Call v. Melvin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

NICHOLAS A. CALL, :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:23-cv-33

:

v. : Judge Thomas M. Rose

:

MATTHEW R. MELVIN, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

:

______________________________________________________________________________

ENTRY AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 29)

______________________________________________________________________________

Currently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”)

(Doc. No. 29), submitted by Defendants Matthew Melvin, in his official capacity as Sheriff for

Champaign County, Ohio (“Sheriff Melvin”), and Champaign County Sheriff’s Deputy Josh

Thomas, in both his personal and official capacity (“Deputy Thomas”) (collectively,

“Defendants”). Plaintiff Nicholas Call (“Call”) brought the instant Complaint (Doc. No. 1)

alleging that, by way of his interaction with Deputy Thomas on August 17, 2022, Defendants are

liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state law for depriving Call of his constitutional

rights. Under federal law, Call has alleged claims against Defendants for excessive force,

malicious prosecution, and municipal liability. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 11.) Under Ohio law, Call

has alleged Deputy Thomas’ liability for malicious prosecution and false arrest. (Id. at PageID

11-12.) Defendants argue that Deputy Thomas is entitled to federal qualified immunity as well as

statutory immunity, and, therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all of Call’s

claims. (Doc. No. 29 at PageID 619-20.) In response, Call only argues for the survival of a federal

false arrest claim not pled in the Complaint and his claim for malicious prosecution under federal

law. (See Doc. No. 34.) Call does not address Defendants’ attack on his federal claims for

excessive force and municipal liability, or his state law claims for false arrest and malicious

prosecution.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 29).

I. BACKGROUND1

The events of this case began with an emergency call made to Champaign Countywide

Communication Center (“Dispatch”) in the early morning hours of August 17, 2022, regarding

Call’s fifteen-year-old son, J.C.2 (See Doc. No. 27-2.) At the time, J.C. was living with his father,

Call, in Champaign County, Ohio. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 119-20.) A little after midnight on

August 17, 2022, J.C. told his friend, during a phone conversation, that he intended to use a knife

to commit some form of self-harm. (Doc. No. 27-2 at PageID 467.) The friend promptly called

Dispatch to report J.C.’s threats and request that authorities go to J.C.’s home to ensure his safety.

(Id.) Over the course of about 12-15 minutes, J.C.’s friend continued to update Dispatch. (Id. at

PageID 467-68.) Notably, as the situation developed, the friend stressed urgency, advising

Dispatch that there were guns in the home, that J.C. would not submit to authorities without a fight,

and that J.C. was imminently about to commit self-harm. (Id. at PageID 468.) Dispatch relayed

this information to the Champaign County Sheriff’s Department in real time. (Id. at PageID 465,

467-68.)

1 The Court refers directly to the Defendants’ exhibits by name where such exhibits have been manually filed. On

September 19, 2024, the Office of the Clerk of Court noticed its receipt of Defendants’ manually filed exhibits on

CM/ECF.

2 J.C. has since reached the age of majority. The Court continues to refer to J.C. by his initials in this Order in light

of his minority status when the events at issue occurred.

On the night in question, there were just two Champaign County Sheriff’s Deputies on

duty: Deputy Thomas and Deputy Brandon Fenwick (“Deputy Fenwick”) (collectively,

“Deputies”). (Doc. No. 19 at PageID 278.) There was no department supervisor on duty. (Id.)

Both Deputies responded to Dispatch’s call regarding J.C., initially following non-emergency

procedures. (Doc. No. 21 at PageID 344.) As Dispatch informed the Deputies that J.C. was

escalating his threats of self-harm, the Deputies adapted to an emergency response, using police

lights and sirens. (Id.)

Deputy Thomas was the first of the two Deputies to reach Call’s home, at around 12:37

AM. (Id. at PageID 346; see also Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 0:00.) When Deputy Thomas arrived, he

stepped onto Call’s small wooden porch, which connected to the front door of the home. (Defs.

Ex. A, Video, 0:00-0:04.) Deputy Thomas knocked on the front door twice, announcing himself

as law enforcement each time. (Id. at 0:10-0:42.) Call, who was in bed when Deputy Thomas

arrived, was not immediately woken by Deputy Thomas’ knocks or announcements. (Doc. No. 17

at PageID 129.) Instead, Call was alerted to the presence of someone at his door by his dogs. (Id.)

About one minute after Deputy Thomas had gotten to Call’s house, Call came from his bedroom,

checked his security cameras to see a sheriff’s deputy on his doorstep, and went to the front door

to greet Deputy Thomas. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 127-28; Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 0:52-0:58.)

Call cracked open his door enough for his thin frame to fit in the threshold. (Doc. No. 17

at PageID 129; Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 0:58-1:01.) As Call opened the front door, J.C. emerged

from his bedroom, just behind Call where he stood in the doorway. (Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 0:58-

1:01.) Deputy Thomas testified that, while its possible he saw someone appearing behind Call, he

could not determine the individual was J.C. (Doc. No. 19 at PageID 301.) Deputy Thomas

identified himself to Call and asked if J.C. was home. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 130.)

When Call told Deputy Thomas that J.C. was there, Deputy Thomas said that he needed to

speak with the boy and attempted to enter Call’s home. (Id.) It is disputed whether Deputy Thomas

told Call why he needed to speak with J.C. or whether Deputy Thomas asked to be let in. (Compare

Doc. Nos. 17 at PageID 130; 19 at PageID 279, 300.) For his part, Call assumed that J.C. had done

something wrong and Deputy Thomas was there to arrest him. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 132-33.)

Nevertheless, it is clear that Deputy Thomas attempted to enter Call’s home after introducing

himself. (Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 1:08-1:15.)

As Deputy Thomas stepped forward, Call blocked his access. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID

131.) Deputy Thomas proceeded to shove Call, causing Call to stumble backward half a step.

(Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 1:17-1:20.) Attempting to diffuse the confrontation, J.C. identified himself

and agreed to come outside to speak with Deputy Thomas on the porch. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID

132.) J.C. began toward the door, but Call put his arm up against the door frame to block J.C.’s

exit. (Id. at PageID 167.) Call advised J.C. that he did not have to speak to Deputy Thomas by

himself. (Id.) Deputy Thomas then gave Call another light shove and Call took his hand off the

door frame to let J.C. out onto the porch. (Doc. No. 19 at PageID 280; Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 1:36-

1:40.) Deputy Thomas patted down J.C. for weapons and checked to make sure J.C. was not

injured. (Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 1:48-2:00.) Call, wearing just his underwear at the time, ran back

to his bedroom to get dressed so he could join J.C. and Deputy Thomas outside. (Doc. No. 17 at

PageID 169; Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 1:50-1:55.)

Call did not return to the porch for about another thirty-to-forty seconds. (Defs. Ex. A,

Video, at 1:50-2:25.) In the meantime, Deputy Thomas spoke with J.C. (Id. at 2:00-2:20.) Deputy

Fenwick had also arrived and was standing at the bottom of Call’s porch steps. (Id. at 2:00-2:25.)

When Call did return, he was aggravated—with Deputy Thomas specifically—about how

he felt he was treated in the doorway. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 136-37.) Call started loudly

demanding the Deputies’ supervisor and, with the limited porch space available to him, pointed

his index finger at Deputy Thomas. (Doc. No. 21 at PageID 347; Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 2:34-

2:38.) Deputy Thomas was now focused on trying to explain to Call that he was called to ensure

J.C.’s well-being. (Doc. No. 19 at PageID 284.) However, Call admittedly tuned out everything

Deputy Thomas had to say, as he continued to swear at the Deputies and demand a supervisor.

(Doc. No. 17 at PageID 170.) Deputy Fenwick instructed Call to join him at the bottom of the

porch steps so they could talk in the yard while Deputy Thomas spoke with J.C. (Doc. No. 21 at

PageID 347.) As Call turned toward the porch steps to comply, he complained about Deputy

Thomas to Deputy Fenwick. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 139.) Before Call could take a full step,

Deputy Thomas placed Call under arrest, securing him in handcuffs and leading him to the

backseat of Deputy Thomas’ police cruiser. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 141; Defs. Ex. A, Video, at

2:40-3:25.)

The Deputies’ left Call’s home after J.C. agreed to go to the hospital for emergency mental

health services. (Doc. No. 28-2 at PageID 487.) At that time, the Deputies transferred Call to

Deputy Fenwick’s police cruiser. (Id.) Deputy Fenwick transported Call to Tri County Jail and

booked him on a charge for obstructing official business. (Id.) Call was in jail for approximately

four or five hours before being released on bond. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 155.) The same day,

Deputy Thomas filled out a formal criminal complaint and completed a written statement, which

were presented to the Champaign County Municipal Court in support of a misdemeanor charge

against Call for obstruction of official business, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.31(A).

(Doc. Nos. 19 at PageID 312; 28-3 at PageID 488-89.) Call was arraigned in Champaign County

Municipal Court shortly after the incident. (Doc. No. 17 at PageID 157.) Local prosecutors later

dropped the obstruction charge against Call on October 25, 2022. (Id.)

Call brought the instant Complaint several months later, on January 30, 2023. (Doc. No.

1.) In his Complaint, Call has lodged three counts, but alleged five causes of action. (See id. at

11-12.) In his first count, Call has stacked allegations.3 (Id. at PageID 11.) Specifically, in his

first count, Call has alleged malicious prosecution and excessive force against Deputy Thomas

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and he has alleged municipal liability pursuant to § 1983 against the

Champaign County Sheriff’s Office for maintaining an unconstitutional policy or custom. (Id.)

In his second count, Call has alleged malicious prosecution, in violation of Ohio law, against

Deputy Thomas. (Id. at PageID 12.) Finally, in his third count, Call has alleged that Deputy

Thomas subjected him to false arrest, in violation of Ohio law. (Id.)

Defendants filed their current Motion on September 25, 2024. (Doc. No. 29.) Call filed

his response in opposition to the Motion on October 16, 2024 (Doc. No. 34), and Defendants

submitted their reply brief on October 30, 2024 (Doc. No. 36). Defendants’ Motion is now ripe

for review and decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] party may move for

summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on

which summary judgment is sought” and that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment has

3 The Court notes that Call alleging multiple causes of action within a single count likely violates the requirement of

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 that claims be pled in short and plain statements. Notwithstanding, Defendants have not moved for

Call to file a more definite statement, and, at any rate, the Court ultimately finds Defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Call’s claims as they are pled. Therefore, the Court will disregard Call’s stacking of allegations for

purposes of the present Motion.

the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions

of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits or sworn declarations, and

admissions on file, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c).

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, which “must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256

(1986). In opposing summary judgment, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings or

merely reassert its previous allegations. Id. at 248-49. It also is not sufficient to “simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party must “go beyond the

[unverified] pleadings” and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position.

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

A party’s failure “to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule

56(c)” can result in the court “consider[ing] the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e). Additionally, “[a] district court is not ... obligated to wade through and search

the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.”

InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). “The court need consider only

the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not the judge’s function to make

credibility determinations, “weigh the evidence[,] and determine the truth of the matter, but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 255. In

determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must assume as true the

evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Id. at

255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014). However, the “mere

existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the” nonmoving party is not sufficient to avoid

summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “There must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Id. The inquiry, therefore, “asks whether reasonable

jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the” nonmoving party is entitled to a

verdict. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Preliminary Matters

As an initial matter, the Court must discuss two faults with Call’s arguments against

summary judgment. First, Call argues that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on

his claim for false arrest pursuant to federal law. Yet, Call has not pled a federal false arrest claim.

In their entirety, Call’s federal claims targeted at Deputy Thomas’ actions allege:

By securing Mr. Call’s prosecution without probable cause, consciously or

recklessly disregarding the elements of his charge, which prosecution ultimately

terminated in his favor after he was deprived of liberty, and shoving him when any

amount of force would have been excessive, Defendant Thomas committed

malicious prosecution and excessive use of force in violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment incorporated

therein.

(Doc. No. 1 at PageID 11 (emphasis added).) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a

party pleading a claim state his claim in “a short and plain statement ... showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The fundamental purpose of pleadings under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give adequate notice to the parties of each side’s claims ….”

Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d

635, 637-38 (6th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Call’s allegations invoking

federal law can only be read to put Defendants on notice of a malicious prosecution claim and a

claim for excessive force. The allegations cannot be read to provide notice of a false arrest claim

pursuant to federal law. To be sure, Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Call’s claims

and, even still, Defendants have not argued for summary judgment on a federal false arrest claim

in their Motion. Accordingly, because Call has failed to even allege a claim for false arrest under

federal law, the Court will disregard his arguments in favor of such a claim here.

Secondly, it seems that Call has abandoned the vast majority of his remaining claims

against Defendants. Generally, “a plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff

fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc.,

545 F. App’x. 367, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Regarding the instant Motion, Call has

only argued for the survival of his federal claim for malicious prosecution and an unpled federal

claim for false arrest. (See Doc. No. 34 at PageID 675-86.) He says nothing of his claims for:

excessive force, pursuant to federal law; municipal liability for pursuing an unconstitutional policy

or custom, under federal law; malicious prosecution, under Ohio law; or, false arrest, under Ohio

law. As such, the Court finds that Call has abandoned these claims.

Even assuming that Call had not abandoned these claims, each would fail as a matter of

law. Because Call has presented no evidence for his various abandoned claims, the Court may

only consider Defendants’ evidence on the issues. Viewing that evidence in Call’s favor, the Court

finds that the existence of probable cause for Deputy Thomas to arrest Call—explained below with

respect to malicious prosecution—and exigent circumstances relating to J.C.’s safety would prove

fatal to Call’s now-abandoned claims.

Thus, the Court has determined to GRANT Defendants’ Motion as to Call’s federal claims

for excessive force and municipal liability, and, as to Call’s claims under Ohio state law for

malicious prosecution and false arrest.

B. Malicious Prosecution

The Court is then solely left with Call’s cause of action against Deputy Thomas, brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for malicious prosecution. Defendants argue that Deputy Thomas

is entitled to qualified immunity and, therefore, summary judgment on Call’s malicious

prosecution claim. (Doc. No. 29 at PageID 623-36.) In particular, Defendants assert that Deputy

Thomas had probable cause to arrest Call on August 17, 2022, and he cannot be liable for Call’s

prosecution when he did nothing more than turn over truthful materials detailing the arrest to

prosecutors. (Id. at PageID 633-34.) On the other hand, Call posits that Deputy Thomas did not

have probable cause to arrest him and the materials handed over to prosecutors in support of

probable cause were fabricated. (Doc. No. 34 at PageID 680-82.)

Once a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “‘the ultimate burden of proof is on the

plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.’” Palma v. Johns, 27

F.4th 419, 427 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Estate of Hill v. Miracle, 853 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir.

2017)). A plaintiff may only satisfy this burden by demonstrating that: “(1) the defendant violated

a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established.” Puskas v. Delaware Cnty., Ohio,

56 F.4th 1088, 1093 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Williams v. Maurer, 9 F.4th 416, 430 (6th Cir. 2021))

(internal quotation marks omitted). If, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

either of these two prongs cannot be established, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

Mitchell v. Schlabach, 864 F.3d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Government officials are protected by

the doctrine of qualified immunity unless the answer to both questions is yes”).

The inquiry into Deputy Thomas’ entitlement to qualified immunity begins and ends with

considering whether Call has established a constitutional violation in the vein of malicious

prosecution. To make out a constitutional violation for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must

show: “(1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff, and the defendant made,

influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for

the criminal prosecution; (3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty, as understood under

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal proceeding

was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” King v. Harwood, 853 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2017)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308-

09 (6th Cir. 2010). Importantly, however, “a police officer cannot be liable for Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution when he did not make the decision to bring charges, as long as the

information he submitted to the prosecutor is truthful.” Wysong v. City of Heath, 377 F. App’x.

466, 470 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kinkus v. Vill. of Yorkville, Ohio, 289 F. App’x. 86, 91 (6th Cir.

2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the Court finds that Deputy Thomas cannot be liable for Call’s prosecution,

however short-lived, because he did not play a part in deciding to bring charges, beyond submitting

an initial criminal complaint. It is undisputed that Deputy Thomas did not make the decision to

prosecute Call for obstruction of official business. However, Call contends that Deputy Thomas

deliberately misrepresented his behavior on the morning of August 17, 2022, as deserving of

prosecution. (Doc. No. 34 at PageID 681.) This argument is without merit. The Court has

reviewed the video footage of the incident (Defs. Ex. A, Video), and, Deputy Thomas’ Court

Statement (Doc. No. 28-3) and Narrative Supplement (Doc. No. 28-2) accurately reflect the events

leading to Call’s arrest as depicted in the video. The only perceivable inconsistency in Deputy

Thomas’ reports is his assertion that Call kept coming toward him just before Deputy Thomas

placed Call in handcuffs. (Doc. No. 28-3 at PageID 488-89.) The Court will not find a

constitutional violation due to this triviality. In-fact, just prior to his arrest, Call’s movements

were directed toward Deputy Thomas. (Defs. Ex. A, Video, at 2:34-2:38.) It was only in the split

second that Deputy Fenwick spoke to Call that Call turned away from Deputy Thomas. (Id. at

2:40.) If anything, Deputy Thomas’ account of the August 17 arrest merely omitted a minor

inconsequential detail. Hence, the Court finds that Deputy Thomas did not participate in the

decision to prosecute Call, as necessary to establish a constitutional violation for malicious

prosecution.

What is more, Deputy Thomas possessed probable cause to arrest Call for obstruction of

official business on August 17, 2022. Ohio law states that:

No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay

the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official's

official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the

performance of the public official’s lawful duties.

Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.31(A). An individual committing such an act shall be guilty of obstructing

an official act. Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.31(B). At bar, exigent circumstances—J.C.’s imminent

threat of self-harm—permitted Deputy Thomas to enter Call’s home without a warrant, if need be

to ensure J.C.’s safety. Lawrence v. Bloomfield Twp., 313 F. App’x. 743, 747 (6th Cir. 2008)

(naming “risk of injury to the officer[] or others that required swift action” as an exigent

circumstance) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That Call did not know why Deputy

Thomas needed to speak with J.C. is irrelevant. Deputy Thomas had probable cause that a teenage

boy was in Call’s home cutting himself with a knife. When Call blocked Deputy Thomas’ entry

and, later, J.C.’s exit, Call was interfering with Deputy Thomas’ wellness check. Indeed, even if

Call assumed that Deputy Thomas was there to arrest J.C., Call’s actions were designed to prevent

Deputy Thomas from affecting an arrest. Further, in light of the exigent circumstances, Deputy

Thomas had probable cause to believe that Call lacked the privilege to so impede the wellness

check.

Additionally, Call’s behavior when he returned to the porch was arguably obstructive.

“Ohio courts have affirmed obstruction convictions premised on true speech only when that speech

involved yelling, cursing, aggressive conduct, and/or persistent disruptions after warnings from

the police against interrupting the investigation.” Patrizi v. Huff, 690 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2012)

(citing State v. Wellman, 879 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)). When he came onto the

porch, Call was loudly swearing at Deputy Thomas such that Deputy Thomas was focused on Call

rather than J.C. Deputy Thomas attempted to explain his presence to Call, but Call tuned out

Deputy Thomas to continue expressing his frustration at the officer. When engaged with Deputy

Thomas, whether out of anger or fear for his son, Call behaved in a way that was perceivably

intended to prevent Deputy Thomas from conducting a wellness check for J.C.’s benefit. Thus,

Call’s claim for malicious prosecution also fails due to the existence of probable cause.

In sum, Deputy Thomas is entitled to qualified immunity on Call’s malicious prosecution

claim because Call has not proven that Deputy Thomas subjected him to a constitutional violation.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion with respect to Call’s malicious prosecution

claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 29) in all respects. Call’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is hereby

DISMISSED.

DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Tuesday, November 19, 2024.

s/Thomas M. Rose

________________________________

THOMAS M. ROSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE