Opinion

United States v. Supervalu Inc

Court
District Court, C.D. Illinois
Filed
Nov 18, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.0%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

THE UNITED STATES OF )

AMERICA and THE STATES OF )

CALIFORNIA, DELAWARE, )

ILLINOIS, INDIANA, )

MASSACHUSETTS, MINNESOTA, )

MONTANA, NEVADA, )

NEW JERSEY, NORTH CAROLINA, )

RHODE ISLAND, VIRGINIA, )

ex rel. TRACY SCHUTTE and )

MICHAEL YARBERRY, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 11-CV-3290

)

SUPERVALU, INC., SUPERVALU )

HOLDINGS, INC., FF )

ACQUISITIONS, LLC, )

FOODARAMA, LLC, SHOPPERS )

FOOD WAREHOUSE CORP., )

SUPERVALU PHARMACIES, INC. )

ALBERTSON’S LLC, JEWEL OSCO )

SOUTHWEST LLC, NEW )

ALBERTSON’S INC., AMERICAN )

DRUG STORES, INC., SHAW’S )

SUPERMARKET, INC., STAR )

MARKET COMPANY INC., JEWEL )

FOOD STORES, INC., and AB )

ACQUISION LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration,

Relators’ Response and Defendant’s Reply. (d/e 439, 440, 441). For

the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (d/e 439) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2024, the Court granted partial summary

judgment in favor of the Relators on the issue of materiality. (d/e

427). On the same date, the Court also granted Relators’ Motion

Requesting the Court Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over State

Law Claims. (d/e 438). Relators are now proceeding with claims

pursuant to the federal False Claims Act and two state law claims

under the California False Claims Act and the Illinois False Claims

Act. (d/e 437, 438).

On October 11, 2024, Defendants filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of this Court’s September 30, 2024 Order and

Opinion, granting partial summary judgment in Relators’ favor. (d/e

437). Defendants argue that this Court erred by granting summary

judgment as to materiality by shifting the burden of proof on

materiality to SuperValu and by relying on a per se materiality

standard that Garbe does not support. (d/e 439, p. 3). Defendant

moves this Court to reconsider its prior order, or alternatively,

Defendants request the Court certify its September 2024 Order for

an interlocutory appeal as to the ruling on materiality. Id. at p. 8.

On October 25, 2024, Relators filed their response arguing

Defendants’ motion advances arguments, authorities, and caselaw

that have been considered and denied. Further, Relators argue that

this Court should not permit an interlocutory appeal as Defendants

do not meet the necessary requirements.

ANALYSIS

I. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration is Denied.

Motions to reconsider “serve a limited function: to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.

Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264,

1269 (7th Cir. 1996). Reconsideration is not appropriate for

rehashing arguments or raising new matters that could have been

heard during the pendency of the previous motions. Id. at 1270.

Defendants raise two arguments for reconsideration. First, the

Court incorrectly articulated the burden of proof for summary

judgment. Defendants point to the language the Court utilized in its

analysis and its use of the word “some” and “could” when describing

evidence and factfinder. Defendants argue that the Court articulated

a different burden of proof in utilizing this language. Further, given

the Court analyzed the evidence presented by SuperValu, that

analysis is indicative of a factual dispute on materiality and a jury

should consider this question.

The Court, in its Opinion and Order, provided an overview of

the parties’ arguments in support of and against summary judgment.

In doing so, the Court described the evidence presented by the

parties, including that SuperValu provided evidence “some payors

may have known” about price matching. However, the Court made a

specific distinction in its finding that there was no evidence presented

that payor knew claims submitted were false in that the usual and

customary price was inflated.

The Court has not confused the summary judgment standard.

The Court emphasized that while both parties provided ample

evidence, none addressed whether the payors knew that price

matching was occurring and resulting in false claims - thus affecting

the usual and customary price and continued payment. The Court

applied the correct summary judgment standard and found Relators

were indeed entitled to summary judgment on the issue of materiality

considering both Garbe and Escobar.

To the extent Defendants argue that the burden has shifted to

the Defendants solely by utilizing the words “some” and “could” is

also incorrect. The Court evaluated each party’s motions for

summary judgment, provided information about various pieces of

evidence, and found that Relators met their burden because there

was no evidence that payors knew claims submitted were false and

continued to pay Defendants. This analysis specifically considered

the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged

misrepresentation.

Defendants second argument for reconsideration is the Court

relied on an incorrect legal premise. Specifically, the Court

misapplies the holding in Garbe, finding that a misstatement

regarding the collection of more money than actually owed was

sufficient to establish materiality.

Defendants’ arguments are a restatement of those previously

before the Court. The Court evaluated these arguments at the

summary judgment stage and found them unpersuasive and found

Garbe, which evaluated a similar set of circumstances as here,

controls. Although Defendants have again argued that this holding

and this Court’s application is impermissible according to Escobar,

this Court disagrees. The Court evaluated the arguments presented

by the parties, and in reading Garbe, found that the misrepresented

prices here were capable of influencing the decision-making body to

which they were addressed, namely the payors at issue.

The arguments by the parties are similar, if not identical, to

those previously made and have provided no controlling case law that

has been ignored by this Court. The Court, therefore, declines to

reconsider its determination on materiality in its September 30, 2024

Order. Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (d/e 439) is,

therefore, denied.

II. Defendants’ Motion for Interlocutory Appeal is Denied.

Defendants ask the Court to certify an interlocutory appeal of

its September 2024 Order granting Relators’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Materiality. Defendants seek certification pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 to determine whether: a claim for more money

than is actually owed is sufficient to establish materiality as a matter

of law under the holistic and demanding standard of Universal Health

Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 US. 176 (2016). (d/e

439, p. 10).

Defendants move for this relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a

narrow exception to the general rule that a party may only appeal

when the court “shall be of the opinion that such order involved a

controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground

for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Certification under § 1292 requires four criteria be met: (1) there

must be a question of law; (2) it must be controlling; (3) it must be

contestable; and (4) its resolution must promise to speed up the

litigation. There is also a statutory requirement that the petition must

be filed in the district court within a reasonable time after the order.

Arenholz v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 219 F.3d 674,

675 (7th Cir. 2000).

All of the statutory criteria must be satisfied for an order to

qualify for immediate appeal. Id. Defendants fail to satisfy the

requirements regarding a question of law and speeding up the instant

litigation. A question of law is a “question of the meaning of a

statutory or constitutional provision, regulation, or common law

doctrine” and should be “something the court of appeals could decide

quicky and cleanly without having to study the record.” Id. at 677.

Here, Defendants ask whether a claim for more money than is

actually owed is sufficient to establish materiality as a matter of law

under Escobar. This issue would require the Seventh Circuit to

examine the record in this case, the record of the Garbe case, and

analyze the Escobar case to decide whether this Court should have

denied Relators’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of

materiality. Because Defendants seek to appeal the Court’s

application of the relevant facts to the Escobar standard, Defendants

claim does not fit the standard under Section 1292(b).

Additionally, this Court is not persuaded that the resolution of

the question presented by the Defendants promises to speed up the

litigation or advance the ultimate termination of this matter. Rather,

this case has been ongoing for approximately 13 years at this

juncture and, whether the Seventh Circuit answers Defendants’

question in the affirmative or not, that will not dispose of this matter

entirely. Indeed, it will again provide a limited answer on one element

in what is a complex case with many moving parts. Allowing an

immediate appeal will serve only to delay this matter further, and,

although counsel for the Defendants indicates that an answer from

the Seventh Circuit may obviate the need for a retrial, that does not

promise to speed up the litigation.

Although counsel for the Defendants provide case law in

support of certifying an interlocutory appeal where it would dispose

of the entire litigation, that is not the case here. Rather, at best, one

element of the False Claims Act would be ruled on by the Seventh

Circuit. This would still require trial on the other elements of the

False Claims Act and the other claims that remain.

As a result, the Court declines to certify its September 30, 2024

Opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

CONCLUSION

In ruling on the prior Motions for Summary Judgment, this

Court utilized voluminous case law, facts, and evidence. Ultimately,

the Court found Realtors met their burden as to materiality.

Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration advances similar arguments

regarding Garbe and its application to this matter both here and in

their briefing for summary judgment. Further, Defendants have not

met the criteria to certify the Court’s September 2024 Order for

immediate appeal. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration

(d/e 439) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: November 18, 2024.

FOR THE COURT

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough____________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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