CASEY v. PROCTOR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

BRIAN M. CASEY,

DOC # 139647,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 4:22cv069-MW-MAF

RICKY DIXON, SECRETARY OF

THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this case on February 16, 2021,

by submitting a § 1983 civil rights complaint, ECF No. 1, an application to

proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 2, and a motion for a

preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3. A Report and Recommendation was

previously entered on that motion, see ECF No. 10, but the Order adopting

that Report and Recommendation, along with a Second Report and

Recommendation, ECF No. 12, which recommending dismissing this case

for failure to sufficiently allege imminent danger, has been vacated. See

Page 2 of 7

ECF Nos. 15, 20. In light thereof, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary

injunction, ECF No. 3, is once again pending.

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeks an Order

transferring him “into another prison system because Defendants will not

process the required reports and written requests” necessary to place him

in protective management. ECF No. 3 at 1. It appears that Plaintiff

contends he is “protection management qualified,” but he has not been

placed in protective management and he contends an injunction is

necessary to him to obtain protective management. Id.

First, that is contrary to the allegations of Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint where Plaintiff alleged that he had been placed in protective

management. See ECF No. 14 at 14 and 17. Additionally, Plaintiff claimed

that even though another officer at Florida State Prison removed him from

protective management and wrongfully reclassified him, id. at 19, Plaintiff

alleged he would be returned to Wakulla’s “protection management unit

and be killed.” Id. at 16.

At any rate, Plaintiff alleges in his motion that he “will be transferred

back to Wakulla’s protection management unit when his close

management punishment is completed.” ECF No. 3 at 2. He is currently

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housed in close management at Florida State Prison, but contends he

should not be there because he has not violated “any rules or rights of

others.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff requests that he be removed from close

management status and have his privileges restored in addition to entry of

an Order directing his transfer “to another state protection management

facility.” ECF No. 3.

Granting or denying a preliminary injunction is a decision within the

discretion of the district court. Carillon Importers, Ltd. v. Frank Pesce

Intern. Group Ltd., 112 F.3d 1125, 1126 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United

States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983)). Preliminary

injunctive relief may be granted only if the moving party establishes:

(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury unless the injunction

issues;

(3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever

harm the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party;

and

(4) granting the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.

Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 868 (11th Cir. 2011); Carillon

Importers, Ltd., 112 F.3d at 1126; United States v. Jefferson Cnty., 720

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F.2d 1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983). A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy and should not be granted unless the

movant “clearly carries the burden of persuasion” of all four prerequisites,

which is always upon the plaintiff. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176

(11th Cir. 2000); Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d at 1519 (citing Canal Auth. v.

Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974)).

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint has been found insufficient to

proceed and in a separate Order entered this day, Plaintiff has been

directed to submit a third amended complaint. Thus, Plaintiff has

correspondingly failed to meet the prerequisites for injunctive relief

because an insufficient complaint does not demonstrate a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits.

In addition, Plaintiff’s motion does not demonstrate a substantial

threat of irreparable injury unless an injunction is issued. That is so

because Plaintiff is currently housed at Florida State Prison and he is not

located at the present time with any named Defendant. If Plaintiff is

entitled to injunctive relief, it should come in the usual course of litigation -

that is, at the end of the litigation, not at the beginning prior to service of

process.

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Moreover, Plaintiff seeks an injunction which requires the Department

of Corrections to institute protective management procedures. ECF No. 3

at 2. Such a request is essentially at odds with Plaintiff’s concern that he

will be transferred back to Wakulla Correctional Institution and again be

housed with Defendants from whom he contends that he faces imminent

danger. Plaintiff contends there are only two institutions which house

protective management inmates, see ECF No. 14 at 14, and he was

previously transferred away from the other prison (Columbia C.I.) because

of a plan to murder him. Id. A request to be placed in a status which will

require that he be housed with persons who Plaintiff alleged will harm him

in the future is not a request which should be granted.

Additionally, judicial notice is taken that Plaintiff seeks $100,000,000.

in compensatory damages from the Defendants. ECF No. 14 at 26.

Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and $10,000 in nominal damages.

Id. “Irreparable injury 'is the sine qua non of injunctive relief.’” Siegel, 234

F.3d at 1176 (quoted in Jernard v. Commissioner, Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., 457

F.App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2012). Because Plaintiff has requested

monetary damages as relief, he has demonstrated that he has an adequate

remedy at law should he prevail. The unavailability of an adequate remedy

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at law is essentially a prerequisite to a finding of irreparable injury.

Jefferson Cnty., 720 F.2d at 1520 (finding “[t]he possibility that adequate

compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in

the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of

irreparable harm”); see also Oscar Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of Fla., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (finding

that “Oscar has failed to demonstrate that monetary damages cannot be

calculated; that is, they fail to carry their burden of demonstrating

irreparable injury”). Here, failing to issue an injunction will not constitute a

“substantial threat of irreparable injury.” That is another reason Plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3, should be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a

preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3, be DENIED and this case be

REMANDED for further proceedings.

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on June 6, 2022.

S/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case No. 4:22cv069-MW-MAF

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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written

objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other

parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic

docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. If a

party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or

recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this

Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on

appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

Case No. 4:22cv069-MW-MAF