The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LATASHA SLATER, Personal Representative of the UNPUBLISHED
ESTATE OF PRISCILLA SLATER, November 12, 2024
10:27 AM
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 366162
Wayne Circuit Court
DETECTIVE SERGEANT JAMES LC No. 21-007076-NO
RUTHENBERG, DEPUTY CHIEF JOHN
VORGITCH, OFFICER AVOLON OWENS,
OFFICER TAEYLOR RYANS, OFFICER
NATALIE ANDERSON, OFFICER CHRISTINE
WHITE, OFFICER ELIJAH LOWERY, OFFICER
DANIEL MCCAW, OFFICER CHRIS JOSEPH, and
LIEUTENANT CHRIS SHAFT,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and SWARTZLE and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this wrongful-death action, defendants appeal by right the trial court’s order denying
their motion for summary disposition. Defendants unsuccessfully argued that they were shielded
by governmental immunity as a matter of law. We conclude that reasonable jurors would agree
that defendants’ conduct did not amount to gross negligence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
for entry of judgment in favor of defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
Officers with the Harper Woods Police Department (HWPD) arrested Priscilla Slater and
lodged her in the Harper Woods jail on charges of possession of heroin and carrying a concealed
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weapon (CCW).1 There is no dispute that Priscilla had been consuming alcohol. Within
approximately 36 hours of her incarceration, Priscilla was found deceased in her jail cell on June
10, 2020; she had been dead for about seven hours without discovery. There were conflicting
expert opinions concerning the cause of Priscilla’s death, which occurred after she suffered a
seizure in her cell. As the personal representative of her sister’s estate, plaintiff, Latasha Slater,
filed this wrongful-death suit against defendants, who were employed by the city of Harper Woods
(the city) and held various positions as police officers and civilian aides (CAs). Plaintiff alleged
that defendants engaged in gross negligence and wanton and willful misconduct by not obtaining
medical care and treatment for Priscilla and not properly monitoring her health status despite her
extreme intoxication, which nonfeasance was the proximate cause of her death by alcohol
withdrawal syndrome.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), arguing
that they were protected by governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2). Defendants
contended that they were not grossly negligent as a matter of law because there were no signs of
extreme intoxication, Priscilla expressed that she was fine, and because defendants had no
information regarding her medical history of severe alcohol abuse, alcohol withdrawal syndrome,
related hospitalizations, and detoxification efforts. Defendants further argued that Priscilla died
of natural causes due to cardiac dysrhythmia of undetermined etiology and that their conduct was
not the proximate cause of her death.
Plaintiff maintained that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to both gross
negligence and proximate cause. The documentary evidence presented by the parties focused on
the state of Priscilla’s health and her physical condition when arrested and while housed in jail,
the level of attention and care given her by defendants in light of her health and condition, and the
physiological cause of her death. The trial court denied defendants’ summary disposition motion,
concluding that reasonable minds could differ on the issue of gross negligence and that there
otherwise existed “questions of fact all over the place.” Defendants appeal by right contending
that (1) no reasonable juror could find that defendants were grossly negligent and that (2) no
reasonable juror could conclude that defendants’ conduct was the proximate cause of Priscilla’s
death.
1
Police responded to a report of multiple gunshots at the Parkcrest Inn shortly before 1:00 a.m. on
June 9, 2020. Through witness interviews, review of video footage from surveillance cameras at
the motel, and the officers’ investigation, it was ascertained that the alleged shooter was Lewis
Nichols, that he was accompanied by his girlfriend, Priscilla, that Nichols and Priscilla were
apprehended in a vehicle parked at the motel, that Nichols was arrested on various charges,
including assault with intent to commit murder, and that Priscilla was arrested on the basis that a
gun and heroin were found in the car. There was evidence that Priscilla had become embroiled in
an argument with other motel patrons, after which she ran back to her motel room. Nichols then
emerged from that room armed with a pistol, which he discharged 19 times across the parking lot
toward the persons with whom Priscilla had been arguing. Fortunately, no one was struck by
gunfire.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW, SUMMARY DISPOSITION PRINCIPLES, AND RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Champine
v Dep’t of Transp, 509 Mich 447, 452; 983 NW2d 741 (2022). This Court likewise reviews de
novo the applicability of governmental immunity to a particular set of circumstances. Id.; Ray v
Swager, 501 Mich 52, 61; 903 NW2d 366 (2017). We also review de novo issues of statutory
construction. Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 578-579; 751 NW2d 493 (2008).
MCR 2.116(C)(7) provides for summary dismissal of an action “because of . . . immunity
granted by law.” The moving party may submit affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence in support of the motion if substantively admissible. Odom v Wayne Co,
482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008). The contents of the complaint must be accepted as
true unless contradicted by the documentary evidence. Id. This Court must consider the
documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party for purposes of MCR
2.116(C)(7). Moraccini v City of Sterling Hts, 296 Mich App 387, 391; 822 NW2d 799 (2012).
When there is no factual dispute, the determination whether a plaintiff’s cause of action is barred
under a principle set forth in MCR 2.116(C)(7) is a question of law for the court to decide. Id.
But when a relevant factual dispute does exist, summary disposition is not appropriate. Id. “If
reasonable jurors could honestly reach different conclusions regarding whether conduct constitutes
gross negligence, the issue is a factual question for the jury.” Oliver v Smith, 290 Mich App 678,
685; 810 NW2d 57 (2010).2
With respect to the rules of statutory interpretation, this Court in Slis v Michigan, 332 Mich
App 312, 335-336; 956 NW2d 569 (2020), explained:
This Court’s role in construing statutory language is to discern and ascertain
the intent of the Legislature, which may reasonably be inferred from the words in
the statute. We must focus our analysis on the express language of the statute
because it offers the most reliable evidence of legislative intent. When statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute as written. A court
is not permitted to read anything into an unambiguous statute that is not within the
manifest intent of the Legislature. Furthermore, this Court may not rewrite the plain
statutory language or substitute its own policy decisions for those decisions already
made by the Legislature.
Judicial construction of a statute is only permitted when statutory language
is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous when an irreconcilable conflict exists
between statutory provisions or when a statute is equally susceptible to more than
one meaning. When faced with two alternative reasonable interpretations of a word
2
Although defendants also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), the
gist of their position was that they had immunity granted by law; therefore, MCR 2.116(C)(7) is
the relevant provision.
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in a statute, we should give effect to the interpretation that more faithfully advances
the legislative purpose behind the statute. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.]
B. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY – GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES
MCL 691.1407, which is part of the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401
et seq., provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the
discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and
employee of a governmental agency . . . is immune from tort liability for an injury
to a person . . . caused by the . . . employee . . . while in the course of employment
or service . . . if all of the following are met:
(a) The . . . employee . . . is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting
within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function.
(c) The . . . employee’s . . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence
that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. [Emphasis added.]
This appeal solely concerns MCL 691.1407(2)(c); there is no dispute for purposes of the
summary disposition motion that defendants were acting in the course of their employment, that
they were acting within the scope of their authority, and that the governmental agency was engaged
in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, all in relation to the arrest, incarceration,
care, and oversight of Priscilla.
Under the GTLA, “the burden . . . fall[s] on the governmental employee to raise and prove
his entitlement to immunity as an affirmative defense.” Odom, 482 Mich at 479.3 Accordingly, it
was not necessary for plaintiff to plead her claims in avoidance of governmental immunity,
although she effectively did so. We note that “[t]he governmental immunity statute does not itself
create a cause of action called ‘gross negligence.’ ” Cummins v Robinson Twp, 283 Mich App
677, 692; 770 NW2d 421 (2009).
3
On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff filing suit against a governmental agency must initially plead his
claims in avoidance of governmental immunity.” Id. at 478-479 (emphasis added). “Placing this
burden on the plaintiff relieves the government of the expense of discovery and trial in many
cases.” Id. at 479.
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C. GROSS NEGLIGENCE
1. BASIC GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
MCL 691.1407(8) defines “gross negligence” as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a
substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Gross negligence “has been
characterized as a willful disregard of safety measures and a singular disregard for substantial
risks.” Oliver, 290 Mich App at 685. “Grossly negligent conduct must be conduct that is
substantially more than negligent.” Bellinger v Kram, 319 Mich App 653, 659-660; 904 NW2d
870 (2017). “Generally, allegations or evidence of inaction or claims that a defendant could have
taken additional precautions are insufficient.” Id. at 360.4 But “evidence that a defendant engaged
in affirmative actions contrary to professionally accepted standards and then sought to cover up
those actions does establish gross negligence.” Id. Gross negligence suggests actions in which
“the actor simply did not care about the safety or welfare of those in his charge.” Tarlea v
Crabtree, 263 Mich App 80, 90; 687 NW2d 333 (2004). Even the negligence standard of conduct
“does not require one to exhaust every conceivable precaution to be considered not negligent.” Id.
2. DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION
Because we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we first assume
that Priscilla died from alcohol withdrawal syndrome and that the signs and symptoms of the
syndrome include vomiting, increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, anxiety, confusion,
disorientation, delirium, and generalized seizures, all as set forth in the affidavit of Dr. Ljubisa
Dragovic, plaintiff’s expert.
Next, we believe that it is appropriate to rule out in fairly short fashion a number of
defendants with respect to whether they were grossly negligent. As demonstrated and established
by Officer Daniel McCaw’s bodycam footage, his deposition testimony, and the deposition
testimony of the other officers who responded to the motel at the time of the shooting, it was
primarily if not solely Officer McCaw who personally and closely interacted with Priscilla from
the time that she was removed from the backseat of the vehicle in which she and Nichols were
found until she was placed in a police car and taken to the HWPD jail by Officer McCaw. Officer
McCaw, to the exclusion of the other officers, was plainly in control of matters in relation to
handling, arresting, monitoring, and transporting Priscilla, along with any associated decision-
making in connection with her care. The other officers were focused on Nichols and different
aspects of the investigation into the shooting. We conclude that when viewed in a light most
favorable to plaintiff, the documentary evidence established as a matter of law that Officer Elijah
Lowery, Officer Chris Joseph, and Lieutenant Chris Shaft did not engage in conduct so reckless
as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether Priscilla might suffer an injury. Given
4
A mere allegation that a defendant “could have done more” does not suffice “to meet the standard
for gross negligence under the GTLA.” Dougherty v Detroit, 340 Mich App 339, 350; 986 NW2d
467 (2021). Nevertheless, an omission to act can constitute gross negligence. See Tallman v
Markstrom, 180 Mich 141, 144; 446 NW2d 618 (1989).
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the events that transpired at the motel, we conclude that there would be little logic to a finding that
the three officers were grossly negligent in regard to Priscilla’s care.
We further conclude as a matter of law that Detective-Sergeant James Ruthenberg was not
grossly negligent. Although Detective-Sergeant Ruthenberg was aware of the circumstances
surrounding Priscilla’s arrest and the events that transpired the night before, including the fact that
Priscilla had been drinking and used heroin, by the time that he first met and interviewed Priscilla
the following morning, there was nothing that Priscilla said and nothing in her conduct, demeanor,
and behavior suggesting that she was in need of medical care and treatment or that she was in any
physical distress. As reflected in video footage of the interview or interrogation, she certainly no
longer appeared intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. Moreover, there was no evidence that
Detective-Sergeant Ruthenberg knew of Priscilla’s medical history of alcohol abuse and
detoxification or witnessed signs or symptoms of alcohol withdrawal syndrome. In sum, the
documentary evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, failed to show that
Detective-Sergeant Ruthenberg engaged in conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack
of concern for whether an injury resulted to Priscilla.
With respect to CAs Avolon Owens, Taeylor Ryans, Natalie Anderson, and Christine
White, we hold as a matter of law that the CAs did not engage in conduct so reckless as to
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted to Priscilla. CA Owens,
aside from booking Priscilla after she arrived at the jail on June 9, 2020, was responsible for
regularly checking her jail cell until 5:30 a.m. on the 9th, and he was also responsible for
performing 30-minute-interval cell checks from midnight to 5:30 a.m. on June 10, 2020, during
which time Priscilla died at approximately 5:12 or 5:13 a.m. We will discuss CA Owens in more
detail below. CAs Anderson and White performed 30-minute-interval cell checks on Priscilla
during the day and evening of June 9, 2020, and they engaged in brief verbal interactions with
Priscilla, who never requested medical care or attention. Examining the video-footage report
issued by the Michigan State Police (MSP),5 the jail-cell video, and the detainee welfare check
log, and assuming that Priscilla vomited at 6:20 p.m. on June 9th as suggested by video footage,
we conclude that CA White would not have seen that occurrence when she did cell checks at 6:00
p.m. and 6:30 p.m. on June 9th. There is simply no evidence putting CAs Anderson and White on
alert that Priscilla was in danger of suffering from alcohol withdrawal syndrome such that they
should have sought a medical evaluation.6 Moreover, even if we were to presume that they should
have performed in-cell, face-to-face checks on Priscilla every 30 minutes, we find no evidence
demonstrating that had they done so, they would have discovered facts that necessitated the
involvement of medical personnel. Plaintiff argues that Priscilla was lethargic and slept almost
the entire time that she was in her jail cell, which should have been noticed by the CAs and
triggered a call for intervention by healthcare professionals. This argument ignores the fact that
5
The MSP’s report followed and described Priscilla’s movements in the jail from intake to her
death and aftermath, as depicted in jail surveillance cameras that covered most but not all of
Priscilla’s movements.
6
Given that Priscilla was not showing any signs of intoxication or being under the influence of
heroin when she was interviewed by Detective-Sergeant Ruthenberg around 10:00 a.m. on June 9,
CAs Anderson and White would also not have witnessed such signs later in the day.
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Priscilla was up during the very early morning hours of June 9 (after midnight), followed by being
booked in the middle of the night (around 3:00 a.m.) and then being brought to an interrogation
the next morning (around 10:00 a.m.), all after a night of drinking. That Priscilla was sleeping
most of the time would have come as no surprise. And failing to enter her cell and interrupt her
sleep every 30 minutes can hardly be characterized as gross negligence.
With regard to CA Ryans, we find that nothing she did during her shift on June 10, 2020,
had any relevance because Priscilla was already deceased when her shift started. As to her shift
on June 9, 2020, CA Ryans performed cell checks on Priscilla from 6:00 a.m. until noon, and, as
reflected in the MSP’s video-footage report and jail-cell video, Priscilla was asleep from 6:00 a.m.
until about 10:00 a.m., at which time Detective-Sergeant Ruthenberg retrieved Priscilla from her
cell and interviewed her. Assuming that CA Ryans should have performed in-cell, face-to-face
checks on Priscilla every 30 minutes, we conclude she would not have discovered anything
triggering a belief that it was necessary to obtain medical care and treatment for Priscilla. There
is simply no evidence putting CA Ryans on alert that Priscilla was suffering from alcohol
withdrawal syndrome such that she should have sought a medical evaluation.7
With respect to the defendants discussed above for which summary dismissal is appropriate
on the issue of gross negligence, we concur that their knowledge of Priscilla’s intoxication and
drug use might demonstrate ordinary negligence for failure to procure medical assistance or
treatment, but it does not constitute gross negligence. Priscilla never indicated that she needed
medical assistance or treatment or that she felt ill, nor did the record reveal that she was so
intoxicated that she lacked the capacity to ask for medical intervention or to express that she was
sick. And there were no signs that she was in physical distress. Moreover, there was no evidence
that defendants knew about Priscilla’s history of alcohol abuse, alcohol withdrawal, and
detoxification. Further, with regard to the signs and symptoms of alcohol withdrawal syndrome,
there was the sole instance of vomiting (upon viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
plaintiff), which we addressed and discounted earlier, and any confusion or disorientation Priscilla
exhibited was early on and could reasonably be attributed to her consumption of alcohol and use
of heroin. To the extent that defendants failed to recognize early medical signs of alcohol
withdrawal syndrome, it would hardly amount to gross negligence on their part.
Turning the focus of the analysis to Officer McCaw and CA Owens, we find that the
resolution of whether there is a question of fact regarding gross negligence is a closer call. On the
underlying issue of whether Priscilla was “extremely” intoxicated, our review of the pertinent
video footage leads us to conclude that Priscilla was not in a state of “extreme” intoxication as a
matter of law, i.e., reasonable minds would not disagree on the matter. She was plainly intoxicated
to some degree, which both Officer McCaw and CA Owens acknowledged, but she could still
converse and communicate effectively with them and answer their questions, and her movements
were not seriously affected by her consumption of alcohol and drugs. We note that motel
surveillance footage showed Priscilla walking and either running or walking swiftly without
7
Our conclusions regarding the CAs would be no different even if the HWPD’s General Orders
required the CAs to physically monitor Priscilla every 15 minutes on the basis that she had “special
needs.”
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difficulty on an outdoor walkway around the second level of the motel around the time of the
shooting. Furthermore, when CA Owens asked Priscilla to stand on two sets of footprint markings
on the floor for purposes of mug shots taken from two different angles, Priscilla easily maneuvered
with agility and made the marks.
Assuming that a question fact exists as to whether Priscilla was extremely intoxicated, we
note that HWPD’s General Order 14-16, § IX, [E][1][a] provides that if a person in custody shows
signs of “extreme drug/alcohol intoxication,” an officer “shall” “[s]ummon EMS as soon as
reasonably possible . . . .” Neither Officer McCaw nor CA Owens summoned EMS. With respect
to the internal rules and regulations of the HWPD, in Meyers v Rieck, 509 Mich 460, 473-475; 983
NW2d 747 (2022), our Supreme Court recently discussed the interplay between an entity’s internal
rules and regulations and the standard of care in negligence cases, explaining:
We long ago held that a private entity’s internal rules do not fix the standard
of its duty to others. That standard is fixed by law, either statutory or common. In
other words, a defendant’s violation of its own internal rule, even if the rule is
designed to protect the public, does not constitute negligence per se. As such, the
mere allegation that a defendant breached its own internal rule or regulation does
not, without more, make out a claim for negligence. . . . .
There are good reasons for this rule. Allowing a private organization’s rules
and regulations to establish the standard of care would permit that organization to
choose the standards under which it would be liable to others. Choosing this course
would send a signal . . . that they have a safe harbor from lawsuits if they comply
with [their internal rules and regulations]. . . . If the order here, for example, had
instructed the nurses to wait a day after the second episode of vomiting before
contacting the physician, we would be reluctant to hold that a nurse followed the
requisite standard of care simply by complying with such a slack order.
Plaintiff’s view might also discourage entities from adopting internal rules
that require a higher degree of care than the law imposes. If the adoption of such a
course is to be used against him as an admission, he would naturally find it to his
interest not to adopt any rules at all. . . . In short, the law neither permits
corporations to legislate away their responsibilities by rules, nor imposes
discriminating liabilities upon them by reason of their efforts to lessen public
danger. [Quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted.8]
8
The Meyers Court, however, also observed:
A private entity’s internal rules or regulations, like the standing order, are
not inadmissible simply because they do not alone establish the standard of care. If
they meet the rules governing the admission of evidence and if the jury is instructed
as to their proper use—i.e., that they are evidence of the standard of care and do not
fix the standard itself—then they might be admitted. [Myers, 509 Mich at 482.]
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Accordingly, the HWPD’s General Orders did not fix the standard of care, but they could
constitute evidence of the standard of care. Accepting that Priscilla was extremely intoxicated, we
conclude that the failure of Officer McCaw and CA Owens to involve EMS was at most ordinary
negligence given that it was a judgment call on a very arguable issue. The failure to contact EMS
did not reflect a willful disregard for Priscilla’s health and well-being.
We conclude that there was insufficient documentary evidence to create an issue of fact
regarding whether Officer McCaw and CA Owens were grossly negligent for failing to secure
medical care and treatment for Priscilla in light of her level of intoxication. This would be an easy
issue to resolve if there were evidence specifically indicating that Officer McCaw and CA Owens
had actual knowledge of Priscilla’s medical history regarding alcohol abuse, alcohol withdrawal,
and detoxification. In that case, there clearly would be a basis to rule that there existed an issue of
fact with respect to gross negligence. It would also be a different story had Priscilla asked for
medical care and was rebuffed, or had she responded that she was not okay when asked, or if she
had exhibited clear signs or symptoms of being in physical distress, which were ignored. While
the existing record might support an action for ordinary negligence against Officer McCaw and
CA Owens, the record does not support a conclusion that the two officers “simply did not care
about the safety or welfare” of Priscilla, Tarlea, 263 Mich App at 90, when they failed to obtain
medical care on observation of her state of intoxication.
With respect to CA Owens, it is also necessary to consider his role in performing cell
checks every 30 minutes on June 10, 2020. During CA Owens’s shift, Priscilla was sleeping up
until her seizure and death, except for a brief three-minute span starting at about 2:38 a.m. when
she used the toilet and got a drink of water. Priscilla suffered the seizure at 5:10 a.m. and died
within two or three minutes, which would not have been observed by CA Owens on his 5:00 a.m.
check, assuming that he did check on her. There is no basis to find that CA Owens was grossly
negligent for not procuring medical care for Priscilla before her seizure and death because there
was nothing suggesting that she needed medical assistance until the terminal seizure occurred—
the night had been uneventful until the seizure struck. To the extent that CA Owens was not
performing any checks throughout the night, as arguably implied in an MSP handwriting-analysis
report of cell-check log entries, it might constitute ordinary negligence, but without evidence that
CA Owens knew or should have known that Priscilla’s health was endangered, skipping the checks
would not reach the level of gross negligence. And Priscilla was no longer intoxicated or under
the influence of heroin when CA Owens started his shift at midnight on June 10th. We conclude
that CA Owens was not grossly negligent as a matter of law with respect to his task of checking
Priscilla’s cell every 30 minutes.9
9
Priscilla informed CA Owens that she was pregnant; however, we are of the view that this
additional information, which did not include any specifics regarding the length of the pregnancy,
did not suffice to make CA Owens’s conduct grossly negligent for failure to procure medical care
for Priscilla in connection with alcohol withdrawal syndrome. Moreover, we agree with our
concurring colleague that any gross negligence by CA Owens was not, as a matter of law, the
proximate cause of Priscilla’s death.
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III. CONCLUSION
We hold that no reasonable juror could find that defendants were grossly negligent.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. In light of our
ruling, it is unnecessary to reach the proximate-cause issue. We do not retain jurisdiction. We
decline to tax costs under MCR 7.219.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
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