Opinion

Bienaime v. Department of Children and Families

Court
District Court, S.D. Florida
Filed
Nov 15, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.0%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 24-cv-23018-BLOOM/Elfenbein

MARSHA BIENAIME,

Plaintiff,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

TIARRA ANDERSON, MARCELLA

MURRAY, and AMANDA

D’ALESSANDRO.

Defendants.

_________________________/

ORDER ON DEFENDANT MURRAY’S MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Marcella Murray’s (“Murray”) Motion

to Stay All Deadlines and Discovery, ECF No. [41], filed on November 5, 2024. Plaintiff Marsha

Bienaime (“Bienaime”) filed a Response, ECF No. [42]. The Court has reviewed the record, the

applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, Murray’s Motion to

Stay All Deadlines and Discovery is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Marcella Murray,

Amanda D’Alessandro, and DCF removed her child from her custody on July 31, 2024. ECF No.

[15] at 5. Defendant Murray stated to Plaintiff on July 9, 2024, that she received a report that

Plaintiff’s child was left unattended/unsupervised on June 17, 2004. Id. Murray later realized the

child was not unattended but stated that “Mother’s mental health [was] unstable” because of the

pending lawsuit Plaintiff has against her former employer, Miami-Dade County, for religious

discrimination. Id. Plaintiff asserts First and Fourth Amendment claims against four Defendants:

DCF, Tiarra Anderson, Marcella Murray, and Amanda D’Alessandro for attempting to label her

religious belief a medical condition and for removing her child, which Plaintiff labels an

unreasonable seizure. Id. at 1-3, 5. Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $2 million. Id.

at 15. Only DCF and Murray have been served and appeared in the case. ECF Nos. [29], [30].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A district court “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to

control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). “[M]otions to stay discovery

pending ruling on a dispositive motion are generally disfavored in this district.” Cuhaci v. Kouri

Grp., LP, No. 20-CV-23950, 2021 WL 1945819, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 14, 2021) (citations

omitted). Motions to stay discovery “are not favored because when discovery is delayed or

prolonged it can create case management problems which impede the Court’s responsibility to

expedite discovery and cause unnecessary litigation expenses and problems.” Feldman v. Flood,

176 F.R.D. 651, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1997).

The party moving for a stay of discovery has “the burden of showing good cause and

reasonableness.” Id. at 652. “[A] defendant who requests a blanket stay of discovery must do more

than simply point to the pendency of a dispositive motion: it must also make a specific showing of

prejudice or burdensomeness.” Wilshire Ins. Co. v. Crestview Towers Condo., Ass'n, Inc., No. 21-

23214-CIV, 2023 WL 7129941, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2023) (citation omitted). “Ultimately, the

proponent of the stay bears the burden of demonstrating its necessity, appropriateness, and

reasonableness.” Ray, 2012 WL 5471793, at *1. “Defendants bear a tall burden in seeking

discovery stays.” Lord v. Univ. of Miami, No. 13-22500-CIV, 2021 WL 9859769, at *2 (S.D. Fla.

Oct. 27, 2021).

“[A] motion to stay discovery . . . is rarely appropriate unless resolution of the motion will

dispose of the entire case.” Bocciolone v. Solowsky, No. 08-20200-CIV, 2008 WL 2906719, at *2

(S.D. Fla. July 24, 2008). “To evaluate whether there is a strong likelihood ‘the [dismissal] motion

will be granted and entirely eliminate the need for such discovery,’ the district court must take a

‘preliminary peek’ at the merits of the motion.’” Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 12-61528-CIV,

2012 WL 5471793, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2012) (quoting Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652-53). When

taking a preliminary peek at a motion to dismiss for purposes of a motion to stay discovery, the

Court must decide if the motion to dismiss “appears to be clearly meritorious and truly case

dispositive.” Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652–53. In other words, the Court asks “if on [the motion to

dismiss’s] face there appears to be an immediate and clear possibility that it will be granted.” Id.

at 653 (quoting Simpson v. Specialty Retail Concepts, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 261, 263 (M.D.N.C. 1988)).

“The court must also weigh ‘the harm produced by a delay in discovery’ against ‘the likely costs

and burdens of proceeding with discovery.’” Ray, 2012 WL 5471793, at *1 (quoting Feldman, 176

F.R.D. at 652). On the one hand, “a defendant should not be forced to expend substantial resources

answering discovery when the plaintiff's claims clearly lack merit[.]” Ray, 2012 WL 5471793, at

*1 (alteration added; citations omitted). On the other hand, “the delay and prolongation of

discovery can also create case management and scheduling problems and unfairly hold up the

prosecution of the case.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court previously granted Defendant DCF’s Motion to Stay Discovery pending the

resolution of its Motion to Dismiss as to only Defendant DCF, ECF No. [40]. Murray now moves

to stay the case regarding the pending the resolution of her own Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [31].

ECF No. [41]. Murray argues that the case should be dismissed because the Motion to Dismiss is

heavily supported by case law and would dispose of the entire case. ECF No. [41] at 4. Plaintiff

responds that the Court should not grant a stay as Defendant fails to provide the Court with good

cause to stay discovery, and a stay of discovery is not automatic even when there is a pending

motion. ECF No. [42] at 3.

In her Motion to Dismiss, Murray argues that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a

justiciable controversy; the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim; Murray is immune from

being sued in her official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment; the dependency action that

appears to be a cause for this civil action continues as an active state court case warrants the court

to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Florida law provides for the immunity of

child protective investigators and Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. [31].

Bienaime responds that Murray was properly joined in the action. ECF No. [36].

Taking a preliminary peek at Murray’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds it that it “appears

to be clearly meritorious and truly case dispositive[,]” Feldman, 176 F.R.D. at 652–53, and would

“entirely eliminate the need for such discovery’” as to Murray. Ray, 2012 WL 5471793, at *1. As

Murray points out, there is an ongoing dependency action in state court underlying this civil action.

“Federal courts abstain from hearing cases that would interfere with state proceedings where those

proceedings are ongoing, they implicate important state interests, and there is an adequate

opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in those proceedings.” Daniels v. Geraldi, 578

F.App’x 811 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Given this, the Motion to Dismiss appears to be a

“sure winner” warranting a stay of discovery at this stage as to Murray. Wilshire Ins., 2023 WL

7129941, at *9. There is good cause to stay discovery because balancing the “‘harm produced by

a delay in discovery’ against ‘the likely costs and burdens of proceeding with discovery’” weighs

in favor of a stay: Murray should not expend resources in discovery if the claim against her lacks

merit. Ray, 2012 WL 5471793, at *1. Accordingly, after taking a “preliminary peek” at Murray’s

Case No. 24-cv-23018-BLOOM/Elfenbein

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [31], the Court grants Murray’s Motion to Stay All Deadlines and

Discovery, ECF No. [41], as to Murray.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant Murray’s Motion to Stay All Deadlines and Discovery, ECF No. [41], is

GRANTED.

2. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any scheduled hearings are CANCELED, and

all deadlines are TERMINATED as to Defendant Murray.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on November 15, 2024.

BETHBLOOM i istsi—‘—s

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: counsel of record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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