“The fact that a party is a non-signatory to an agreement is insufficient, standing alone, to preclude enforcement of a forum-selection clause.” (cleaned up)
How later courts described this case
- “The fact that a party is a non-signatory to an agreement is insufficient, standing alone, to preclude enforcement of a forum-selection clause.” (cleaned up)
- explaining that foreseeability “implies that the nonsignatory must have been otherwise involved in the transaction in some manner”
- “Parties can consent to personal jurisdiction through forum-selection clauses.”
- interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)’s language that “transferee district was one in which the action ‘might have been brought’” to require personal jurisdiction in transferee court
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND SOCIAL MEDIA
GROUP, LLC; SARANTO
CALAMAS; CLIFFORD PFLEGER;
SECURE OPERATIONS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MONITORING SERVICES, INC.,
Case No. 2:23-CV-9405 (FB) (ARL)
Plaintiffs,
-against-
LETIP INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
LETIP WORLD FRANCHISE, LLC;
SUMMER MIDDLETON; PAUL
DELLAVALLE,
Defendants.
Appearances:
For the Plaintiffs: For the Defendants:
RAYMOND R. GRASING BRIAN LAURENCE BANK
Law Firm of Grasing and Associates, P.C. Rivkin Radler LLP
99 Smithtown Blvd, Suite 6 926 RXR Plaza
Smithtown, NY 11787 Uniondale, NY 11556
JEFFREY H. WOLF
Quarles & Brady
Two North Central Avenue,
Renaissance One
Phoenix, AZ 85004
BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiffs Long Island Media Group, LLC, Saranto Calamas, Clifford
Pfleger, and Secure Operations Monitoring Services, Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
allege that Defendants LeTip International, Inc., LeTip World Franchise, LLC,
Summer Middleton, and Paul Dellavalle (collectively, “Defendants”) breached a
franchise agreement, LeTip International’s bylaws, and a membership agreement,
and defamed Plaintiffs. Defendants ask the Court to dismiss this case for improper
venue pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) or transfer it to the United States District
Court for the District of Arizona under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the following
reasons, the Court deems the forum selection clause applicable to all parties except
Secure Operations, severs its claims, and transfers the remaining claims to the
District of Arizona.
I. Background
This case involves two distinct sets of claims: one arising out of the LeTip
Suffolk County Franchise Agreement and another involving the LeTip
International (“LeTip Int’l”) bylaws and a membership agreement. Parties to the
franchise agreement include defendant LeTip World Franchise, a subsidiary of
defendant LeTip Int’l, and plaintiff Long Island Social Media Group (“LISM”),
owned by its principal, plaintiff Clifford Pfleger, and plaintiff Saranto Calamas.
The agreement, signed by LISM and Pfleger, allowed LISM to operate a LeTip
franchise in Suffolk County and included a forum selection clause requiring claims
be brought in Arizona. LISM alleges that Defendants breached this agreement by
establishing competing chapters and terminating LISM’s franchise because Pfleger
used an altered LeTip logo. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants defamed Pfleger
by claiming he altered the logo without permission.
Claims by plaintiff Secure Operation Monitoring Services (“SO”), also
owned by Pfleger and not a party to the franchise agreement, arise from different
facts. Defendant Middleton, who owns both LeTip World Franchise and LeTip
Int’l, allegedly breached LeTip Int’l’s bylaws and a membership agreement
between SO and LeTip Int’l by terminating SO’s company seat in the LeTip Int’l
Port Jefferson Chapter at the insistence of defendant Dellavalle, a LeTip Int’l
officer. SO also alleges defamation arising from this incident.
Plaintiffs filed this action with the Court on December 20, 2023, which
Defendants allege violated the forum selection clause. LeTip World Franchise then
filed a suit in the District of Arizona on January 23, 2024 (the “Arizona action”),
including every party here except SO and LeTip Int’l. Defendants now seek to
either dismiss this case or transfer it to the District of Arizona pursuant to the
forum selection clause.
II. Forum Selection Clause
A district court should ordinarily transfer a case involving parties to a valid
forum selection clause to its specified forum. Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013). Such a clause is presumptively
enforceable if it (1) was reasonably communicated to the party resisting
enforcement, (2) is mandatory, and (3) covers the claims and parties in the dispute.
Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007). The resisting
parties can rebut that presumption “by making a sufficiently strong showing that
‘enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that the clause was invalid for
such reasons as fraud or overreaching.’” Id. at 383–84 (quoting M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
Plaintiffs argue the clause does not apply for four reasons: (1) it was not
conveyed to SO, (2) Defendants did not first seek mediation, (3) it does not cover
the defamation action, and (4) it would be unjust to enforce. The Court is not
convinced. First, Plaintiffs concede the clause binds all plaintiffs besides SO.
Second, Plaintiffs have waived the clause’s mediation requirement by bringing this
suit. Roldan v. Second Dev. Servs., Inc., No. 16-CV-2364 (DLI) (PK), 2018 WL
1701938, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (explaining that party may not complain
of condition precedent’s nonoccurrence that it caused). Third, the clause covers the
defamation claim because it “stems from [Defendant’s] purported breach of the
[franchise] [a]greement.” Horn v. Kirey, 281 F. Supp. 3d 325, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)
(applying forum selection clause to defamation claim). Fourth, Plaintiffs do not
make a “sufficiently strong showing” of the clause’s unjustness beyond that
conclusory statement. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 383 (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at
15). As such, the forum selection clause applies to all parties except for SO.
Defendants then contend plaintiff SO, which did not sign the franchise
agreement, is also bound by the clause because it is “so closely related to the
dispute . . . that it becomes foreseeable that [they] would be bound.’” Prospect
Funding Holdings, LLC v. Vinson, 256 F. Supp. 3d 318, 324–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(quoting Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Reeve, 942 F. Supp. 2d 244, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2013))
(allowing signatory to enforce forum selection clause against non-signatory); see
also Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della Citta del Vaticano, 714 F.3d 714, 723 (2d Cir.
2013) (“The fact that a party is a non-signatory to an agreement is insufficient,
standing alone, to preclude enforcement of a forum-selection clause.” (cleaned
up)). “Courts have found parties to be so ‘closely related’ that enforcement of a
forum selection clause is ‘foreseeable’ in two kinds of situations: ‘where the non-
signatory had an active role in the transaction between the signatories or where the
non-signatory had an active role in the company that was the signatory.’” Affiliated
FM Ins. Co. v. Kuehne + Nagel, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 2d 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(quoting Vinson, 256 F. Supp. 3d at 325).
Defendants argue SO should have foreseen being bound by the clause
because Pfleger owns SO. But Pfleger’s co-ownership of LISM and SO does not
make the clause’s application to SO foreseeable without some other involvement
by SO, which Defendants do not allege. See Miller v. Mercuria Energy Trading,
Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 774 F. App’x 714 (2d Cir.
2019) (refusing to find non-signatory closely related where relationship between it
and signatory was “primarily horizontal” by virtue of shared owner, as opposed to
vertical relationship where non-signatory owned signatory); Recurrent Capital
Bridge Fund I, LLC v. ISR Sys. & Sensors Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 297, 307–08
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that foreseeability “implies that the nonsignatory must
have been otherwise involved in the transaction in some manner”). Thus, the clause
does not bind SO.
III. Transfer or Dismissal of Remaining Signatory Parties’ Claims
Defendants ask the Court to either dismiss the claims of parties bound by the
clause, so they can be refiled as counterclaims in the Arizona action, or to transfer
those claims to the District of Arizona. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The Court has
discretion to either transfer or dismiss the claims in the interest of justice. Minnette
v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1996); Donner v. DER SPIEGEL
Gmbh & Co. KG, No. 23-CV-8196 (JGK), 2024 WL 4035215, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 4, 2024). Plaintiffs concede that if the forum selection clause is enforced
against all parties except SO, the Court should sever SO’s claims for lack of
personal jurisdiction in Arizona and transfer the rest. See D.H. Blair & Co. v.
Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Parties can consent to personal
jurisdiction through forum-selection clauses.”). The Court agrees.
Transferring, rather than dismissing, all but SO’s claims furthers the interests
of justice because it “promotes expeditious and orderly adjudication of this case on
the merits.” McDermott v. Semolic, No. 06-CV-3235 (JFB) (ETB), 2006 WL
3050877, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2006) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S.
463, 466–67 (1962)). Rather than forcing Plaintiffs to start from square one,
causing undue delay and wasting judicial resources, the District of Arizona can
consolidate this case with the existing Arizona action, which involves similar facts.
See Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, No. 19 CIV. 3171
(ER), 2020 WL 1503192, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (favoring transfer where
“there are parallel matters underway in” transferee court and consolidation is
possible).
Plaintiffs rightly argue that the Court cannot transfer the claims of SO, as a
non-signatory, because the District of Arizona cannot assert personal jurisdiction.
See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a)’s language that “transferee district was one in which the action ‘might
have been brought’” to require personal jurisdiction in transferee court). Severance
is warranted to cure procedural defects like a lack of personal jurisdiction by the
transferee court. Wausau Bus. Ins. Co. v. Sentosacare, LLC, No. 14-1040, 2014 WL
12972341, at *1 (2d Cir. May 20, 2014) (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-
Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989)) (remanding to district court to consider whether to
sever non-diverse parties to cure jurisdictional defect); Herrick Co., Inc. v. SCS
Commc’ns, Inc., 251 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining courts may cure
jurisdictional defects by dismissing “spoilers [of jurisdiction] . . . pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 21”).
“In diversity cases . . . personal jurisdiction is determined by the law of the
state in which the district court sits,” DiStefano v. Carrozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d
81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001), subject only to the limitation that the exercise of jurisdiction
authorized by state law must comport with due process. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996). Arizona’s long-arm statute
mirrors that limitation. See Ariz. R. Civ. Proc. 4.2(a); Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130
F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997). “To comport with due process, a forum state may
exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporate defendant only if the defendant
has ‘certain minimum contacts with [the State] such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am. N.A., 916 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011)).
SO is a New York corporation and the events underlying its claims occurred
in New York. Pl. Opp. 2, ECF No. 24. Plaintiffs do not mention any contacts that
could arguably create jurisdiction over SO in Arizona besides the forum selection
clause inapplicable to it. And severance would not fracture proceedings because
SO’s claims involve distinct facts and the LeTip Int’l bylaws and a membership
agreement, not the franchise agreement that contained the forum selection clause.
As such, the Court agrees to sever SO’s claims from those of the remaining parties.
IV. Conclusion
The Court retains jurisdiction over plaintiff Secure Operations Monitoring
Services’ severed claims. The Clerk is directed to transfer the remaining claims by
plaintiffs Long Island Social Media Group, LLC, Saranto Calamas, and Clifford
Pfleger to the District of Arizona.
SO ORDERED.
_/S/ Frederic Block________
FREDERIC BLOCK
Senior United States District Judge
Brooklyn, New York
November 12, 2024