The opinion
J-A23004-24
2024 PA Super 280
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RYAN CASTANEIRA :
:
Appellant : No. 299 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered January 31, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-MD-0001477-2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 20, 2024
Ryan Castaneira appeals from the order entered on January 31, 2024,
denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the background of this matter thusly:
On October 2, 2009, [A]ppellant was convicted of attempted
child molestation in Georgia. [He] was sentenced to ten years of
incarceration followed by twenty years of probation. [A]ppellant
was paroled in 2014. Upon release, [A]ppellant’s parole was
transferred to Pennsylvania via the Interstate Compact for Adult
Offender Supervision [(“ICAOS”)]. [A]ppellant’s parole ended on
September 28, 2019, and his twenty years’ probation period
began. On August 25, 2022, [he] received a citation for
harassment. [Four days later, A]ppellant received a notice of two
probation violations and was told that he could not have contact
with his wife and was to seek a new temporary residence[,] as he
was no longer permitted to reside with his wife. [A]ppellant was
placed on electronic monitoring.
On September 29, 2022, [A]ppellant signed a document
[presented by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
(“PBPP”)] titled, “Optional Special Conditions for Sex Offenders.”
The conditions include[d] the general sex offender conditions.
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On October 6, 2022, [A]ppellant filed a writ of habeas
corpus arguing that the new condition prohibiting him from having
contact and living with his spouse is not germane to the conditions
set by the trial court in Georgia. The petition further [asserted]
that the [PBPP] lacked the authority to impose the special sex
offender conditions because they were not imposed by the
sentencing court in Georgia. On October 12, 2022, th[e c]ourt
denied said petition. . . . Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the writ of habeas corpus. On
November 14, 2022, th[e c]ourt granted reconsideration and set
the matter for a hearing . . . . Appellant filed a notice of appeal
on [the same day, after the court] granted reconsideration and
scheduled a hearing.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/24, at 1-2 (cleaned up).
The trial court issued a statement requesting that this Court remand the
matter so that it could hold a reconsideration hearing. On review, we quashed
the appeal as premature pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1701 because the trial court
timely granted reconsideration before the appeal was filed. See In re
Castaneira, 305 A.3d 990, 2023 WL 5995521, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2023) (non-
precedential decision). Thereafter, the court conducted a hearing and
ultimately denied the petition for habeas corpus relief.
Appellant timely appealed and complied with the court’s order to file a
statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court further
entered a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion. Appellant presents the following
questions for our review:
I. Did the court err when it denied Appellant’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus[?]
a. Does the [PBPP] have the authority to impose additional
conditions of probation that were not ordered by the trial
court?
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b. Does the imposition of additional conditions of probation
that were not ordered by the trial court amount to an
illegal sentence?
c. Did Appellant waive his right to challenge conditions of
probation when he signed the application to have his
supervision transferred from Georgia to Pennsylvania
pursuant to the [ICAOS?]
Appellant’s brief at 4 (cleaned up).
We note that “an appellate court will review a grant or denial of a petition
for writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion, but for questions of law, our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717, 732 (Pa. 2020) (citation
omitted). Further, “[i]n reviewing a trial court’s order . . . denying a
defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, we must generally consider
whether the record supports the trial court’s findings, and whether the
inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings are free from
error.” Commonwealth v. Price, 189 A.3d 423, 427 (Pa.Super. 2018)
(cleaned up).
As discussed above, Appellant’s supervision was transferred from
Georgia to Pennsylvania, and therefore his claims are all to some extent
intertwined with the ICAOS and our interpretation thereof. Our High Court
has noted that,
[i]n matters involving statutory interpretation, the Statutory
Construction Act directs courts to ascertain and effectuate the
intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). A statute’s
plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative
intent. In construing the language, however, and giving it effect,
we should not interpret statutory words in isolation, but must read
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them with reference to the context in which they appear. Accord
Commonwealth v. Office of Open Records, 628 Pa. 163, 103
A.3d 1276, 1285 (2014) (statutory language must be read in
context; in ascertaining legislative intent, every portion is to be
read together with remaining language and construed with
reference to statute as a whole).
Commonwealth v. Guilian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1267 (Pa. 2016) (some internal
citations omitted).
Although our task begins with the text of the ICAOS, we observe that
there has been minimal prior interpretation of the statute by Pennsylvania
courts. Within the background provision of the compact, the General
Assembly elucidated the following:
It is the purpose of this compact and the Interstate Commission
created hereunder, through means of joint and cooperative action
among the compacting states: to provide the framework for the
promotion of public safety and protect the rights of victims
through the control and regulation of the interstate movement of
offenders in the community; to provide for the effective tracking,
supervision, and rehabilitation of these offenders by the sending
and receiving states; and to equitably distribute the costs,
benefits and obligations of the compact among the compacting
states.
61 Pa.C.S. § 7112 at Article I. The ICAOS further allows for the Interstate
Commission to promulgate rules “in order to effectively and efficiently achieve
the purposes of the compact[.]” Id.
Pertinent here, ICAOS Rule 4.101 addresses the manner and degree of
supervision in the receiving state, which in this case is Pennsylvania: “A
receiving state shall supervise offenders consistent with the supervision of
other similar offenders sentenced in the receiving state, including the use of
incentives, corrective actions, graduated responses, and other supervision
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techniques.” ICAOS Rule 4.101. Further, Rule 4.103 concerns conditions of
supervision and provides that “[a]t the time of acceptance or during the term
of supervision, the receiving state may impose a condition on an offender if
that condition would have been imposed on an offender sentenced in the
receiving state.” ICAOS Rule 4.103(a).
Also dispositive to our resolution of Appellant’s claims is the distinction
between conditions of probation and those of supervision. Probation
conditions are imposed by sentencing courts and are authorized by 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9745, which states that “[t]he court shall attach reasonable conditions
authorized by [§] 9763.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9745(b). Section 9763 in turn lists
fourteen different conditions the court may impose, including a catchall
relating to “other things reasonably related to rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9763(b)(15).
On the other hand, conditions of supervision are governed by the Prisons
and Parole Code, which directs the “[PBPP] and its agents to establish uniform
standards for the supervision of probationers under its authority, and further
to implement those standards and conditions.” Commonwealth v. Elliott,
50 A.3d 1284, 1291 (Pa. 2012) (citing 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 6131(a)(5)(ii) and 6151).
Our High Court has clarified that “the [PBPP] and its agents may impose
conditions of supervision that are germane to, elaborate on, or interpret any
conditions of probation that are imposed by the trial court.” Id. at 1292.
Phrased another way, the board “may impose more specific conditions
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of supervision pertaining to that probation, so long as those supervision
conditions are in furtherance of the trial court’s conditions of probation.” Id.
With this background in mind, we return to the first two questions
presented on appeal. Appellant argues that his sentence is illegal because the
PBPP lacked the authority to compel him to agree to special conditions, as
they were unrelated to any probationary conditions imposed by the Georgia
sentencing court. See Appellant’s brief at 8-9. He highlights that when he
was initially sentenced, the only express condition was to register as a sex
offender. Id. at 10. Appellant maintains that the new special conditions
imposed by the PBPP, which, inter alia, restrict his ability to be around minors
without prior approval, are not “germane to, elaborate on, nor [do they]
interpret” his registration requirement. Id. at 10. He therefore concludes
that the PBPP is usurping the power of the Georgia sentencing court, which
elected not to impose the supervisory conditions in question. Id. at 11.
Appellant further contends that his claims are supported by the ICAOS
rules. Specifically, he asserts that by its title, Rule 4.101 makes it clear that
it concerns and governs conditions of supervision, not probation. Id. at
12. Additionally, he interprets Rule 4.101 in conjunction with Rule 4.103,
which allows a receiving state to impose new “conditions,” to mean that any
newly imposed supervisory requirement must relate to his duty to register,
since that is all the Georgia court mandated at sentencing. Id. at 12-13.
Appellant also urges us to adopt the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Goe v. Commissioner of Probation, 46 N.E.3d 997 (Mass.
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2016), that Rule 4.103 only allows imposition of new conditions if they are
mandated by law. See Appellant’s brief at 13-15. In that case, the Goe Court
considered whether the Massachusetts Department of Probation was
permitted to impose global positioning system monitoring, as a mandatory
condition of probation pursuant to the ICAOS, upon a transferred probationer
from Connecticut. After reviewing the language of the relevant rules and the
bench book promulgated by the Interstate Commission, the Goe Court
concluded somewhat summarily that a receiving state could only impose a
condition when it would “necessarily have been imposed” had sentencing
occurred within the receiving state. See Goe, 46 N.E.3d at 1006. Appellant
argues that we should follow suit.
In denying Appellant’s habeas corpus petition, the trial court held that
Appellant waived his challenge by signing the PBPP special conditions form or,
alternatively, that the restrictions were permissible pursuant to the ICAOS.
As to the latter, it found that if “[A]ppellant has not waived his right to
challenge the special conditions, the compact administrator[1] is authorized to
impose these special conditions because they are the same conditions that
____________________________________________
1 The compact administrator is the person “responsible for the administration
and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of offenders subject
to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the Interstate Commission
and policies adopted by the State Council under this compact.” 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 7112. Presumably, the trial court discussed the compact administrator
because that role is referenced in a prior version of ICAOS Rule 4.103, which
specifically listed that person as having the authority to impose special
conditions. However, that version of the rule was amended effective June 1,
2017, approximately five years before Appellant signed the PBPP form herein,
to remove any reference to the compact administrator.
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would have been imposed had [A]ppellant been sentenced in Pennsylvania.”
Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/24, at 4-5.
For its part, the Commonwealth likewise argues that the ICAOS allows
the restrictions ultimately placed upon Appellant. It cites 61 Pa.C.S. § 7122,
which is entitled “Supervision of persons paroled by other states” and is
included with the administrative provisions relating to the ICAOS, for support
that the PBPP is permitted to impose supervisory conditions. See
Commonwealth’s brief at 7. That section declares that other states must
comply with Pennsylvania’s laws with respect to transferred supervision under
the ICAOS, including that “[e]lectronic monitoring or other special
conditions, or both, of supervision shall be imposed as deemed necessary by
the receiving state.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 7122(d)(5) (emphasis added). The
Commonwealth interprets this provision as the General Assembly intending to
give the PBPP the authority to impose special conditions as a receiving state.
The Commonwealth also contends that a plain reading of ICAOS Rule
4.103 supports its position, as it permits imposition of special conditions that
would have been imposed upon the offender had he been sentenced in the
receiving state. See Commonwealth’s brief at 7-8. It remarks that “[t]he
conditions that are challenged are used all the time in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, consistent with probationary sentences for sex offenders that
are imposed by trial courts all over the state.” Id. at 10.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Initially, the plain language of
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Rule 4.103 indicates that Pennsylvania, as the receiving state, is permitted to
place the same conditions upon Appellant as it would upon Pennsylvania
probationers. See ICAOS Rule 4.103 (stating that a receiving state “may
impose a condition on an offender if that condition would have been imposed
on an offender sentenced in the receiving state”). We disagree with the
holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goe, which does
not bind us, that a condition must be statutorily mandated in order for Rule
4.103 to apply. The text of the rule expressly addresses conditions that
“would have been imposed,” and does not dictate that they “must” or
“necessarily would” have been imposed. As both the trial court and the
Commonwealth have noted, the conditions imposed upon Appellant herein,
although optional, are routine requirements for sexual offenders sentenced
within this Commonwealth. See, e.g., N.T. Hearing, 1/22/24, at 5 (The
Commonwealth arguing that these conditions would have been imposed upon
Appellant had he been sentenced in Pennsylvania). Therefore, there can be
no dispute that pursuant to the clear language of the ICAOS, Pennsylvania
was not limited to only the conditions imposed by the sentencing court in
Georgia.
We are likewise not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
sentence is illegal, or the conditions otherwise impermissible, simply because
he signed an agreement with the PBPP instead of being resentenced by a court
in Pennsylvania. As our Supreme Court has articulated, the responsibility of
the PBPP is to instill “uniform standards for the supervision of probationers
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under its authority, and further to implement those standards and conditions.”
Elliott, 50 A.3d at 1292. When Appellant signed the “Optional Special
Conditions for Sex Offenders,” he agreed to the requirements that are
consistently and routinely imposed upon similarly-situated offenders who were
sentenced to probation in this Commonwealth. In the same way that the PBPP
may impose these special conditions on Pennsylvania-sentenced probationers,
it could do the same to Appellant as part of his acceptance to being transferred
here.
Our position is also supported by advisory opinions promulgated by the
Interstate Commission, which as noted was created through enactment of the
ICAOS. For example, the commission wrote as follows when discussing Rule
4.103:
In seeking to have supervision transferred to another state,
the offender accepts that a sending state can retake, that no
formal extradition proceeds are required, and that he or she is
subject to the same type of supervision as other offenders in the
receiving state. The receiving state can even add additional
requirements on an offender as a condition of transfer. In short,
a probationer or parolee is subject to whatever reasonable
conditions the sentencing court or corrections authority
deems necessary to promote both community safety and
offender rehabilitation. The offender accepts probation or
parole on a conditional basis – fulfilling the requirements imposed
upon him or her.
Advisory Opinion 2-2005, Interstate Commission for Adult Offender
Supervision, 4/3/05 (internal citations omitted, emphases added). In the
same vein, when discussing Rule 4.101, the commission declared as follows:
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Moreover, Rule 4.101 plainly requires the receiving state to
supervise an offender transferred in a manner “consistent
with the supervision of other similar offenders sentenced
in the receiving state.” Clearly, this portion of the rule does
not permit a receiving state to impose the establishment of sex
offender risk level or community notification on offenders
transferred under the compact if it does not impose these
same requirements on offenders sentenced in the receiving
state.
Advisory Opinion 5-2006, Interstate Commission for Adult Offender
Supervision, 4/4/06 (emphases added). In other words, the rules do allow
sex offender prohibitions to be placed on transferees to the extent they are
initially imposed upon those sentenced in Pennsylvania.
Finally, we note that provisions within the bench book issued by the
Interstate Commission undermine Appellant’s arguments and bolster our
holding. See ICAOS Bench Book, § 3.6.1 (“In seeking to transfer, an offender
accepts any conditions imposed by the receiving state; that is, by applying for
transfer and with acceptance by a receiving state, the offender accepts the
condition or risks forfeiting the ability to transfer supervision.”); see also
ICAOS Bench Book, § 3.6.2 (“If a statute governs authorization of a condition
and/or does not violate any constitutional protections, habeas corpus relief is
unavailable to an offender contesting the condition[.]”).
For the above reasons, we concur with the trial court that the conditions
agreed to by Appellant did not render his sentence illegal. Accordingly, we
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have no cause to disturb the court’s order denying Appellant’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus.2
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/2024
____________________________________________
2 Appellant’s final question on appeal concerns whether he waived the right to
challenge the conditions when he signed the PBPP form. Since this was simply
an alternative basis for the trial court’s denial of the petition, we need not
address it here.
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