts of the instant case; accordingly, it requests that we

affirm the final judgment. 1 Conversely, School Board asserts that

the Fourth District’s opinion in School Board of Broward County,

issued while the instant appeal was pending, 2 holding that

sovereign immunity for public school boards in this circumstance

has not been waived is correct; School Board thus asks that we

reverse the final judgment entered against it with directions that

the suit be dismissed.

III.

Whether a legislative enactment waived sovereign

immunity is reviewed de novo. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 390 So.

3d at 29 (citing Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conser. Comm’n v. Hahr, 326

So. 3d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)). However, because

“sovereign immunity is the rule, rather than the exception,” Town

of Gulf Stream v. Palm Beach County, 206 So. 3d 721, 725 (Fla. 4th

1 School Board did not contest the reasonableness of the PIP

benefits paid or that they were related to the subject accident.

2 The parties requested, and were granted, leave to file

supplemental briefs addressing the decision in School Board of

Broward County.

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DCA 2016) (citing Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So.

2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984)), “[a]ny statute ‘purportedly waiving immunity

should be strictly construed.’” Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 390 So.

3d at 29 (quoting Hightower, 306 So. 3d at 1196). The reason such

statutes are strictly construed is to provide “a protection of the

public against profligate encroachments on the public treasury.”

Spangler v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth., 106 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1958).

Preliminarily, we observe that the statutes in question,

sections 627.7405(1) and 627.732(3)(b), did not expressly waive

sovereign immunity. Cf. § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (“In accordance

with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and

for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity

for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.”).

Nevertheless, “no particular magic words are required” for the

legislature to waive sovereign immunity. Klonis v. State, Dep’t of

Rev., 766 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). However, the

Florida Supreme Court long ago explained that any statute

purporting to waive sovereign immunity must be “clear and

unequivocal.” Spangler, 106 So. 2d at 424. Additionally, and

pertinent here, “[w]aiver will not be reached as a product of

inference or implication.” Id.

It was the necessity of having to make the inference that

sovereign immunity was waived by section 627.7405(1), based on

the definition of commercial vehicle in section 627.732(3)(b), that

led the Fourth District to disagree with the Second District’s

opinion in Lee County School Board. Citing to caselaw from the

First District Court of Appeal that held that sovereign immunity

had not been waived when the applicable statutes in those cases 3

did not also name or include the State or its entities within the

definition of the proper party to be sued, the Fourth District viewed

sections 627.7405(1) and 627.732(3)(b) as having the same

infirmity. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 390 So. 3d at 33. The court

reasoned that because chapter 627 did not name the State or a

public school board as a proper party to be sued under section

627.7405(1), the inference would not be based on the text of the

3See Hightower, 306 So. 3d at 1193; State, Dep’t of Elder

Aff. v. Caldwell, 199 So. 3d 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

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statute Id. And while acknowledging that an inference that

section 627.7405(1) did waive sovereign immunity and thus

authorized PIP reimbursement suits against school boards could

be considered reasonable, the Fourth District held that such an

inference could not be the basis of a sovereign immunity waiver.

Id. at 34 (citing Hightower, 306 So. 3d at 1196); see also Spangler,

106 So. 2d at 424).

We agree with this reasoning. 4 In doing so, we also find that

the separation of powers principle, which underpins the doctrine

of sovereign immunity, see Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 471 (Fla. 2005), guides our

decision. Simply stated, it is the function of the Florida Legislature

to waive sovereign immunity in cases or claims such as the one

before us with a clear and unequivocal statutory enactment. The

Legislature has shown itself well qualified to write such a statute

waiving sovereign immunity; and it is prudent for this Court to

refrain from finding such a waiver, absent clear directive from the

Legislature.

Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment in favor of State

Farm and remand with directions that the trial court enter a final

judgment of dismissal in favor of the Marion County School Board.

We also certify conflict with Lee County School Board v. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 276 So. 3d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA

2019).

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions; CONFLICT

CERTIFIED.

EDWARDS, C.J., and JAY, J., concur.

4 The Fourth District provided a second reason for declining

to infer that chapter 627 authorized PIP reimbursement suits

against school boards. We find it unnecessary to, and thus decline

to, adopt the additional reason.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

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