Harris v. State of Tennessee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

RICKY HARRIS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3: 19-cv-00174

) Judge Richardson/Frensley

CANDACE WHISMAN, )

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This pro se 42 U.S.C. §1983 action is before the court on sole remaining defendant Candace

Whisman’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Docket No. 177) and Plaintiff Ricky

Harris’s motions for discovery and other matters. Docket Nos. 165-69. Plaintiff opposes the

motion to dismiss, and the motion is ready for disposition. After reviewing the record and the

briefs, the undersigned recommends that Defendant’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED. The

Plaintiff’s motions will be addressed by separate order.

I. BACKGROUND

Tennessee inmate Ricky Harris and others filed this 42 U.S.C. §1983 action against

defendant Candace Whisman, former Director of Sentence Management Information Services for

the Tennessee Department of Corrections (TDOC), and others, asserting that Tennessee’s statutes

regarding life sentences and calculating sentence credits are unconstitutionally vague in violation

of their rights to due process, and that the TDOC’s process for addressing a prisoner’s request to

recalculate his sentence violates the due process clause and the Eighth Amendment. Docket No.

36, generally. Plaintiff sues Whisman in her official capacity only. Plaintiff has been assisted by

court-appointed counsel during periods of this litigation but is currently proceeding pro se. Harris,

sole remaining plaintiff, alleges the following in his 46-page, second amended complaint.1 He is

currently housed at Bledsoe County Correctional Complex. Docket No. 164, p. 7. Whisman had

broad responsibility for calculating sentences for TDOC prisoners and setting and overseeing those

sentence calculation procedures. Id. at p. 6.

On March 1, 1988, Harris was convicted of first-degree murder, and on May 4, 1988, was

sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Docket No. 164, pp. 9-10, 22, Docket No.

164-1, p. 3. Plaintiff alleges he was tried and convicted under the Class X Felonies Act of 1979,

Criminal Sentence Reform Act of 1982, Judge Sentencing Act of 1982, and the Tennessee

Comprehensive Improvement Act of 1985. Id., p. 10. He alleges that Tennessee relies on a web of

sentencing and parole statutes, many of which incorporate each other by reference. Id. He alleges

that none of the four Acts state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given

criminal statute. Id., p. 10

Plaintiff alleges that he has asked Whisman to calculate or recalculate his sentence, but she

refused to do so. Docket No. 164, p. 13. Plaintiff alleges that Whisman has failed to properly

calculate life sentence credits to reduce the expiration dates of his sentence and failed to list

expiration dates on his inmate sentence summary sheet. Id., at pp. 5, 13.

Plaintiff alleges that Whisman has calculated his sentence length--as an individual

sentenced to life in prison--and calculated sentence credits pursuant to a statutory system that is

unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1 A review of the record shows that the complaint now before the court is Plaintiff’s third amended

complaint. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on February 22, 2019. Docket No. 1. The court

granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, Docket No. 69, and Harris filed an amended

complaint on January 11, 2021. Docket No. 72. Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint

on September 18, 2023. Docket No. 143. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on June 7, 2024.

Docket No. 164.

Docket No. 164, pp. 11-14. He further alleges that the TDOC, through Whisman, has not

maintained an adequate process for addressing a prisoner’s requests to recalculate his sentence in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id., at p. 17-22. He alleges there is no question

that his life sentence is a determinate sentence, and that Defendant’s processes and procedures are

not adhering to statute. Id., p. 17.

For relief, Plaintiff seeks, among other things, declaratory and injunctive relief that would

require Defendant to recalculate his sentence to include newly applied sentencing credits. Id., pp.

40-43.

Defendant now moves to dismiss on the basis that habeas corpus relief is the exclusive

remedy for Plaintiff’s claim. Docket No. 178. Defendant contends §1983 is not the appropriate

vehicle for an inmate to challenge his sentence calculation or request sentencing credits.

Defendant argues that any such requests must first be made pursuant to the procedures set forth in

the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”), which Plaintiff has failed to do,

specifically, Plaintiff has not previously sought a declaratory order from the state Chancery Court.

The undersigned agrees.

II. DISCUSSION

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes the record in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations

as true. See Terry v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 2010). While a complaint

will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “either direct or inferential allegations respecting all

material elements” necessary for recovery under a viable legal theory, this court “need not accept

as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences, and conclusory allegations or legal

conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.” Id. at 275-76 (citation and

quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement

to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions....” Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear Stearns

& Co., Inc., 683 F.3d 239, 246-47 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Rather, ‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Id. at 247 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009)).

A. Section 1983

Plaintiff challenges both the calculation of his sentence and the application of sentencing

credits. The gist of his complaint is the specific amount of time he believes he must serve. Docket

No. 164, pp. 1115. Plaintiff contends the TDOC has miscalculated his sentence because they have

neither issued him an appropriate expiration date, Id. pp. 12, 16, 18, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33-34, nor

have they applied the appropriate credits to his sentence. Id. pp. 29-30, 38.

In his opposition to defendant’s motion, Plaintiff asserts that the relief he seeks would not

necessarily affect the duration of his sentence. Docket No. 179, p. 2. He claims he is not

challenging his sentence calculation or complaining about the award of sentence credits. He states

his claim is based on how Defendant's policies and procedures fail to follow state law in calculating

sentences and violate his constitutional rights with respect to his accrued sentence credits. Id. He

states he is not complaining about not receiving sentence credits and that he has received all

statutorily mandated sentence credits. Id.

An action under §1983 is not the appropriate vehicle for the type of challenge Plaintiff is

presenting, however. See Wilson v. Rutherford Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 3:19-CV-00570, 2019 WL

3574286, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 2019) (habeas corpus relief is the exclusive remedy for a claim

of improper sentence calculation due to improperly applied sentencing credits.) “Federal law opens

two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28

U.S.C. § 2254, and a [Section 1983] complaint.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).

“Courts have long struggled to mark the appropriate boundary between these two statutes, as ‘it is

sometimes difficult to draw the line’ between them.” Kitchen v. Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525 (6th Cir.

2024) (quoting Dist. Att'y’s Off. for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 76 (2009) (Alito, J.,

concurring)).

In Kitchen, the Sixth Circuit very recently detailed the Supreme Court’s 50-year history

involving the interplay between habeas relief and § 1983, and it is worth repeating here.

The Court first confronted the interplay of §1983 and habeas in Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). When state

prisoners used §1983 to challenge the deprivation of their good-conduct-time

credits, which would cause their immediate release if restored, the Court

acknowledged the “broad language of [§] 1983” but held that inmates must bring

their claims under habeas for three reasons. Id. at 476–77, 489, 93 S.Ct. 1827. First,

the language of the habeas statute is “more specific” than § 1983. Id. at 489, 93

S.Ct. 1827. Second, after reviewing the history of the writ of habeas corpus, the

Court concluded that “in each case” where a prisoner's “grievance is that he is being

unlawfully subjected to physical restraint,” habeas “has been accepted as the

specific instrument to obtain release from such confinement.” Id. at 486, 93 S.Ct.

1827. Third, because §1983 does not require exhaustion of state-law remedies,

allowing claims to proceed under §1983 raised “federal–state comity”

concerns. Id. at 491, 93 S.Ct. 1827. These reasons led the Court to hold that “when

a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to

immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal

remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827; see also Wilkinson v.

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78–79, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (summarizing

that “considerations of linguistic specificity, history, and comity led”

the Preiser Court to hold that claims covered by habeas cannot be brought under §

1983).

The Supreme Court later elaborated on this holding in Heck. There, a state prisoner

brought a §1983 claim seeking damages—but not release from custody—against

state officials who allegedly targeted him with an “unlawful, unreasonable, and

arbitrary investigation.” 512 U.S. at 479, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (citation omitted). In its

key holding, the Court explained that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in

a §1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at

487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The Supreme Court spoke clearly: If a successful claim

“would necessarily imply the invalidity” of the “conviction or sentence,” then “the

complaint must be dismissed.” Id. Because a successful unlawful investigation

claim would “challenge[ ] the legality of the conviction,” the claim needed to go

through habeas instead of § 1983. Id. at 490, 114 S.Ct. 2364.

That brings us to Wilkinson, the most recent Supreme Court case to address this

issue at length. The two prisoners in Wilkinson requested parole, which the parole

board denied. 544 U.S. at 76–77, 125 S.Ct. 1242. In denying parole, however, the

board applied “parole guidelines first adopted in 1998,” which came after the

prisoners “began to serve” their terms. Id. They both asked a federal district court

to conclude that the use of the 1998 guidelines violated the Due Process Clause and

the Ex Post Facto Clause and sought an injunction that ordered a new parole hearing

under constitutionally proper procedures. Id. at 77, 125 S.Ct. 1242.

To begin its analysis, the Supreme Court surveyed the cases discussed above and

reasoned that, throughout the “legal journey from Preiser” onward, “the Court has

focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus” when

“they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through

an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial

determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's

custody.” Id. at 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242. A §1983 action is thus barred “if success in that

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its

duration.” Id. at 81–82, 125 S.Ct. 1242. Applying that rule, the Supreme Court held

that plaintiffs’ claims were “cognizable under § 1983” because neither prisoner

sought “an injunction ordering his immediate or speedier release,” and “a favorable

judgment” would “not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or

sentences.” Id. at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242 (cleaned up).

Our circuit applied this rule in two cases relevant here. In Wershe v. Combs, a state

prisoner's “initial opportunity for parole was denied after a public hearing in 2003,”

and the board decided not to consider him for parole again until 2017. 763 F.3d

500, 502 (6th Cir. 2014). The prisoner alleged that he was procedurally given only

cursory consideration. Id. At 505-06 (complaining of “perfunctory consideration,”

the parole board's failure to interview him, and its refusal to explain its reasoning).

The prisoner brought a §1983 suit against Michigan Parole Board members

“alleging that the parole consideration process did not afford him a meaningful

opportunity for release,” id. at 502, essentially bringing a claim under Graham.

Rather than challenge a specific statute, the prisoner challenged parole procedures

and administration: The inmate “does not seek direct release from prison or a

shorter sentence; he seeks a change in the procedures used to determine whether he

is eligible for parole.” Wershe, 763 F.3d at 504. Because success would “not

necessarily affect the duration of his sentence because prison officials would retain

discretion regarding whether to grant him parole,” the Heck line of cases did not

bar the §1983 claim. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir.

2007)).

Three years later, this court addressed a similar question in Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d

193 (6th Cir. 2017). The plaintiffs in Hill asserted that Michigan's “policies and

procedures governing access to prison programming and parole eligibility,

consideration, and release deny them a meaningful opportunity for release on parole

before the end of their natural lives.” Id. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Hill court noted that “claims that ordinarily fall within the scope of §1983 are

unavailable to prisoners if they necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or

sentence.” Id. at 207 (cleaned up). And the “word ‘necessarily’ must not be

ignored—if invalidation of a conviction or speedier release would not automatically

flow from success on the §1983 claim, then the Heck doctrine is

inapplicable.” Id. The court then reasoned that, because the prisoners “do not seek

direct release from prison or a shorter sentence, but instead seek an examination”

of the parole “policies and procedures,” this “circuit has already expressly found

such challenges cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 210.

A clear and consistent two-part rule emerges from this precedential backdrop.

Prisoners can “use only habeas corpus” if “they seek to invalidate the duration of

their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier

release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the

unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81, 125 S.Ct. 1242. So

prisoners can “proceed under § 1983” if (1) they do not seek an “injunction ordering

immediate or speedier release into the community,” and (2) “a favorable judgment

would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or

sentences.” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 533–34, 131 S.Ct. 1289 (cleaned up). The

Supreme Court most recently summarized it this way: The “simplest cases” for

when a claim must be brought through habeas “arise when an inmate, alleging a

flaw in his conviction or sentence, seeks immediate or speedier release from

prison,” but the “[s]lightly less obvious” cases occur “when the relief he seeks

would ‘necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’ ” Nance v.

Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 168, 142 S.Ct. 2214, 213 L.Ed.2d 499 (2022) (quoting Heck,

512 U.S. at 481, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364). These less obvious cases nevertheless “lie

within the core of habeas corpus.” Id. at 167, 142 S.Ct. 2214 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

With this legal rule in mind, we turn to this case. The district court below—and

now Kitchen on appeal—reason that Kitchen's requested relief would not

necessarily lead to an early release from prison, so Kitchen can bring his claim

under § 1983. R.31, pp.4–5, PageID 153–54; Appellee Br. at 19–20. Defendants

disagree. They contend that it is “flawed” to focus on whether Kitchen will get an

early release because it ignores whether success for Kitchen would necessarily

imply the invalidity of his sentence. Appellants Br. at 47, 49–53. And Defendants

believe there is “no way for Kitchen to challenge Michigan's parole jurisdiction

statute” without “invalidating his underlying criminal sentence.” Id. at 32.

Defendants have the better argument. We hold that Kitchen's claim must be brought

through habeas for two reasons. First, the district court focused solely on whether

a successful claim would spell an early release for Kitchen and overlooked whether

the claim implicates the validity of his sentence. Second, once we apply the correct

legal test, we see that Kitchen's claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

sentence if successful. The relief granted by the district court and its own reasoning

demonstrate this very point.

First, the correct legal test. As mentioned, the district court analyzed only whether

Kitchen's requested relief would lead to a quicker release and ignored the question

of invalidity, an essential part of the Supreme Court's test. Indeed, our court has

emphasized that a focus only on whether a challenge will lead to a speedier release

is a “crabbed reading” of Supreme Court caselaw. Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F.3d

880, 882 (6th Cir. 2019) (criticizing Fuller v. Nelson, 128 F. App'x 584, 586 (9th

Cir. 2005), because Fuller reasoned that Heck does not apply when the requested

relief would not yield immediate release). The Supreme Court does “not

consider Heck inapplicable only because the claims’ success would not mean

release.” Id. (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242). Rather, the

Supreme Court has “emphasized” that “new parole procedures (or even a grant of

parole for that matter) would not imply the invalidity of the prisoners’ original

sentences.” Id. (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 83–84, 125 S.Ct.

1242). Sampson thus clarifies that courts must consider both speedier

release and invalidation of the sentence to remain faithful to Supreme Court

guidance.

Kitchen, 106 F. 4th at 525, 537-40.

Defendant counters that like Kitchen, Plaintiff has attempted to satisfy only one part of the

Supreme Court’s test and he ignores the question of the validity of his conviction or sentence.

Defendant notes Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s alleged actions have denied him both a “timely

release” or a “meaningful opportunity for release.” Docket No. 164, pp. 17-19.

As outlined above in Kitchen, habeas is the exclusive remedy for any such claims implying

an unlawfulness of custody.

Here, Plaintiff seeks an injunction ordering speedier release by reducing his sentence

expiration date by application of sentencing credits. Docket No. 164, p. 42. Granting his requested

injunction to recalculate his sentence by applying certain credits would necessarily imply the

invalidity of the TDOC’s current sentence calculation. Plaintiff’s §1983 claim fails both prongs

of the Kitchen test and thereby fails to state a claim for relief.

B. Failure to Exhaust

Defendant also contends Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust

state remedies because he has not filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Davidson County

Chancery Court. The undersigned agrees.

In Tennessee, an inmate seeking to challenge the award of post-judgment sentence

reduction credits, including “good time” or behavior credits, for example, must follow the

procedures set forth in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). See Yates v.

Parker, 371 S. W. 3d, 152, 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“The proper avenue to address post-

judgment jail credit for prisoners is through the TDOC administratively.”). Plaintiff here must

similarly follow the UAPA to challenge his sentence expiration date or release eligibility date. See

Hughley v. State, 208 S. W. 3d 388, 395 (Tenn. 2006) “[t]he validity of any sentence reduction

credits must be addressed through the avenues of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.”,

quoting Carroll v. Raney, 868 S. W. 2d 721, 723 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (emphasis added).

Under the UAPA, to exhaust a sentence calculation challenge, an inmate must first seek a

declaratory order regarding the sentence calculation from the TDOC. Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.

W. 3d 457, 464 (Tenn. 2012); Bonner v. Tenn. Dep’t. of Corr., 84 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2001) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-5-225(b)). If the TDOC refuses to issue a declaratory

order, the petitioner may seek judicial review by seeking a declaratory judgment in the chancery

court and may appeal the chancery court’s adverse decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.

Stewart, 368 S.W.3d at 464; Bonner, 84 S. W. 3d at 578.

Here, Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that he submitted a motion for declaratory order to

the TDOC and was denied his request. Docket No. 164, p. 5. He has failed to pursue judicial relief

as required under the UAPA by seeking a declaratory judgment in the chancery court.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

the complaint for failure to state a claim (Docket No. 177) be GRANTED and Plaintiffs claims

be DISMISSED.

Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14)

days after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to

this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have

fourteen (14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any

response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of

service of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this

Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed. 2d 435 (1985),

reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.

— 2 Xe

eee

United States Magistrate Judge

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