The opinion
Filed 10/24/24; Certified for Publication 11/6/24 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CHRIS ROBLES et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G064119
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS2007038)
CITY OF ONTARIO et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Michael A. Sachs, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Law Offices of Scott J. Rafferty and Scott J. Rafferty for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Parrinello Gross & Leoni, Nielsen Merksamer, Marguerite M.
Leoni, Chirstopher E. Skinnell and David J. Lazarus; Best, Best & Krieger
and Ruben Duran for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
This is a case under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (52 U.S.C.
§ 10301(c) (VRA), the California Voting Rights Act (Elec. Code, § 14027) 1
(CVRA), and title 42 United States Code section 1983. Plaintiffs Chris Robles
and the California Voting Rights Initiative alleged the City of Ontario (the
city) violated both acts by failing to conduct district, rather than at-large,
elections for members of its city council. The parties eventually entered into a
settlement and stipulation for entry of judgment (stipulated judgment) which
would eventually provide such elections. The stipulated judgment also
provided for attorney fees incurred to date.
The crux of the current conflict is whether plaintiffs are entitled
to any further attorney fees under the stipulated judgment. We conclude
plaintiffs, under the plain language of the stipulated judgment, were entitled
to seek attorney fees incurred in the effort to enforce the stipulated
judgment’s terms. Therefore, we reverse and remand the order for the trial
court to decide, in the first instance, whether plaintiffs are prevailing parties,
and if so, the appropriate amount of an attorney fees award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the interests of brevity, we summarize the factual background
in light of the issues relevant to the appeal. While we have reviewed the
entire record, we have not included every underlying fact or step in the trial
court litigation.
A. Commencement of Litigation
In January 2020, plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to the city
asking the city council to transition from its at-large method of electing
council members to election by district. The letter contended that the at-large
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Elections Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
method of election diluted the electoral influence of Latinos as a community,
and state and federal law required the council to adopt a map for district
elections that increased the opportunity to influence elections for Latino,
Asian, and Black voters. The letter asked for new districts to be drawn up in
time for the 2020 election.
In March, plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit against the city, the
city council, city officials, and individual council members (defendants),
alleging violations of the CVRA, VRA, and title 42 United States Code section
1983. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the scheduled 2020 at-large
election, an order directing the city to create new districts in time for that
election, and other relief.
Defendants demurred, arguing failure to state a claim. The
court’s tentative ruling sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.
Thereafter, the parties settled the case, jointly submitting the stipulated
judgment.
B. The Stipulated Judgment
This complex agreement provided in paragraph 6, among other
things, that the city would switch to district elections in 2024 and set forth a
process for drawing the district maps. The mapping process was required to
“follow the standards and procedures set forth in . . . [former] sections 21601,
21607.1, and other applicable law” and to observe other specified procedures,
most of which were part of the California Fair Maps Act in effect at the time. 2
(See Stats. 2019, ch. 557, §24, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.) The parties agreed the final
map was to be adopted by December 31, 2022, which would allow that map to
be used for 2024 city council elections.
2 Many of the Elections Code provisions relevant to this case were
amended effective January 1, 2024.
3
The city also agreed, in paragraph 5.1, to pay “$300,000 in full
satisfaction of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in this Action consistent
with Elections Code section 14030 . . . . The City accepts plaintiffs’ attorneys’
statement for this claim and representation that it is based on actual time
and expenses incurred.” In paragraph 5.2, the parties agreed that “except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Stipulation, each party shall bear its
own costs, expenses, and attorneys fees arising out of or relating to the
Action.”
In paragraph 9, which addressed mutual release of claims,
plaintiffs released defendants “from any and all claims . . . debts, damages,
costs, expenses, including expert fees, losses, or attorneys’ fees of whatever
nature, involving or relating to the City’s electoral system, or elections held
thereunder, whether known or not known . . . or in any way related to (i) the
facts alleged in the complaint . . . or (ii) the ‘at-large’ electoral system of
Defendant City . . . which the Plaintiff Releasors have or may have against
the Defendant Releasees, except for rights to enforce this Stipulation, or as
provided herein.”
Paragraph 10, which was a waiver of claims under Civil Code
section 1542, included that section’s language as required, and further stated:
“Notwithstanding these provisions of Section 1542, [the parties] expressly
acknowledge that this Stipulation is intended to include . . . all Claims
described [elsewhere in the agreement] . . . and that the settlement reflected
in this Stipulation contemplates the extinguishment of all such Claims,
except for rights to enforce this Stipulation.” The court entered the stipulated
judgment on June 4, 2021.
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C. Brief Summary of the Districting Process
According to the city, the districting website was available to the
public after March 22, 2022, and announced four public hearings and five
community workshops, as well as offering other information and the
opportunity to submit draft maps and public comments. The city averred the
website was regularly updated and that “members of the public submitted 13
proposed maps by July 1, 2022.” Three maps were developed by the city’s
demographic consultant. The city asserted that all public hearings were
noticed in Ontario’s newspaper of general circulation.
Plaintiffs claim, however, that the city violated section 10010,
subdivision (a)(1), which requires “the political subdivision shall hold at least
two public hearings over a period of no more than 30 days, at which the
public is invited to provide input regarding the composition of the districts”
prior to the drawing of a draft map or maps. The first hearing was held on
April 5, 2022, and the second more than 30 days later, on May 10.
Plaintiffs also asserted, in a series of letters dated May through
July 2022, that the city had violated numerous provisions in the stipulated
judgment. The city had agreed to follow the standards set forth in former
sections 21601, 21607.1, “and other applicable law” when drawing district
maps. The alleged violations concerned the timing, execution, and follow-up
relating to community meetings that were required to take place on specified
timelines prior to the adoption of proposed maps.
In sum, plaintiffs alleged that the spirit of the relevant provisions
of the Election Code was to give the public the opportunity and ability to
understand the districting process and provide input into it. Under former
section 21608, city councils are required “to encourage residents, including
those in underrepresented communities and non-English speaking
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communities, to participate in the redistricting public review process.” (See
Stats. 2020, ch. 90, §15, eff. Jan. 1, 2021.) City councils are required to make
an effort to provide media coverage of the process, including through non-
English media organizations, to provide information through civic
engagement and other groups, to arrange for live translation of public
hearings or workshops, and to publish the time and date of hearings and
workshops on the Internet at least five days in advance. Draft maps are to be
published prior to hearings and workshops. The public must be allowed to
submit public testimony or draft maps in writing and electronically. Cities
are required to record or prepare a written summary of each public comment
and council deliberation held, and make them available to the public. Cities
are also required to establish and maintain a web page dedicated to
redistricting, which is required to include a general explanation of
redistricting in English and other applicable languages, information
regarding testifying or submitting testimony, a calendar of all relevant
hearings and workshops, and other information. (Former § 21608.)
The Elections Code also includes procedural requirements,
including the number of hearings that must be held, and when. (Former
§ 21607.1.) Further, if the city council consolidates a regular meeting with a
redistricting hearing, the hearing must be held at a specified time noticed to
the public. (Former § 21607.1, subd. (d).) Plaintiffs claimed the city had failed
to comply with these provisions.
Meanwhile, the districting hearings and procedures continued.
Hearings were held in April through July, with an additional hearing
scheduled for November.
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D. The Motion to Enforce
On August 1, 2022, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to
shorten time on an application for an order to show cause on purported
violations of the stipulated judgment as noted above. Plaintiff submitted
declarations stating the city had either violated or failed to comply with
numerous statutory requirements included in the stipulated judgment,
including section 10010 and former sections 21607.1, and 21608.
As a remedy, plaintiffs proposed either adoption of their proposed
maps or deferring a decision on whether to impose a map pending additional
public input. The city opposed.
At a hearing on October 4, 2022, the court expressed numerous
concerns about the stipulated judgment, but also found that “it does appear
that the City has not complied with the terms of the settlement.” The court
questioned “whether the City can still comply with the requirements of . . .
§10010 at this late stage of the game, and if not, what would be the proper
remedy?” The court also requested briefing on how to proceed, as it believed
that “the terms of the stipulated judgment incorporate California Fair Maps
Act, which appears to me, based on my reading of the pertinent statute, it
doesn’t apply.” Incorporating the procedural requirements of the Fair Maps
Act, the court suggested, was inconsistent with section 10010, subdivision
(a). 3 “I can’t enforce an illegal settlement agreement.”
The court requested further briefing and denied plaintiffs’
request for further attorney fees for the moment. The court noted: “But if the
3 Section 10010, subdivision (a) applies to at-large jurisdictions
that conduct legislative hearings to draw district lines. The Fair Maps Act
has certain protections for public input that are lacking in section 10010,
subdivision (a). (Former §§ 21607.1, 21608.) The stipulated judgment agreed
to incorporate both provisions.
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settlement agreement contains an illegal or invalid term, the entire
settlement agreement is void ad initio. That appears to be the case based on
my further review of the matter.” The minute order stated the motion to
enforce the stipulated judgment was granted in part and denied in part.
Eventually, defendants conceded the issue of whether the
stipulated judgment was valid. They admitted the requirements of section
10010, subdivision (a) were not inconsistent with the provisions of former
sections 21607.1 and 21608.
On September 6, 2022, Robles submitted the proposed map
nicknamed the “Unity Map.” After resistance by defendants and further
efforts by plaintiffs, the city announced that the staff would recommend the
council adopt the Unity Map on November 1, and the map was later adopted.
E. Motion for Attorney Fees
At a hearing on December 9, 2022, the court noted the
substantive issues appeared to have been resolved, and the city had adopted
the map suggested by Robles. As to attorney fees, the court stated it would
require a separate motion. The court expressed skepticism that plaintiffs
were a prevailing party.
On January 10, 2023, plaintiffs’ attorney moved for attorney fees,
claiming 130 hours and $3,140 in postjudgment costs. Defendants claimed
the stipulated judgment precluded any further fee award.
At the hearing on February 3, the court made a tentative ruling:
“My position has always been—and we’ve discussed this on numerous
occasions—that the stipulation that the parties entered into did not provide
fees beyond those already paid. And that still is of my belief. Also, it’s of my
belief that the motions filed by Mr. Robles and his attorney, since I’ve had the
case, have been unnecessary. What I perceived was simply Mr. Robles
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pushing the matter, pushing it, pushing it, pushing it because it wasn’t
moving quick enough. [¶] As we spoke about on numerous occasions, when we
have these motions and issues before me, the City of Ontario has been doing
everything they can. You may disagree with that, counsel, but I believe they
have been doing everything they could in their power to comply with the
stipulation they’ve entered into. And that’s where I’m coming from, but I’ll be
happy to look at your papers as long as I get them by noon on Monday. And
then if I require further briefing, I’ll let the parties know.” The court did not
wish to hear further from plaintiffs’ counsel.
On March 6, the court adopted the tentative without further
explanation. Plaintiffs now appeal the order denying attorney fees.
DISCUSSION
I.
PLAINTIFFS’ LEGAL ENTITLEMENT TO SEEK ATTORNEY FEES
A. Standard of Review and General Principles of Law
“‘On appeal this court reviews a determination of the legal basis
for an award of attorney fees de novo as a question of law.’” (De La Carriere v.
Greene (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 270, 275.) This includes cases where the right
to recover attorney fees is dependent on the interpretation of a contract
without extrinsic evidence. (San Francisco CDC, LLC v. Webcor Construction,
L.P. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 266, 285.)
The default for attorney fees not specifically provided for by
statute is commonly referred to as “the ‘American rule,’” under which each
party pays its own fees. (Tract 19051 Homeowners Assn. v. Kemp (2015) 60
Cal.4th 1135, 1142.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 permits parties to
“‘contract out’ of the American rule by executing an agreement” that allocates
attorney fees. (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 279.) It states, in relevant
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part: “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the
measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left
to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1021.)
“The meaning and effect of a judgment are determined according
to the rules governing the interpretation of writings generally.” (Hirshfield v.
Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 766.) We must interpret a contract so as
to give effect to the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract was
formed. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) “The language of a contract is to govern its
interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an
absurdity.” (Civ. Code, § 1638.) Courts must also endeavor to give effect to
every part of a contract, “if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to
interpret the other[s].” (Civ. Code, § 1641.) “[T]he entire document is to be
taken by its four corners and construed as a whole to effectuate the obvious
intention.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 617, 622.)
B. The Relevant Provisions of the Stipulated Judgment
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, subdivision
(a), “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the
parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for
settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter
judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the
parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the
settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” The
stipulated judgment stated: “A further purpose of this stipulation is to avoid
unnecessary litigation by the Parties jointly requesting the Court to enter
into a judgment pursuant to its authority under the Code of Civil Procedure
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[section] 664.6 . . . .” Accordingly, the trial court had ongoing jurisdiction to
enforce the stipulation.
As discussed in more detail above, in the attorney fees provision
in the stipulation, paragraph 5.1, the city agreed to pay $300,000 “in full
satisfaction of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in this Action.”
Paragraph 5.2 stated that “except as otherwise expressly provided in this
Stipulation, each party shall bear its own costs, expenses, and attorneys fees
arising out of or relating to the Action.” In the release, paragraph 9, plaintiffs
released defendants from all claims “including . . . attorneys’ fees . . . except
for rights to enforce this Stipulation.”
According to defendants, the language of paragraph 5.1 not only
included attorney fees already incurred, but applies to future attorney fees as
well, ignoring the language about enforcing the stipulated judgment.
Further, interpreting the language in this matter would also require us to
ignore the following sentence: “The City accepts plaintiffs attorneys’
statement for this claim and representation that it is based on actual time
and expenses incurred.” “[I]ncurred” is in the past tense. If the parties had
intended this language to cover future attorney fees, the language should
have been clear on that point.
What we have before us is language which set forth an attorney
fees award for fees already “incurred.” The language clearly states that in
most situations, plaintiffs were precluded from seeking further attorney fees.
But the express language of the stipulated judgment also included a carve-
out “to enforce this stipulation.” That is exactly what plaintiffs sought when
they filed their motion to enforce. Despite the voluminous briefing on this
issue, at the end of the day, this is not a close call. Plaintiffs had the legal
right, based on the plain language of the stipulated judgment, to seek
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additional attorneys fees for enforcing its terms. Defendants’ arguments to
the contrary are simply unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in deciding plaintiffs
had no right to seek additional attorney fees. We therefore remand for the
trial court to decide, in the first instance, whether plaintiffs qualify as
prevailing parties, and if so, the amount of fees that should be awarded.
II.
PREVAILING PARTY
At the hearing on plaintiffs’ attorney fee request, the court
stated: “[I]t’s of my belief that the motions filed by Mr. Robles and his
attorney, since I’ve had the case, have been unnecessary. What I perceived
was simply Mr. Robles pushing the matter, pushing it, pushing it, pushing it
because it wasn’t moving quick enough. [¶] As we spoke about on numerous
occasions, when we have these motions and issues before me, the City of
Ontario has been doing everything they can. You may disagree with that,
counsel, but I believe they have been doing everything they could in their
power to comply with the stipulation they’ve entered into.”
This comment was dicta once the court decided plaintiffs had no
legal entitlement to seek attorney fees. But this statement also reflects an
incorrect standard for determining the prevailing party, which we clarify for
purposes of remand. The trial court has discretion in determining which
party has prevailed, or that no party has prevailed. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9
Cal.4th 863, 871.) If a party obtains an unqualified victory, that party is
entitled as a matter of law to be considered the prevailing party (Id. at p.
876.)
“[T]he terms ‘prevailing party’ and ‘successful party,’ . . . are
synonymous.” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 570.)
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“The term ‘successful party,’ as ordinarily understood, means the party to
litigation that achieves its objectives. . . . ‘In everyday use, “prevail” means
“gain victory by virtue of strength or superiority: win mastery: triumph.”
[Citation.] . . . A lawsuit’s ultimate purpose is to achieve actual relief from an
opponent. Favorable judgment may be instrumental in gaining that relief.
Generally, however, “the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the
end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of
action) by the defendant . . . .” [Citation.] On this common understanding, if a
party reaches the “sought-after destination,” then the party “prevails”
regardless of the “route taken.”’” (Id. at p. 571.)
Thus, whether plaintiffs’ counsel was “pushing” or whether
defendants were “doing everything they can,” is not relevant to an
assessment of which party should be granted prevailing party status.
DISPOSITION
The court’s order denying plaintiffs attorney fees with respect to
the motion to enforce is reversed. The matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs
on appeal.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
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Filed 11/6/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CHRIS ROBLES et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G064119
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS2007038)
CITY OF ONTARIO et al., ORDER GRANTING REQUEST
FOR PUBLICATION
Defendants and Respondents.
Attorney Scott J. Rafferty has requested that our opinion, filed on
October 24, 2024, be certified for publication. It appears that our opinion
meets the standards set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).
The request is GRANTED.
The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
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