Opinion

State v. Peoples

  • 2024 Ohio 5381
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Nov 12, 2024
Status
Published
On the bench
Boggs
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.0%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Peoples, 2024-Ohio-5381.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 24AP-254

v. : (C.P.C. No. 01CR-4150)

David A. Peoples, : (ACCELLERATED CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on November 12, 2024

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and

Kimberly M. Bond, for appellee.

On brief: David A. Peoples, pro se.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BOGGS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, David A. Peoples, appeals the Franklin County Court of

Common Pleas’ decision and entry denying Peoples’s motion for leave for a new trial. For

the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} We have previously recounted the history of this case as follows:

“On July 20, 2001, Peoples was indicted on one count of

aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, a felony in the

first degree, with two firearm specifications in violation of R.C.

2941.145 and 2941.146, and one count of having a weapon

while under disability. With respect to the first firearm

specification, R.C. 2941.145, Plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio,

alleged that Peoples displayed, brandished, indicated

possession of, or used a firearm to commit the offense. With

respect to the second firearm specification, R.C. 2941.146, the

No. 24AP-254 2

state alleged that Peoples discharged a firearm from a motor

vehicle when he committed the underlying offense.

The case was tried to a jury on June 27, 2002, and the jury

found Peoples guilty of aggravated murder and the two firearm

specifications. The court sentenced Peoples to a term of 25

years to life imprisonment on the aggravated murder charge,

plus 6 years for [the] R.C. 2941.146 firearm specification, and

three years on the R.C. 2941.145 firearm specification, for a

total of 34 years. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences

on the counts.

The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State

v. Peoples, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-925, 2003-Ohio-4680.

On April 16, 2008, the trial court issued a corrected judgment

entry because the original judgment entry erroneously

indicated that prison was not mandatory. In the corrected

judgment entry, the court imposed the same sentence,

including a six-year sentence for the drive-by firearm

specification.”

State v. Peoples, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-850, 2019-Ohio-2141,

¶ 2-5.

The 2008 corrected judgment entry also added the life tail for

Peoples’[s] aggravated murder count of 25 years to reflect what

the trial judge had imposed at the 2002 sentencing hearing.

Following the 2008 corrected judgment entry, Peoples

continued to file various pleadings challenging his sentence.

“[O]n March 20, 2017, Peoples filed a motion to vacate his

sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly imposed a

period of post-release control on his aggravated murder

conviction. The court denied that motion on April 6, 2017.

Peoples then filed another motion on June 26, 2017, requesting

to amend his March motion, which had already been denied.

Peoples sought to amend the motion to argue that the six-year

term for the drive-by specification was invalid. In its response

to the motion to amend, the state agreed that the drive-by

specification, R.C. 2941.146, mandated a five-year term, not a

six-year term. On August 3, 2017, the trial court denied the

motion.

Peoples filed a motion to vacate void sentence on August 7,

2017, again arguing that the six-year term imposed for the

drive-by specification was void. Peoples filed a supplemental

memorandum in support of this motion on September 1, 2017.

On October 10, 2018, the trial court denied the motion.”

Id. at ¶ 6-8.

No. 24AP-254 3

Peoples appealed the trial court’s October 10, 2018 decision

denying his motion to vacate a void sentence for the six-year

term imposed for the drive-by firearm specification. This court

agreed with Peoples that the imposed prison term was unlawful

and not in accordance with R.C. 2941.146 and

2929.14(B)(1)(c)(i) and was therefore void. This court reversed

the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter for further

proceedings regarding the drive-by firearm specification.

Peoples at ¶ 15.

On May 12, 2023, Peoples filed a motion for resentencing,

pursuant to Crim.R. 43(A), wherein he argue[d] that he should

have been allowed the opportunity to be present in 2008 when

the trial court issued a corrected judgment entry. On May 30,

2023, the trial court denied Peoples’[s] motion.

State v. Peoples, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-374, 2024-Ohio-1220, ¶ 2-5.

{¶ 3} This court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying Peoples’s motion for

resentencing. Id. at ¶ 12. On February 2, 2024, Peoples filed a motion for leave for a new

trial, pursuant to Crim.R. 33, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 12, 2024,

the trial court denied his motion. Peoples now appeals that denial.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 4} Peoples argues one assignment of error: “did the trial court lose its

jurisdiction when it failed to hold a hearing pursuant to State [v.] Bethel, 167 Ohio St.3d

362, 2022-Ohio-783.” (Appellant’s Brief at 1.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 5} We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for leave to file a motion

for a new trial under an abuse of discretion analysis. State v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-576,

2023-Ohio-1954, ¶ 15, citing State v. McNeal, 169 Ohio St.3d 47, 2022-Ohio-2703, ¶ 13.

Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-38, 2022-Ohio-4073, ¶ 19,

citing State v. Angel, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-771, 2021-Ohio-4322, ¶ 68, citing Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶ 6} In his assignment of error, Peoples argues that the trial court erred by failing

to hold a hearing on his motion for leave for a new trial. We do not agree.

{¶ 7} “A trial court’s decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a

motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial is * * * discretionary.” State v.

No. 24AP-254 4

Dodson, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-388, 2023-Ohio-701, ¶ 14, citing State v. Hoover-Moore, 10th

Dist. No. 14AP-1049, 2015-Ohio-4863, ¶ 14. In this respect, “ ‘[a] criminal defendant “is

only entitled to a hearing on a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial if he submits

documents which, on their face, support his claim that he was unavoidably prevented from

timely discovering the evidence at issue.” ’ ” Id., quoting State v. Ambartsoumov, 10th Dist.

No. 12AP-878, 2013-Ohio-3011, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Cleveland, 9th Dist.

No. 08CA009406, 2009-Ohio-397, ¶ 54, citing State v. McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800,

2007-Ohio-1181, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 8} Under Crim.R. 33(B), “when a new-trial motion is premised on newly

discovered evidence, the defendant must file the motion within 120 days of the date of the

jury’s verdict.” McNeal at ¶ 15. However, “Crim.R. 33(B) excuses a defendant’s failure to

move for a new trial within the * * * 120-day deadline * * * if the defendant proves by clear

and convincing evidence that he or she was unavoidably prevented from discovering the

evidence on which the motion would be based within that time.” Id. at ¶ 16. A defendant

is unavoidably prevented from discovering new evidence if he “had no knowledge of the

existence of the new evidence and, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have

learned of its existence within the time prescribed for filing a motion for new trial.” State

v. Lundy, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-505, 2020-Ohio-1585, ¶ 11.

{¶ 9} Upon examination of Peoples’s motion, we do not find an abuse of discretion

by the trial court. Peoples’s motion focuses on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

namely the alleged mistakes of his counsel at trial and on appeal. However, when a

defendant seeks leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(B), “the trial

court may not consider the merits of the proposed motion for a new trial until after it grants

the motion for leave.” State v. Hatton, 169 Ohio St.3d 446, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 30, citing

Bethel at ¶ 41, citing State v. Brown, 8th Dist. No. 95253, 2011-Ohio-1080, ¶ 14. “The sole

question before the trial court when considering whether to grant leave is whether the

defendant has established by clear and convincing proof that he was unavoidably prevented

from discovering the evidence on which he seeks to base the motion for a new trial.”

(Emphasis added.) Id. Peoples’s motion does not show, through clear and convincing

proof, that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he bases

his ineffective assistance argument within the time frame for filing a timely motion for a

No. 24AP-254 5

new trial. We also note that Peoples’s motion was well beyond the 120-day deadline.

Peoples’s trial was on June 27, 2002, he was found guilty on July 5, 2002, and the trial

court sentenced him on July 31, 2002. On August 28, 2002, Peoples appealed his

conviction, but it wasn’t until February 2, 2024 that Peoples filed his motion for leave for a

new trial. We accordingly overrule Peoples’s sole assignment of error.

V. CONCLUSION

{¶ 10} For the reasons stated above, we overrule Peoples’s sole assignment of error

and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ., concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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