WOMBLE v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

SHANNEL WOMBLE, e¢ ai, : HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS

Plaintiffs,

y. | Civil Action

CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF No, 23-3373 (KMW-SAK)

COMMISSIONERS, ef al.,

Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

Appearances:

Scott M. Lempert, Esq.

Pamela M. Keith, Esq.

Center for Employment Justice, LLC

650 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Suite 600

Washington, DC 20001

Benjamin Folkman, Esq.

Folkman Law Offices, PC

1949 Berlin Road, Suite 100

Cherry Hill, NJ 08003

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Howard L. Goldberg, Esq.

Krista A. Schmid, Esq.

Office of Camden County Counsel

$20 Market Street, 6th Floor

Camden, NJ 08102

Counsel for Defendants Camden County Board of Commissioners and Set, Michael Olson

WILLIAMS, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court by way of plaintiffs Shannel Womble (“Womble”),

Marcus Cuevas (“Cuevas”), and Darel Graham’s (“Graham,” collectively with Womble and

Cuevas, “Plaintiffs”) supplemental briefing (ECF No. 91); and Defendants Camden County Board

of Commissioners (the “Board”) and Michael Olson’s (“Olson,” collectively with the Board,

“Defendants”) (ECF No. 94) opposition thereto; addressing application of the Younger abstention

doctrine to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 78), seeking to enjoin Defendants from pursuing two disciplinary

actions against Graham. For the reasons that follow, and for good cause shown, the Court DENIES

Plaintiffs’ Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2022, the Board filed a disciplinary action against Graham charging that he

was “insubordinate” during an interaction with a supervisor because Graham was allegedly using

his cell phone during a morning lineup (the “First Disciplinary Action”). (ECF No. 78-1 at 1.) On

July 12, 2022, Graham provided statements about his supervisor, Olson, during an Internal Affairs

(“IA”) investigation (the “July 2022 Investigation”). Ud. at 5.)

On June 20, 2023, Womble and Cuevas filed their initial Complaint in the instant action

against Defendants alleging race discrimination — hostile work environment; race discrimination

— disparate treatment; race discrimination — retaliation; gender discrimination — disparate

treatment; breach of duties of fair representation; retaliation; violations of the New Jersey

Conscientious Employee Protection Act; and violations of the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination. (ECF No. 1), On July 1, 2024, Womble and Cuevas amended the Complaint to

include Graham as a plaintiff in the instant action. (ECF No. 71), Days later, on July 13, 2024,

Graham provided deposition testimony in the instant action. (ECF No. 78-5.)

On July 22, 2024, the Board initiated a second IA investigation against Graham alleging

that he provided statements during the July 2022 Investigation that conflict with his June 13, 2024

deposition testimony (the “Second Disciplinary Action”), (ECF No. 78-1 at 5.) Counsel

representing Graham in both the First and Second Disciplinary Action then sent the Board a letter

requesting an abeyance of both actions pending litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims before this Court.

(Ud. at 6.) The Board declined Graham’s request. (/d.)

On August 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant Emergency Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin Defendants from pursuing: (1) the

First Disciplinary Action, including an IA hearing scheduled for October 2024; and (2) the Second

Disciplinary Action, including an IA interview of Graham. (ECF No. 78). The Court held a

telephonic hearing on August 28, 2024 and entered an Order (ECF No. 82) denying Plaintiffs’

Motion for TRO (ECF No. 78). The Court’s Order instructed Plaintiffs to indicate by letter whether

they intended to file supplemental briefing addressing application of the Younger abstention

doctrine to Plaintiffs’ requests to enjoin the First and Second Disciplinary Actions. (/d.) Plaintiffs

submitted a letter indicating they wished to do so, (ECF No. 84), and filed their supplemental

briefing on October 4, 2024, (ECF No. 91). Defendants filed opposition thereto on October 17,

2024, (ECF No, 94.)

II. DISCUSSION

a. Plaintiffs’ Motion for TRO is Denied Because Plaintiffs Have Failed to

Satisfy the Criteria of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.

Asa threshold matter, the Court first addresses whether Plaintiffs have satisfied their heavy

burden of demonstrating that the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction is warranted,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 governs injunctions and restraining orders. The Third Circuit has repeatedly

held that an injunction “is an extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only in limited

circumstances.” Frank’s GMC Truck Cir., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir.

1988) (citing United States vy. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 191 n.1 Gd Cir. 1980). The

Court must consider four factors when considering an application for a preliminary injunction:

(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success

on the merits;

(2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the

relief;

(3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm

to the nonmoving party; and

(4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.

SI Handling Sys. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985). The burden is on the moving

party “to convince the district court that all four factors favor preliminary relief.” AT&T vy. Winback

and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994), If the moving party fails to

demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court must deny the preliminary injunction.

Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.G. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Adams

v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000) (the Court need not weigh the balance

of equities if the movant fails to satisfy either of the first two factors). “[T]he injury created by a

failure to issue the requested injunction must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in

money cannot atone for it.” Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 Gd Cir. 1994) (citation

omitted), “[T]he claimed injury cannot merely be possible, speculative, or remote.” Laidlaw, Inc.

v. Student Transp. of Am., 20 F. Supp. 2d 727, 766 (D.N.J. 1998) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the First and Second Disciplinary Actions. (ECF No. 78.)

Plaintiffs claim that they will be irreparably harmed if the Court permits the allegedly retaliatory

Disciplinary Actions to proceed against Graham because potential witnesses will be “cowed by

the pressure of potentially losing their livelihoods for speaking the truth, making it impossible to

present a complete and accurate record of Defendant’s conduct, rendering the judicial process

impotent.”! (ECF No. 78-1 at 12.) The Court finds that this alleged injury to Plaintiffs is too

speculative and remote to merit immediate relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, See Laidlaw, Inc,

20 F. Supp. 2d at 766. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs are arguing the prospective loss of pay or

employment supports entry of a TRO, lost wages are clearly compensable by monetary damages.

Furthermore, courts have held that the loss of employment is not irreparable harm, as courts are

empowered to reinstate wrongfully terminated employees, order backpay and award damages in

discrimination and retaliation suits, See Selby v. City of Paterson, No. CV 07-4206 (DMC), 2007

WL 9752116, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2007) (holding “the loss of one’s job does not constitute

irreparable injury”); Sempson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 92 n.68 (1974); Marxe v, Jackson, 833 F.2d

1121 (3d Cir. 1987).

The balance of hardships and public equities also weigh toward denying Plaintiffs’ request

precisely because Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries can be adequately redressed, whereas our courts have

acknowledged that “institut{ing] the disciplinary proceedings at issue here in an effort to regulate

the conduct of its police force,” and “‘maintaining the integrity, public confidence, and goodwill

of ] law enforcement’ is an important state interest.” Killion v. Coffey, No. 13-1808, 2015 WL

7345749, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2015) (quoting Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor,

755 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 2014).

! The Court notes that arguably, as the Second Disciplinary Action relates to Graham's lack of truthfulness during the

July 2022 investigation into Oison’s conduct, such discipline can be said to pressure officers fo be truthful in the first

instance with respect to [A’s investigations, rather than discourage “speaking the truth” as Plaintiffs allege here. See

Office of the Attorney General Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures, § 8.0.4 (2022) (“The officer also must truthfully

answer all questions put to him or her during the course of the [IA] investigation.”).

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits of their claim as Plaintiffs do not cite to a single case where this Court has

enjoined a police disciplinary hearing as they seek to do in their Motion.

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden

of establishing the four factors required to support the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary

injunction pursuant to Fed, R. Civ. P. 65. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief does not alter

the Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No, 82.) While

these reasons alone are sufficient to support the denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court will address

the question of whether the Younger abstention doctrine applies to Plaintiffs’ multiple requests to

enjoin ongoing state disciplinary proceedings,” (See ECF Nos. 78, 93.)

b. The Court Will Abstain from Enjoining Pending State Disciplinary

Proceedings pursuant to Younger.

“Younger abstention requires dismissal of certain federal claims for injunctive or

declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state court proceedings.” Fam, CLL. Union v.

State, 386 F. Supp. 3d 411, 432 (D.N.J. 2019), aff'd sub noim,, 837 F. Appx 864 (3d Cir. 2020)

(citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S, 37 (1971)). Here, the Court addresses whether Younger

abstention bars Plaintiffs from enjoining the First and Second Disciplinary Actions.

Younger requires federal courts to abstain from interfering with certain pending state

proceedings. Kaul v. Christie, 372 F. Supp, 3d 206 (D.N.J. 2019); see Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 180.

It applies “in only three ‘exceptional’ classes of cases: (1) ‘state criminal prosecutions,’ (2) ‘civil

enforcement proceedings,’ and (3) ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in

2 Following the Court’s denial (ECF No. 82) of Plaintiffs’ first Emergency Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction

(ECF No. 78), Plaintiffs filed a second Emergency Motion for TRO seeking to enjoin the First Disciplinary Action,

(ECF No, 93), which the Court also denied (ECF No. 98),

furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Jd. (citing Sprint

Communications, Inc. vy. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)). The Court must also consider the following

three additional factors identified in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,

457 U.S. 423 (1982), whether: “(1) there is a pending state proceeding that is judicial in nature;

(2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity in

the state proceeding for the plaintiff to raise its constitutional challenges.” Kaul, 372 F. Supp. 3d

at 206.

Younger abstention is appropriate in the context of “civil enforcement proceedings” that

are “akin to a criminal prosecution in important respects.” Ki/ion, 2015 WL 7345749 at *4

(quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Such quasi-criminal

civil enforcement proceedings are generally, as here, “initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff,

i.e., the party challenging the state action, for some wrongful act.” Jd. Likewise, a state party is

customarily a party to the state proceedings and often, if not always, initiates the state action. Id.

These types of civil enforcement proceedings often commence with internal investigations, as

here, that “culminatfe] in the filing of a formal complaint or charges.” /d.

“(Plolice disciplinary proceedings, first heard at the administrative level, which cither

could have been or have been appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court .. . fall into the category

of civil enforcement proceedings from which federal courts may abstain under Younger.” Jd.; see

Gonzalez y, Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 755 ¥.3d 176, 182 3d Cir. 2014) (In sum,

we conclude that the state disciplinary proceedings involved in this appeal bears the hallmarks of

the quasi-criminal proceedings discussed by the Supreme Court. It was initiated by a state actor

following an internal investigation and the filing of formal charges for the purpose of sanctioning

[the plaintiff] for his wrongful actions. Given these circumstances, we hold that [the plaintiffs]

disciplinary hearing and the pending State Appeal are indeed ‘akin to a criminal prosecution.””).

Regarding the Middlesex factors, Plaintiffs argue in their supplemental brief that Younger

abstention does not apply because the Second Disciplinary Action was initiated after Plaintiffs

filed their Complaint in federal court. (ECF No. 91 at p.4-5). Yet Plaintiffs’ Motion seeks to enjoin

both the First Disciplinary Action—-which predates the filing of Plaintiffs’ Complaint—as well as

the Second Disciplinary Action. (See ECF No. 1). Clearly, the First Disciplinary Action was an

ongoing proceeding at the time the Complaint was filed. Moreover, the Second Disciplinary Action

against Graham was commenced within three weeks of his joining Womble and Cuevas’s pending

federal suit, before the Court conducted any “proceedings of substance on the merits” with respect

to Graham. See Tucker vy. Ann Klein Forensic Ctr., 174 F. App’x 695, 697 (3d Cir. 2006).

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not established why the First and Second Disciplinary

Actions, which involve the same parties, may both culminate in Graham’s eventual termination,

and are both reviewable by the state court after a final agency decision, should not be treated as

part of the same unitary process for Younger purposes. See WK. vy. N.J. Div. of Dev'l Disabilities,

974 F.Supp. 791, 794 (D.N.J. 1997) (stating proper forum for review of state agency’s final

decision is New Jersey Appellate Division, as for Younger purposes the administrative and appeals

process is treated as a unitary system); see N.J. Ct, R. 2:2-3 (setting forth procedure for further

state review). Thus, the Court finds that the first Middlesex factor is met.

The Court finds that the second Middlesex factor is also present. Courts in this District have

long acknowledged that “institut[ing} the disciplinary proceedings al issue here in an effort to

regulate the conduct of its police force,” and “maintaining the integrity, public confidence, and

goodwill of [ ] law enforcement’ is an important state interest.” Killion, 2015 WL 7345749, at *5

(citing Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 182).

Finally, the third Middlesex factor is satisfied because state disciplinary proceedings afford

Plaintiffs an opportunity to raise discrimination and retaliation claims as a defense to the First and

Second Disciplinary Actions that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin in their Motion for TRO. “[W]Jhen

confronted with administrative matters appealable to the state courts, ‘[w]e will assume... . that

an administrative adjudication and the subsequent state court’s review of it count as a unitary

process’ for Younger purposes.” Altice USA, Inc. v. New Jersey Bd. of Pub. Utilities, 26 F.4th 571,

579 (3d Cir, 2022); see N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3. The “burden on this point rests on the federal plaintiff to

show that state procedural law bars] presentation of its claims.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d

666, 670-71 (3d Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs do not raise any arguments in their supplemental brief to

satisfy this burden. (See generally ECF No. 91.)

Notably, numerous courts in the Third Circuit have applied Younger abstention in the

context of disciplinary proceedings involving police officers. See, e.g., Bayliss v. New Jersey State

Police, No. Civ. A. 11-890 MLC, 2014 WL 4657304, at *11 (D.NJ. Sept. 17, 2014) (disciplinary

proceedings concerning police officers implicate important state interests under Younger”), aff'd,

622 F. App’x 182 (3d Cir. 2015); Goode v. Borough of Keansburg, No. Civ. A. 06-5861 MLC,

2007 WL 150507, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2007) (“proceedings concerning police discipline

implicate important state interests”); Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 180; Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia,

630 F, Supp. 827, 835-36 (E.D. Pa.) aff'd, 808 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1986).

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Younger abstention bars

Plaintiffs from obtaining the relief sought in their Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order in

the instant matter.

ORDER

IT IS this [4° day of November, 2024, hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and

Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 78) is DENIED.

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: JAREN M, WILLIAMS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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