The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TERESA HOLDER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 23-CV-409-MTS
)
TARGET CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Target Corporation.
(Docket No. 44). Upon the Court’s review and consideration of the filings of the parties, the
Motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Factual and Procedural Background
On March 10, 2021, Plaintiff Teresa Holder (“Plaintiff”) went shopping at a store owned
by Defendant Target Corporation (“Defendant”) located at 1701 South Yale Avenue in Tulsa,
Oklahoma. (Docket No. 51-1 at 3, 5). Plaintiff had shopped at the store on several occasions, but
because of the COVID pandemic, this was her first time visiting the store since March of 2020.
Id. at 5, 7. Prior to shopping, Plaintiff went to use the women’s restroom, which she had used on
previous trips to the store. Id. at 8. Before entering the restroom, Plaintiff noticed a sign above
the door handle depicting a method for pulling the door open without touching the handle with her
hands. (Docket Nos. 44-3; 48 at 4; 51-1 at 8–9). Viewing the sign as a COVID safety suggestion,
Plaintiff put her entire right hand and wrist through the enclosed area of the door handle. (Docket
Nos. 44-5 at 12–13; 51-1 at 9–10). When she pulled the door open, it easily swung toward her,
and she was unable to pull her arm out immediately. (Docket No. 51-1 at 11, 18). Plaintiff might
have expected the door to be heavier than it was. (Docket No. 44-5 at 8). Her arm became stuck
in the door handle and was twisted in a counterclockwise position for a few seconds, which caused
a pop and pain in her forearm and wrist. (Docket No. 51-1 at 19, 22). As she shopped, Plaintiff
experienced pain in her whole arm and into her shoulder. Id. at 22. She reported the incident to
one of Defendant’s employees, who completed a guest incident report. (Docket No. 57-1).
On October 16, 2020, Defendant installed the restroom door pull used by Plaintiff in March
of 2021 because of COVID. (Docket Nos. 48 at 2; 51-5 at 3). Pursuant to instructions in the work
order, the existing door handle was completely removed, and a new handle was installed with the
“hook side” in a downward position. Id. at 4. It was recommended that a previously provided
decal be displayed with the door handle to demonstrate the operation of the new handle. Id. For
the women’s restroom at the Yale store, Defendant placed the decal above the door handle.
(Docket No. 44-3 at 2). The decal showed a partial image of the handle with use of the left wrist
to open the door, demonstrated by an arrow pointing left. Id. Defendant has not had any other
reports of injuries or incidents involving the door handle since it was installed in 2020. (Docket
Nos. 44-8 at 3; 44-7 at 10–11).
During her deposition, Plaintiff explained that on the day of the incident the door handle
appeared the same as it had on prior occasions, except for the sign. (Docket No. 51 at 8). The
door handle was not hidden or concealed and was open and obvious for anyone to see. (Docket
No. 44-5 at 13–14). Plaintiff only placed her arm in the enclosed portion of the door handle
because of the sign. Id. at 14. She testified the sign did not depict the entire door handle, and she
did not understand that the sign was directing her to pull the handle with her wrist using the hook
underneath the handle. (Docket No. 51-1 at 13, 15). In fact, from the angle she approached the
handle, Plaintiff did not even notice the hooked opening on the bottom. Id. at 18. Although the
sign directed use of the left wrist to open the door, Plaintiff used her right arm because the door
was hinged on the right side and opened from left to right. (Docket Nos. 44-5 at 12–13; 51-7 at
4). Plaintiff believed it was not normal to use her left arm to open a door that was hinged on the
right. (Docket No. 51-1 at 12–13). She did not believe it was a different door handle, but that
Defendant added a sign that did not relate to the door. Id. at 20. Plaintiff does not know of anyone
else who received a similar injury from this type of door handle at Defendant’s store. (Docket No.
44-5 at 10).
On March 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed her lawsuit in the District Court for Tulsa County,
Oklahoma, bringing a claim of negligence against Defendant and seeking various remedies,
including punitive damages. (Docket No. 2-2). On September 20, 2023, Defendant removed the
case to this Court. (Docket No. 2). Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket
No. 44) on September 16, 2024, to which Plaintiff filed her Response (Docket No. 51) on October
7, 2024. Defendant filed its Reply (Docket No. 59) on October 21, 2024. The Motion is ripe for
this Court’s review.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of any issues
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A material fact is one that
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the
evidence is to be taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward with
specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, which demonstrates that there
is a genuine issue for trial. Applied Genetics v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241
(10th Cir. 1990); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (e)(2), (e)(3). “To accomplish this, the facts
must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits
incorporated therein.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). Thus,
“[i]n a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on
speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that
something will turn up at trial.” Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted). Although a court may consider materials in the record other than those cited, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(3), the inquiry is whether the facts and evidence identified by the
parties present “a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
Discussion
Defendant argues that it owed no duty to warn or protect Plaintiff from a dangerous
condition because the undisputed facts establish the door handle, and its accompanying sign, were
open and obvious to Plaintiff and did not constitute a hidden danger.1 (Docket No. 44 at 12–18).
Additionally, Defendant contends it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s request for
1 In its Motion, Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff cannot bring an ordinary negligence claim,
and to the extent Plaintiff is raising a products liability claim, such a claim fails for several reasons.
(Docket No. 44 at 18–21). However, because Plaintiff alleges a premises liability claim and did
not raise a products liability claim (Docket Nos. 2-2; 51 at 9–12), the Court does not address either
issue in this Opinion and Order.
punitive damages because the evidence does not support a punitive damages award in this case.
Id. at 21–23. Plaintiff responds that there are material questions of fact regarding whether the door
handle was open and obvious because the handle and sign considered together had a deceptively
innocent appearance of safety. (Docket No. 51 at 9–12). Further, Plaintiff asserts that if the Court
denies Defendant’s motion, it should reserve any decision regarding whether to instruct the jury
on punitive damages until it has heard the evidence at trial. Id. at 12–14.
A. Premises Liability
Because this case is before the Court based on diversity jurisdiction, Oklahoma law applies.
Martinez v. Angel Expl., LLC, 798 F.3d 968, 973 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
“[T]o prevail on a negligence claim, a party must prove (1) existence of a duty on the part of the
defendant to protect plaintiff from injury; (2) defendant’s breach of the duty; and (3) injury to
plaintiff proximately resulting therefrom.” Maxville v. Target Corp., Case No. 17-CV-00609-
TCK-FHM, 2018 WL 4289322, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 7, 2018) (citing Ritch v. Carrabbas Italian
Grill, L.L.C., 719 F. App’x 838, 840 (10th Cir. 2018)).
The extent of the defendant’s duty depends on the plaintiff’s status as either a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee.2 Hodges v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Case No. 16-CV-195-JED, 2017 WL
1658890, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 30, 2017) (citing Wood v. Mercedes-Benz of Okla. City, 336 P.3d
457, 459 (Okla. 2014)). Invitees, or those “who use[] [a] premises of another for the purpose of a
common interest and mutual advantage[,]” are owed the highest duty of care. Wood, 336 P.3d at
459 n.6 (citing Brown v. Nicholson, 935 P.2d 319, 321 (Okla. 1997)). As such, “[a] business owner
owes a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition for use of
its invitees and a duty to warn invitees of dangerous conditions upon premises that are either known
2 Plaintiff’s status as an invitee is undisputed. (Docket Nos. 44 at 13; 51 at 2).
or should reasonably be known by the owner.” Phelps, et al. v. Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 925 P.2d 891,
893 (Okla. 1996) (citing Taylor v. Hynson, 856 P.2d 278, 281 (Okla. 1993); Williams v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 515 P.2d 223, 225 (Okla. 1973)).
While an owner has a duty to warn of “dangerous conditions, including hidden dangers,
traps, snares, pitfalls and the like which are not known to the invitee[,]” there is no duty to warn
of dangers which are “open and obvious.” Phelps, 925 P.2d at 893; see Sholer v. ERC Mgmt. Grp.,
LLC, 256 P.3d 38, 43 (Okla. 2011). In other words, “the owner ‘need not guard the invitee against
dangers so apparent and readily observable that the conditions should be discovered.’” Hodges,
2017 WL 1658890, at *1 (quoting Sholer, 256 P.3d at 43). However, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has rejected the open and obvious defense in certain cases “where the condition or defect
was visible but unseen by the plaintiff[,]” reasoning that:
A danger need not be totally or partially obscured from vision or withdrawn from
sight to be considered hidden. Rather, it may encompass a condition presenting a
deceptively innocent appearance of safety, cloaking a reality of danger. It may also
arise from circumstances diverting the plaintiff’s attention from the danger.
Therefore, not every “observable” condition is “open and obvious” as a matter of
law. Whether harm from an open and obvious defect may be actionable depends on
an objective due care standard, i.e., whether under similar circumstances a prudent
person would be able to see the defect and avoid being injured. Nevertheless, it is
well established in our jurisprudence that, where conflicting evidence is presented
on the issue of the open and obvious nature of a defect, the question must be
resolved by the trier of fact. What would normally be considered an open and
obvious danger may become a latent defect because of the conditions existing at
the time of injury.
Sholer, 256 P.3d at 43–44. In other words, “the characteristic of an item as being observable . . .
cannot, by itself, require that item to be declared as a matter of law an open and obvious danger.”
Zagal v. Truckstops Corp. of Am., 948 P.2d 273, 275 (Okla. 1997). Therefore, “[i]f . . . conflicting
inferences may be drawn from the facts and circumstances in evidence as to whether the offending
hazard did have a ‘deceptively innocent appearance,’ or its extent could not be anticipated, neither
the trial court nor this court may declare that the peril was obvious and apparent and that recovery
is precluded as a matter of law.” Jack Healey Linen Serv. Co. v. Travis, 434 P.2d 924, 928 (Okla.
1967); see also West v. Spencer, et al., 242 P.3d 545, 548 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010).
Having reviewed the photographs and other evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff,
the Court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the restroom door
handle and accompanying sign constituted an open and obvious danger as a matter of law. Plaintiff
testified that, although she observed the door handle and sign, she did not notice the hooked
opening of the handle and believed the handle was unchanged since she last used it. (Docket No.
51-1 at 8, 18). Further, she testified that she did not understand the sign placed above the door
handle. Id. at 13, 15, 20. More specifically, she did not understand: (1) why the sign instructed
the use of the left wrist to open a right-hinged door; and (2) that the wrist was to be inserted through
the hooked opening at the bottom of the handle. Id. Although the door handle and sign were
observable, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the combination of the handle and sign
presented a “deceptively innocent appearance” of safety. Moreover, a reasonably prudent juror
could find that Plaintiff’s attention may have been diverted considering all of the circumstances,
such as the angle at which she approached the door handle, her need to use the restroom, and
concerns in adhering to recommended COVID protocols. Thus, the Court finds that the openness
and obviousness of the danger cannot be decided as a matter of law, but is instead a question of
fact for the jury.
B. Punitive Damages
Oklahoma law provides that punitive damages may be awarded “(1) where the jury finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of ‘reckless disregard for the
rights of others;’ or (2) where the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
has acted ‘intentionally and with malice towards others.’” Roberson v. Wal-Mart, Inc., Case No.
CIV-21-657-PRW, 2022 WL 2874715, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 21, 2022) (quoting Okla. Stat. tit.
23, § 9.1). Thus, “punitive damages are only allowable under [Okla. Stat. tit. 23,] § 9.1 when, at a
minimum, there is competent evidence of a reckless disregard by the defendant of the plaintiff’s
rights from which malice and evil intent may be inferred.” Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 121
P.3d 1080, 1106 (Okla. 2005) (emphasis in original).
Moreover, “[t]he Oklahoma punitive damages statute does not preclude a trial court at the
summary judgment stage from determining whether the requisite evidence exists which would
warrant the issue of punitive damages to proceed to trial.” Newsome v. Tull, No. CIV-18-791-HE,
2019 WL 5197567, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 22, 2019) (citing Estrada v. Port City Props., Inc., 258
P.3d 495, 504 (Okla. 2011)). The issue “is regularly addressed [by federal district courts] at
summary judgment.” Roberson, 2022 WL 2874715, at *5 (quotation omitted). A court’s role at
the summary judgment stage is to “determine whether any competent evidence exists which would
warrant submission [of] the question of punitive damages to the jury.” Id. at *5 (quoting Estrada,
258 P.3d at 504 (emphasis in original)).
In the Petition, Plaintiff alleges “the intentional, wanton, and reckless conduct of Defendant
in disregard of Plaintiff was conducted with full knowledge in that Defendant knew, or should
have known, of the severe adverse consequences of its actions[,]” and “[s]uch actions were
detrimental not only to Plaintiff but to the public at large.” (Docket No. 2-2 at 4). Plaintiff also
contends she is entitled to punitive damages “to set an example to others similarly situated that
such inexcusable conduct will not be tolerated in our community.” Id. Defendant asserts that at
her deposition, however, Plaintiff testified she was seeking punitive damages “because she didn’t
know if she was the only person hurt by the door handle, and because [Defendant] was negligent.”
(Docket No. 44 at 22) (citing Docket No. 44-5 at 11–12). She further explained that “it didn’t
matter if she was the only person injured by the door handle, the door handle wasn’t safe and that
is enough to warrant punitive damages against [Defendant].” Id. (citing Docket No. 44-5 at 12–
13).
In response to Defendant’s argument, Plaintiff asserts the evidence supports that “at the
minimum, [Defendant] recklessly used signage and handles that harmed its invitees[,] . . . did not
obtain studies, did not use experts, and the corporate representative did not even know if there
were internal discussions related to installing the handle and sign.” (Docket No. 51 at 14; see also
Docket No. 51-5 at 3–5). Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the Court reserve its ruling on
whether to instruct the jury on the issue of punitive damages until all the evidence is submitted at
trial. Id.
Considering the record evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds
the evidence does not support an inference of reckless disregard by Defendant. The evidence
shows that, although Defendant’s corporate representative did not know if Defendant obtained
studies or expert consultation regarding the safety of the door handle prior to installation or had
any discussions with outside parties regarding its use, Defendant had no other reports of injuries
or incidents involving the door handle since it was installed in 2020. Moreover, Plaintiff’s own
testimony supports, at most, an inference of negligence by Defendant and does not rise to a level
sufficient to support her request for punitive damages. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Target Corporation. (Docket No. 44). The Court
DENIES Defendant’s Motion as to Plaintiff’s premises liability claim and GRANTS the Motion
regarding Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of November, 2024.
MARK T. STEELE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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