Morgan v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DALE MORGAN, No. 4:23-CV-00872

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

CENTRE COUNTY and

MICHAEL D. BROWN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOVEMBER 6, 2024

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dale Morgan initiated this Section 1983 action in August 2021 with

the filing of a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of New York.1 In his initial complaint, Morgan named as defendants the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), Centre

County, Pennsylvania, several unidentified law enforcement officers, and PSP

Trooper Michael D. Brown.2 Morgan filed an amended complaint in November

2022,3 which the defendants moved to dismiss.4 Several defendants also filed a

motion to change venue.5 The Honorable Eric R. Komitee granted the latter request

1 Complaint, Doc. 1.

2 Id.

3 First Amended Complaint, Doc. 28

4 Commonwealth Motion to Dismiss, Doc 31; Centre County Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 34.

transferring the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 6 He then denied the

motions to dismiss without prejudice to renew before the transferee court.7

Following transfer, defendants again moved to dismiss the amended

complaint.8 This Court granted those motions, dismissing the claims against the

Commonwealth and PSP with prejudice, and granting Morgan leave to amend his

claims against Brown and Centre County.9 Morgan filed a second amended

complaint in December 2023, naming several additional defendants,10 and all

defendants moved to dismiss again.11 This Court granted the motions to dismiss,

granting Morgan leave to amend as to the false arrest and imprisonment, and related

municipal liability claims, against defendants Centre County, Brown, Luke Nelson,

and Spring Township Police Department (“STPD”).12 In May 2024, Defendants

Nelson and STPD, both of whom had only been added to the suit with the second

amended complaint, filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that they should have

6 Memorandum and Order, Doc. 41.

7 Id.

8 Centre County Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 46; Commonwealth, PSP, and Brown Motion to

Dismiss, Doc. 55.

9 Order, Doc. 66.

10 Second Amended Complaint, Doc. 73.

11 Centre County Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 82; Brown Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 90; Cantorna and

Smith Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 95; Nelson and STPD Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 97.

12 Order, Doc. 110.

been dismissed with prejudice.13 The Court granted that motion as unopposed in July

2024,14 and then denied Morgan’s motion for reconsideration in September 2024.15

In July 2024, while the parties were litigating the dismissal of Nelson and

STPD, Morgan filed his third amended complaint.16 Count One attempts to state a

claim for false arrest and imprisonment in violation of the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments, while Count Two attempts to state a municipal liability claim based

on the same conduct.17 Now that Nelson and STPD have been dismissed with

prejudice from this suit, the only remaining defendants are Brown and Centre

County (the “Defendants”). In September 2024, Brown and Centre County filed

motions to dismiss the third amended complaint for failure to state a claim.18 The

motions are now ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below, they are granted

with prejudice.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts dismiss a complaint,

in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly19 and

13 Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. 111.

14 Order, Doc. 117.

15 Order, Doc. 129.

16 Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118.

17 Id.

18 Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 126; Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 130.

19 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,20 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’”21 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

instructed that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a

court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: (1) “take note

of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) “identify allegations

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption

of truth”; and (3) “assume the[] veracity” of all “well-pleaded factual allegations”

and then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”22

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts alleged in the third amended complaint, which this Court must

accept as true for the purposes of this motion, are as follows.

In an investigation centering on identity theft, Dale Morgan was mistakenly

arrested because the true culprit stole his identity. Sherica Chambers, Horace Henry,

and Andrew Herdsman were all members of a criminal identity theft conspiracy

being investigated in Centre County during January and February of 2019.23 Among

the conspirators, Henry was known by the alias “Metro.”24 The conspiracy, as laid

20 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

21 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

22 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations

and citations omitted).

23 Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118 ¶¶18-20, 27.

24 Id. ¶¶19, 30.

out by Brown’s affidavit, involved suspects using stolen identities to create

fraudulent Sprint accounts and then using counterfeit identification to receive Sprint

cellphones when they were delivered.25 The investigation included the active

involvement of the Department of Homeland Security-HIS, the PSP, and Centre

County local law enforcement agencies.26 According to the third amended

complaint, “Centre County works in tandem in state troopers and other local

municipal police officers to investigate allegations and initiate criminal charges.”27

On January 2, 2019, Chambers rented a 2018 gray Volkswagen Passat bearing

Pennsylvania license plate KRS2315 at John F. Kennedy International Airport.28

Chambers handed the car off to Henry.29 While Henry was driving the car on January

4, 2019, PSP conducted a traffic stop of the rental car.30 But Henry—who, after all,

was orchestrating an identity theft criminal enterprise—did not present accurate

identification to the officer at the traffic stop.31 Instead, unbeknownst to the officer,

Henry provided a doctored driver’s license displaying his photograph but with the

name and identifying information of the Plaintiff.32 The officer noted traffic

violations but allowed Henry—who he believed to be Morgan—to leave.33 But the

25 Id. ¶54.

26 Id.

27 Id. ¶24.

28 Id. ¶28.

29 Id. ¶29.

30 Id. ¶31.

31 Id. ¶¶32, 34.

32 Id.

33 Id. ¶33.

traffic stop would later be connected to law enforcement’s investigation into the

identity fraud conspiracy.

On January 24, 2019, law enforcement surveilled the rented Volkswagen

Henry was driving, with Herdsman as his passenger, between 1:10 p.m. to 2:00

p.m.34 Henry and Herdsman had parked in front of a Spring Mills, Pennsylvania

residence, waiting for FedEx to deliver cellphones they had ordered using stolen

identifying information.35 After Herdsman exited the Volkswagen to retrieve the

cellphones, PSP Troopers Michael D. Brown and Thomas Stock pursued and

arrested him.36 Meanwhile, Henry fled the scene in the Volkswagen; officers

recovered a cloth bag in the area containing fraudulently ordered iPhones and an

iPad.37

A subsequent incident that same day appeared to also be in furtherance of the

conspiracy. Chambers went to a different residence in Patton Township, Centre

County, and waited there from 1:45 p.m. to 2:20 p.m. in another vehicle, at which

point she left; two Sprint cellphones were delivered to the address by FedEx after

Chambers’ departure.38 On January 26, 2019, Chambers returned the Volkswagen to

Avis, the car rental company at JFK airport.39

34 Id. ¶37.

35 Id. ¶38.

36 Id. ¶¶39-40.

37 Id. ¶41.

38 Id. ¶¶44-45.

39 Id. ¶48.

On January 25, 2019, Brown and an FBI agent interviewed Herdsman.40 After

Brown showed Herdsman surveillance footage of the Volkswagen, Herdsman

identified himself and Chambers.41 Brown and STPD Officer Luke Nelson

conducted a subsequent interview of Herdsman on January 28.42 That same day,

Avis provided Brown with surveillance footage capturing Chambers’ return of the

vehicle.43 Law enforcement officers then accessed the Pennsylvania DMV database

to obtain information on the vehicle.44

Various sources of evidence available to law enforcement gave officers a view

of what Henry looked like. The cloth bag recovered from the scene of Herdsman’s

arrest contained an iPad with personal identifying information and photos of

Henry.45 Surveillance footage also captured Henry entering a Days Inn in State

College, Pennsylvania on January 17, and a Wal-Mart in Spring Mills, Pennsylvania

on January 24, 2019.46

Using the information at his disposal, Brown drafted an affidavit of probable

cause supporting an arrest warrant for Dale Morgan, allegedly assisted by Centre

County District Attorney Bernie Cantorna and Centre County First Assistant District

40 Id. ¶46.

41 Id. ¶47.

42 Id. ¶49.

43 Id. ¶53.

44 Id. ¶56.

45 Id. ¶43.

46 Id. ¶35-36.

Attorney Mark Smith.47 Brown was in possession of, and had viewed, the

surveillance tapes and photographs clearly identifying Henry’s physical

characteristics and appearance.48

But Morgan states many times throughout the third amended complaint that

Brown never compared these depictions to any photographs of Morgan.49 Morgan at

first states that Brown had a photograph of Morgan in his possession,50 but

subsequent parts of the complaint clarify that these photographs were those in

government databases, such as the New York DMV and Department of Homeland

Security.51 Brown and the other investigating officers did not present video footage

of Henry or Morgan to Herdsman to make a final identification,52 speak with the

PSP Trooper who conducted the traffic stop on January 4,53 speak with law

enforcement officials who had surveilled Henry on January 24,54 or speak with

FedEx drivers involved in the deliveries.55 In sum, there was “no attempt

whatsoever” to conduct an identification procedure that would have clarified that

Henry was not Morgan.56 The comparison may have revealed a discrepancy in

47 Id. ¶¶57-58.

48 Id. ¶¶60, 64.

49 Id. ¶¶61, 62, 65, 120-21.

50 Id.

51 Id. ¶¶ 93, 117.

52 Id. ¶86.

53 Id. ¶90.

54 Id. ¶91.

55 Id. ¶92.

56 Id. ¶98.

appearance; while Morgan is a 6’1”, 220-pound, dark-skinned black male, Henry is

a 5’6”, 150-pound, light-skinned black male.57

Morgan was not involved in the criminal conspiracy and has never been to

Pennsylvania.58 But because Brown filed the affidavit, Morgan was charged with

five felony counts involving theft, conspiracy, identity theft, and receiving stolen

property, and was named in an arrest warrant.59 The third amended complaint also

alleges that Centre County prosecutors Cantorna and Smith failed to question,

examine, or confirm the identity of the true perpetrator, acquire the requisite

knowledge to ensure the matter was competently investigated, disregarded

contradicting data in the warrant application, and altogether wrongfully permitted

Brown to file his warrant and failed to review it.60

On February 1, 2019, a Pennsylvania magistrate judge approved a warrant for

Morgan’s arrest based on Brown’s affidavit.61 Following the approval of this

warrant, Detective Michael Langellotti, employed by the New York City Police

Department,62 served a criminal complaint on Morgan as a fugitive from justice and

arrested him.63 Langellotti’s criminal complaint states that “Defendant’s

57 Id. ¶¶62, 64. The third amended complaint states that Henry is 5’3” tall. Id. ¶64. But the

Presentence Report for Henry states that he is 5’6” tall. Horace Henry v. United States, No.

4:19-cr-00231, Presentence Report, Doc. 164 ¶56.

58 Id. ¶74.

59 Id. ¶¶71-73.

60 Id. ¶¶76-84.

61 Id. ¶103.

62 Id. ¶21.

63 Id. ¶104.

identification has been confirmed by . . . a photograph of the defendant provided by

said jurisdiction,”64 and the third amended complaint infers that “Defendants Brown,

Nelson, and/or Smith” accessed one of these databases to acquire this picture and

supply it to Langellotti.65 Morgan was denied bail and remained at the Vernon C.

Bain Correctional Facility in Bronx County, New York for approximately nine days

before his release.66

On March 26, 2019, Brown wrote an email to the Queen’s County District

Attorney Office indicating that, after conferring with officials at the Centre County

District Attorney’s Office, the investigation had led to the withdrawal of charges

against Morgan.67 Morgan now brings a two-count complaint against Brown and

Centre County.

IV. ANALYSIS

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a species of tort liability for the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”68 In this case,

Morgan seeks relief from Brown for Fourth Amendment violations under the

theories of false arrest and false imprisonment.69 He also seeks municipal liability

against Centre County for the same alleged violations.70

64 Doc. 118-4 at 2.

65 Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118 ¶119.

66 Id. ¶¶112, 126.

67 Id. ¶128.

68 Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 362 (2017) (cleaned up).

69 Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118 at 27.

70 Id. at 38.

A. Claims Against Brown

“False arrest and false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the

latter.”71 “To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish ‘(1) that there

was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.’”72 “[W]here

the police lack probable cause to make an arrest, the arrestee has a claim under §

1983 for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”73 “To state

a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that [he] was detained’

and (2) that the detention was unlawful.”74 As to the first prongs, an individual may

be held liable where his “intentional actions set forth the arresting officer in motion”

to cause the arrest or imprisonment; that means Brown may be liable because he

wrote the affidavit of probable cause, even though he did not arrest or imprison

Morgan himself.75 The inquiry under the second prong, whether the arrest and

subsequent detention were supported by probable cause, is “largely the same” for

both false arrest and false imprisonment claims.76

71 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).

72 Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre,

700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)).

73 Id. at 202 (quoting Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)).

74 Id. (quoting James, 700 F.3d at 682-83).

75 Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Wilson v. Russo, 212

F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (filing affidavit of probable cause with false statement or

omission can support false arrest claim); Diaz v. Carstaphen, No. 22-CV-7465 (RBK/SAK),

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126688, at *11-12 (D.N.J. Jul. 24, 2023) (personal involvement based

on supervisory authority over arrest).

76 Id.

Morgan has supplemented his allegations by laying out various materials at

Brown’s disposal which he could have used to compare Morgan and Henry. But the

substance of Morgan’s claim against Brown rises and falls on the same factors in

each of this Court’s analyses.

1. Brown’s Affidavit is Not Facially Invalid

First, as the Court has continued to emphasize, “[a]ssuming the truthfulness

of Brown’s affidavit, Morgan’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims would

have to clear an astoundingly high bar to evade a qualified immunity defense.”77

“The threshold for establishing this exception is a high one”78 because “an officer

cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination.”79

The arrest is valid unless “it is obvious that no reasonable competent officer

would have concluded that a warrant should issue.”80 Morgan’s third amended

complaint, unlike his prior complaints, does allege “that Brown could verify

Morgan’s identity through any readily available information,” and that “a picture of

Henry, the man who was actually Metro, was available.”81 But it remains the case

77 Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 65 at 19.

78 Messerchmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).

79 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984).

80 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986); Armstrong v. Asselin, 734 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.

2013) (citing Messerchmidt, 565 U.S. at 556) (The warrant must be “so lacking in indicia of

probable cause” that “it is apparent from a ‘simple glance’ at the face of the warrant itself, not

a defect that would ‘become apparent only upon a close parsing of the warrant application.’”).

81 Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 65 at 21. The Court did not opine on whether supplementing this

gap in the first amended complaint would allow it to survive dismissal. Indeed, the Court’s

reasoning makes it eminently clear that under controlling precedent, Morgan faced a nearly

insurmountable bar to challenging the search warrant based on the face of the affidavit.

that any deficiency would only be revealed by a “close parsing” of Brown’s

affidavit.82 “Successful plaintiffs in this Circuit generally demonstrate such

deficiencies through ‘bare bones’ or ‘skeletal’ affidavits containing, at most, a few

general sentences.”83 And as this standard is based upon the face of the affidavit

itself, the reasoning set out in this Court’s first Memorandum Opinion—which

closely analyzed the facial validity of Brown’s affidavit—applies equally here.84

2. It Is Implausible That Brown Intentionally or Recklessly

Made a False Statement

Another exception to the general rule that officers may rely on arrest warrants

is derived from the Supreme Court case of Franks v. Delaware.85 Under this theory,

the officers (1) “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the

truth, made false statements and omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a

warrant;” and (2) “such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the

finding of probable cause.”86 Under such circumstances, “the protection afforded

82 Id. at 21.

83 Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 65 at 20 (citing Fiore v. City of Bethlehem, 510 F.App’x 215,

221 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 664 (3d Cir. 2012) (collecting

examples of “bare bones” affidavits); Kolhas v. N.J., Civ. No. 16-1564, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

175134, at *14-15 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2017)).

84 See Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 65 at 19-21; Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 109 at 22

(“Regarding Brown’s affidavit, as before, the fact that a neutral magistrate approved the

warrant, despite Brown not describing any steps he took to compare the appearance of Morgan

to Metro in his affidavit, renders Brown’s reliance on that warrant ‘objectively reasonable’

under binding Supreme Court precedent.”) (citing Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 546-47).

85 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

86 Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396,

399 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Goodwin v. Conway, 868 F.3d 321, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2016);

Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 469 (3d Cir. 2016); Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344,

356-57 n.5 (3d Cir. 2018).

by the magistrate’s review [of the affidavit] is lost; the magistrate will be unable to

assess the circumstances for probable cause because he will not know what those

circumstances actually are.”87 This analysis requires a “three-step procedure . . . .

First, we assess the evidence the plaintiff asserts was recklessly omitted from the

affidavit. Next, we reconstruct an affidavit that includes any recklessly omitted

information. And finally, we assess the materiality of the omitted information to the

probable cause determination.”88

Morgan’s briefings curiously fail to apply or even cite to this legal theory at

all; the only cited cases set out the standard for municipal liability under Monell,

which is irrelevant to an individual defendant’s liability.89 The Court nevertheless

analyzes this theory because Morgan’s brief and third amended complaint repeatedly

refer to Brown’s “recklessly drafted affidavit.”90 But Morgan fails at step one in any

event, because no intentional or reckless false statement or omission is plausible

from the complaint. Morgan does pepper the words “reckless” and “false”

throughout his third amended complaint.91 But saying that something is a reckless

falsehood does not make it so, even if one says it in bolded italics.

87 Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 469.

88 Id. at 470.

89 See Brief in Opposition, Doc. 135, generally.

90 See id. at 4; Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118, generally.

91 Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118 ¶¶ 58, 78, 80.

Brown’s misidentification of Morgan as the perpetrator is certainly a false

assertion, but Morgan can only prevail if that false assertion was made with an

intentional or reckless disregard for the truth; “[a]llegations of negligence or

innocent mistake are insufficient.”92 And as Morgan alleges many times over that

Brown never viewed the evidence which would exonerate Morgan, Brown’s false

statement cannot have been intentional.93 So the only question is whether he made

his false assertion with a reckless disregard for the truth.

In Wilson v. Russo, the Third Circuit explained that “assertions are made with

reckless disregard for the truth when an officer has obvious reasons to doubt the truth

of what he or she is asserting.”94 Whether an assertion is reckless “is measured not

by the relevance of the information, but the demonstration of willingness to

affirmatively distort truth.”95

“[I]n general, the failure to investigate fully is not evidence of an affiant’s

reckless disregard for the truth.”96 In previous complaints, that is all Morgan alleged,

for the evidence available to Brown did not establish the discrepancy between Henry

and Morgan’s identities. The third amended complaint’s allegations center around

Brown’s failure to consult the evidence already available to him, by obtaining a

92 Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.

93 See Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118 ¶¶61, 62, 65, 120-21.

94 212 F.3d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 2000).

95 Id. at 788.

96 United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d 638, 648 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Dale, 991

F.2d 819, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

picture of Morgan on a government database and then comparing it to Henry either

by referencing various surveillance footage or speaking with the traffic officers.

However, this is just another iteration of the same argument. Brown’s conduct is

certainly culpable—negligent, if not grossly negligent given the fact that he was

investigating the ringleader of an identity fraud conspiracy—but Brown’s negligent

investigation does not show any willingness on Brown’s part to distort the truth

when misidentifying Morgan as the culprit.

United States v. Brown highlights the relevant distinction here.97 In Brown,

the officer authored an affidavit relaying incriminating evidence that he believed his

fellow officer had told him when they spoke over the phone: that a van matching the

description of the defendant’s van had been spotted meeting with suspected bank

robbers by “multiple witnesses.”98 The fellow officer testified at a hearing that he

had said no such thing.99 A divided panel held: “The fact that a statement is a

fabrication or a figment of a speaker’s imagination is sufficient reason for finding

that it was not made in good faith—i.e., that it was made with (at least) reckless

disregard for the truth—even if the speaker testified that he believed the statement

to be true.”100

97 631 F.3d 638 (3d Cir. 2011).

98 Id. at 641-42.

99 Id.

100 Id. at 649.

While the “existence of contradictory evidence highlighted the problem” with

the officer’s affidavit, the “major flaw” supporting his reckless disregard for the truth

was that the officer had “made up [the assertion] out of whole cloth.”101 The panel

contrasted this situation from a mere “fail[ure] to corroborate” by explaining that, as

“a reasonable person’s default position is to doubt the proposition is true until there

are grounds to believe it,” “[t]he absence of sufficient grounding to support an

averment constitutes an ‘obvious reason[] for doubt’ under Wilson.”102 The ruling

therefore distinguished between a “total lack of evidentiary basis for making an

averment” and “duplicative fact-checking” or a “fail[ure] to corroborate.”103

Brown’s conduct falls on the other side of that fine line. Unlike the officer in

Brown, what evidence this defendant had reviewed supported his identification of

Morgan as the culprit. Brown was therefore guilty of “fail[ing] to corroborate his

averment,” but there was not a “total lack of an evidentiary basis for making” it.

Making an averment based on an incomplete survey of the evidence is negligent

police work, and shoddy police work, but it is not police work evidencing a reckless

disregard for the truth. In sum, the third amended complaint does not plausibly allege

that Brown was aware of the risk that Morgan had been misidentified, so Morgan’s

allegations support negligence but not recklessness.

101 Id. at 648.

102 Id.

103 Id. at 649.

3. No Duty of Further Inquiry is Clearly Established

Morgan may have argued that because Brown was investigating the ringleader

of an identity fraud conspiracy and based his identification of the culprit solely on

the identity he provided at a traffic stop, he had obvious reasons to doubt the truth

of his identification of Morgan as the culprit.104 According to the United States Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Tanguay, the argument

is that a “web of circumstantial evidence set up a red flag – and that red flag may

have been sufficient to create a duty of further inquiry.”105 However, Morgan failed

to raise any such argument in his papers, and there is a limit to what the Court will

raise on his behalf.

Even if Morgan’s briefings could be construed as raising this issue, Brown’s

qualified immunity defense would have thwarted it regardless. “Qualified immunity

shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts

showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

104 See United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 2015) (Selya, J.) (“Under some limited

circumstances, however, the officer’s duty may be broader: she may be obliged to inquire

further in order to dispel serious doubts about either the credibility of an informant upon whom

she relies or the veracity of the allegations underlying the attempted showing of probable

cause.”). It is unclear if even Morgan’s circumstances would implicate this theory, since it is

reasonable to rely on “what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow officer.” Rogers v.

Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1997).

105 Id. at 53 (citing United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1982)). See also

id. at 46 (“All that is required to trigger an officer’s duty of further inquiry is her knowledge

of an obvious and unexplored reason to doubt the truthfulness of the allegations. When

confronted with such a red flag, the officer should look into the matter even if she does not

believe that what she will discover is likely to vitiate probable cause.”).

the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”106 “A

Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of

the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right.”107 The law must have a “sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing

precedent,” precedent “clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it

to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.”108

What Third Circuit authority exists casts doubt upon such a theory’s viability.

As noted, “failure to investigate” claims are not clearly established within this

circuit, and our Court of Appeals has indicated its doubts that such claims are viable

on the merits.109 This argument arises in a different context—it is implicated through

a Franks recklessness inquiry instead of through a standalone claim—but the one

casts doubt upon the other. Even the Tanguay court noted that “[t]his duty of further

inquiry is not well understood,” and only remanded because the district court ruled

106 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).

107 Id. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (cleaned up)).

108 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).

109 See Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 207 (3d Cir. 2020); Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 354

n.5 (3d Cir. 2018); White v. Andrusiak, No. 14-7045, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110076, at *2-3

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015); Wright v. City of Phila., 229 F.Supp. 3d 322, 332 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2017).

See also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432

U.S. 197, 208 (1977) (“Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at

whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person”).

“categorically” that it does not exist.110 And the Court is aware of no in-Circuit case

applying such an argument.

It is not clearly established in the Third Circuit that, when circumstantial

evidence presents an “obvious and unexplored reason to doubt the truthfulness of

the allegations,” a failure to “inquire further” even when the officer “does not believe

that what she will discover is likely to vitiate probable cause” evidences that officer’s

reckless disregard for the truth. So although circumstances implicating Tanguay’s

rationale may present a challenging question in the appropriate case, the Court does

not reach that question here.

As this is the third time Morgan has failed to plausibly allege Fourth

Amendment false arrest and imprisonment claims against Brown, granting leave to

amend would be futile. The claim is dismissed with prejudice.

B. Municipal Liability Claim Against Centre County

Morgan’s municipal liability claim against Centre County is based upon the

alleged failure to train prosecutors and police officers in identifying suspects and

drafting, reviewing, and ratifying legally sufficient affidavits in support of criminal

complaints.111 A municipal body is a “person” which can be liable under Section

110 Tanguay, 787 F.3d at 46. Qualified immunity was inapplicable in Tanguay because it arose on

a motion to suppress evidence.

111 Morgan includes his claims against Centre County in both Count I, which pleads false arrest

and imprisonment actions under the Fourth Amendment, and Count II, which pleads a “1983-

Monell Claim.” Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118 at 27, 38. “But Monell v. Department of

Social Services is simply a decision clarifying how liability for constitutional violations can

attach to municipal bodies under Section 1983; it is not a unique cause of action.” Thompson

1983.112 But a municipal body is only liable for its own acts, not the acts of its

employees. A Section 1983 claim against a municipality must show (1) an

underlying constitutional violation (2) caused by the municipality’s execution of a

municipal policy, custom or training.113 Municipalities act through a “policy

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by

that body’s officers.”114 This includes practices “so permanent and well settled as to

constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”115 As relevant here, it also

includes a municipality’s “deliberate indifference to constitutional rights” through

failures, such as deficient training or supervision, 116 which “reflect[] a deliberate or

conscious choice.”117

“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault.”118 “A pattern of

similar constitutional violations” is ordinarily necessary “to demonstrate deliberate

indifference for purposes of failure to train.”119 It is clear from Morgan’s current

v. City of Williamsport, No. 4:22-CV-01159, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206935, at *11 (M.D. Pa.

Nov. 17, 2023). So Count I and Count II are pleading the same cause of action against Centre

County.

112 See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). A

municipality and its departments are treated as a single entity. Jackson v. City of Erie Police

Dep’t, 570 F.App’x 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1997); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25

n.4 (3d Cir. 1997).

113 Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003).

114 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

115 City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 117 (1978).

116 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 392 (1989).

117 Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (2019) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg

Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)).

118 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

119 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011).

pleading that no such pattern is alleged, and Morgan does not argue otherwise.

Instead, he rests his arguments upon the theory of single-incident liability.120 Absent

a pattern of violations, municipal liability only attaches if the need for training “can

be said to be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be characterized as

‘deliberate indifferent’ to constitutional rights.”121

“Where there is no underlying constitutional violation, there can be no Monell

claim.”122 But even if Morgan’s third amended complaint did set out facts supporting

a Fourth Amendment violation, he fails to allege Centre County’s deliberate

indifference.

Because prosecutors are legally trained, the Supreme Court of the United

States ruled that a failure to train them can never support a municipality’s deliberate

indifference to their constitutional violations.123 So any alleged violations based on

Centre County’s failure to train prosecutors do not state a claim for relief in the

absence of a pattern or practice of similar violations.

As to Officers Brown and Nelson, Morgan’s reference to these officers as

Centre County’s “employee police officers”124 is belied by other parts of his

complaint, which clarify that, as PSP and Spring Township officials, they only work

120 Brief in Opposition, Doc. 135 at 7.

121 See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.

122 Popiolek v. Twp. of Deptford, No. 15-3291 (RBK/AMD), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171248, at

*9 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2015).

123 Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-67.

124 See Third Amended Complaint, Doc. 118 ¶187.

“in tandem with” Centre County.125 As this Court already explained, the Centre

County safety pamphlet appended by Morgan outlines coordination between Centre

County, local police departments, and the PSP,126 but that “does not explain what

Centre County’s role is in training local police agencies [or state police] and is

perfectly consistent with the idea that it does not oversee or empower them.”127

Morgan’s third amended complaint fails to provide well-pled allegations

demonstrating how Brown or Nelson are trained, overseen, or supervised by Centre

County. Their actions then provide no basis for Centre County’s liability.

Moreover, Morgan’s failure to train allegations fail because he does not set

out what specific training existed, and what specific training was due.128 This is a

necessary plausibility requirement because “liability cannot rest only on a showing

that the employees ‘could have been better trained or that additional training was

125 See id. ¶¶11-12, 24-25.

126 Community Services Handbook, Doc. 118-2.

127 Memorandum Opinion, Doc. 65 at 13.

128 Morgan cites to contrary dictum in Carter v. City of Philadelphia, but Carter was decided

before Twombly and Iqbal clarified the plausibility standard. Brief in Opposition, Doc. 134

(citing Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.d3 339, 358 (3d Cir. 1999)). More recent cases are

unambiguous that more is required to plead a failure to train. See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d

209, 232 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1030 (3d Cir.

1991)) (“[A] failure to train claim requires a plaintiff to ‘identify a failure to provide specific

training that has a causal nexus with his or her injury and must demonstrate that the failure to

provide that specific training can reasonably be said to reflect a deliberate indifference to

whether constitutional deprivations of the kind alleged occur.’”). See also Wood v. Williams,

568 F.App’x 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The complaint was also deficient in alleging a claim

for failure to train or supervise. The complaint did not allege specific facts showing any

particular or specific policy or custom, or how it allowed the claimed constitutional violation

to occur . . .”)

available that would have reduced the overall risk of continued injury.’”129 In any

case, Morgan could not prevail on a single-incident liability theory here even if such

improperly pled allegations did not doom his claim. Given that Morgan does not

allege that officers receive no training or education on investigatory techniques at

all,130 it is not plausible that officers equipped with such general training would

foreseeably cause constitutional violations through misidentifying suspects, merely

because of a lack of training on the specific situation faced by Morgan here.131

The Court recognizes that single-incident liability is frustratingly difficult to

plead—but that is because its scope has been drastically narrowed by controlling

precedent. Some situations do call for single-incident liability, but in the ordinary

course of events, as in Morgan’s case, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly allege

a pattern of similar violations for his claim to survive dismissal.

Morgan’s municipal liability claims therefore fail. Given the number of

reasons these claims cannot survive and given the number of opportunities Morgan

129 Thomas, 749 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Colburn, 946 F.2d 1029-30).

130 Nor is this a reasonable inference based on the third amended complaint given that probable

cause is the bread-and-butter of police work—assuming otherwise would require the Court to

write additional allegations into the complaint on Morgan’s behalf. See Semerod v. Siko, No.

4:24-CV-1165, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180741, at *13 & n.67 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2024).

131 Compare Connick, 563 U.S. at 67 (explaining that where prosecutors received general legal

training and were “familiar with the general Brady rule,” nuanced training addressing the

specific scenario causing constitutional violations was not necessary for the municipality to

avoid single incident liability). Cf. Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 799-800 (plaintiff alleged that,

for over twenty years, the City did not train some officers at all, nor did its training “cover the

basics of the Fourth Amendment”).

has had to amend his complaint, his Section 1983 claims against Centre County are

also dismissed with prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

Both claims in Morgan’s third amended complaint fail to state a claim, so

Brown and Centre County’s motions to dismiss are granted. Leave to amend is

denied. “Among the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are undue

delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.”132 A complaint is “futile”

if even, as amended, it would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted.133 Although there is a “liberal pleading philosophy of the federal rules” no

amendment will be permitted because, as explained above, another opportunity to

plead a case through fourth amended complaint would be futile.134

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

132 Id. (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)).

133 Id.

134 See Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2008).