Opinion

Kleinschmidt v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

Court
United States Court of Federal Claims
Filed
Jan 8, 2024
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Brian H. Corcoran
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.9%

explaining that a special master must decide what weight to give evidence including oral testimony and contemporaneous medical records

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that a special master must decide what weight to give evidence including oral testimony and contemporaneous medical records

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 20-0680V

JEFF KLEINSCHMIDT, Chief Special Master Corcoran

Petitioner, Filed: December 5, 2023

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Amy A. Senerth, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for Petitioner.

Emilie Williams, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT AND DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1

On June 4, 2020, Jeff Kleinschmidt filed a petition for compensation under the

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the

“Vaccine Act”), alleging that he suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration

(“SIRVA”), as defined in the Vaccine Injury Table, after receiving an influenza (“flu”)

vaccine on September 11, 2018. Petition at 1, ¶¶ 1, 12. The case was assigned to the

Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters (the “SPU”).

For the reasons described below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to compensation,

and I award damages in the amount $55,000.00, representing his actual pain and

suffering, plus $5,349.34 for past unreimbursed expenses.

1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made

publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or

at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government

Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government

Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In

accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other

information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I

agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease

of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. §

300aa (2018).

I. Relevant Procedural History

Along with his petition, Mr. Kleinschmidt filed the affidavit and medical records

required by the Vaccine Act. Exhibits 1-6, filed June 4, 2020, ECF No. 1; see Section

11(c). On June 12, 2020, the case was activated and assigned to the SPU (OSM’s

adjudicatory system for attempting to resolve cases deemed likely to settle). ECF No. 8.

On July 26, 2021, Respondent indicated he was willing to engage in settlement

discussions. ECF No. 19. Approximately seven months later, Petitioner reported the

parties had reached an impasse in their settlement discussions. Status Report, filed Feb.

3, 2022, ECF No. 26.

Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) Report on March 21, 2022, arguing that Petitioner

had failed to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of a Table SIRVA

injury. ECF No. 27. Specifically, he maintains that Petitioner’s alleged injury does not

meet the second and third criteria of the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation (“QAI”)

– related to pain onset and symptom location, for a Table SIRVA. Id. at 5-6; see 42 C.F.R.

§ 100.3(c)(10)(ii) - (iii) (2017). Regarding the third criterion – that the location of a

petitioner’s pain and reduced range of motion (“ROM”) be limited to the arm in which the

vaccination was administered, Respondent relies upon his belief that the vaccine record

does not sufficiently indicate the site of vaccination. Rule 4(c) Report at 5-6; see 42 C.F.R.

§ 100.3(c)(10)(iii).

Thereafter, I shared my views regarding onset and site of vaccination, indicating

that, although I did not believe Petitioner’s delay in seeking treatment prevented him from

establishing the required onset, it was reflective of a less severe SIRVA injury. ECF No.

29 (Order issued August 5, 2022). I instructed the parties to resume their settlement

discussions. Id.

After three months, Petitioner indicated the parties had reached an impasse in their

renewed settlement discussions. Status Report, filed Nov. 27, 2022, ECF No. 34.

Thereafter, Petitioner filed briefing regarding entitlement and damages. Petitioner’s Brief

in Support of Entitlement and Damages (“Brief”), Feb. 22, 2023, ECF No. 40. Petitioner

observes that the vaccine record contains a notation “LA” - indicating the flu vaccine

Petitioner received was administered in his left arm. Id. at 9 (citing Exhibit 1 at 1 (vaccine

record)). Regarding pain onset, he emphasizes the consistent histories he provided when

seeking treatment, linking his shoulder pain to the vaccine. Brief at 9-12. Petitioner

requests $80,000.00 for pain and suffering and $5,349.33 for out-of-pocket expenses. Id.

at 12.

2

In response, Respondent filed briefing setting forth his arguments regarding onset

and compensation. Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Motion for Ruling on the

Record, and Brief in Support of Damages (“Opp.”), filed Apr. 28, 2023, ECF No. 42. Thus,

it appears Respondent has abandoned his argument related to situs and the third QAI

criterion. See id. at 5-10 (entitlement discussion). Regarding pain onset, he maintains the

histories Petitioner provided in the contemporaneously created medical records and later

assertions in affidavits are insufficient to establish onset within 48 hours of vaccination.

Id. at 6-8. He insists that, if I find Petitioner entitled to compensation, a pain and suffering

award of $35,000.00 is sufficient and otherwise objects only to the mileage rate Petitioner

used when calculating his expenses. Id. at 15.

Approximately one week later, Petitioner filed his reply, reiterating his arguments

related to onset and compensation. Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Response to

Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Entitlement and Damages (“Reply”), filed May 5, 2023,

ECF No. 43. The matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. Factual Findings and Ruling on Entitlement

A. Legal Standards

Before compensation can be awarded under the Vaccine Act, a petitioner must

demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, all matters required under Section

11(c)(1), including the factual circumstances surrounding his claim. Section 13(a)(1)(A).

In making this determination, the special master or court should consider the record as a

whole. Section 13(a)(1). Petitioner’s allegations must be supported by medical records or

by medical opinion. Id.

To resolve factual issues, the special master must weigh the evidence presented,

which may include contemporaneous medical records and testimony. See Burns v. Sec'y

of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 415, 417 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that a special

master must decide what weight to give evidence including oral testimony and

contemporaneous medical records). Contemporaneous medical records are presumed to

be accurate. See Cucuras v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 993 F.2d 1525, 1528 (Fed.

Cir. 1993). To overcome the presumptive accuracy of medical records testimony, a

petitioner may present testimony which is “consistent, clear, cogent, and compelling.”

Sanchez v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 11–685V, 2013 WL 1880825, at *3 (Fed.

Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 10, 2013) (citing Blutstein v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90–

2808V, 1998 WL 408611, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 30, 1998)).

3

In addition to requirements concerning the vaccination received, the duration and

severity of petitioner’s injury, and the lack of other award or settlement,3 a petitioner must

establish that she suffered an injury meeting the Table criteria, in which case causation

is presumed, or an injury shown to be caused-in-fact by the vaccination she received.

Section 11(c)(1)(C).

The most recent version of the Table, which can be found at 42 C.F.R. § 100.3,

identifies the vaccines covered under the Program, the corresponding injuries, and the

time period in which the particular injuries must occur after vaccination. Section 14(a).

Pursuant to the Vaccine Injury Table, a SIRVA is compensable if it manifests within 48

hours of the administration of a flu vaccine. 42 C.F. R. § 100.3(a)(XIV)(B). The criteria

establishing a SIRVA under the accompanying QAI are as follows:

Shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (SIRVA). SIRVA manifests

as shoulder pain and limited range of motion occurring after the

administration of a vaccine intended for intramuscular administration in the

upper arm. These symptoms are thought to occur as a result of unintended

injection of vaccine antigen or trauma from the needle into and around the

underlying bursa of the shoulder resulting in an inflammatory reaction.

SIRVA is caused by an injury to the musculoskeletal structures of the

shoulder (e.g. tendons, ligaments, bursae, etc.). SIRVA is not a neurological

injury and abnormalities on neurological examination or nerve conduction

studies (NCS) and/or electromyographic (EMG) studies would not support

SIRVA as a diagnosis (even if the condition causing the neurological

abnormality is not known). A vaccine recipient shall be considered to have

suffered SIRVA if such recipient manifests all of the following:

(i) No history of pain, inflammation or dysfunction of the affected shoulder

prior to intramuscular vaccine administration that would explain the alleged

signs, symptoms, examination findings, and/or diagnostic studies occurring

after vaccine injection;

(ii) Pain occurs within the specified time frame;

(iii) Pain and reduced range of motion are limited to the shoulder in which

the intramuscular vaccine was administered; and

3 In summary, a petitioner must establish that he received a vaccine covered by the Program, administered

either in the United States and its territories or in another geographical area but qualifying for a limited

exception; suffered the residual effects of his injury for more than six months, died from his injury, or

underwent a surgical intervention during an inpatient hospitalization; and has not filed a civil suit or collected

an award or settlement for her injury. See Section 11(c)(1)(A)(B)(D)(E).

4

(iv) No other condition or abnormality is present that would explain the

patient’s symptoms (e.g. NCS/EMG or clinical evidence of radiculopathy,

brachial neuritis, mononeuropathies, or any other neuropathy).

42 C.F.R. § 100.3(c)(10).

B. Factual Finding Regarding QAI Criteria for Table SIRVA

1. Pain Onset – First Criterion

Respondent contests the second SIRVA Table claim criterion - whether the onset

of Petitioner’s pain occurred within 48 hours of vaccination. Opp. at 6-8; Rule 4(c) Report

at 6; see 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(c)(10)(ii); see also 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a)(XIV)(B) (requiring the

first symptom or manifestation of onset within 48 hours of vaccination for a SIRVA injury

following receipt of a flu vaccine). Citing the more than four-month delay before Petitioner

sought medical treatment, the mildness of his initial pain, and the lack of a specific

description of pain within 48 hours of vaccination in the medical records (Opp. at 7),

Respondent argues “[P]etitioner’s medical records fail to demonstrate that the onset of

his alleged shoulder pain was within 48 hours of his flu vaccination” (id. at 6-7).

Petitioner counters that “[his] affidavit testimony, supported by his medical records,

provide[s] preponderant evidence that his left shoulder pain began within 48 hours of

vaccination.” Reply at 1. Acknowledging that his initial pain could be properly

characterized as “soreness, . . . a mild discomfort that did not resolve” (id.), he

emphasizes the statement from his wife (a board-certified Physician’s Assistant) that he

complained of pain immediately. Id. at 1-2 (citing his wife’s affidavit filed as Exhibit 7). He

maintains that the descriptions he used to identify the onset of his left shoulder pain, such

as after and since then have been found by me to indicate an immediate pain onset. Id.

at 2-3 (citing Williams v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-1046V, 2020 WL 3579763,

at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 1, 2020)).

Delay in seeking treatment for a SIRVA injury is not by itself evidence that onset

of pain was not immediate. Indeed, as I have previously stated in numerous decisions

and rulings, “it is often common for a SIRVA petitioner to delay treatment, thinking his/her

injury will resolve on its own.” Bergstrom v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-0784V,

2020 WL 8373365, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 4, 2020). Additionally, Petitioner was

not seen during this four-and one-half-month period for any other condition or illness.

Such intervening evidence - which can collaborate or undermine a petitioner’s claim, is

totally absent here.

5

Furthermore, there is reasonable record evidence of onset consistent with this

Table requirement. When Petitioner first mentioned and later sought treatment for his left

shoulder pain, he consistently reported an immediate onset. The Federal Circuit has

stated that “[m]edical records, in general, warrant consideration as trustworthy evidence

. . . [as they] contain information supplied to or by health professionals to facilitate

diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions.” Cucuras, 993 F.2d at 1528 (emphasis

added). Thus, the Circuit has instructed that greater weight should be accorded to this

information even when the information is provided by Petitioner.

Although he did not seek treatment for left shoulder pain at his first medical

appointment post-vaccination (a primary care provider (“PCP”) appointment for high blood

pressure and lab work attended on February 18, 2019), Petitioner mentioned pain in his

left arm after receiving a flu shot. Exhibit 2 at 11, 14. And he described a lump and dull

pain in his left shoulder since receiving a flu shot at Costco in September when he

returned for medical care on April 17, 2019. Id. at 10. When seen by an orthopedist five

days later, he “state[d] [that] his symptoms began 09/29/18 after he had a flu-shot.” Exhibit

3 at 84 (emphasis added).

All of the above amounts to preponderant evidence establishing Petitioner likely

suffered left shoulder pain immediately upon vaccination. The lack of a single

contemporaneous item of evidence specifically identifying onset in 48 hours is simply not

a basis for finding against Petitioner, since the other evidence taken together supports a

favorable finding. And frankly, such an entry specifically alleging a 48-hour pain onset

would be less supportive of a SIRVA injury as it would indicate prior knowledge of the

Table requirements. Petitioner has satisfied the second criterion for a Table SIRVA injury.

2. Site of Vaccination – Third Criterion

Petitioner’s vaccine record in this case includes a designation showing he received

the flu vaccine in his left arm as alleged. Exhibit 1 at 1 (indicating “LA” in the vaccine

record); see Brief at 9 (discussing this record). And, in his later response, Respondent

appears to abandon his earlier argument regarding situs and location of pain and reduced

ROM in his later filed response. Compare Rule 4(c) Report at 5-6 with Opp. at 6-8; see

42 C.F.R. § 100.3(c)(10)(iii). Thus, I find Petitioner received the flu vaccine in his left,

injured shoulder as alleged, and has met the third Table criterion.

3. Other QAI Criteria

Respondent does not dispute any other Table SIRVA requirements, and the record

contains sufficient evidence showing Petitioner has satisfied the other QAI criteria. See

42 C.F.R. § 100.3(c)(10)(i) & (iv). A thorough review of the record in this case does not

6

reveal a prior or current condition or abnormality which would explain Petitioner’s

condition or pain. Thus, all elements of a Table SIRVA claim have been preponderantly

established.

C. Other Requirements for Entitlement

Because Petitioner has satisfied the requirements of a Table SIRVA, he need not

prove causation. Section 11(c)(1)(C). However, he must satisfy the other requirements of

Section 11(c) regarding the vaccination received, the duration and severity of her injury,

and the lack of other award or settlement. Section 11(c)(A), (B), and (D). Respondent

does not dispute that Petitioner has satisfied these requirements in this case, and the

overall record contains preponderant evidence which fulfills these additional

requirements.

III. Compensation Awarded for Past Pain and Suffering

A. Legal Standards

In another recent decision, I discussed at length the legal standard to be

considered in determining damages and prior SIRVA compensation within SPU. I fully

adopt and hereby incorporate my prior discussion in Sections I and II of McKenna v. Sec’y

of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 21-0030V, 2023 WL 5045121, at *1-3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

July 7, 2023).

In sum, compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or

actual and projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related

injury, an award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). The petitioner bears the

burden of proof with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y

of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

Mar. 18, 1996). Factors to be considered when determining an award for pain and

suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3) duration of

the suffering.4

B. Parties’ Arguments

Emphasizing the severe pain level - rated as seven out of ten, that he reported at

his first orthopedic appointment, more than six-months post-vaccination, and pain with

4 I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May

14, 2013) (quoting McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed.

Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

7

movement after a cortisone injection one month thereafter, Petitioner seeks $80,000.00

for past pain and suffering. Brief at 12-14. He maintains that he stopped going to physical

therapy (“PT”) in late December 2019, after 23 sessions, because he “decided to take

some time off during the holidays, and come back at the end of January.” Id.at 14.

Portraying his SIRVA as moderate, he favorably compares the facts and circumstances

in his case to those experienced by the petitioners in Vinocur and Sherbine5 - decisions

featuring awards of $70,000.00. Id. at 13-14.

In contrast, Respondent asserts that Petitioner should receive the lesser amount

of $35,000.00 for past pain and suffering. Opp. at 10. Characterizing Petitioner’s injury as

“mild and limited,” he argues that “the most crucial period of time, in terms of severity and

treatment, was only one month, from the end of April until the end of May 2019.” Id. at 11

(emphasis in the original). He emphasizes the significant improvement Petitioner made

thereafter, as well as initial delays before reporting his symptoms to his PCP (four months)

and seeking treatment from an orthopedist (almost seven months). Id. at 11-12.

Distinguishing the cases cited by Petitioner, Respondent instead proposes Ramos and

Mejias6 – involving pain and suffering awards of $40,000.00 and $45,000.00, respectively.

Opp. at 12-14.

C. Appropriate Pain and Suffering Award

In this case, awareness of the injury is not disputed. The record reflects that at all

times Petitioner was a competent adult with no impairments that would impact his

awareness of his injury. Therefore, I analyze principally the severity and duration of

Petitioner’s injury. In determining appropriate compensation for pain and suffering, I have

carefully reviewed and taken into account the complete record in this case, including, but

not limited to: Petitioner’s medical records, filings, and all assertions made by the parties

in written documents. I have also considered prior awards for pain and suffering in both

SPU and non-SPU SIRVA cases, and relied upon my experience adjudicating these

cases. However, my determination is ultimately based upon the specific circumstances

of this case.

The medical records show that, except for a one-month period from April to May

2019, Petitioner experienced only mild SIRVA symptoms. Even during this one-month

5 Vinocur v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-0598V, 2020 WL 1161173 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan.

31, 2020); Sherbine v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-0413V, 2020 WL 1933136 (Fed. Cl. Spec.

Mstr. Mar. 27, 2020).

6 Ramos v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-1005V, 2021 WL 688576 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 4,

2021); Mejias v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 19-1944V, 2021 WL 5895622 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

Nov. 10, 2021).

8

period, Petitioner stated that his more severe pain primarily occurred with movement.

Exhibit 2 at 10; Exhibit 3 at 71. The only time he reported constant and severe pain was

during an orthopedic visit on April 22, 2019. Exhibit 3 at 84. And he reported significant

improvement (for at least a week) after receiving a cortisone injection the following week

on April 29, 2019. Exhibit 3 at 71. Furthermore, Petitioner’s pain substantially lessened

after the application of tape at his first PT session on May 10, 2019. By his second session

on May 17, 2019, he reported that “the tape gave him a lot of relief,” and “he [wa]s feeling

a noticeable difference.” Id. at 69.

Additionally, Petitioner’s initial symptoms were mild. He first mentioned his left

shoulder pain at a PCP visit on February 18, 2019, but did not seek treatment until mid-

April 2019, almost seven months post-vaccination. Exhibit 2 at 13 (1/18/19 visit), 7, 10-

11 (4/17/19 visit). Although this significant delay did not prevent Petitioner from

establishing the pain onset needed for a Table injury, it provides credible evidence of a

milder initial injury.

The only case cited by the parties which shares enough similarities to provide

helpful guidance to the present case is Ramos, involving a petitioner who also suffered

milder symptoms and delayed seeking treatment for four months. Ramos, 2021 WL

688576, at *5. However, the Ramos petitioner did not receive a cortisone injection and

attended approximately half the number of PT sessions. Id. Thus, Petitioner’s award

should be higher than the $40,000.00 awarded in Ramos.

The remaining cases cited by the parties do not offer helpful comparisons. The

Mejias petitioner sought treatment only two days post-vaccination, suffered moderate

pain levels throughout his injury, and did not receive a cortisone or attend any PT. Mejias,

2021 WL 5895622, at *6-7. Differing from Petitioner’s circumstances by almost every

metric, it provides little guidance. Additionally, both cases cited by Petitioner, Vinocur and

Sherbine, involved petitioners who suffered more significant pain levels and limitations in

ROM throughout the duration of their injuries. Vinocur., 2020 WL 1161173, at *12-14;

Sherbine, 2020 WL 1933136, at *2-3, 10-11. The Vinocur petitioner’s pain was so severe

that he questioned whether he could continue PT. Vinocur, 2020 WL 1161173, at *3-4.

Instead, I find Rayborn, Welch, and Couch7 – decisions featuring awards of

$55,000.00, to be better comparable cases. All involved petitioners who delayed

treatment, suffered symptoms involving similar severity and duration, and required, at

most, one cortisone injection and a similar amount of PT. Rayborn, 2020 WL 5522948, at

7 Rayborn v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-0226V, 2020 WL 5522948 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug.

14, 2020); Welch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-0660V, 2021 WL 4612654 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

Sept. 2, 2021); Couch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-1246V, 2022 WL 4453921 (Fed. Cl. Spec.

Mstr. Aug. 24, 2022).

9

*2, 11-12; Welch, 2021 WL 4612654, at *2-4; Couch, 2022 WL 4453921, at *3-5.

Additionally, like Petitioner (44 years old), the Rayborn and Couch petitioners (both 35

years old at the time of vaccination) were not likely to have experienced significant

degenerative changes prior to vaccination. Rayborn, 2020 WL 5522948, at *2; Couch,

2022 WL 4453921, at *3. And MRI results in all cases support that proposition. Id.; see

also Exhibit 3 at 91-92 (Petitioner’s MRI results). Thus, I find Petitioner should receive the

same amount of compensation for past pain and suffering as I awarded in these cases,

$55,000.00 for past pain and suffering.

IV. Compensation for Unreimbursed Expenses – Mileage Rate

The parties agree that Petitioner should be awarded $4,659.14, plus

reimbursement for 1,190 miles of travel. Brief at 16, Opp. at 15; Reply at 5. Petitioner

maintains that this travel should be reimbursed using $0.58 per mile, the IRS business

mileage rate. Brief at 16; Reply at 5. Respondent argues that $0.20, the IRS medical

mileage rate, should be applied. Opp. at 15; 15 n.6.

To support his position, Petitioner cites several cases from the late 1990s, showing

other special masters have determined the IRS business rate is appropriate to use in

vaccine cases when calculating travel expenses. Reply at 5 (citing Williams v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-2239V, 1996 WL 608455 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 10,

1996) and Ashe-Robinson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 94-1096V, 1997 WL

54350 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 23, 1997)). As the Williams special master explained,

the greater business mileage rate “is intended to cover all costs of driving a car,” not only

the cost of gasoline and oil. Williams, 1996 WL 608455, at *2. Thus, both special masters

found it more appropriate to reimburse this full cost when a petitioner drives her personal

car to medical treatment. Id.; Ashe-Robinson, 1997 WL 54350, at *2-3 (reimbursing the

petitioner for the full cost of operating her personal vehicle using the greater IRS business

rate but only actual costs for meals and gasoline when transported in another individual’s

car).

Although Respondent references a more recent decision involving the application

of the medical mileage rate, it does not provide the strong support he suggests. Opp. at

15 n. 6 (citing Hood v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1042V, 2021 WL 5755324,

at *11 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 19, 2021)). In Hood, the petitioner (who suffered from

Guillain-Barré syndrome) requested an amount to cover the cost of Uber rides to and from

a recommended work hardening program, while Respondent countered that Petitioner

should be able to drive himself to these sessions as the Hood petitioner’s award included

the amount needed to add hand controls to his car. Hood, 2021 WL 5755324, at *7.

Although the special master ruled in favor of Respondent, there is nothing in the decision

10

to suggest that the Hood petitioner opposed the lower medical mileage rate employed by

Respondent or that the special master considered the mileage issue. Id. at *11.

I recently determined that travel expenses should be reimbursed using the IRS

business mileage rate employed in Williams and Ashe-Robinson, and Respondent has

again not persuaded me that the lower medical mileage rate is more appropriate. See

Gibson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-0243V, 2022 WL 17820891, at *12 (Fed.

Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 5, 2022). I will award Petitioner amount of travel expenses he seeks,

$690.20, based upon a business mileage rate of $0.58, as well as the agreed amount of

unreimbursed expenses, $4,659.14. The total amount of unreimbursable expenses

awarded is $5,349.34.

Conclusion

For all the reasons discussed above and based on consideration of the entire

record, I find that Petitioner’s left shoulder injury meets the definition for a Table

SIRVA. Thus, causation is presumed, and Petitioner is entitled to compensation in

this case. Furthermore, I find that $55,000.00 represents a fair and appropriate

amount of compensation for Petitioner’s actual pain and suffering.8 I also find that

Petitioner is entitled to $5,349.34 in actual unreimbursable expenses.

I therefore award Petitioner a lump sum payment of $60,349.34, in the form

of a check payable to Petitioner. This amount represents compensation for all damages

that would be available under Section 15(a) of the Vaccine Act. Id.

This amount represents compensation for all damages that would be available

under Section 15(a). The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance

with this Decision.9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master

8 Since this amount is being awarded for actual, rather than projected, pain and suffering, no reduction to

net present value is required. See Section 15(f)(4)(A); Childers v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 96-

0194V, 1999 WL 159844, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 5, 1999) (citing Youngblood v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 32 F.3d 552 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).

9 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice

renouncing the right to seek review.

11

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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