The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHRISTOPHER BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:22-CV-920
)
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, )
Commissioner of Social )
Security, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This case is before the court on the Plaintiff Christopher
Brown’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), and expenses
filed on June 27, 2024. (Doc. 20.) The Commissioner challenges
both Brown’s right to a reasonable fee and the amount requested.
(Doc. 22.) Brown replied in opposition. (Doc. 24.) For the
reasons set forth below, the court determines that Brown should be
awarded an attorney’s fee under the EAJA in the amount of
$14,489.59.
I. BACKGROUND
Brown applied for disability insurance benefits on January
14, 2021. (Tr. at 27.)1 His claim was denied by the North Carolina
state agency. (Tr. at 59-84.) An administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
held a telephonic hearing on March 9, 2022 (Tr. at 43-58) and later
that month issued a written decision unfavorable to Brown (Tr. at
27-38). The Appeals Council denied Brown’s request for review.
(Tr. at 1-7.) Brown then filed this action, and on November 14,
2023, the magistrate judge issued a recommended ruling in favor of
the Commissioner. (Doc. 15.) On March 29, 2024, this court
sustained Brown’s objections to the recommendation and ordered
that the Commissioner’s decision finding no disability be reversed
and remanded for further proceedings. (Doc. 18.) Brown now moves
for attorney’s fees in the amount of $19,376.47 for 79.30 attorney
hours pursuant to § 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA. (Doc. 20.)
II. ANALYSIS
A. Whether Government Was Substantially Justified
The Commissioner argues that Brown is not entitled to
attorney’s fees because the Government’s position was
substantially justified.2 (Doc. 22 at 7-9.) He primarily relies
on the recommendation from the magistrate judge to affirm the
1 Transcript references are to the sealed administrative record at docket
entry 8.
2 The Commissioner states in the introduction of his brief that he “does
not dispute that an EAJA award is appropriate” and only requests a
reduction in the award. (Doc. 22 at 1.) However, he goes on to argue
that Brown is not entitled to a fee award both in the body of the brief
(see id. at 7-9) and in the conclusion (id. at 15).
Commissioner’s decision as evidence that reasonable minds can
differ on the issues presented in this case, citing to the similar
reasoning in Hodge v. Berryhill, No. 5:15-CV-248, 2017 WL 758494,
at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 27, 2017). (Id. at 9.)
Brown distinguishes this case from Hodge and argues that the
Government’s position was not substantially justified. He asserts
that “the ALJ failed to discuss relevant evidence, imposed a
requirement [that Plaintiff be hospitalized or institutionalized
as a result of his illness] not in the regulations, did not explain
why he . . . discounted or did not discuss certain relevant
evidence in the treatment notes, failed to consider the extent
[Plaintiff] could perform daily activities, and failed to explain
why he found treating medical opinions unpersuasive.” (Doc. 24 at
4-5.)
Parties who prevail in litigation against the United States
are entitled under the EAJA to a reasonable attorney’s fee unless
the United States was substantially justified in its litigation
position. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The court must award
attorney’s fees if (1) the claimant is the prevailing party; (2)
the Government’s position was not substantially justified; (3) no
special circumstances make an award unjust; and (4) the fee
application was submitted to the court within thirty days of final
judgment and was supported by an itemized statement. See Crawford
v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 656 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Government’s position was substantially justified if “a
reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a
reasonable basis in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552, 566 n.2 (1988). “[T]he Government need not prevail in an
action for its position to have been substantially justified.
Rather, the Government will avoid paying fees as long as ‘a
reasonable person could [have thought]’ that its litigation
position was ‘correct.’” Meyer v. Colvin, 754 F.3d 251, 255 (4th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 n.2). The court looks
to the totality of the circumstances, rather than proceeding issue-
by-issue, when assessing the reasonableness of the Government’s
position. Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139
(4th Cir. 1993). The Government bears the burden of proving that
its position was substantially justified. Meyer, 754 F.3d at 255
(citing Crawford, 935 F.2d at 658).
While a magistrate judge’s recommendation agreeing with the
Government provides support for the argument that the Government’s
position was substantially justified, it is not dispositive.
Holcomb v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 8:13-CV-02066, 2016
WL 6068022, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2016); Groves v. Colvin,
No. 3:14-CV-00044, 2015 WL 4093894, at *4 (W.D.N.C. July 7, 2015).
Here, the court held that the ALJ’s decision was “not susceptible
to meaningful judicial review” (Doc. 18 at 14), because he did not
explain his reasoning, omitting a “logical bridge” between the
evidence and his conclusions (id. at 17-18, 23). Specifically,
the ALJ did not sufficiently explain his reasoning with respect to
his assessment of the medical evidence, Brown’s durational
capacity to work, and NP Ganzman’s medical opinions. (Id. at 17-
18, 20-21, 23.) The court also concluded that he had failed to
consider all relevant medical evidence. (Id. at 17.) The
requirements that an ALJ must explain his or her reasoning and
consider all relevant medical evidence are matters of well-settled
Social Security law, and as such, the Government’s position that
the ALJ’s analysis was sufficient was not substantially justified.
See Tallent v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-02066, 2019 WL
2513516, at *1 (D.S.C. June 18, 2019); Trappier v. Astrue,
No. 3:11-2494, 2013 WL 706800, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2013);
see also Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868-69 (4th Cir. 2017);
Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Mascio
v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, the
court will grant Brown’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to
the EAJA.
B. Reasonable Fee Award
In determining what is a reasonable fee, the court considers
the number of hours at a reasonable rate, supported by the evidence
of hours worked and rates claimed, with the burden resting on the
plaintiff. Hyatt v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 239, 248, 253 (4th Cir.
2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The court may also consider (1) the
novelty and complexity of the issues presented, (2) the experience
and skill of the attorney, and (3) the typical range of compensated
hours in a particular field. Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs.,
LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2009).
The Commissioner does not object to Plaintiff counsel’s
requested rate of compensation (approximately $244 an hour) but
does object to the 79.3 attorney hours for which he seeks to
recover. The Commissioner requests a sixty percent reduction of
the total fee, from $19,376.47 to $7,750.59, arguing that the hours
are excessive considering the level of experience of Brown’s
attorneys and the nature of his case. (See Doc. 22 at 15-16.)
The Commissioner also argues that Brown’s medical record index
included as an attachment to his initial brief was unnecessary and
did not include any formal legal analysis, rendering time spent
preparing it not compensable. (Id. at 10-13.) Finally, he
contends that the average Social Security case is reasonably
expected to involve twenty to forty hours of work, which is far
below the nearly eighty hours of work recorded by Brown’s counsel.
(Id. at 14-15.) Given that Brown’s attorneys have extensive
experience with Social Security cases and the issues in his case
were neither “complex [n]or novel,” the Commissioner argues,
Brown’s case should not have required twice the typical number of
reasonable hours. (Id.)
Brown responds that the attorney fees requested are
reasonable on several grounds. He argues that the issues in his
case were fact-specific and required a time-intensive review of
the administrative record. (Doc. 24 at 6.) He also points out
that the Commissioner’s brief was not supported by affidavits from
Social Security practitioners (id. at 6-7, 10, 13) and contends
that courts have found requests involving a similar number of hours
reasonable in other Social Security cases (id. at 11-12.)
The attorney’s fees requested in this case appear excessive
considering the experience of Brown’s attorneys and the nature of
the issues. Brown’s counsel spent 39.2 total hours on the initial
brief, 12.2 hours on the reply brief, and 24.9 hours on his
objections to the magistrate judge’s recommended ruling. (Doc.
21-2 at 1-3.) The briefs and objections focused on the same
arguments and many of the same facts, as might be expected. Given
the experience level of Brown’s attorneys, the court finds that
the total time spent preparing these documents is slightly
excessive and will reduce the attorney hours requested by ten hours
to account for the expected efficiency that comes from having
experienced counsel, especially when preparing three similar
documents.
The court also agrees with the Commissioner that Brown is not
entitled to recover attorney’s fees for the time spent creating
the medical index, which did not include legal analysis and was
unnecessary to the case. See, e.g., Lewis v. Kijakazi, No. 7:21-
CV-69, 2022 WL 2128558, at *2 (E.D.N.C. May 26, 2022); Mullis v.
Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-00083, 2021 WL 4391879, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C.
Sept. 24, 2021). The Commissioner requests that Brown’s recorded
number of hours be reduced by ten to account for the time spent on
the medical index. (Doc. 22 at 13.) Brown neither responded to
this argument in his reply brief nor specified for the court how
much time was spent on the index. Moreover, if the time spent
creating the index was recorded as time spent “analyzing medical
evidence,” (Doc. 21-2 at 1-2), the court finds that the twenty-
one hours spent analyzing Brown’s medical evidence for the initial
brief are excessive and that an award for eleven hours is more
reasonable. The court, therefore, agrees with the Commissioner
that a reduction of ten hours is appropriate to account for the
time spent on the medical index.
After carefully reviewing all filings, the court finds that
a reduction of twenty hours, which is a reduction of about twenty-
five percent, is appropriate in this case and will award Brown
attorney’s fees in the amount of $14,489.59 for 59.3 attorney
hours. The Commissioner does not challenge Brown’s request for
reimbursement of expenses of $24.18 for serving process.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth,
IT IS ORDERED that Brown’s motion for attorney’s fees and
expenses is GRANTED to the extent that the court awards attorney’s
fees in the amount of $14,489.59. Pursuant to Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. --, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010), the award will
first be subject to offset of any debt Plaintiff may owe to the
United States. The Commissioner will determine whether Plaintiff
owes a debt to the United States. If so, the debt will be satisfied
first, and if any funds remain, they will be made payable to Brown
and mailed to his counsel. If the United States Department of the
Treasury reports to the Commissioner that Brown does not owe a
federal debt, the Government will exercise its discretion and honor
an assignment of EAJA fees and pay the awarded fees directly to
Brown’s counsel. No additional petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d) shall be filed. Brown is also awarded $24.18 in expenses
for service of process by certified mail from the Judgment Fund by
the United States Department of the Treasury pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(a)(1). The motion is otherwise DENIED.
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
November 20, 2024