Veronica Baxter v. Carson Hendren

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11902

____________________

VERONICA BAXTER,

as Personal Representative of the

Estate of Angelo J. Crooms, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,

AL-QUAN PIERCE,

as Personal Representative of the

Estate of Sincere Pierce, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAFET SANTIAGO-MIRANDA,

individually and as an agent of

Brevard County Sheriff's Office,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

Defendant-Counter Claimant,

CARSON HENDREN,

individually and as an agent of

Brevard County Sheriff's Office,

SHERIFF, BREVARD COUNTY FLORIDA,

EVELYN MIRANDA,

as Personal Representative of the

Estate of Jafet Santiago-Miranda,

Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00718-CEM-LHP

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LUCK and HULL, Circuit

Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves a fatal shooting in which Deputy Jafet

Santiago-Miranda fired his weapon into a moving vehicle as it

accelerated toward him and tragically killed two young persons.

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Plaintiffs Veronica Baxter and Al-Quan Pierce sued as

personal representatives of the estates of the driver, Angelo

Crooms, and a passenger, Sincere Pierce, respectively. The

plaintiffs’ complaint asserted that Santiago-Miranda used excessive

force, failed to render medical aid, and was liable for state-law

battery. The plaintiffs’ complaint also raised claims against Deputy

Carson Hendren, who was the other deputy on the scene, and

Sheriff Wayne Ivey in his official capacity.

The three defendants filed a joint motion for summary

judgment on all claims. In their response, the plaintiffs opposed

summary judgment and further stated they had decided not to

pursue certain claims. In a single order, the district court dismissed

with prejudice all claims against defendant Hendren and granted

Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff Ivey’s motion for summary

judgment. The court concluded, among other things, that

defendant Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was constitutionally

permissible. The plaintiffs appeal only the grant of summary

judgment in favor of defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff Ivey.

After careful review of the record and briefs, and with the

benefit of oral argument, we affirm. We divide our discussion into

four parts. First, we examine our appellate jurisdiction because this

case was adjudicated in the district court through a voluntary

dismissal of defendant Hendren and a summary judgment grant as

to defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff Ivey. Second, satisfied

that we have jurisdiction, we determine whether

Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was excessive in violation of the

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Next, we review the plaintiffs’ state law battery claims and, finally,

their Monell claims against Sheriff Ivey. 1

I. BACKGROUND

We recount the evidence of the events in the light most

favorable to the plaintiffs, the non-moving parties. See Cantu v. City

of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 2020). Some events were

captured on defendant Santiago-Miranda’s dashcam in his cruiser.2

A. The Stolen VW Passat

Around 10:15 a.m. on November 13, 2020, Deputy Ezra

Dominguez with the Brevard County Sheriff’s Department was

patrolling the parking lot of a hotel in Cocoa, Florida when he

observed a gray or silver Volkswagen Passat with illegal dark tint

on all windows. Dominguez noticed a man acting suspiciously

near the Passat. A few minutes later, the Passat pulled out of the

hotel parking lot, and Dominguez followed it.

Deputy Dominguez turned on his blue lights and attempted

to conduct a traffic stop on the Passat, but the vehicle did not stop

and drove away at an increasing rate of speed. Dominguez

1 Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

2 The dashcam video was enhanced by the Florida Department of Law

Enforcement (“FDLE”) to more closely show the deputy and the moving

vehicle. On appeal, the plaintiffs do not challenge the admissibility of the

dashcam video. Deputy Hendren did not activate her dashcam.

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terminated the traffic stop and reported the Passat’s description

over the dispatch radio.

At about 10:30 a.m., a woman reported that her silver

Volkswagen Passat with license plate number NWEG22 was

stolen. The stolen Passat was registered to an address in Brevard

County. The dispatch radio reported Dominguez’s attempted

traffic stop and the stolen Passat.

B. Deputies Pursue a VW Passat

Deputies Jafet Santiago-Miranda and Carson Hendren, also

with the Brevard County Sheriff’s Department, received

information over the dispatch radio about the stolen Passat that

fled from Deputy Dominguez. After receiving Dominguez’s

description of the Passat, Santiago-Miranda and Hendren, in their

separate cruisers, met in a liquor store’s parking lot on the corner

of Clearlake Drive and Dixon Boulevard in Cocoa. Both deputies

were in full police uniform, and each drove a marked police cruiser.

At that juncture, approximately 15 minutes after hearing the

dispatch radio, Deputy Hendren, from the parking lot, observed a

gray Volkswagen Passat, which also had illegal dark tint on the

windows, turn quickly onto Dixon Boulevard and speed away. In

their separate cruisers, Santiago-Miranda and Hendren then

followed that Passat down Dixon Boulevard and into a residential

neighborhood. Hendren’s cruiser followed the Passat on one street

through the neighborhood. Santiago-Miranda’s cruiser went down

another street in the neighborhood. Neither deputy activated their

lights or sirens.

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Both deputies thought this Passat was the stolen Passat that

eluded Deputy Dominguez’s attempted stop about 15 minutes

earlier. In this Passat, 16-year-old A.J. Crooms was driving, and his

friend Jaquan Kimbrough-Rucker was in the front passenger seat.

Crooms stopped at Cynthia Green’s house on Exeter Street to pick

up Sincere Pierce, who was Green’s 14-year-old great-nephew.

Pierce entered the Passat and sat in the middle of the backseat

behind driver Crooms’s right shoulder.

When the Passat drove off, Green saw from her house a

sheriff’s deputy vehicle following the Passat. Green got in her car

and began to follow the deputy’s vehicle.

After picking up Pierce at Green’s house, Crooms in the

Passat turned left from Exeter Street onto Ivy Drive. Deputy

Hendren turned onto Ivy Drive a few seconds later, and Deputy

Santiago-Miranda accelerated to fall in behind Hendren’s cruiser.

With both deputies’ cruisers now directly behind, Crooms drove

the Passat down Ivy Drive and turned left onto Stetson Drive.

After that left turn, Crooms immediately turned right into the

driveway of the first house on the right on Stetson Drive.

Deputy Hendren also turned left onto Stetson Drive but

stopped her cruiser in the middle of the street and got out of her

cruiser with her gun drawn. Hendren reported the Passat’s license

plate number—NWEG04 3—to dispatch, but received no response.

3 Since the stolen Passat’s number was NWEG22, the first four characters in

both license plate numbers—NWEG—were the same.

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Deputy Santiago-Miranda also turned left onto Stetson

Drive, pulled up his cruiser to the left of Hendren’s cruiser, and

stopped. Santiago-Miranda activated his cruiser’s overhead

emergency lights but did not activate the sirens. At this point, the

deputies’ two cruisers were parked side-by-side on Stetson Drive.

The photograph below shows the cruisers blocking the

entrance/exit of Stetson Drive with Santiago-Miranda’s cruiser on

the right.

At this time, the Passat is still in the driveway of the first house on

the right on Stetson Drive.

C. Santiago-Miranda Orders Driver to Stop

Santiago-Miranda’s dashcam captured the following events.

The dashcam shows the Passat backing out of the driveway of the

first house on the right of Stetson Drive.

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Backing out, the Passat did not turn its rear toward the cruisers

(which would allow it to continue down the open direction of

Stetson Drive). What happened next gives rise to the shooting.

As shown in the photograph below, Crooms backed out and

turned the front of the Passat directly facing the two deputies and

their cruisers.

With the Passat turned toward the deputies, Hendren raised

her gun and retreated behind her cruiser. Santiago-Miranda exited

his cruiser. Standing at the left side of his cruiser, Santiago-Miranda

issued a command for Crooms to “stop the vehicle!” The above

photograph depicts the scene at 1:06 on the dashcam.

At 1:08, the Passat started slowly moving forward.

Santiago-Miranda issued a second command for Crooms to “stop

the vehicle!” At 1:10, the Passat stopped moving. The Passat was

still facing both cruisers, but was now pointed more closely toward

Santiago-Miranda and his cruiser. Santiago-Miranda issued a third

command for Crooms to “stop the vehicle!” From 1:11 to 1:14, the

Passat did not move. Santiago-Miranda, with increasing volume

and intensity, issued a fourth command to “stop the vehicle!” and

a fifth command to “stop!”

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After the five commands to stop, however, Crooms at 1:15

started reversing the Passat again, now pointing the Passat’s front

directly toward Santiago-Miranda’s cruiser. Santiago-Miranda

announced code 1033 to the dispatch radio to signal an emergency

and request all radio traffic to cease. At 1:16, the Passat was still

reversing. Santiago-Miranda approached the Passat from the left

side of his cruiser with his gun pointed at the Passat.

Santiago-Miranda gave a sixth command to “stop the vehicle, god

damn it,” and took a slight step to his right, closer to his cruiser.

At 1:17, the Passat stopped reversing. The front of the Passat

was now pointed toward Santiago-Miranda and his cruiser. While

stopped, Crooms begins turning the Passat’s wheels slightly to his

right and more toward Santiago-Miranda. Santiago-Miranda

issued a seventh command to “stop!” The photograph below

shows the positioning of the Passat at this point at 1:17.

D. As Passat Accelerates, Santiago-Miranda Fires Weapon

At 1:18-1:19, these next events rapidly occurred in two

seconds. At 1:18, Crooms turned the Passat’s wheels further to his

right, in the direction where Santiago-Miranda was standing on the

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curb or near the curbside. Santiago-Miranda issued his eighth and

final command to “stop!” Instead of stopping, Crooms accelerated

the Passat forward directly toward Santiago-Miranda.

Simultaneously, Santiago-Miranda took a short step to his

left, and the Passat still accelerated forward toward

Santiago-Miranda. The photograph below depicts the scene at this

point with Santiago-Miranda about ten feet away from the front

bumper of the Passat with its wheels turned further to the right.

Then, at 1:19, the Passat was still accelerating at

Santiago-Miranda, who began to fire his gun at the Passat. Within

2.1 seconds, Santiago-Miranda rapidly fired 10 shots with each shot

fired at an average of only 0.236 seconds apart.

When Santiago-Miranda fired his first shot, the Passat had

closed to a distance of 9.05 feet away. Because of the Passat’s

acceleration, the Passat was 6.06 feet away at Santiago-Miranda’s

second shot and 5.74 feet away at his third shot. 4 At the time of

4 These undisputed distance figures were presented in the defendants’ expert

report, filed with their motion for summary judgment.

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this initial rapid firing, the Passat was directly headed toward

Santiago-Miranda as shown in the photograph below.

The entry place of the 10 shots within 2.1 seconds also

reflects the Passat’s acceleration. The first two shots entered into

the center of the front windshield and hit the hood of the Passat.

As the Passat accelerated forward, the next three shots struck the

windshield further to Santiago-Miranda’s right. The final five shots

entered into the driver’s side windows as the vehicle accelerated

over the curb and off of Stetson Drive onto a yard, passing

Santiago-Miranda on his left.

The Passat’s accelerator was completely depressed as it

accelerated forward, and from a full stop, the Passat reached a

maximum speed of 14 miles per hour before crashing into a house.

Deputy Hendren kept her firearm pointed at the Passat while using

both police cruisers as cover. Green parked her car behind the

cruisers, got out, and observed the shooting from about ten feet

behind and to the left of Santiago-Miranda.

A forensic analysis revealed that Santiago-Miranda’s first

shot likely struck the middle of the Passat’s front windshield,

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deflected slightly downward, and struck Pierce, the backseat

passenger, in the chest. Santiago-Miranda’s seventh, eighth, and

ninth shots entered the driver’s side window and likely struck

Crooms in his head, shoulder, and back. Pierce and Crooms later

died from their gunshot wounds.5

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Complaint

The plaintiffs’ operative amended complaint contained ten

counts; specifically, each plaintiff asserted five of the ten counts.

Plaintiff Baxter asserted two counts against defendant

Santiago-Miranda6: Count One combined together excessive force

and failure to render emergency medical aid claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; and Count Two contained state-law battery claims.

Plaintiff Baxter asserted one count against defendant Hendren:

Count Three combined together failure to intervene and failure to

render emergency medical aid claims under § 1983.

Plaintiff Baxter also asserted two counts against defendant

Sheriff Ivey: Count Four for deliberate indifference in training and

Count Five for deliberate indifference in retention under Monell.

5 The accelerator data comes from FDLE’s investigative report. The speed

data and shot entries come from the plaintiffs’ expert report. This data is not

disputed.

6 During the course of the proceedings in the district court, Santiago-Miranda

died. Evelyn Miranda, the personal representative of Santiago-Miranda’s

estate, was substituted as a defendant.

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Plaintiff Pierce asserted separately the same claims against

the same two deputies and the Sheriff in Counts Six through Ten.

B. Summary Judgment Proceedings

The three defendants jointly moved for summary judgment

on all claims. The defendants asserted that (1) Santiago-Miranda’s

use of force was reasonable, (2) Santiago-Miranda and Hendren

rendered emergency medical aid, (3) Hendren had no meaningful

opportunity to intervene, (4) both deputies were entitled to

qualified immunity, and (5) the plaintiffs’ Monell claims against

Sheriff Ivey failed. The defendants requested that their joint

motion for summary judgment be granted as to all defendants on

all claims.

The plaintiffs’ summary judgment response not only

opposed summary judgment, but also stated the plaintiffs had

decided not to pursue certain claims. We discuss the plaintiffs’

response in more detail later.

Ultimately, in its summary judgment order, the district

court (1) dismissed with prejudice all claims against defendant

Hendren, and (2) granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. The plaintiffs timely appealed only the summary

judgment grant in favor of defendants Santiago-Miranda and

Sheriff Ivey.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual

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inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Richmond v. Badia,

47 F.4th 1172, 1179 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).

We review our jurisdiction de novo. Allen v. AT&T Mobility Servs.,

104 F.4th 212, 215 (11th Cir. 2024).

IV. JURISDICTION

This case was adjudicated in the district court through a

voluntary dismissal as to defendant Hendren and a summary

judgment grant as to defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff

Ivey. How a party drops a claim or a defendant can trigger

appellate jurisdictional issues. So, as a threshold matter, we are

obligated to ensure we have jurisdiction. Id. We review the

relevant jurisdictional principles and apply them to this case.

A. Jurisdictional Principles

Generally, our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the

district courts.”7 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision is typically one

that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the

court to do but execute its judgment.” Acheron Cap., Ltd. v.

Mukamal, 22 F.4th 979, 986 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks

omitted). An order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims

against all the parties to an action is typically not a final judgment

from which an appeal may be taken. Sargeant, 689 F.3d at 1246.

7 “There are exceptions to th[is] final judgment rule,” but none of the

exceptions apply here. Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244,

1245 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012).

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To explain the potential finality issue, we review Rules 41(a)

and 15, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that provide several

options for when parties want to dismiss claims or defendants.

Under Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff—without a court order—

may dismiss an “action” by filing “a notice of dismissal before the

opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary

judgment,” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), or “a stipulation of

dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared,” FED. R. CIV.

P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Alternatively, under Rule 41(a)(2), a plaintiff may

also seek dismissal of an “action” “by court order” on terms that

the court considers proper. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).

Rule 41(a) applies to “actions,” not claims. See Esteva v. UBS

Fin. Servs. Inc. (In re Esteva), 60 F.4th 664, 675 (11th Cir. 2023).

“Rule 41(a)’s reference to the voluntary dismissal of ‘an action’

refers to ‘the whole case’ instead of particular claims.” Id.; see also

Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 958 (11th Cir. 2018)

(“There is no mention in the Rule of the option to stipulate

dismissal of a portion of a plaintiff’s lawsuit—e.g., a particular

claim—while leaving a different part of the lawsuit pending before

the trial court.”). Thus, under Rule 41(a), a plaintiff may dismiss

only an entire action. In re Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677.

Further, “in a multi-defendant lawsuit, an ‘action’ can refer

to all the claims against one party.” Rosell v. VMSB, 67 F.4th 1141,

1144 n.2 (11th Cir. 2023). Therefore, under Rule 41(a), a plaintiff

may dismiss an “action” against a single defendant—that is, all

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claims against that defendant. See id.; In re Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677;

Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004).

Now comes the pitfall. A plaintiff may not use Rule 41(a) to

dismiss a single or discrete claim against a single defendant or

against all defendants. In re Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677. Rule 41(a) “does

not permit plaintiffs to pick and choose, dismissing only particular

claims within an action.” Id.; see also Klay, 376 F.3d at 1106. “Our

precedent has been consistent on this point for almost two

decades.” Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144. This limitation applies to

dismissals under both Rule 41(a)(1) and Rule 41(a)(2). Id. As a

result, a Rule 41(a) dismissal of only one of the claims against a

defendant or defendants is ineffective and leaves that claim pending

in the district court, creating a lack of finality. See id.

Plaintiffs who no longer wish to pursue a claim have other

avenues to drop or abandon that claim. For example, one

procedural option is Rule 15. A plaintiff may move to amend the

complaint to add or drop a discrete claim or a defendant under

Rule 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); Perry, 891 F.3d at 958. Rule 15

is the “easiest and most obvious” way to “dismiss a single claim

without dismissing an entire action.” Perry, 891 F.3d at 958.

Rule 15 permits an amendment to the pleadings upon permission

from the opposing party or the court’s leave, and it states that “[t]he

court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “A plaintiff wishing to eliminate particular claims

or issues from the action should amend the complaint under

Rule 15(a) rather than dismiss under Rule 41(a).” Klay, 376 F.3d at

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1106; see also Perry, 891 F.3d at 958 (“Rule 15 was designed for

situations like this.”). Of course, if a plaintiff chooses not to amend

his complaint, he may instead concede a claim in the district court.

Cf. Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2001)

(deeming claim abandoned and affirming grant of summary

judgment as to claim presented in complaint but not raised in

plaintiff’s initial response to summary judgment motion); Rd.

Sprinkler Fitters Loc. Union No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d

1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the district court “could

properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint but

not even raised as a ground for summary judgment”). Although

that route will result in the entry of judgment on that claim against

the plaintiff, this kind of concession, like a Rule 15 amendment,

avoids any finality problems.

When a party attempts to drop a claim or a defendant

without citing one of the rules, or when a party’s language is

ambiguous, our Court has construed a party’s attempt in

accordance with the appropriate rule. See, e.g., Lowery v. AmGuard

Ins. Co., 90 F.4th 1098, 1102–03 (11th Cir. 2024) (concluding

plaintiff’s “notice of intent to abandon” a count functioned as

proper Rule 15 motion); Mid City Mgmt. Corp. v. Loewi Realty Corp.,

643 F.2d 386, 388 n.2 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) (holding no finality

problem resulted where “the defendant actually abandoned its

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counterclaim at trial in response to questioning by the trial

judge”).8

Similarly, when a district court interprets a party’s attempt

to drop or concede a claim, we construe that interpretation to align

with the law. “Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to

apply it in making their decisions.” Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Mil.

Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks

omitted). Where ambiguous or not fully explained, we construe

the district court’s words to support a lawful judgment. Id.

B. Analysis

We turn to what happened here. The plaintiffs’ summary

judgment response not only opposed summary judgment, but also

stated in Section V that the plaintiffs had decided not to pursue

certain claims. Here is the heading and entire text of Section V of

the plaintiffs’ summary judgment response:

V. Plaintiffs dismiss their claims for failure to

render medical aid against Deputy Santiago

and Hendren (part of Counts 1, 3, 6, and 8)

and failure to intervene against Deputy

Hendren (part of Counts 3 and 8)

Plaintiffs have decided not to pursue their claim based

on failure to render emergency medical aid. In

addition, Plaintiffs have decided not to pursue their

8 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed

down prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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claim for failure to intervene against Deputy Carson

Hendren, which results in a dismissal of Plaintiffs’

claims against Deputy Hendren.

Section V’s heading referred to dismissal of the medical aid claims

against both named deputies, but the text’s dismissal request is for

“a dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Deputy Hendren.”

Section V did not cite Rule 41(a) or Rule 15. What’s more, the

plaintiffs did not file a separate motion to dismiss. What was thus

before the district court was (1) the defendants’ joint motion for

summary judgment, and (2) the plaintiffs’ summary judgment

response opposing summary judgment but also containing

Section V.

Here’s how the district court addressed the defendants’

motion and the plaintiffs’ response. Early in its summary judgment

order, the district court construed the plaintiffs’ request in

Section V as a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2)

as follows:

In Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs state that they are no

longer pursuing their claims for failure to render

medical aid as to either of the deputies nor are they

pursuing any of their claims against Hendren. The

court construes this announcement as a Motion for

Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)(2), which will be granted.

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In the conclusion of that summary judgment order, the district

court then granted that construed Motion and “Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment” as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ construed Motion for Voluntary

Dismissal (Doc. 96 at 53) is GRANTED. The claims

against Defendant Carson Hendren are DISMISSED

with prejudice.

2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

62) is GRANTED.

The district court then directed the clerk to “enter judgment in

favor of [Sheriff Ivey] and [Deputy Santiago-Miranda].”

A potential finality issue arises because Rule 41(a)(2) allows

a party to voluntarily dismiss all claims against a defendant (such as

Hendren) but would not permit a party to dismiss, even

voluntarily, a single or discrete claim against a defendant (such as

the discrete medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda). See In re

Esteva, 60 F.4th at 677; Klay, 376 F.3d at 1106; Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144

n.2. If the district court dismissed the medical aid claim against

Santiago-Miranda under Rule 41(a)(2), then that is not permissible

and that medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda remains

pending in the district court. See Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144. But if the

district court dismissed with prejudice all claims against Hendren

and granted summary judgment on all claims against

Santiago-Miranda, then no claims remain pending against

Santiago-Miranda and the judgment is final.

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Helpfully, the district court’s decretal language is divided

into two parts. The decretal language, reasonably read, makes

clear that the district court in the order’s Part (1) dismissed with

prejudice only the claims against defendant Hendren, and then in

Part (2) granted defendant Santiago-Miranda’s motion for

summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, Part (1)

does not mention defendant Santiago-Miranda but expressly refers

to dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims as to only defendant Hendren.

This is what Rule 41(a)(2) allows. As noted above, “[t]rial judges

are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their

decisions.” Burrell, 125 F.3d at 1395 (quotation marks omitted).

We presume the district court knew that it was not permitted to

dismiss a single claim, such as the plaintiffs’ medical aid claim

against Santiago-Miranda, under Rule 41(a)(2). We decline to read

into Part (1) a dismissal of the medical aid claim against

Santiago-Miranda, who is not mentioned in the decretal language

in Part (1).

Rather, it is Part (2) of the decretal language that adjudicates

the plaintiffs’ claims against Santiago-Miranda. In Part (2), the

district court grants the defendant Santiago-Miranda’s motion for

summary judgment without limitation. That motion sought

summary judgment on all the plaintiffs’ claims, including the

medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda. The plaintiffs’

decision not to pursue their medical aid claim against

Santiago-Miranda was tantamount to abandonment of that claim,

entitling the district court to grant Santiago-Miranda summary

judgment on the claim. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1322. The

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

district court accepted the plaintiffs’ abandonment and adjudicated

all claims against Santiago-Miranda when it entered summary

judgment for him.9 Given the purely summary judgment posture

of the case, the district court’s order evinces an intent to dismiss the

plaintiffs’ claims against only Hendren and enter judgment on the

plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Santiago-Miranda and Sheriff

Ivey.

In so ruling, we recognize that the district court’s order

(1) first construes the plaintiffs’ Section V announcement as a

Motion for Voluntary Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) and (2) then,

in the first sentence of Part (1)’s decretal language, states that the

plaintiffs’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal is granted. But, as the

parties’ appellate briefs point out, the text of the plaintiffs’

Section V distinguished between their decision “not to pursue” the

medical aid claims and their request for “dismissal of Plaintiffs’

claims against Deputy Hendren.” Plus, the language in the second

sentence of Part (1) actually “dismissed” only “the claims against

Defendant Carson Hendren,” consistent with that distinction.

At bottom, the two sentences in Part (1) must be read

together and not separately—especially since Part (1) nowhere

names defendant Santiago-Miranda, much less the medical aid

9 Both the plaintiffs and the defendants submit jurisdiction exists. Plaintiffs’

appellate brief asks us to read their Section V as a concession that summary

judgment should be granted on their medical aid claim against

Santiago-Miranda, not an attempted Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal as to only the

medical aid claim against Santiago-Miranda. The defendants agree.

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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 23

claim against him. We should not ignore the intent of the district

court or the parties.

In sum, reasonably read, the district court’s order entered a

final judgment in this action by (1) dismissing with prejudice the

plaintiffs’ claims against only defendant Hendren, and (2) entering

summary judgment for defendants Santiago-Miranda and Ivey.

We have appellate jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

V. EXCESSIVE FORCE

Satisfied that we have appellate jurisdiction, we turn to

whether Deputy Santiago-Miranda used excessive force in

violation of Crooms’s and Pierce’s Fourth Amendment rights.

A. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials

performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

When raising a qualified immunity defense, officers have

“the burden to establish that they were acting within their

discretionary authority.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th

Cir. 2022). If the officers satisfy that burden, then the burden shifts

to the plaintiff to establish that (1) “the defendant violated a

constitutional right,” and (2) “the violation was clearly

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24 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

established.” Christmas v. Harris County, 51 F.4th 1348, 1354 (11th

Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).

The Fourth Amendment provides a “right of the people to

be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from

unreasonable seizures includes the right to be free from excessive

force. Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009).

“In excessive force cases, the first qualified immunity

inquiry—i.e., whether a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were

violated—is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s objective

reasonableness standard.” Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268,

1279 (11th Cir. 2023). In analyzing reasonableness, “we look at the

fact pattern from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the

scene with knowledge of the attendant circumstances and facts,

and balance the risk of bodily harm to the suspect against the

gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.” McCullough v.

Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009).

“Although we construe the facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiffs, we determine reasonableness from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the events

unfolded.” Tillis ex rel Wuenschel v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1298 (11th

Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Our inquiry

does not employ the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (quotation

marks omitted); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)

(providing that reasonableness “must be judged from the

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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 25

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with

the 20/20 vision of hindsight”).

“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for

the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. It is “reasonable, and

therefore constitutionally permissible, for an officer to use deadly

force when he has ‘probable cause to believe that his own life is in

peril.’” Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.

2005)).

B. Vehicle as Deadly Force

Under the Tennessee v. Garner factors, deadly force is

reasonable when an officer (1) has probable cause to believe that a

suspected felon poses a threat of serious physical harm to the

officer or others; (2) reasonably believes that the deadly force was

necessary to prevent escape; and (3) has given some warning about

the possible use of deadly force, if feasible. 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985).

This rule covers situations in which (1) an officer believed his life

was in danger because a suspect used a vehicle as a weapon against

the officer or (2) the suspect’s use of the vehicle otherwise

presented an immediate threat of serious physical harm. See

McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207–08.

Consistently, this Court has upheld an officer’s use of deadly

force in cases where the officer reasonably believed his life was

endangered by a suspect who used or threatened to use his car as a

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26 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

weapon or where the officer reasonably believed the use of a

vehicle presented an immediate threat of serious physical harm.

See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002);

Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1255–56; McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1207–08;

Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1182–83; Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299; Davis v.

Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022).

In Robinson, this Court held that an officer’s use of force was

reasonable where the officer shot a suspect who was slowly driving

a car toward him from a close distance. 415 F.3d at 1256. The

suspect was accelerating at only one to two miles per hour, but the

officer was standing just two to four feet away in a narrow space

between the suspect’s car and another car. Id. at 1254, 1256. The

officer had only 2.72 seconds to react because of the close distance.

Id. at 1256. We concluded that a reasonable officer could have

perceived the car as a deadly weapon, so the officer had probable

cause to believe the suspect posed a threat of serious physical harm

by using his car as a deadly weapon. Id.

Similarly, in Singletary, this Court held that an officer

reasonably used deadly force when he shot at a vehicle accelerating

toward him. 804 F.3d at 1178, 1183. Surveillance video showed

that the officer stood directly in the path of the vehicle and that the

vehicle caused the officer to fall to the ground. Id. at 1178. Even

though the driver applied the brakes at the same moment the

officer fired the shots, there was no “issue of fact as to whether any

danger had dissipated in the split-second immediately preceding

[the officer’s] decision to use deadly force.” Id. at 1183. We also

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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 27

held that the location of the bullet holes in the side of the car, rather

than the front, did not establish that the officer was not in danger

of being hit by the car because surveillance video showed that the

officer was in the path of the car when it accelerated. Id. at 1183–

84.

In Tillis, after a high-speed chase and a crash of the suspect’s

vehicle, an officer stepped out of his cruiser to make an arrest.

12 F.4th at 1295. As the officer approached the suspect’s vehicle,

the vehicle’s reverse lights turned on. Id. The vehicle suddenly

went into reverse and started backing up toward the officer. Id.

The officer began firing at the vehicle and fired 11 shots through

the back windshield and side passenger windows as the car passed

him. Id. After the chambered round, the officer fired a 10-round

magazine and later another 10 rounds. Id. This Court concluded

that the officer reasonably perceived a lethal threat when the

vehicle shifted into reverse. Id. at 1299. We explained that “[w]hen

an officer is on foot and standing in close proximity to a . . . moving

vehicle, [the officer] need not be directly in the vehicle’s path to

fear reasonably for his life,” as the driver could quickly turn the

steering wheel toward the officer. Id. We emphasized that the

officer had no way of knowing whether the vehicle would continue

in a straight line or swerve toward him, and the officer “certainly

did not have time to calculate angles and trajectories to determine

whether he was a few feet outside of harm’s way.” Id.

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28 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

C. Analysis

Santiago-Miranda’s use of deadly force was reasonable

because he had probable cause to believe the Passat’s close position

and acceleration posed a threat of serious physical harm to him.

See Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1184. Although mistaken,

Santiago-Miranda and Hendren reasonably believed the

Crooms-driven Passat was the same stolen Passat that evaded

Deputy Dominguez’s traffic stop at a high rate of speed just 15

minutes earlier. The deputies saw the Passat enter a driveway but

then back out, turning to face the deputies and their cruisers head

on—as opposed to stopping in the driveway or backing out in the

other direction. Crooms then did not comply with

Santiago-Miranda’s eight commands to stop the Passat.

Rather, after reversing, Crooms accelerated the Passat

toward Santiago-Miranda, who was standing only ten feet away.

Santiago-Miranda, on foot, had only a second or two to react.

Santiago-Miranda fired all ten shots within 2.1 seconds as the Passat

moved within 5.74 feet of him. Under these particular

circumstances, Santiago-Miranda had to make a split-second

judgment. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. It was not unreasonable

for Santiago-Miranda to perceive at the time he fired that the Passat

was accelerating at him and posed a threat of serious physical harm.

Contra Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1329–32 (11th

Cir. 2021) (explaining that the vehicle was merely idling, officers

thought the car was going to stop, officers were safely on the side

of the car but continued walking to the front of the car and stopped

in front of the car).

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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 29

This case is similar to Robinson, Singletary, and Tillis. The

Passat was accelerating directly toward Santiago-Miranda from a

close distance. See Robinson, 415 F.3d at 1254; Singletary, 804 F.3d

at 1183. Santiago-Miranda was standing on foot only ten feet away

from the Passat, and thus, he was in a vulnerable position and had

only a second or two to react. See Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1295. Even

from a full stop, the Passat had accelerated to 14 miles per hour and

had closed the distance from 10 to 5.74 feet within 1 second. See id.

Santiago-Miranda “did not have time to calculate angles and

trajectories to determine whether he was a few feet outside of

harm’s way.” Id. at 1299. Accordingly, Santiago-Miranda’s use of

force was objectively reasonable because a reasonable officer

would have perceived the Passat accelerating directly toward him

as a lethal threat.

The plaintiffs resist this conclusion. They argue that

Crooms backed up and slowly turned the Passat’s wheels to the

right in order to go around Santiago-Miranda by going off the street

and into the yard of a home. Yet without the benefit of hindsight,

nothing indicated that Crooms was positioning the Passat merely

to go around Santiago-Miranda and into that yard. Instead,

Crooms positioned the Passat to face the deputies, did not obey the

eight commands to stop, and accelerated directly toward

Santiago-Miranda. In these circumstances, when the Passat

accelerated, Santiago-Miranda reasonably perceived the Passat to

be driving at him and not around him. Notably, the Passat could

have stayed stopped and did not have to accelerate at all.

Santiago-Miranda had no reason to expect that the Passat was

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30 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

accelerating to go around him. Santiago-Miranda had only a

second or two to react to the Passat’s movements, and he was not

required to wait and “hope[] for the best.” See Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007).

The plaintiffs also assert that Santiago-Miranda was never in

the Passat’s path, but the dashcam video establishes otherwise.

Moreover, “the relevant question is whether it was reasonable for

[Santiago-Miranda] to fear” being hit by the Passat when it started

accelerating at him at the close distance shown in the video. See

Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299. The dashcam video establishes that it was

reasonable for Santiago-Miranda to perceive that the vehicle’s

acceleration toward him presented an immediate threat of serious

physical harm. See Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1183.

The plaintiffs point to eyewitness testimony from Green,

Kimbrough-Rucker, and Deputy Hendren that, they assert,

establishes that because the Passat was trying to go off the street

and around Santiago-Miranda, Santiago-Miranda had room to

move further to the right away from the Passat rather than

stepping to the left toward its path. Even assuming

Santiago-Miranda had room to move further to the right,

Santiago-Miranda had no reason to expect the accelerating Passat

was trying to go around him. Room to move to the right does not

establish that no reasonable officer could have believed he was in

danger of serious physical harm. “The only perspective that counts

is that of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time the events

unfolded.” Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1166 (11th Cir.

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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 31

2009). Green, Kimbrough-Rucker, and Hendren each had a

different perspective than Santiago-Miranda; none were faced with

a vehicle accelerating toward them from ten feet away.

The plaintiffs emphasize that (1) Hendren did not fire her

weapon, and (2) their expert testified that no reasonable officer

would have perceived an immediate threat justifying lethal use of

force. The fact that Hendren did not fire her weapon does not

establish that it was unreasonable for Santiago-Miranda to fire his.

See Davis, 44 F.4th at 1318 (“More than one course of action can be

reasonable – the other officers’ decision not to shoot does not

render [an officer’s] choice unreasonable.”). This is especially true

here given the dissimilar locations of the two deputies when the

Passat accelerated. The expert’s analysis of the situation is the

exact kind of 20/20 hindsight analysis we do not engage in. See

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

The plaintiffs argue that Tillis and Singletary are

distinguishable because both cases involved other dangerous

conduct—one a high-speed chase and one a drug bust. However,

the discrete decision to fire in both cases occurred when the vehicle

accelerated toward the officer at a close distance. See Tillis, 12 F.4th

at 1295; Singletary, 804 F.3d at 1178, 1183. The same is true here.

Lastly, the plaintiffs suggest that Deputy Santiago-Miranda’s

continued shooting into the driver’s side window of the Passat as it

passed him constituted an independent violation of Crooms’s

Fourth Amendment rights. This Court has rejected a request to

“sequentially sever” two rounds of shots. See Davis, 44 F.4th at

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32 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

1317–18. Santiago-Miranda’s shots into the Passat’s driver’s side

window are inseparable from his shots into the front windshield.

Santiago-Miranda fired all 10 shots within 2.1 seconds.

Santiago-Miranda had no realistic opportunity within those brief

two seconds to react to the Passat’s continued acceleration and to

stop shooting.

Even if we could distinguish between Santiago-Miranda’s

initial shots through the Passat’s windshield and his later shots

through the side of the Passat, the later shots did not violate

Crooms’s constitutional rights. The location of the bullet holes in

the side of the Passat does not establish that Santiago-Miranda was

no longer in danger of being hit by the Passat. See Singletary,

804 F.3d at 1183–84. Santiago-Miranda was on foot only a few feet

away from the Passat by then, and he could not have known

whether the Passat was going to continue on that trajectory or

swerve toward him. See Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299. In this kind of

“tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstance, “[w]e are

loath to second-guess the decisions made by” Santiago-Miranda.

See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1331

(11th Cir. 2003).

Because Deputy Santiago-Miranda did not violate the

plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, we need not consider the second

prong of the qualified immunity analysis. We affirm the district

court’s grant of qualified immunity to Santiago-Miranda on the

plaintiffs’ excessive force claims.

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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 33

VI. BATTERY CLAIMS

The plaintiffs also assert that their state law battery claims

should be revived for the same reasons that Deputy

Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was excessive. Since

Santiago-Miranda’s use of force was not excessive, the plaintiffs’

battery claims fail as well.

Under Florida law,

A law enforcement officer . . . need not retreat or

desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of

resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. The

officer is justified in the use of any force . . . [w]hich he

or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend

himself or herself or another from bodily harm while

making the arrest.

FLA. STAT. § 776.05(1) (emphasis added). “Police officers receive a

presumption of good faith . . . as to the use of force applied during

a lawful arrest.” Kimbrel v. Clark, 385 So. 3d 1124, 1128 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 2024).

Battery claims for excessive force under Florida law are

“analyzed by focusing upon whether the amount of force used was

reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). This Court has applied the same Fourth Amendment

excessive force analysis to a battery claim against an officer under

Florida law. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir. 2006)

(finding triable issue of fact on Florida battery claim for same

reasons as Fourth Amendment excessive force claim).

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34 Opinion of the Court 23-11902

As we explained above, Santiago-Miranda’s use of deadly

force was reasonable because the Passat’s close position and

acceleration posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to

him. For those same reasons, the district court correctly found that

Santiago-Miranda is entitled to summary judgment on the

plaintiffs’ battery claims. See FLA. STAT. § 776.05(1); Kimbrel,

385 So. 3d at 1128.

VII. MONELL CLAIMS

We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Sheriff Ivey on the plaintiffs’ Monell claims for

deliberate indifference in training and retention. See Monell,

436 U.S. at 692.

To seek damages from Sheriff Ivey in his official capacity,

the plaintiffs had to show, inter alia, “that [their] constitutional

rights were violated.” Land v. Sheriff of Jackson Cnty., 85 F.4th 1121,

1129 (11th Cir. 2023). “A Monell claim is derivative of—and so

requires—an actual constitutional violation by an officer.” Id.

The plaintiffs’ Monell claims fail because, as explained above,

Deputy Santiago-Miranda did not violate their constitutional

rights. Without an underlying constitutional violation, Sheriff Ivey

cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference in training and

retention. 10 See id.

10 We note that the plaintiffs may have abandoned any objection to the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to Sheriff Ivey. In their brief, the plaintiffs

mention their Monell claims only once in describing the operative complaint

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23-11902 Opinion of the Court 35

VIII. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have appellate jurisdiction over this

appeal. Because Santiago-Miranda’s use of deadly force did not

violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to (1) Santiago-Miranda on the

plaintiffs’ excessive force and battery claims, and to (2) Sheriff Ivey

on the plaintiffs’ Monell claims.

AFFIRMED.

and once in the concluding sentence. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,

739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “an appellant abandons a

claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a

perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority”). Even

affording the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt that they adequately presented

this issue to us, the Monell claims fail because Santiago-Miranda did not violate

the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

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23-11902 LUCK, J., Dissenting 1

LUCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I completely agree that Deputy Jafet Santiago-Miranda did

not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, he

did not commit a state law battery, and the sheriff was not liable

under Monell. In other words, I agree with the bulk of the thought-

ful and well written majority opinion. But I must respectfully dis-

sent because I don’t think the district court’s summary judgment

order was final, which means we do not have jurisdiction over this

appeal. The district court’s order was not final because it did not

resolve all of the claims against Deputy Santiago-Miranda. See

Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777

(11th Cir. 2007) (“Ordinarily . . . an order adjudicating fewer than

all the claims in a suit . . . is not a final judgment from which an

appeal may be taken.”).

The plaintiffs alleged three claims against Deputy Santiago-

Miranda: a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 excessive force claim; a section

1983 failure-to-render-aid claim; and a state law battery claim. The

district court construed the plaintiffs’ summary judgment response

as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss vol-

untarily their failure-to-render-aid claim against Deputy Santiago-

Miranda, granted the voluntary dismissal motion, and granted

summary judgment for Deputy Santiago-Miranda on the plaintiffs’

excessive force and state law battery claims.

The problem is that a rule 41(a)(2) voluntary dismissal “can

only be for an entire action, and not an individual claim.” Rosell v.

VMSB, LLC, 67 F.4th 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2023). Rule 41(a)(2) does

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2 LUCK, J., Dissenting 23-11902

not allow plaintiffs and district courts to “pick and choose, dismiss-

ing only particular claims within an action.” Id. (quotation omit-

ted). “Our ‘cases make clear that a voluntary dismissal purporting

to dismiss a single claim is invalid, even if all other claims in the

action have already been resolved.’” Id. (quoting In re Esteva, 60

F.4th 664, 677–78 (11th Cir. 2023)). Because the district court “at-

tempted to dismiss one [claim] rather than the entire action, no

part of [r]ule 41(a) authorized the dismissal. And because the dis-

missal was ineffective,” the failure-to-render-aid claim “is still pend-

ing before the district court.” See id. “That means we have no final

decision to review.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291)

That should be the end of it. The summary judgment order

was not final since the failure-to-render-aid claim was still pending.

And because the summary judgment order was not final, we do not

have jurisdiction to review it.

The plaintiffs offer two responses. First, they argue that they

abandoned their failure-to-render-aid claim, and the judgment was

properly entered on the abandoned claim. But the plaintiffs didn’t

abandon the claim; they sought to dismiss it. In their summary

judgment response, the plaintiffs wrote (in bold) that they “dismiss

their claims for failure to render medical aid against Deputy Santi-

ago[-Miranda] and [Deputy] Hendren.” And the district court

treated the plaintiffs’ summary judgment response not as an aban-

donment, but “as a [m]otion for [v]oluntary [d]ismissal.” Like the

district court, I read the plaintiffs’ statement that they “dismiss their

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23-11902 LUCK, J., Dissenting 3

claims for failure to render medical aid against Deputy Santiago[-

Miranda] and [Deputy] Hendren” as what it is—a dismissal.

Second, the plaintiffs contend that the district court’s order

was ambiguous about how it resolved the failure-to-render-aid

claim. Because there was an ambiguity, the argument goes, we

should presume the district court knew and applied the law and

entered a lawful judgment. But there was no ambiguity in the dis-

trict court’s order. The district court handled the plaintiffs’ dismis-

sal of the failure-to-render-aid claim against Deputy Santiago-Mi-

randa in five clear steps.

Step one. The district court explained the plaintiffs’

announcement to dismiss their failure-to-render-aid

claim against Deputy Santiago-Miranda: “In

[p]laintiffs’ [r]esponse to [d]efendants’ [m]otion for

[s]ummary [j]udgment, [p]laintiffs state that they are

no longer pursuing their claims for failure to render

medical aid as to either of the deputies nor are they

pursuing any of their claims against [Deputy] Hen-

dren.”

Step two. The district court construed the announce-

ment as a voluntary dismissal motion under rule

41(a)(2) and declared that it would grant the motion:

“The [c]ourt construes this announcement as a

[m]otion for [v]oluntary [d]ismissal pursuant to [rule]

41(a)(2), which will be granted.”

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4 LUCK, J., Dissenting 23-11902

Step three. The district court spelled out the claims

that were left over after the plaintiffs’ voluntary dis-

missal: “The following counts in [p]laintiffs’

[a]mended [c]omplaint remain, with the claims dupli-

cated and alleged separately for each [p]laintiff:

Counts 1 and 6—Fourth Amendment violations

against [Deputy Santiago-]Miranda, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. [section] 1983; Counts 2 and 7—common law

battery against [Deputy Santiago-]Miranda; Counts 4

and 9—deliberate indifference in training against

[Sheriff] Ivey, pursuant to [section] 1983; and Counts

5 and 10—deliberate indifference in retention against

[Sheriff] Ivey, pursuant to [section] 1983.” The failure-

to-render-aid claim was not mentioned.

Step four. In the decretal language at the end of the

order, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ con-

strued voluntary dismissal motion: “Plaintiffs’ con-

strued [m]otion for [v]oluntary [d]ismissal (Doc. 96 at

53) is GRANTED.” Helpfully, the district court’s in-

ternal record cite was to the plaintiffs’ announcement

in the summary judgment response that they were

dismissing the failure-to-render-aid claim against

Deputy Santiago-Miranda.

Step five. Finally, the district court granted summary

judgment on the left over claims: “Defendants’

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23-11902 LUCK, J., Dissenting 5

[m]otion for [s]ummary [j]udgment ... is

GRANTED.”

Reading the steps together, the district court told us what it

was going to do (construe the plaintiffs’ announcement that they

were dismissing the failure-to-render-aid claim against Deputy San-

tiago-Miranda as a motion to dismiss voluntarily under rule

41(a)(2)), and did it (granted the voluntary dismissal motion).

There was nothing ambiguous about what the district court did.

For that reason, I would dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate ju-

risdiction.