“Given the precautionary nature of [Rule 56(d)], these requests ordinarily are treated and reviewed liberally.”
How later courts described this case
- “Given the precautionary nature of [Rule 56(d)], these requests ordinarily are treated and reviewed liberally.”
- “To prevail on a § 1983 false arrest claim, [a plaintiff] must show that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest him.” (cleaned up)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT November 15, 2024
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
GALVESTON DIVISION
FRED RAHDAR, et al., §
§
Plaintiffs. §
§
V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-cv-00280
§
CITY OF FRIENDSWOOD, et al., §
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Defendants. §
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. See Dkt. 70. Before
I can turn to that motion, I must decide Plaintiffs’ Motion for Continuance
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(d). See Dkt. 83. Plaintiffs contend that, before I address
the merits of Defendants’ summary judgment motion, they should be allowed to
depose former Friendswood police officer Jesse Beckwith.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) permits “further discovery to
safeguard non-moving parties from summary judgment motions that they cannot
adequately oppose.” Curtis v. Anthony, 710 F.3d 587, 594 (5th Cir. 2013)
(quotation omitted). A nonmovant may obtain a continuance of a summary
judgment motion “to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery” if it
“shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
essential to justify its opposition.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d)(2).
“Rule 56(d) motions for additional discovery are broadly favored and should
be liberally granted because the rule is designed to safeguard non-moving parties
from summary judgment motions that they cannot adequately oppose.” Am.
Family Life Assur. Co. of Columbus v. Biles, 714 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 2013)
(quotation omitted); see also Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
823 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Given the precautionary nature of [Rule 56(d)],
these requests ordinarily are treated and reviewed liberally.”).
As required by Rule 56(d), Defendants have submitted a declaration from
their counsel, Jared Woodfill. In that declaration, Woodfill explains that Beckwith
reached out to Plaintiff Fred Rahdar on August 12, 2024. Woodfill then had an
approximately hour-long conversation with Beckwith on August 14, 2024.
According to Woodfill, Beckwith will testify that the Friendswood Police
Department instituted an intentional and concerted campaign to target and harass
Plaintiffs due to Plaintiffs’ complaints against the police chief and, more generally,
the police department.
Two claims remain in this lawsuit: a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim
and a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, both of which arise from a
February 5, 2021 incident where Friendswood police officers arrested Rahdar. I do
not see how Beckwith’s expected testimony impacts the false arrest claim. The false
arrest claim will rise or fall on whether the arresting officers had probable cause to
arrest Rahdar on February 5, 2021. See Anokwuru v. City of Houston, 990 F.3d
956, 963 (5th Cir. 2021) (“To prevail on a § 1983 false arrest claim, [a plaintiff]
must show that the arresting officers did not have probable cause to arrest him.”
(cleaned up)). Because Beckwith was not at the scene of the arrest on February 5,
2021, he cannot offer relevant testimony as to whether the arresting officers had
probable cause to arrest Rahdar on that date.
Turning to the First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim, a finding of
“probable cause [will] generally defeat a retaliatory arrest claim.” Nieves v.
Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 406 (2019). Probable cause is not, however, required “when
a plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise
similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had
not been.” Id. at 407. In their summary judgment brief, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim fails because the arresting
officers had probable cause to arrest Rahdar and no evidence indicates that any
individual had escaped arrest for engaging in the novel conduct that Rahdar
allegedly committed. Defendants also argue that “[n]o evidence supports Rahdar’s
claim of retaliation.” Dkt. 70 at 20. Although I do not believe Beckwith’s expected
testimony relates to the probable cause issue, it unquestionably relates to the
retaliation issue. Defendants have sought summary judgment on the ground that
there is no evidence of retaliation even if Plaintiffs establish that (1) there is no
probable cause; or (2) there is probable cause, but no others similarly situated are
typically arrested for the underlying conduct at issue.
I agree with Defendants that they are entitled to a prompt decision on the
qualified immunity issue. See Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir.
2021) (“Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit, not merely a
defense to liability, . . . a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity should be
determined at the earliest possible stage of the litigation.” (cleaned up)). I intend
to resolve the pending Motion for Summary Judgment as quickly as possible. But
I cannot decide a summary judgment motion in which Defendants claim, in part,
that there is no evidence of retaliation without allowing Plaintiffs to obtain and
present Beckwith’s testimony, which is expected to directly address that issue. As
an aside, I agree with Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs should have previously
disclosed Beckwith as a potential witness in this case. Nonetheless, keeping in
mind that Rule 56(d) motions are “broadly favored and should be liberally
granted,” I think the most prudent course at this juncture is to allow Plaintiffs a
reasonable period of time to take Beckwith’s deposition and present such
testimony as part of the summary judgment record. Biles, 714 F.3d at 894
(quotation omitted).
For these reasons, I grant Plaintiffs’ request to take Beckwith’s deposition
before I rule on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The deposition must be
completed by January 10, 2025. Plaintiffs may provide an Amended Response to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment by January 22, 2025. Defendants may
file an Amended Reply in Support of Summary Judgment by January 31, 2025. I
will then take the Motion for Summary Judgment under consideration. To the
extent Plaintiffs seek any additional discovery beyond Beckwith’s deposition, that
request is denied.
SIGNED this 15th day of November 2024.
______________________________
ANDREW M. EDISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE