The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
QUEEN CHARLOTTE L. FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:24-cv-611
Plaintiff,
Hopkins, J.
vs. Litkovitz, M.J.
UC DRAKE HOSPITAL, et al., REPORT AND
Defendants. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, has filed a pro se civil complaint against
several hospitals and a nursing care facility located in Cincinnati, Ohio. (Doc. 1-1). By
separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915.
This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine
whether the complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Screening of Complaint
A. Legal Standard
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant
whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in
forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the
plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 328-29; see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action
has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action
has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the
irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The
Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing
a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed
by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however,
the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71
(“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a
claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-
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pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide
“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . .
. claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
B. Plaintiff’s Complaint
Ms. Franklin’s complaint is difficult to decipher. As such, the Court quotes Ms.
Franklin’s factual allegations verbatim. The complaint alleges:
In 1975 there was an accident on Hollywood Ave., Cincinnati, OH 45224 which
involved my grandparents. My grandmother was a patient at Providence Hospital,
where she was operated on her brain where there was nothing wrong with her to
have a brain operation. I, Charlotte L Franklin, was their guardian through probate
9–1974. Nor her husband or my consent. Then I had her transported to Christian
Care Nursing Home, 625 Probasco Rd. Cincinnati, OH 45220. Someone had her
transported to Drake hospital, 151 W. Galbreath Rd., Cincinnati, OH 45216 without
our permission. After finding her where both being [illegible] by attorney Floyd
Black – go find her. I did find her at Drake. My grandfather and I went to
information desk, was told she there. He and I attempted to go visit her when a
white woman met us in the hallway and ask, “who we were“ after telling “she said
we were not allowed to visit.” Leave the hospital because our family said we were
crazy. We left. The next morning a China man doctor called saying she passed
away with cancer. I was told she was given poison candy August 27, 75. After
that, my aunt had my grandfather’s leg removed, where the hospital knew I was
guardian of him as well – 1977. My daughter was a patient at Good Samaritan
Hospital. They removed her leg and left a cater in her and released her.
(Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 7). Ms. Franklin does not state the type of relief she is requesting.
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C. Resolution
Ms. Franklin’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim with an arguable basis in law
over which this federal Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
To the extent Ms. Franklin seeks to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), the complaint reveals such jurisdiction is lacking. A district court has
jurisdiction over a suit between citizens of different states when the amount in controversy
“exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Ms. Franklin has not alleged the requisite amount in controversy to establish diversity
jurisdiction. In addition, the complaint alleges that Ms. Franklin and all of the defendants are
Ohio citizens. (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 4-5). Therefore, there is no complete diversity of
citizenship in this matter. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity
of citizenship over any state law claims Ms. Franklin may be alleging.
To the extent Ms. Franklin invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, the
complaint fails to state a claim for relief. District courts have original federal question
jurisdiction over cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1331. In order to invoke the Court’s federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331, Ms. Franklin must allege facts showing the cause of action involves an issue of
federal law. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). The undersigned is
unable to discern from the facts alleged in the complaint any federal statutory or constitutional
provision that applies to give rise to an actionable claim for relief.
In any event, Ms. Franklin’s pro se complaint is rambling, difficult to decipher, and
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virtually incomprehensible. Ms. Franklin’s complaint provides no factual content or context
from which the Court may reasonably infer that the named defendants violated Ms. Franklin’s
rights. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Ms. Franklin’s allegations do not “give the defendant[s] fair
notice of what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93
(citations omitted).
Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons an
appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good
faith and therefore deny Ms. Franklin leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Ms. Franklin
remains free to apply to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v.
Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal
Serv., 105 F.3d
274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).
Date: 11/6/2024 Haun K Kethovy
Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
QUEEN CHARLOTTE L. FRANKLIN, Case No. 1:24-cv-611
Plaintiff,
Hopkins, J.
vs. Litkovitz, M.J.
UC DRAKE HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report
objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If
the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the
record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the
record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems
sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another
party’s objections WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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