The opinion
_____________________________________
BRUCE INGRAHAM; HOLLY INGRAHAM,
Plaintiffs,
v.
1:20-CV-1189
SAINT MARY’S HOSPITAL; (MAD/CFH)
DR. CHRISTOPHER MIEREK,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Bruce & Holly Ingraham
2455 Rt. 8
Apt. 2
P.O. Box 861
Lake Pleasant, New York 12108
Plaintiffs pro se
CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
I.In Forma Pauperis
Plaintiffs pro se Bruce Ingraham and Holly Ingraham (“Plaintiffs”) purported to
commence this action against Saint Mary’s Hospital and Dr. Christopher Mierek
(“Defendants”) on September 24, 2020, by filing a complaint. Dkt No. 1. In lieu of
paying this Court’s filing fee, Plaintiffs each filed Motions to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
(“IFP”). Dkt. Nos. 8, 10. After reviewing Plaintiffs’ IFP applications, Dkt. Nos. 8, 10, the
undersigned determines that Plaintiffs qualify to proceed IFP for purposes of filing."
IL. Initial Review
A.Legal Standard
Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code directs that, when a plaintiff
seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that. . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, it is a court’s
responsibility to determine whether a plaintiff may properly maintain his complaint
before permitting him to proceed with his action.
Where, as here, the plaintiff proceeds pro se, “the court must construe his
submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Kirkland v. Cablevisions Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam )
(internal quotation marks omitted). However, this does not mean that the Court is
required to accept unsupported allegations that are devoid of sufficient facts or claims.
Although detailed allegations are not required at the pleading stage, the complaint must
include enough facts to provide the defendants with notice of the claims against them
and the grounds upon which these claims are based. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Ultimately, the
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Plaintiffs are advised that, despite being granted IFP status, they will still be required to pay any fees and
they may incur in this action, including but not limited to copying fees, transcript fees, and witness
Pleading guidelines are set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R.
Civ. P.”). Specifically, Rule 8 provides that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief
shall contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). “The purpose . . . is to give fair
notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to
file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the
doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 54 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rule 8 also requires the
pleading to include:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s
jurisdiction . . .
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Although “[n]o technical form is required,” the Federal Rules make
clear that each allegation contained in the pleading “must be simple, concise, and
direct.” Id. at 8(d)(1).
Further, Rule 10 of the Federal Rules provides in pertinent part that:
[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each
limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later
pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If
doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence – and each defense other than a denial – must
be stated in a separate count or defense.
FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). This serves the purpose of “provid[ing] an easy mode of
identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Flores, 189
F.R.D. at 54 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A complaint that fails to comply with the pleading requirements “presents far too
heavy a burden in terms of defendants’ duty to shape a comprehensive defense and
provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of their claims.”
Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y 1996). As the Second Circuit has
held, “[w]hen a complaint does not comply with the requirement that it be short and
plain, the court has the power, on its own initiative . . . to dismiss the complaint.”
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). However,
“[d]lismissal . . . is usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so
confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is
well disguised.” Id. (citations omitted). A court should not dismiss a complaint if the
plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 US. at
556).
A.Plaintiff’s Complaint?
Plaintiffs seek recovery for “failure to treat by denying xrays [sic],” “indement [sic]
enjerment [sic] of paralyze” and “pain and suffering.” Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5. It appears that
Plaintiffs are attempting to set forth a claim for medical malpractice. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiffs
*The Court notes that Plaintiffs have commenced several actions in this District, many of which
have been dismissed. See Ingraham v. Red Carpet Housing Corp., 1:17-CV-1076 (GLS/CFH)
(dismissed Dec. 21, 2017); Ingraham v. Cumo et al., 1:20-CV-147 (TJM/CFH) (dismissed Aug. 31,
2020); Ingraham v. Mayfield State Troppers et al., 1:20-CV-1186 (GLS/TWD) (dismissed Jan. 25,
2021); Ingraham v. Palentine Motel, 1:20-CV-1187 (GLS/ML) (pending); 20-CV-1187 (pending);
Ingraham v. Casey, 1:20-CV-1188 (BKS/CFH) (pending).
support this claim by detailing Ms. Ingraham’s treatment for a neck injury. Id. at 1-5.
On September 12, 2020, Plaintiffs went to the emergency room at St. Mary’s Hospital in
Amsterdam, New York. Id. at 1. The hospital allegedly refused to contact Dr. Shoan, a
surgeon who had performed surgery on Ms. Ingraham. Id. Plaintiffs allege that an
unidentified doctor refused to perform an X-ray on Ms. Ingraham. Id. Plaintiffs then
went to Albany Medical Center “for a second opinion” on Ms. Ingraham’s neck, as St.
Mary’s Hospital had diagnosed her with a “cervical neck sprain.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs
allege that Ms. Ingraham waited “3 to 4 hours” at Albany Medical Center before being
seen, despite being “in a lot of pain.” Id. Plaintiffs claim that Ms. Ingraham thereafter
received an X-ray which showed that “the plate in [Ms. Ingraham’s] cervical neck [wa]s
broken.” Id. at 3. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Ingraham’s “insurance would not fill”
her prescriptions from St. Mary’s Hospital, and these prescriptions “had to be canceled
because anything from Saint Marys [sic] was rejected,” whereas her prescriptions from
Albany Medical Center could be filled. Id. at 3-4.
Plaintiffs also contend that either St. Mary’s Hospital or Albany Medical Center “is
contracted with the State Police in NY.” Dkt. No. 1 at 4.° They claim that such a
“contract” is improper, as it creates an “affalation [sic] within this [sic] two entys [sic].
Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4. Finally, in their “Prayer for Relief,” Plaintiffs ask that the Court revoke
Defendant Mierek’s license to practice medicine, and that Plaintiffs be awarded
$240,000,000 in unspecified damages. ld. at 5.
B.Analysis
> It is not clear whether Plaintiffs are referring to St. Mary's Hospital or Albany Medical Center with this
contention.
First, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to satisfy Rule 10. FED. R. Clv. P. 10. Their claims
are listed in one long paragraph, and it is unclear which factual allegations are intended
to support each of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1-4. Even applying special
solicitude, Plaintiffs’ claims are not presented in a way that “promote[s] clarity.” FED. R.
Civ. P. 10(b). Second, even liberally construed, Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to comply with
Rule 8, as well as the pleading requirements set out by the Supreme Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Rule 8
requires that a plaintiff establish “the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” and Plaintiffs
fail to establish that this Court has jurisdiction over their apparent medical malpractice
claim, or any of the other allegations listed in their complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
To establish this Court’s jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the claims arise
from a federal question, as set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or that the reg uirements for
diversity jurisdiction, as set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, are met. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). To establish federal question jurisdiction, the claims must “arise[]
under the Constitution [or] laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs
do not establish that any of their claims arise under a Constitutional provision or federal
statute, as they seem to be alleging only medical malpractice, a state law claim. See
Dkt. No. 1 at 1-2. As such, they fail to demonstrate that this Court has federal question
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
To establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that there is complete
diversity among the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident
& Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 930 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs do not set forth Dr. Mierik’s
domicile. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1. However, Plaintiffs provide that St. Mary’s Hospital is in
“Amsterdam NY,” and make clear that they are domiciled in Lake Pleasant, New York.
Id. at 1. As St. Mary’s Hospital is in New York and Plaintiffs are domiciled in New York,
there is not complete diversity of the parties as all defendants are not “citizens of
different states” than Plaintiffs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1). Plaintiffs cannot establish this
Court’s jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because “[fJor a district court to have
diversity jurisdiction . . . no plaintiff [can be] a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.” Lehmann v. Discovery Comme'ns, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347
(E.D.N.Y. 2002). In sum, Plaintiffs fail to establish this Court's jurisdiction, and the
requirements of Rule 8(a)(1).‘
Generally, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without
granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05
(2d Cir. 1991). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where “[t]he problem
with [the plaintiff's] cause[] of action is substantive” and cannot be cured because the
plaintiff “is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support [his] claim.” Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949
F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991).
Here, the undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed with
prejudice and without opportunity to amend. Plaintiffs fail to establish federal question
jurisdiction, and cannot show complete diversity between themselves and all defendants
“Even if Plaintiffs could plead prima facie state law claims, the undersigned would recommend that this
Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to review these state law claims as they have failed to
present any question of federal law. See Smith v. Da Ross, 777 F. Supp 2d 340, 366 (D. Conn. 2011)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 445 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal citation omitted) (“Supplemental or pendent jurisdiction is a matter of discretion, not of right. A
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when the court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction.”).
in order to establish diversity jurisdiction. Because Plaintiffs cannot establish this
Court’s jurisdiction, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice
and without opportunity to amend as any amendment would be futile.
l.Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiffs’ motions to proceed IFP (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10) be
GRANTED for the purposes of this filing only; and it is
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiffs’ complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed with
prejudice and without opportunity to amend, and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve this Report-Recommendation &
Order on Plaintiffs in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Plaintiffs have FOURTEEN (14) days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette,
984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 72 & 6(a).°
Dated: May 13, 2021
5 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation & Order by mail, three (3)
additional days will be added to the fourteen (14) day period, meaning that you have seventeen (17) days
from the date the Report-Recommendation & Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. FED.
R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then
the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Id. §
6(a)(1)(c).
Albany, New York
Christian F. Hummel
U.S. Magistrate Judge