People v. Brown

2024 IL 129585

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 129585)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

ALVIN BROWN, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 14, 2024.

JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Rochford, and O’Brien

concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Cunningham specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In October 2019, defendant, Alvin Brown, pleaded guilty to driving while

license revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2016)). Based on his

criminal history, the Boone County circuit court sentenced him to nine years in

prison as a Class X offender under section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of

Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018)). The court later

denied his postplea motion, and the appellate court affirmed. 2023 IL App (4th)

220400, ¶ 1.

¶2 Now on appeal, defendant argues (1) he is entitled to elect the benefit of a Class

X recidivism provision that took effect after sentencing but before the circuit court

ruled on his postplea motion and (2) defense counsel failed to comply with the

requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In July 2017, a grand jury indicted defendant on one count of DWLR (625 ILCS

5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2016)), a Class 2 felony, alleging he drove a motor vehicle

on a state highway at a time when (1) his driving privileges had been revoked due

to his commission of the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and (2) he

had 14 prior violations for DWLR. The bill of indictment indicated defendant was

subject to Class X sentencing.

¶5 In October 2019, defendant entered an open guilty plea to the offense. At the

plea hearing, the circuit court admonished him that, based on his criminal history,

he was subject to sentencing as a Class X offender with a possible sentencing range

of 6 to 30 years in prison. Defendant indicated he understood. Following a factual

basis, the court accepted his guilty plea, finding it knowing and voluntary.

¶6 In November 2019, the circuit court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing.

At that time, the applicable sentencing statute, section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified

Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018)), provided as follows:

“When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class

2 felony *** after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of

an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class

1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater

Class felony, *** and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise

out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X

offender. This subsection does not apply unless:

(1) the first felony was committed after February 1, 1978 ***;

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(2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and

(3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.”

¶7 In support of a Class X sentence, the State’s exhibits showed defendant had

prior felony convictions for (1) burglary, a Class 2 offense committed in September

1978, and (2) rape, a Class X offense committed in July 1981. The State also

submitted evidence indicating defendant was on bond for a March 2017 DWLR

charge when he committed the underlying offense in this case. The State sought a

10-year sentence.

¶8 For the defense, defendant’s sister-in-law, his ex-wife, and his two children

testified on his behalf. Defendant testified he was 64 years old and stated his lengthy

criminal history was the result of “a very bad drug problem.” Defense counsel asked

the circuit court to impose a six-year sentence.

¶9 The circuit court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison and ordered the

sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in Winnebago County

case No. 17-CF-607.

¶ 10 In December 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea

and vacate his sentence, claiming he was forced to plead guilty after his attorney

told him he would receive a 20-year prison sentence if he went to trial. His pro se

motion for reduction of sentence lacked any specific reasons in support of a

reduction, containing only a boilerplate request asking the circuit court to review

his sentence due to “a litany of substantial extenuating circumstances.” The court

appointed counsel.

¶ 11 In July 2020, defense counsel filed a certificate of compliance pursuant to

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), stating he had consulted

with defendant by phone to ascertain his contentions of error in the sentence,

examined the circuit court file and report of proceedings of the sentencing hearing,

and elected not to file an amended motion.

¶ 12 At the hearing on the postplea motions, counsel indicated defendant did not

want to pursue his motion to vacate the guilty plea. Defendant agreed he did not

want to withdraw his plea. Counsel then argued the nine-year Class X sentence was

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excessive and that defendant should have been sentenced as a Class 2 offender. The

circuit court denied the motion, finding the sentence appropriate.

¶ 13 Defendant appealed, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender was

appointed to represent him. In November 2020, appellate counsel filed an

unopposed motion for summary remand, requesting remand for additional

proceedings under Rule 604(d) due to postplea counsel’s deficient certificate of

compliance. The motion alleged counsel’s certificate was deficient, as it did not

certify he consulted with defendant about both his contentions of error in the guilty

plea and the sentencing hearing.

¶ 14 In granting the motion, the Second District vacated the denial of defendant’s

postplea motion and remanded the matter to the circuit court for the filing of a valid

Rule 604(d) certificate, the opportunity for defendant to file a motion to withdraw

the guilty plea and/or reconsider the sentence, and a hearing on any motions. People

v. Brown, No. 2-20-0432 (Dec. 4, 2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 23(c)) (granting defendant’s unopposed motion for summary

remand).

¶ 15 At a January 2021 status hearing, the circuit court asked defense counsel if he

had communicated with defendant as to his wishes regarding the filing of a new

motion to withdraw. Counsel indicated he had spoken with defendant, who simply

wanted counsel to file a new certificate. The court inquired of defendant, telling

him he had two options—counsel could file a new certificate and proceed with the

appeal, or defendant could renew his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and have

a hearing. Defendant indicated he wanted counsel to file a new certificate and to

return to the appellate court.

¶ 16 In February 2021, defense counsel filed a new Rule 604(d) certificate, asserting

as follows:

“1. I have consulted with the Defendant in person, by mail, by phone or by

electronic means to ascertain the defendant’s contentions of error in the entry

of the plea of guilty and in the sentence;

2. I have examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea

of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing; and

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3. I have made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate

presentation of any defects in those proceedings.”

¶ 17 Effective July 1, 2021, the General Assembly amended section 5-4.5-95(b) (see

Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)).

The amended version of the statute provided that for Class X sentencing to apply,

a defendant had to be convicted of “a Class 1 or Class 2 forcible felony” offense

and have prior qualifying convictions that were also forcible felonies. See id.

¶ 18 In March 2022, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate

the sentence, arguing he did not understand the consequences or the effect of his

plea.

¶ 19 In May 2022, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the postplea motion.

Defense counsel filed a third Rule 604(d) certificate, which was similar to the one

filed in February 2021. Counsel indicated defendant did not intend to seek

withdrawal of his guilty plea, only that the consequences of his sentence be

reconsidered. Counsel pointed out the “changes in the law” and noted that, although

“not retroactive,” the previous enhancements would not apply to defendant at the

current time. The court denied the motion to reconsider the sentence, finding the

sentence “appropriate,” “proper,” and “merited” by defendant’s actions.

¶ 20 Defendant appealed, arguing (1) he was entitled to remand for resentencing

because he was not given the opportunity “to elect the benefit of” amendments to

section 5-4.5-95(b), which made the statute inapplicable to his case and took effect

after his sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his postplea motion, and

(2) the record refuted counsel’s certification of compliance under Rule 604(d),

entitling him to further postplea proceedings.

¶ 21 The Fourth District affirmed. 2023 IL App (4th) 220400, ¶ 1. Pertaining to the

amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b), the appellate court found the doctrine of invited

error precluded defendant’s claim that he was entitled to retroactive application of

the amended statute. Id. ¶ 30. The court also found that, because defendant was not

entitled to have the new version of the statute applied to his case, defense counsel

was not ineffective for failing to raise the argument in the motion to reconsider the

sentence. Id. ¶ 51.

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¶ 22 Regarding the Rule 604(d) issue, the appellate court found defense counsel filed

a certificate that was facially compliant with Rule 604(d). Id. ¶ 56. The court also

found the record indicated defendant had been afforded a full and fair second

opportunity to present his motion for reconsideration of his sentence and that

further postplea proceedings were unwarranted. Id. ¶ 61.

¶ 23 In April 2023, defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal, and we

allowed that petition. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25 A. Resentencing and Statutory Amendments

¶ 26 Defendant argues he was entitled to elect the benefit of a Class X recidivism

provision that took effect after sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his

postplea motion. The State initially argues the invited-error doctrine precludes

defendant from claiming he is entitled to resentencing under the amended statute,

as defense counsel explicitly argued the amendment was not retroactive. Defendant,

however, responds that, regardless of whether this court agrees with the State’s

argument, we must still consider the merits of the issue because defense counsel

was ineffective for failing to argue he was entitled to sentencing under the more

favorable version of section 5-4.5-95(b).

¶ 27 A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the

two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People

v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 51. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, “a defendant

must show both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient

performance prejudiced defendant such that he was deprived of a fair trial.” People

v. Cross, 2022 IL 127907, ¶ 19 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

¶ 28 To establish deficient performance, the defendant must show “counsel’s

performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” People v.

Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Prejudice is

established when a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 219-20 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,

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694). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard, and the

failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of

counsel. People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18 (2010).

¶ 29 Whether counsel is ineffective is a question of law subject to de novo review.

People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 52. Moreover, where we are called upon to

employ statutory construction to determine whether a statutory amendment applies

to defendant’s case, that analysis is also subject to de novo review. People v.

Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 15.

¶ 30 Public Act 101-652 was passed by the General Assembly on January 13, 2021,

and signed by Governor Pritzker on February 22, 2021. However, in section 99-

999 of the public act, the legislature delayed implementation of the changes it made

in section 10-281—which amended the recidivism statute by requiring felony

offenses for Class X sentencing to be a “forcible” felony—to July 1, 2021. See Pub.

Act 101-652, § 99-999 (eff. July 1, 2021).

¶ 31 In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of DWLR in October 2019.

In November 2019, the circuit court sentenced him to nine years in prison. A month

later, he filed pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence.

Ultimately, the circuit court denied his remaining postplea motion in May 2022.

¶ 32 Given the change in the sentencing law created by Public Act 101-652,

defendant argues he was entitled to the benefit of the new provision that took effect

after sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his postplea motion. He

contends that, when a new law contains no explicit indication of temporal reach,

section 4 of the Statute on Statutes guides its application. 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2022).

He points out that section 4 provides, in part, that “[i]f any penalty, forfeiture or

punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by

the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the

new law takes effect.” Id. We note the appellate court here found the temporal reach

of the statute was not clearly indicated and analyzed the issue under section 4. 2023

IL App (4th) 220400, ¶ 36.

¶ 33 The State, however, argues the General Assembly clearly stated its intent that

the amendment apply prospectively only by expressly delaying the amendment’s

implementation date in the text of the legislation. The State argues defendant was

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not entitled to elect the benefit of the amendment that took effect after his

sentencing and thus counsel was not ineffective in declining to argue otherwise.

¶ 34 This court has stated, when evaluating a statute enacted after events giving rise

to the litigation, courts evaluate the temporal reach of the new law utilizing the

standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film

Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 201 (2007).

“Under the Landgraf standards, the threshold inquiry is whether the legislature has

expressly prescribed the statute’s temporal reach. If it has, that expression of

legislative intent must be given effect absent some constitutional prohibition

against doing so.” Id. “[W]hen a statute is silent as to temporal reach, section 4 of

the Statute on Statutes supplies the default rule and procedural changes are applied

retroactively.” People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 23.

¶ 35 In Brown, 225 Ill. 2d at 201, the statute in question—juvenile justice reform

provisions—contained a section calling for its delayed implementation. Although

the law was enacted in June 1998, the provisions were not to take effect until

January 1999 or January 2000. Id. This court found it clear “that the law was

intended to have only prospective application.” Id.

¶ 36 In General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 187 (2011), the amendment

at issue was signed into law on August 12, 2005, and became effective on January

1, 2006. Thus, as in Brown, this court found “the delayed implementation date of

the amendment indicates a clear legislative intent for the prospective application of

the provision.” Id.; see Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 23 (noting “a statute that has

an express delayed implementation date but is otherwise silent as to temporal reach

will be applied prospectively”).

¶ 37 We find the legislature clearly stated its intent that the amendment apply

prospectively when it expressly delayed the amendment’s implementation date in

the text of the legislation. Public Act 101-652 expressly stated the relevant

provisions of the Unified Code became effective on July 1, 2021. Thus, section 4

of the Statute on Statutes does not apply here. See Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234

Ill. 2d 393, 406 (2009) (“Because section 4 of the Statute on Statutes operates as a

default standard, it is inapplicable to situations where the legislature has clearly

indicated the temporal reach of a statutory amendment.”).

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¶ 38 Defendant, however, argues a question remains as to whether a defendant has a

right to elect when an amendment is not effective at the time of sentencing but is

effective while the case is still pending in the circuit court. Relying largely on

People v. Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, defendant argues he should have been

able to elect to be sentenced under the amended statute because, even after his

sentencing on November 7, 2019, his postplea motion was pending in the circuit

court when the amendment became effective on July 1, 2021.

¶ 39 In Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶¶ 3, 5, the defendant pleaded guilty, and

the circuit court sentenced him as a Class X offender under the version of section

5-4.5-95(b) in effect prior to July 2021 (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018)).

Thereafter, he filed postplea motions and had his case remanded for compliance

with Rule 604(d). Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶¶ 6-10. His postplea

proceedings continued on remand after the July 2021 amendment to section 5-4.5-

95(b) took effect, until the circuit court denied his amended motion to reconsider

sentence in October 2021. Id. ¶¶ 11-16.

¶ 40 On appeal, the defendant argued the circuit court erred in denying his amended

motion to reconsider sentence because, since his case was still “pending” in the

circuit court, “he was entitled to elect the benefit of the amendment to section 5-

4.5-95 of the Code that took effect after sentencing but before the trial court ruled

on his amended motion to reconsider the sentence.” Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 41 The Second District agreed. Id. ¶ 27. Relying on People v. Feldman, 409 Ill.

App. 3d 1124, 1127 (2011), the appellate court found it was “the order denying his

amended motion to reconsider the sentence that acts as the final judgment in the

underlying proceedings.” Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶ 29; see Feldman,

409 Ill. App. 3d at 1127 (stating the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is

the “final judgment”). Thus, the court found the case was still pending in the circuit

court when the July 1, 2021, amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b) took effect and that

the amended version of the statute should have applied. Spears, 2022 IL App (2d)

210583, ¶ 29. The court then remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id.

¶ 42 We find the Spears analysis misguided, as it looked at the ruling on the amended

motion to reconsider sentence instead of the actual imposition of sentence to

determine when the judgment was final. In doing so, the Spears court failed to

adhere to “our long-standing case law holding that imposition of a sentence

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constitutes the final judgment in a criminal case.” People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965,

¶ 23; see People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492, ¶ 19 (“ ‘The final judgment in a

criminal case is the sentence.’ ” (quoting People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 51

(1984))). Thus, because the sentence had been imposed and rendered a final

judgment in that case, the defendant could not elect the benefit of the newer version

of the statute that took effect thereafter. It should be noted that, after Spears was

decided, this court in Walls explicitly stated its disagreement with Feldman and

overruled it. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, ¶ 24. Given Spears’s similar holding, that

decision is likewise overruled.

¶ 43 On both dates of defendant’s offense (June 3, 2017) and sentence (November

7, 2019) in this case, section 5-4.5-95(b) made him eligible for mandatory Class X

sentencing. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2018). Because the amended statute was

not yet in effect when the circuit court sentenced him in November 2019, defendant

was not entitled to be sentenced under the newer version of section 5-4.5-95(b).

The operative time for determining whether the amended statute applies is the date

of sentencing, and that defendant had a pending postplea motion does not change

the fact that the judgment had been finalized before the July 1, 2021, effective date.

Thus, we reject defendant’s argument that judgment was not final and the

proceedings were ongoing until May 2022 such that he could elect to avail himself

of the newer version of the statute.

¶ 44 Moreover, because defendant was not entitled to be sentenced under the newer

version of section 5-4.5-95(b), where the amended statute was not yet in effect

when the circuit court sentenced him in November 2019, he suffered no prejudice

when defense counsel agreed that the new statute was not retroactive. Thus, counsel

did not render ineffective assistance.

¶ 45 B. Rule 604(d) Compliance

¶ 46 Defendant argues defense counsel failed to comply with the requirements of

Rule 604(d), thereby depriving him of a full and fair hearing on his sentencing

claim. He asks this court to remand for further postplea proceedings.

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¶ 47 Rule 604(d) governs the procedure to be followed when a defendant wishes to

appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1,

2017). Specifically, Rule 604(d) provides:

“The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate stating that

the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic

means or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the sentence

and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the

report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the

sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for

adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.” Id.

The filing of a Rule 604(d) certificate allows the circuit court to ensure counsel has

reviewed the defendant’s claim and considered all relevant bases for moving to

withdraw the guilty plea or to reconsider the sentence. In re H.L., 2015 IL 118529,

¶ 10. “ ‘The attorney certificate thereby encourages the preservation of a clear

record, both in the trial court and on appeal, of the reasons why a defendant is

moving to withdraw his plea or to reduce sentence.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Shirley,

181 Ill. 2d 359, 361 (1998)). Rule 604(d) warns that any issue not raised by the

defendant in the motion to reconsider sentence or the motion to withdraw the guilty

plea shall be deemed waived on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 48 “This court requires strict compliance with the certification requirement of Rule

604(d).” H.L., 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 8. Counsel’s failure to strictly comply with the

rule “requires ‘a remand to the circuit court for the filing of a new motion to

withdraw guilty plea or to reconsider sentence and a new hearing on the motion.’ ”

People v. Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 33

(1994)). Whether counsel has complied with Rule 604(d) is a question of law that

is reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 49 In this case, defendant concedes defense counsel’s certificate complied with

Rule 604(d). However, even with the facially sufficient certificate, defendant

argues a review of the record refutes the validity of the certificate such that he did

not receive a full and fair hearing on his sentencing claim. See People v. Curtis,

2021 IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 36 (stating the record may be utilized to refute

compliance with a facially valid Rule 604(d) certificate).

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¶ 50 In December 2019, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea

and a motion to reduce his sentence. After his appointment, defense counsel filed

his Rule 604(d) certificate in July 2020. At the July 2020 hearing on the postplea

motions, counsel told the circuit court that defendant did not want to withdraw his

plea but instead argued his sentence was excessive. Counsel noted defendant had

been arrested “a number of times” but the State on those occasions “chose not to

upgrade it” to a felony. Considering his age and the length of his prison sentence,

counsel asked the court to reconsider its decision. The court denied the motion to

reconsider sentence.

¶ 51 After the case was remanded by the appellate court, defense counsel filed a

second Rule 604(d) certificate in February 2021. In March 2022, counsel filed a

motion to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the sentence, claiming defendant did

not understand the consequences of the plea. Counsel then filed his third Rule

604(d) certificate in May 2022.

¶ 52 At the May 2022 hearing, defendant indicated he had had enough time to speak

with counsel about all the issues. Counsel indicated defendant did not wish to

pursue his motion to withdraw his guilty plea but instead wanted his sentence

reconsidered. Counsel said he was “going back to what we had brought up at the

past hearing” and stipulating to the prior arguments on the motion to reduce the

sentence made at the July 2020 hearing. He went on to argue the sentence was

enhanced because of reasons that did not apply at the time of the May 2022 hearing.

He asked the circuit court “on the basis of justice” to reconsider in light of the

“recent changes in the law.” The court denied the motion.

¶ 53 The point of Rule 604(d) is to “ ‘protect the defendant’s interests through

adequate consultation. The certificate serves as evidence that the requisite

consultation has taken place.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Gorss, 2022 IL 126464, ¶ 16

(quoting People v. Easton, 2018 IL 122187, ¶ 32). This court has rejected

arguments that the strict compliance standard of Rule 604(d) “must be applied so

mechanically as to require Illinois courts to grant multiple remands and new

hearings following the initial remand hearing.” Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 369. Where a

defendant has been “afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion

for reduced sentencing,” there is “limited value in requiring a repeat of the exercise,

absent a good reason to do so.” Id.

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¶ 54 Here, the record shows defendant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to

present his postplea claims. Beyond the sentencing hearing, the circuit court had

two opportunities to reconsider defendant’s sentence. Consistent with counsel’s

valid certificate, defendant explicitly told the court that he had enough time to speak

with counsel regarding the issues. Counsel then argued the sentence was excessive

considering the nature of the offense and even noted the change in the law. Nothing

indicates the ruling would be different following a third attempt at reconsideration.

Moreover, counsel’s argument sufficiently presented the claim to the circuit court

and allowed for appellate review. Thus, requiring another remand and a hearing on

the motion to reduce the sentence “would be an empty and wasteful formality.” Id.

at 370.

¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment.

¶ 57 Judgments affirmed.

¶ 58 JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring:

¶ 59 I agree with the majority that the judgment of the appellate court must be

affirmed. However, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning in reaching that result.

I believe the majority misconstrues the principal issue presented in this appeal, and

I thus specially concur.

¶ 60 I. Brown’s Reliance on Spears

¶ 61 In October 2019, the defendant, Alvin Brown, pled guilty to the offense of

driving while license revoked (DWLR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d-5) (West 2016)).

Based on his criminal history, Brown was found eligible for a Class X sentence,

which has a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

25(a), 5-4.5-95(b) (2018). On November 7, 2019, the trial court sentenced Brown,

as a Class X offender, to nine years in prison.

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¶ 62 On December 9, 2019, Brown filed three pro se motions: (1) a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence, (2) in the alternative, a motion

seeking to reduce his sentence, and (3) a motion for the appointment of counsel.

The trial court granted the latter motion and appointed counsel to represent Brown

during his postplea proceedings. Following a hearing, the trial court denied

Brown’s remaining postplea motions.

¶ 63 On appeal, the appellate court vacated the circuit court’s orders denying

Brown’s postplea motions and summarily remanded the matter to the circuit court

for the filing of a valid attorney certificate of compliance as required by Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). People v. Brown, No. 2-20-0432

(Dec. 4, 2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

23(c)). Brown was also given the opportunity to file new postplea motions and to

have a new motion hearing. Id. Upon remand to the circuit court, defense counsel

filed a motion to reconsider Brown’s sentence.

¶ 64 In January 2021, while Brown’s new postplea motion to reconsider his sentence

was still pending, the Illinois General Assembly enacted an amendment to the Class

X sentencing statute to provide that a defendant must have been convicted of “a

Class 1 or Class 2 forcible felony” offense and have prior qualifying convictions

that were also forcible felonies in order to be sentenced as a Class X offender. Pub.

Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)). The

amended statute went into effect on July 1, 2021. There is no dispute that Brown

would not have qualified for Class X sentencing had the amended statute been in

effect at the time of his sentencing in November 2019.

¶ 65 On May 11, 2022, the trial court denied Brown’s new postplea motion to

reconsider his sentence, finding that the nine-year sentence imposed in November

2019 was appropriate. Brown appealed.

¶ 66 On appeal, Brown argued that (1) he was entitled to a remand for resentencing

because he was not given the opportunity “to elect the benefit of” the new, more

favorable sentencing law that became effective in July 2021 and (2) the record

showed his counsel had not filed a valid Rule 604(d) certificate, thus requiring

further postplea proceedings. The appellate court rejected both arguments and

affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. 2023 IL App (4th) 220400. This court

allowed Brown’s petition for leave to appeal.

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¶ 67 On appeal to this court, Brown maintains that he is entitled to be resentenced

pursuant to the amended sentencing statute because his postplea proceedings were

pending in the trial court when the amendment went into effect. He argues that the

trial court retained jurisdiction over his case during ongoing postplea proceedings

and, therefore, had the authority to change his sentence in compliance with the

updated sentencing law. In other words, Brown asks this court to treat the trial

court’s ruling on his postplea motion as the date of “judgment” for purposes of

determining the applicability of the amended statute to his sentencing situation.

¶ 68 In support of his argument that he is entitled to resentencing, Brown relies

principally on People v. Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583. The relevant facts in

Spears are nearly identical to those in this case. In that case, the defendant, Michael

Spears, pled guilty to various offenses and was sentenced as a Class X offender in

June 2019. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. Spears filed a postplea motion to reconsider sentence, which

was denied. Id. ¶ 8. The appellate court then vacated the trial court’s order and

remanded the case for compliance with Rule 604(d). Id. ¶ 10. Upon remand to the

trial court, on May 18, 2021, Spears filed a new motion to reconsider sentence, and

on September 14, 2021, he filed an amended motion to reconsider sentence. Id.

¶¶ 11, 13. On October 5, 2021, the trial court denied Spears’s amended motion. Id.

¶ 16. On appeal, Spears made the same argument Brown makes in the present case.

Spears argued “that he was entitled to elect the benefit of the amendment to section

5-4.5-95 of the Code that took effect after sentencing but before the trial court ruled

on his [postjudgment] amended motion to reconsider the sentence.” Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 69 The appellate court agreed with Spears and remanded the matter for a new

sentencing hearing to allow the trial court to resentence Spears in accord with the

new sentencing statute. Id. ¶ 29. Citing People v. Feldman, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1124,

1127 (2011), the appellate court reasoned that,

“[b]ecause defendant entered an open guilty plea, he could not file an appeal

without first filing a motion to reconsider the sentence or a motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, and it is the order denying his amended motion to reconsider

the sentence that acts as the final judgment in the underlying proceedings.”

(Emphasis added.) Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶ 29.

The Spears court further held that, because the proceedings in the trial court were

ongoing when the statute took effect on July 1, 2021, the new version of the statute

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should have applied to Spears’s motion to reconsider sentence and the trial court

erred in denying Spears’s amended motion to reconsider on that ground. Id.

According to the Spears court, denying Spears the benefit of the new sentencing

law would lead to an absurd result because, if the trial court had granted the

amended motion to reconsider on a different ground, e.g., that the sentence was

excessive, the new, more favorable sentencing statute would have applied at

Spears’s new sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 70 The problem with Brown’s reliance on Spears is that this court has considered,

and rejected, the precise rationale underlying the holding in Spears. In People v.

Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶¶ 46-47, two juvenile defendants argued that an amended

sentencing statute that became effective while the defendants’ cases were pending

on direct appeal in the appellate court should be applied to their cases. This court

held that their argument was foreclosed by the language in the second sentence of

section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016)). Hunter, 2017 IL

121306, ¶ 52. That section states, “[i]f any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be

mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of

the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes

effect.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016). This court noted that the quoted language meant

that, if the statutory changes mitigated a punishment, those changes could not be

applied to defendants who “were sentenced before the statute took effect”

(emphasis added) (Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 52), because the sentencing is when

a judgment becomes final.

¶ 71 This court thus concluded that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes negated the

defendants’ argument. Our reasoning was as follows:

“In People v. Hansen, 28 Ill. 2d 322, 340-41 (1963), we held that the

defendant was not entitled to be resentenced under the new criminal code,

which went into effect just 13 days after he was sentenced, because, under

section 4, ‘a punishment mitigated by a new law is applicable only to judgments

after the new law takes effect.’ Similarly, in People v. Bradford, 106 Ill. 2d 492,

504 (1985), we held that, under section 4, the defendant was not eligible to be

sentenced under a statutory amendment that became effective while his case

was pending in this court because he had already been sentenced prior to the

statute’s effective date. Where, however, a defendant’s sentence is vacated on

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appeal and the matter remanded for resentencing, under section 4 of the Statute

on Statutes, the defendant may elect to be sentenced under the law in effect at

the time of the new sentencing hearing. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 12

(per curiam) ***.

Here, no dispute exists that defendants were sentenced well before the new

juvenile sentencing provisions, including subsection (b), became effective on

January 1, 2016. Further, defendants make no claim that error occurred in the

trial court that would require vacatur of their sentences and remand for

resentencing, thus giving them the option to be sentenced under subsection (b).

*** Accordingly, defendants are not eligible to be sentenced under

subsection (b).” Id. ¶¶ 54-56.

¶ 72 Subsequently, in People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, ¶ 23, this court reaffirmed

“our long-standing case law holding that imposition of a sentence constitutes the

final judgment in a criminal case.” (Emphasis added.) In so holding, this court

expressly overruled Feldman, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1124, the decision upon which the

Spears court relied. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, ¶¶ 23-24.

¶ 73 Brown attempts to distinguish Hunter on the ground that the amendments in

that case took effect while the defendants’ cases were pending on appeal, while the

amendment in this case took effect while his case was pending in the trial court.

This is a distinction without a difference. As the appellate court below correctly

observed, “the court’s rationale in Hunter was not based upon the fact that the

defendants’ cases were pending on appeal rather than in the trial court when the

amendments took effect, but explicitly on the fact that the defendants ‘were

sentenced well before’ the sentence amendments took effect.” 2023 IL App (4th)

220400, ¶ 40 (quoting Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 55); see People v. Bradford, 106

Ill. 2d 492, 504 (1985) (“Judgment is defined as ‘an adjudication by the court that

the defendant is guilty or not guilty and if the adjudication is that the defendant is

guilty it includes the sentence pronounced by the court.’ [Citation]. Bradford was

sentenced prior to the effective date of [the amended statute], and he is not eligible

to elect to be sentenced under it.”); People v. Hansen, 28 Ill. 2d 322, 341 (1963)

(holding a new sentencing statute did not apply to the defendant under section 4 of

the Statute on Statutes because the judgment and sentence were pronounced prior

to the effective date of the new law); People v. Lisle, 390 Ill. 327, 328 (1945)

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(holding that “Section 4 of the [Statute on Statutes] does not give the defendant the

right to be sentenced under a law not in full force and effect at the time of his

sentence”).

¶ 74 Finally, numerous other appellate decisions have rejected the reasoning of

Spears. See 2023 IL App (4th) 220400, ¶¶ 48-49; People v. Neal, 2024 IL App (4th)

230029-U, ¶¶ 29-30; People v. Foy, 2023 IL App (4th) 220680-U, ¶¶ 30-37; People

v. Stevenson, 2023 IL App (3d) 220055, ¶¶ 16-18; People v. Hilson, 2023 IL App

(5th) 220047, ¶¶ 82-89; People v. Lopez, 2023 IL App (4th) 220144-U, ¶¶ 34-38;

People v. Foster, 2022 IL App (3d) 210342-U, ¶¶ 13-15.

¶ 75 Spears is clearly irreconcilable with this court’s established precedent, and I

agree with the majority that it should be overruled. Supra ¶ 42. Based on our well-

established case law, the date of the final judgment in Brown’s case was the date

of his sentencing (November 7, 2019), not the date that the trial court finally denied

his postplea motion (May 11, 2022). Thus, under section 4 of the Statute on

Statutes, Brown cannot avail himself of the new sentencing law that became

effective after his sentencing date in November 2019. See, e.g., Hunter, 2017 IL

121306, ¶ 55. For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the judgment of the

appellate court must be affirmed.

¶ 76 II. Misconstruing Brown’s Argument

¶ 77 The majority affirms the judgment of the appellate court but, in so doing,

misconstrues the issue presented. The majority frames the issue in this case as

whether the temporal reach of the amended sentencing provision is both retroactive

and prospective, or prospective only. The majority concludes that the provision is

prospective only and, on that basis, affirms the judgment of the appellate court.

However, that is not the argument Brown is raising.

¶ 78 Brown is asking this court to adopt the rule announced in Spears. That is, Brown

is asking this court to hold that, if a new sentencing law becomes effective after a

defendant’s sentencing but while postsentencing proceedings are still pending, the

defendant is entitled to be resentenced under the new sentencing law because the

pendency of the postsentencing issues means the judgment is not yet final. See

Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, ¶ 29 (“it is the order denying his amended

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motion to reconsider the sentence that acts as the final judgment in the underlying

proceedings”). Brown’s argument means that imposition of a sentence would no

longer be a final judgment so long as there were postsentencing matters pending.

This is not a retroactivity argument. Rather, it is an argument that asks this court to

upend established case law regarding when a judgment becomes final.

¶ 79 As Brown argues in his reply brief,

“the effective date [of the amended statute at issue in this case] is ultimately

irrelevant. Indisputably, the amendment was not effective when Mr. Brown was

originally sentenced, and it was effective when the motion to reconsider

sentence was denied. Nothing in the plain language of the amended Class X

recidivism provision addresses this situation. Accordingly, a delayed effective

date sheds no light on the question at issue. In other words, merely saying that

[the] statute applies ‘prospective only’ begs the question: prospective based on

the date of sentencing or the date of the denial of the motion to reconsider

sentence?”

¶ 80 In short, Brown concedes that the amended sentencing statute is only

prospective. However, his contention is that applying the sentencing statute to a

defendant whose proceedings are still pending in the trial court is a prospective

application of the statute because the judgment is not yet final. This argument is, of

course, without foundation in Illinois law.

¶ 81 The majority, by focusing solely on whether the amended sentencing statute is

prospective or retroactive, addresses an issue that is not in dispute. And, in so doing,

the majority fails to address Brown’s actual argument. Although the majority

correctly holds that the “final judgment” was pronounced at Brown’s sentencing in

November 2019 (supra ¶ 42), the majority fails to explain why this matters. The

date of the final judgment matters because the rule, as stated in section 4 of the

Statute on Statutes, is that a new, more favorable sentencing law does not apply to

a defendant if the statute becomes effective after the “judgment” is pronounced,

i.e., after a defendant is sentenced. See 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2018); Hunter, 2017 IL

121306, ¶¶ 52, 54-56. The application of that rule to the present case is

straightforward. Accordingly, the majority’s conclusion that section 4 of the Statute

on Statutes “does not apply” to this case (supra ¶ 37) is simply incorrect.

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¶ 82 The majority should address this issue as it was raised and briefed by the parties

in this appeal. For the foregoing reasons, I therefore specially concur.

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