Opinion

Ferrise v. Berea City School Dist.

  • 2024 Ohio 5310
Court
Ohio Court of Claims
Filed
Oct 1, 2024
Status
Published
On the bench
Marti
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 51.7%

The opinion

[Cite as Ferrise v. Berea City School Dist., 2024-Ohio-5310.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

ADAM FERRISE Case No. 2024-00504PQ

Requester Special Master Todd Marti

v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BEREA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

Respondent

{¶1} This matter is before me for a R.C.2743.75(F) report and recommendation. I

recommend that the court: (1) order respondent to produce the settlement agreements

requested, subject to redactions to protect third parties’ statutory privacy rights, (2) award

requester his filing fees and other costs, and (3) require respondent to bear the balance

of the costs of this case.

I. Background.

{¶2} Respondent Berea City School District (“the District”) was sued in federal

court over particularly troubling claims (“the Litigation”). Its counsel actively defended the

suits. The District’s Board of Education eventually authorized its superintendent and

treasurer to take any actions necessary to resolve the Litigation. Three functionally

identical settlement agreements were reached. Those agreements provided that the

plaintiffs’ claims would be paid by the District’s insurer. PQ Miscellaneous, filed

September 9, 2024 (“Requester’s Evidence”), pp., 14-62, 148-149, 154-155; Sealed

Documents Received, September 25, 2024.1

{¶3} Requester Adam Ferrise, a reporter for the Cleveland Plain Dealer, made

multiple public records requests for copies of the settlement agreements. The District

1 All references to specific pages of Requester’s Evidence are to the pages of the PDF copy posted in the

court’s docket.

Case No. 2024-00504PQ -2- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

responded by stating that it had no responsive records. Requester’s Evidence, pp. 10 ¶¶

8-14, 11 ¶¶ 16, 20, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126.

{¶4} Mr. Ferrise brought this case to enforce his requests. Mediation was

unsuccessful and a schedule was set for the parties to file evidence and memoranda

supporting their positions. The District was also ordered to file a copies of the settlement

agreements for in camera review. That schedule has run its course, and the settlement

agreements have been filed, making this case ripe for decision. Order Terminating

Mediation, entered August 23, 2024; Order, entered September 19, 2024; Sealed

Documents Received.

II. Analysis.

A. The settlement agreements are public records and should be produced.

{¶5} A party suing for public records must “prove facts showing that the requester

sought an identifiable public record . . . and that the public office or records custodian did

not make the record available.” Welsh-Huggins v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor’s Office,

2020-Ohio-5371, ¶ 33. Mr. Ferrise sought what he claims are public records and the

District did not make those putative public records available. The District does not invoke

any exception to the Public Records Act, but instead argues that the agreements do not

meet the threshold definition of public records. This case therefore turns on whether the

settlement agreements fit within the definition of “public records.”

{¶6} R.C. 149.43(A)(1) defines public records as “records kept by any public office,

including … school district units[.]” (Emphasis added). The settlement agreements are

“records,” they are “kept” by the District for purposes of the Public Records Act, and all

agree that the District is a public office. The settlement agreements are therefore public

records and should be produced.

Case No. 2024-00504PQ -3- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

1. The settlement agreements are “records.”

{¶7} R.C. 149.011(G) defines a “record,” as relevant here, as “any document . . .

coming under the jurisdiction of any public office . . . which serves to document the . . .

decisions . . . or other activities of the office.” That definition is a direction for “expansion

rather than constriction[.]” Kish v. City of Akron, 2006-Ohio-1244, ¶ 20. Consistent with

that, the courts apply the definition according to its “great breadth” and “expansive scope.”

Id.; State ex rel. Data Trace Information Servs., L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Fiscal Officer,

2012-Ohio-753, ¶ 30. The settlement agreements have all the elements of “record[s].”

{¶8} The settlement agreements are “document[s].” A review of the copies filed for

in camera review reveals that they are writings.

{¶9} The settlement agreements came under the District’s “jurisdiction.” On a

general level, “[j]urisdiction is power to act[.]” Roy v. Plageman, 2002-Ohio-6286, ¶ 28 (3d

Dist.); Relief Assn. of Union Works, etc. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 63 Ohio App. 91,

100, (7th Dist.1939). Consistent with that, a matter is within a public office’s jurisdiction

for purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) if the office has statutory authority to address the matter.

Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-825, ¶ 16, adopted March 29, 2017 (Ct. of Cl.), aff’d 2017-

Ohio-7820 (5th Dist.).

{¶10} R.C. 3313.17 gave the District power to act regarding the Litigation. It

provides that the District’s Board is “capable of . . . being sued[.]” That language gave

the District power, and indeed the obligation, to “take whatever action is necessary and

appropriate to protect the public interest” in connection with the Litigation. State ex rel.

Armatas v. Plain Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2021-Ohio-1176, ¶ 20. See also Id. at ¶ 24.

{¶11} The District exercised that statutory power. Its counsel appeared and actively

defended its interests and the District presumably discharged its responsibility to monitor

its counsel’s actions in that lawsuit. Id. at ¶ 24; State ex rel. Hicks v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of

Commrs., 2022-Ohio-4237, ¶ 21 (“in the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts will

presume that public officers have properly performed their duties”); Requester’s

Evidence, pp. 20, 21, 22 at docket entries 6, 8, 21, 27. Further, the District’s Board’s

directed its superintendent and treasurer to “take any actions as may be necessary to

resolve the lawsuit[.]” Id. p. 148. The settlement and the agreements that journalized it

Case No. 2024-00504PQ -4- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

were therefore within the District’s statutory authority to respond to the Litigation, and

consequently within its jurisdiction for purposes of R.C. 149.43(G).

{¶12} The settlement agreements documented the district’s decisions and actions.

That is true in two respects.

{¶13} First, they documented the District’s response to the Litigation. The District’s

Board decided to seek settlement and directed its superintendent and treasurer to take

action to achieve that result. The settlement agreements document the results of that

decision and those officials’ actions. As the Supreme Court has held, “[s]ettlement

agreements document decisions and activities of the public office” that is a defendant in

the settled litigation. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,

80 Ohio St.3d 134, 136 (1997).

{¶14} Second, they documented the Districts’ financial status. Materials are

records if they shed light on the public office’s financial affairs. State ex rel. Harper v.

Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist., 2014-Ohio-1222, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.); Doe v. Ohio

State Univ., 2023-Ohio-4880, ¶ 9, adopted 2024-Ohio-565 (Ct. of Cl.). The Litigation

exposed the District to significant potential liabilities, and the settlement agreements

resolved those liabilities. Those potential liabilities implicated the District’s finances, and

the settlement agreements shed light on those matters. They also shed light on the

District’s future financial status because such settlements can impact insurance

premiums going forward. Armatas, 2021-Ohio-1176, ¶ 24.

{¶15} The settlement agreements are therefore records

{¶16} That is not changed by the District’s assertion that it did not create the

settlement agreements. Statutorily, R.C 149.011(G) does not always require that the office

“create” the document for it to be a record. In the alternative, the document can also be a

record if it is “under the jurisdiction” of the office, as was the case here. Precedentially,

the Supreme Court has treated documents created by entities other than the public office

as records. Armatas, 2021-Ohio-1176, ¶¶ 1, 6, 23, 24 (invoices created by private

lawyers); State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Krings, 93 Ohio St.3d 654 (2001) (documents

created by the public office’s contractors and private construction manager). And of

particular import here, the Supreme Court has specifically held that a settlement

Case No. 2024-00504PQ -5- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

agreement was a record, despite the “preparation of the settlement agreement by the

attorney for the county’s insurer[.]” Findlay Publishing, 80 Ohio St.3d at 137.

{¶17} Nor is it changed by the fact that the District was not a party to the settlement

agreement. Nothing in the text of R.C. 149.011(G) limits the class or records to materials

to which the public office is a party. Consistent with that, the courts have required

production of records documenting transactions the public office was not a party to if those

transactions were related to a delegated governmental function. Armatas, 2021-Ohio-

1176, ¶¶ 1, 6, 24 (invoices to private insurer from law firm hired by the insurer); State ex

rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2005-Ohio-3549, ¶¶ 6, 10, 17, 20,

21 (records of transactions between coin brokers and buyers/sellers of coins). Further,

“any material on which a public office . . . did rely” is considered to be a record. State ex

rel. Mazzaro v. Ferguson, 49 Ohio St.3d 37, 40 (1990); Kish, 2006-Ohio-1244, ¶ 20. The

District plainly relied upon the settlement agreements, regardless of whether it was a party

to them; the agreements disposed of significant claims against it. The settlement

agreements are therefore records, regardless of whether the District was a party to the

agreements.

{¶18} Finally, to the extent that there is any doubt about whether the settlement

agreements are records, precedent requires that doubt to be resolved in favor of record

status. State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Schweikert, 38 Ohio St.3d 170, 173 (1988); State

ex rel. Dist. 1199, Health Care & Social Serv. Union, SEIU v. Gulyassy, 107 Ohio App.3d

729, 733 (10th Dist.1995); Chernin v. Geauga Park Dist., 2018-Ohio-1579, ¶ 18, adopted

2018-Ohio-1717 (Ct. of Cl.). That tie breaking rule is necessary because public records

are a “portal through which people observe their government, ensuring its accountability,

integrity, and equity while minimizing sovereign mischief and malfeasance.” State ex rel.

Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2008-Ohio-6253, ¶ 20. A holding that

the settlement agreements are not records would thwart that important function, limiting

District residents’ ability to hold the District and its officials accountable for a matter of

significant import.

2. The settlement agreements were “kept by” the District for purposes of the

Public Records Act

Case No. 2024-00504PQ -6- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

{¶19} Although R.C. 149.43(A)(1) requires that a record be “kept by” a public office

for it to be a “public record,” it does not require that the public office maintain actual

possession of the record. Instead, a record is a public record, even in the possession of

a private party, if that party came to have the record as result of the public office delegating

one of its public functions to the private party. Krings, 93 Ohio St.3d at 656; State ex rel.

Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Shirey, 78 Ohio St.3d 400, 403 (1997); Toledo

Blade, 2005-Ohio-3549, ¶¶ 10, 20, 21; Hurt v. Liberty Twp., 2017-Ohio-7820, ¶¶ 80-90

(5th Dist.); Wengerd v. E. Wayne Fire Dist., 2017-Ohio-8951, ¶¶ 21, 22, adopted

December 11, 2017 (Ct. of Cl.); See also State ex rel. Rea v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 81 Ohio

St.3d 527, 530-531 (1998).

{¶20} Indeed, Armatas and Findlay Publishing applied those principles in cases

that are indistinguishable from this case. In both, as here, public offices were sued and

their insurers arranged for counsel to defend the offices. In both, as here, those counsel

created documents related to the litigation they were defending, but the offices did not

possess those documents. In both, as here, requesters made public records requests for

those records. In both, as here, the offices denied the requests, asserting that the records

were not public records because they did not possess them.

{¶21} Armadas none the less required that the records be produced because they

were created pursuant to a delegation of one of the office’s public duties:

The prosecution and defense of such lawsuits involves a public duty . . . . In

connection with such lawsuits, the [public office] must take whatever action is

necessary and appropriate to protect the public interest—including hiring and

supervising attorneys. Although the [office] here has delegated that duty . . . the

[office] still occupies one side of the bilateral formal relationship between an

attorney and client—a relationship that persists even when an insurer hires an

attorney and exercises substantial control over the course of litigation. 2021-Ohio-

1176, ¶ 20, 21

The Court therefore concluded that the public office’s duty to “obtain appropriate legal

representation is analogous to other public duties that were delegated by public offices in

cases in which” it required the production of records. Id. at ¶ 21.

Findlay Publishing similarly rejected that argument:

Case No. 2024-00504PQ -7- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

“The board’s argument is meritless. Government entities cannot conceal public

records by delegating a public duty to a private entity. The preparation of the

settlement agreement by the attorney for the county’s insurer, who is representing

the county and its employees in the lawsuit, constitutes a public duty performed by

the county’s agent.” 80 Ohio St.3d at 137.

{¶22} There is no meaningful distinction between Armadas, Findlay Publishing,

and this case. Those precedents should therefore control this case.

***

{¶23} In sum, the settlement agreements fit within the general definition of public

records. The District has not asserted any specific exemption from that definition. I

therefore recommend that the District be ordered to produce the settlement agreements.

{¶24} That said, the agreements contain the names of private individuals, including

minors, whose identities were shielded in the Litigation. The District should be allowed to

redact the settlement agreements to protect those persons’ statutory privacy rights. Matis

v. Toledo Police Dept., 2023-Ohio-4878, ¶ 10, adopted 2024-Ohio-567 (Ct. of Cl.).

C. Requester is entitled to recover his filing fee and costs; respondent should

bear the balance of the costs.

{¶25} R.C. 2743.75(F)(3)(b) provides that the “aggrieved person shall be entitled

to recover from the public office *** the amount of the filing fee *** and any other costs

associated with the action[.]” Mr. Ferrise was aggrieved by the District withholding the

settlement agreements. I therefore recommend that he recover his filing fee and the costs

he incurred in this case. I also recommend that the District bear the balance of the costs

of this case.

III. Conclusion.

{¶26} Based on the foregoing, I recommend that the court:

A. Order respondent to produce the settlement agreements, subject to redactions

to protect third parties’ statutory privacy rights.

B. Award requester his filing fees and other costs.

C. Require respondent to bear the balance of the costs of this case.

Case No. 2024-00504PQ -8- REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

{¶27} Pursuant to R.C. 2743.75(F)(2), either party may file a written objection with

the clerk of the Court of Claims of Ohio within seven (7) business days after receiving this

report and recommendation. Any objection shall be specific and state with particularity all

grounds for the objection. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption

of any factual findings or legal conclusions in this report and recommendation unless a

timely objection was filed thereto. R.C. 2743.75(G)(1).

TODD MARTI

Special Master

Filed October 1, 2024

Sent to S.C. Reporter 11/6/24

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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