The opinion
Filed 11/15/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G062674
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-
01047183)
EXPERIAN DATA CORP.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Donald F. Gaffney, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, Mark Ankcorn and Kevin King,
Deputy City Attorneys, and Blood Hurst & O’Reardon, Timothy G. Blood,
Leslie E. Hurst and Paula R. Brown for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jones Day, Nathaniel P. Garrett, Richard J. Grabowski, John A.
Vogt and Ryan D. Ball, for Defendant and Respondent.
In this case of first impression, we are asked to determine
whether the discovery rule can apply to delay the accrual of a non-fraud civil
enforcement action brought by the San Diego City Attorney (City Attorney),
pursuant to the unfair competition law (UCL), as set forth in Business and
1
Professions Code section 17200 et seq. We conclude the City Attorney can
invoke the discovery rule. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Complaint, Demurrer, and Summary Judgment Motions
On March 6, 2018, the City Attorney, on behalf of the People of
the State of California, filed a complaint for civil penalties, alleging a single
cause of action for violation of the UCL against Experian. The predicate
violation was the failure of Experian to promptly provide notice to consumers
following discovery of a data breach as required by Civil Code section
2
1798.82(a). The original complaint sought only civil penalties, but in the
Second Amended Complaint, the operative complaint in this matter, the City
Attorney also sought injunctive relief, specifically, an order requiring
Experian to give notice to California victims.
The UCL claim is subject to a four-year limitation period, and
Experian demurred to the complaint on statute of limitations ground. The
1
All further statutory references are to the Business &
Professions Code unless otherwise stated.
2
We deny the City Attorney’s request for judicial notice of certain
documents, including the legislative history of Civil Code section 1798.82, the
San Diego City Charter, and various websites, because the submitted
materials are not relevant to our disposition.
2
trial court (Judge Nathan Scott) overruled the demurrer, concluding the
complaint does not show “on its face the UCL claim accrued before 3/6/14.”
The parties subsequently filed summary judgment motions, and
the trial court (Judge Richard Oberholzer) denied the motions. Experian’s
summary judgment motion was based on the statute of limitations. As noted
by the trial court, “[t]he parties are in agreement that [Experian] first
breached its obligations under Civil Code [section] 1798.82 (the predicate act
supporting the UCL claim) on September 6, 2013, which is more than 4-years
[sic] prior to the initiation of this action.” Thus, the action is untimely unless
an equitable exception applies to delay accrual.
In denying Experian’s summary judgment motion, the trial court
first distinguished Gabelli v. S.E.C. (2013) 568 U.S. 442 (Gabelli), in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held the discovery rule cannot be applied to delay
accrual of an action “where the plaintiff is not a defrauded victim seeking
recompense, but is instead the government bringing an enforcement action
for civil penalties.” (Id. at p. 449.) The trial court noted that under federal
law, the application of common-law discovery rule to delay accrual of actions
is “‘very limited’” and must be used with ‘’great caution.”’ (Id. at p. 454.) In
contrast under California common law, the delayed discovery rule should be
applied to actions unless expressly precluded. Moreover, Gabelli is factually
distinguishable because the instant action sought injunctive relief in addition
to civil penalties.
The trial court further concluded the undisputed facts did not
preclude application of the delayed discovery rule. The court rejected
Experian’s argument that the City Attorney was on inquiry notice
throughout 2013 and early 2014 based on: news articles from the period
discussing the data breach; congressional hearings in late 2013 concerning
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this topic; the criminal indictment of the perpetrator of the data breach,
which was unsealed on October 17, 2013; and 2013 litigation between
Experian and the former owner of the consumer data which was stolen. The
court found the new articles contained no reference to Experian or its alleged
failure to provide notice to affected individuals. Likewise, the publicly
available court documents did not put the City Attorney on inquiry notice of
Experian’s failure to provide notice to affected individuals. Finally, the court
found the record supported a discovery date of March 18, 2014, which is
“within 4 years of the filing on this action on March 6, 2018.” The record
showed that in congressional hearings, an Experian representative stated
Experian knew the individuals who had their data stolen and “‘we are going
to make sure they are protected.’” However, on March 18, 2014, this
testimony was corrected to state that Experian did not know the affected
individuals. Thus, it can be inferred that on this date, the City Attorney was
on inquiry notice that Experian would not provide notice to affect individuals
pursuant to Civil Code section 1798.82.
B. Experian’s Motion In Limine
Before trial, Experian moved to exclude evidence relating to civil
penalties, arguing the “claim for civil penalties is time-barred and not subject
to the discovery rule.” In its motion in limine, Experian argued the same
reasons for rejecting the discovery rule in Gabelli, supra, 568 U.S. 442, apply
with equal force to the instant action. Those reasons include:
(1) governmental agencies are in a state of constant investigation and have
enforcement tools not available to the ordinary plaintiff; (2) civil penalty
actions seek remedies beyond compensation; and (3) the inherent difficulty in
determining when the claim is first discovered and by whom when
governmental entities are involved.
4
Over the City Attorney’s opposition, the trial court granted
Experian’s motion. The court first found that the UCL claim accrued on
September 6, 2013, based on the City Attorney’s responses to interrogatories.
It rejected the City Attorney’s argument that Experian’s public statements in
late 2013 and early 2014 that it was working to identify affected individuals
altered this accrual date or created an additional accrual date. The court
then “conclude[d] that the delayed discovery rule may or may not apply to a
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UCL action depending on the nature of the claim asserted.” However, “[t]he
court, for two reasons, [found] that the . . . discovery rule does not apply in
the instant case.” First, no case has applied the discovery rule to delay
accrual of a non-fraud UCL claim. Second, no case has applied the discovery
rule to enforcement actions seeking civil penalties. The court thus declined
“to extend the . . . discovery rule to governmental actions seeking the
imposition of civil penalties.”
On December 12, 2022, the City Attorney moved for
reconsideration of the court’s order granting Experian’s motion in limine.
The City Attorney asserted that five days after the court’s order, she learned
for the first time that Experian had entered into a tolling agreement with the
California Attorney General, which would toll the limitations period of the
3
Although the trial court used the term “delayed discovery rule,”
we will use the term “discovery rule” in accordance with the practice of our
Supreme Court. Both terms refer to the common-law rule delaying accrual of
a claim until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the claim.
(See, e.g., Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1109, fn. omitted
(Jolly) [“The discovery rule provides that the accrual date of a cause of action
is delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury and its negligent cause”].)
5
instant UCL claim. The trial court denied the motion, concluding the City
Attorney failed to produce admissible evidence such a tolling agreement
existed.
The City Attorney also moved for leave to file a Third Amended
Complaint to allege, among other things, the UCL claim under the unlawful
and unfair prongs of the UCL for Experian’s misrepresentations that it would
locate and protect individuals affected by the data breach. The trial court
denied the motion on the ground that the proposed amendments would not
affect the court’s order.
Thereafter, on March 14, 2023, the parties stipulated to the
dismissal of the entire complaint, including the claim for injunctive relief,
and requested the court enter judgment in favor of Experian. The stipulation
noted: “the People and [Experian] agree that if presented with a proper
motion concerning the People’s UCL claim for injunctive relief, the Court
would apply the same reasoning from its . . . order, with the same result.”
Following entry of judgment, the City Attorney appealed.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law
The City Attorney argues the trial court erred in granting
Experian’s motion to preclude evidence of civil penalties based on the statute
of limitations. Generally, a superior court’s ruling on a motion in limine is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Tudor Ranches, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins.
Fund (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1431.) However, where the court’s ruling
“precludes an entire cause of action, the ruling is subject to independent
review on appeal as though the court had granted a motion for nonsuit.”
(Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1279.) Experian argues we
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should apply an abuse of discretion standard because the court’s in limine
ruling only excluded evidence of civil penalties, and did not touch the
injunctive relief portion of the UCL claim. However, the trial court’s
conclusion that the claim for civil penalties is time-barred would apply with
equal force to the claim for injunctive relief. Thus, “[w]e will independently
review the granting of defendant’s motion in limine, viewing the record in the
light most favorable to plaintiff[ ] and determining whether the evidence and
inferences were sufficient to support a judgment in defendant’s favor.” (Id., at
p. 1282) Moreover, the ruling concerns “[t]he application of the statute of
limitations on undisputed facts[, which] is a purely legal question.” (Aryeh v.
Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh).)
Accordingly, we review de novo whether the discovery rule applies to delay
accrual of the UCL claim.
“An affirmative defense, the statute of limitations exists to
promote the diligent assertion of claims, ensure defendants the opportunity
to collect evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from
dilatory suits once excess time has passed. [Citations.] The duration of the
limitations period marks the legislatively selected point at which, for a given
claim, these considerations surmount the otherwise compelling interest in
adjudicating on their merits valid claims. [Citations.]” (Aryeh, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 1191.) The UCL has a four-year limitations period. (Id. at p.
1192.)
“The limitations period, the period in which a plaintiff must bring
suit or be barred, runs from the moment a claim accrues. [Citations.]
Traditionally at common law, a ‘cause of action accrues “when [it] is complete
with all of its elements”—those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and
causation.’ [Citations.] This is the ‘last element’ accrual rule: ordinarily, the
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statute of limitations runs from ‘the occurrence of the last element essential
to the cause of action.’ [Citations.]” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1191-
1192.) Here, the City Attorney does not challenge the trial court’s finding
that under the last element rule, the UCL claim accrued on September 6,
2013.
“To align the actual application of the limitations defense more
closely with the policy goals animating it, the courts and the Legislature have
over time developed a handful of equitable exceptions to and modifications of
the usual rules governing limitations periods. These doctrines may alter the
rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running
of the limitations period, or both. The “‘most important’” of these doctrines,
the discovery rule, where applicable, ‘postpones accrual of a cause of action
until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.’
[Citations].” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.)
“The discovery rule provides that the accrual date of a cause of
action is delayed until the plaintiff is aware of her injury and its negligent
cause. [Citation.] A plaintiff is held to her actual knowledge as well as
knowledge that could reasonably be discovered through investigation of
sources open to her. [Citation.]” (Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1109, fn.
omitted.) The latter is referred to as inquiry notice. A plaintiff is on inquiry
notice “when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was
caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” (Id.
at p. 1110, fn. omitted.) “A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’
necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial
discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an
incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So
8
long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts;
she cannot wait for the facts to find her.” (Id. at p. 1111.)
Where a statute is silent on the applicability of common law
accrual rules, we presume “the Legislature intended the well-settled body of
law that has built up around accrual, including the traditional last element
rule and its equitable exceptions, to apply fully . . . .” (Aryeh, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 1193.) Because the UCL is silent on accrual, it “is governed by
common law accrual rules to the same extent as any other statute. That a
cause of action is labeled a UCL claim is not dispositive; instead, ‘the nature
of the right sued upon’ [citation] and the circumstances attending its
invocation control the point of accrual. The common law last element accrual
rule is the default [citation], while exceptions to that rule apply precisely to
the extent the preconditions for their application are met, as would be true
under any other statute.” (Id. at p. 1196.)
B. Application of Discovery Rule to the Instant UCL Claim
Here, the trial court concluded the discovery rule should not
apply to delay the accrual of the UCL claim based on: (1) the nature of the
claim – a UCL claim not involving fraud or misrepresentation; (2) the nature
of the action – an enforcement action seeking civil penalties; and (3) the
nature of the plaintiff – a governmental entity. We address each reason
seriatim.
1. Non-Fraud UCL Claim
“[T]he discovery rule most frequently applies when it is
particularly difficult for the plaintiff to observe or understand the breach of
duty, or when the injury itself (or its cause) is hidden or beyond what the
ordinary person could be expected to understand.” (Shively v. Bozanich (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1230, 1248.) Thus, where a defendant intentionally hides the
9
breach of duty or injury by means of fraud or misrepresentation, the
discovery rule would apply. (Cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d) [“An action
for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is
not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the
facts constituting the fraud or mistake”].) Likewise, where a fiduciary hides a
breach of duty, the discovery rule applies because it “vindicates the fiduciary
duty of full disclosure; it prevents the fiduciary from obtaining immunity for
an initial breach of duty by a subsequent breach of the obligation of
disclosure.” (Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6
Cal.3d 176, 189.) Finally, “[i]n professional malpractice cases, . . . delayed
accrual is justified on the basis that the expertise expected of professionals is
beyond the ability of laypersons to evaluate, and on the further basis that it
may be impossible for a layperson even to observe the professional’s
application of this expertise.” (Shively, at p. 1248.)
Although the discovery rule has been applied to causes of action
involving fraud, professional negligence or breach of a fiduciary duty, the
discovery rule is not limited only to those claims. (Gryczman v. 4550 Pico
Partners, Ltd. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.) For example, in Shively, supra,
31 Cal.4th 1230, the Supreme Court noted that for defamation claims, the
discovery rule “has been applied when the defamatory statement is hidden
from view as, for example, in a personnel file that generally cannot be
inspected by the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 1249.) In Gryczman, the appellate court
applied the discovery rule to delay accrual of a breach of contract claim that
did not involve fraud or fiduciaries or professional negligence. (See Gryczman,
supra, 107 at pp. 3-4 [applying discovery rule to breach of contract claim
based on failure to provide contractual notice].) As the court explained,
“application of the discovery rule [i]s not governed by the presence of
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deliberate concealment or a heightened level of duty to the plaintiff but by
two overarching principles: ‘[p]laintiffs should not suffer where circumstances
prevent them from knowing they have been harmed’ and ‘defendants should
not be allowed to knowingly profit from their injuree’s ignorance.’” (Id. at pp.
5-6, fn. omitted, quoting April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV (1983) 147
Cal.App.3d 805, 831.)
Here, the predicate violation was Experian’s alleged failure to
notify individuals affected by the data breach in a timely manner. Whether
Experian breached this disclosure obligation depends on the “legitimate
needs” of the criminal investigation and the reasonableness of any delay.
(See Civ. Code, § 1798.82, subd. (a) [“A person or business that conducts
business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized data that
includes personal information, shall disclose a breach of the security of the
system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the
data to a resident of California . . . . The disclosure shall be made in the most
expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with the
legitimate needs of law enforcement . . .”].) The record indicates the data
breach was not publicly known until the criminal indictment was unsealed in
October 2013. Even after the date breach was revealed, Experian made public
statements in March 2014 that it was working to investigate the data breach
and protect affected individuals. Thus, it would be particularly difficult to
ascertain if or when Experian breached its disclosure duties. These
circumstances support application of the discovery rule to delay accrual of the
instant UCL claim notwithstanding the lack of fraud or misrepresentation.
2. Enforcement Action Seeking Civil Penalty
Similarly, the fact that the instant matter is an enforcement
action seeking civil penalties does not preclude application of the discovery
11
rule. For example, in Montalti v. Catanzariti (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 96, the
appellate court held that the discovery rule applies to an action seeking civil
penalties under the Invasion of Privacy Act (Pen. Code, § 630 et seq.), for a
defendant’s eavesdropping by means of an extension telephone. (Id. at pp. 98-
100.) The court found the applying the discovery rule was appropriate
because “secret monitoring of private conversations is conduct not subject to
contemporary reasonable discovery.” (Id. at p. 99.)
As for enforcement actions brought by governmental entities, the
Legislature has codified the discovery rule for numerous enforcement actions.
For example, “[a]n action commenced under the Porter-Cologne Water
Quality Control Act (Division 7 (commencing with Section 13000) of the
Water Code . . . shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
the State Water Resources Control Board or a regional water quality control
board of the facts constituting grounds for commencing actions under their
jurisdiction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (i).) “An action commenced under
Division 26 (commencing with Section 39000) of the Health and Safety Code .
. . shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the State Air
Resources Board or by a district, as defined in Section 39025 of the Health
and Safety Code, of the facts constituting grounds for commencing the action
under its jurisdiction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (k).) “An action
commenced under Section 1602, 1615, or 5650.1 of the Fish and Game Code .
. . shall not be deemed to have accrued until discovery by the agency bringing
the action of the facts constituting the grounds for commencing the action.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (l).) “An action commenced under Section
4601.1 of the Public Resources Code, if the underlying violation is of Section
4571, 4581, or 4621 of the Public Resources Code, or of Section 1103.1 of Title
14 of the California Code of Regulations, and the underlying violation is
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related to the conversion of timberland to nonforestry-related agricultural
uses . . . shall not be deemed to have accrued until discovery by the
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd.
(o).)
The statute of limitations for the false advertising law (FAL),
sections 17500 et seq., is particularly illustrative. “An action commenced
under Section 17536 of the Business and Professions Code . . . shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party, the
Attorney General, the district attorney, the county counsel, the city
prosecutor, or the city attorney of the facts constituting grounds for
commencing the action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (h).) Section 17536,
subdivision (a) provides: “Any person who violates any provision of this
chapter shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and
recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the State of
California by the Attorney General or by any district attorney, county
counsel, or city attorney in any court of competent jurisdiction.” “The
provisions of the UCL and FAL that govern the determination of civil
penalties are identical.” (People v. Ashford University, LLC (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 485, 498.) In light of the similarities between the UCL and FAL,
the common law discovery rule should apply to enforcement action seeking
civil penalties under the UCL.
Experian’s reliance on Eisenberg Village etc. v. Suffolk
Construction Co., Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1201 is misplaced. In Eisenberg,
the appellate court declined to apply the discovery rule to a claim under
section 7031, subdivision (b), which allows “any person who utilizes the
services of an unlicensed contractor to bring an action for disgorgement of all
13
compensation paid for the performance of any act or contract, regardless of
whether there was any fault in the contractor’s work.” (Id. at p. 1203.) The
court concluded there was no equitable basis for the discovery rule because
“[a] section 7031(b) claim does not require that the plaintiff suffer any injury,
or at least an injury in the sense used by the courts to justify an equitable
exception to the ordinary rules of accrual.” (Id. at p. 1213.) The Eisenberg
court noted that under section 7031, a plaintiff can seek disgorgement from
an unlicensed contractor for a building construction project even if “there are
no problems with the construction or the building.” (Id. at p. 1214.) In
contrast, although proof of an injury is not required to recover on the instant
UCL claim, the complaint does allege individuals affected by the data breach
and the subsequent failure to receive timely notice suffered harm.
Specifically, the complaint alleges the “ongoing failure to inform victims of
the [data breach] so they could take steps to protect their identities and
credit is substantially injurious to [the] victims.” These allegations justify
application of the discovery rule in this case.
Similarly, Experian’s reliance on Gabelli, supra, 568 U.S. 442,
and its progeny is misplaced. The holding in those cases that the discovery
rule should not apply to governmental actions seeking civil penalties was
reached under legal precedent that “the cases in which ‘a statute of limitation
may be suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself . . . are very
limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; otherwise the
court would make the law instead of administering it.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p.
454.) In contrast, under California law, where the statute is silent on accrual,
it is presumed that the discovery rule will apply absent adverse equitable
factors. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1193.)
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3. The People of the State of California as Plaintiff
Finally, the trial court determined that the difficulty in applying
the discovery rule in cases where the People is the plaintiff weighs against
application of the discovery rule. The difficult issues include: “[W]hen the
[People], as opposed to an individual, knew or reasonably” knew of the
wrongdoing and “[w]ho is the relevant actor?” No legal authority supports
the proposition that the difficulty in determining actual knowledge or
constructive notice precludes invocation of the discovery rule. The People
have the burden of proof concerning the discovery rule, and any difficulty in
proof is accounted for under that burden.
As to who is the relevant actor for the purposes of the discovery
rule, the relevant actor depends on the nature of the action. (See Aryeh,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1196 [application of the discovery rule depends on
“‘the nature of the right sued upon’ [citation] and the circumstances
attending its invocation”].) For example, in criminal prosecutions brought by
the People for insurance fraud where the limitations period begins from the
discovery of the crime, “[t]he crucial determination is whether law
enforcement authorities or the victim had actual notice of circumstances
sufficient to make them suspicious of fraud thereby leading them to make
inquiries which might have revealed the fraud.” (People v. Zamora (1976) 18
Cal.3d 538, 571-572.) As noted above, in FAL actions brought on behalf of the
People by a city attorney, the relevant actors for the purposes of the discovery
rule include “the aggrieved party, . . . , [and] the city attorney . . . .” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (h).) Here, the City Attorney is a relevant actor
because the City Attorney brought suit on behalf of the People. If the instant
action was brought to vindicate the rights of individuals affected by the data
breach, those individuals also would be relevant actors. Given that the
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Attorney General might have a tolling agreement with Experian concerning
claims arising from the data breach, the Attorney General also might be a
relevant actor. We need not decide the issue because the trial court made no
finding on whether a relevant actor was on notice of circumstances sufficient
“‘to put a reasonable person on inquiry.’” (Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101.) It is not impossible to make a finding on inquiry
notice, and the record does not conclusively establish the discovery rule would
not save the UCL claim. The trial court thus erred in concluding the City
Attorney could not invoke the discovery rule.
In light of our conclusion that the City Attorney can invoke the
discovery rule, the trial court’s orders granting Experian’s motion in limine
and denying reconsideration are vacated. The matter is remanded for the
trial court to reconsider how the discovery rule will apply in this case, e.g.,
determine when the UCL claim accrued based on the actual or constructive
knowledge of the relevant actors. Because the court’s order denying the City
Attorney’s request to file a third amended complaint was based on the ground
that the proposed amendments to the complaint would not revive the time-
barred claims, that order also is vacated. The trial court shall reconsider the
request after its reconsideration of Experian’s motion in limine, if the City
Attorney still desires to file the proposed third amended complaint.
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III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for further
proceedings in light of this opinion. The City Attorney is entitled to costs on
appeal.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, ACTING P.J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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