C. Talbert v. Commonwealth of PA, Governor Shapiro

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles Talbert, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 543 M.D. 2023

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Governor Josh Shapiro, Laurel Harry, :

Department of Corrections, Christine :

Meukel, Mindy Parks, and Smart :

Communications, :

Respondents : Submitted: September 9, 2024

BEFORE: HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 6, 2024

Petitioner Charles Talbert, an inmate currently incarcerated within our

Commonwealth’s prison system, has filed a pro se amended petition for review

(Amended Petition) in our original jurisdiction. Therein, Talbert asserts that

Respondents Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth); Governor Josh

Shapiro; Laurel Harry; Department of Corrections (Department); Christine Meukel;

and Mindy Parks (collectively, Commonwealth Respondents) have violated various

constitutional provisions by preventing him from having sufficient internet access,

interfering with mail that has been sent to him, and limiting the amount of legal

materials he is allowed to keep while incarcerated. In addition, Talbert argues that

the Commonwealth, the Department, and Respondent Smart Communications have

conspired to commit fraud by agreeing to have Smart Communications process and

scan incoming inmate mail under the allegedly false pretense that doing so prevents

the Department’s employees from being exposed to, and sickened by, illicit and

dangerous substances contained therein. In response, Commonwealth Respondents

and Smart Communications have submitted preliminary objections, via which they

seek dismissal of the Amended Petition. Additionally, Talbert has filed an

application for summary relief, through which he requests judgment in his favor on

all counts. After thorough review, we sustain Commonwealth Respondents’

preliminary objections in part and overrule them in part. We also deny Talbert’s

application for summary relief in part. Finally, we sua sponte conclude we lack

jurisdiction to consider the Amended Petition in part, as to Count III, and

consequently transfer this matter in part to the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th

Judicial District- Forest County Branch (Common Pleas) for disposition of that

claim.1

I. Background

As Talbert essentially offers self-contained averments for each of his claims,

rather than an all-encompassing narrative, we will summarize those claims in

succession.

First, Talbert alleges that the Commonwealth, the Department, Governor

Shapiro, and Harry have arbitrarily and capriciously prevented him from accessing

1

Talbert was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest) at the

time that the facts giving rise to his lawsuit occurred. See Am. Pet., ¶¶43-46, 48-51, 57-60. We

take judicial notice of the fact that SCI-Forest is located in Forest County, as well as that Forest

County is part of the 37th Judicial District. See COM. OF PA., SCI Forest,

https://www.pa.gov/en/agencies/cor/state-prisons/sci-forest.html (last accessed November 5,

2024); 42 Pa. C.S. § 901(a) (stating that Forest and Warren Counties constitute the 37th Judicial

District); Pa. R.E. 201(b) (“The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable

dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can

be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.”).

2

“current information from the Internet[.]” Am. Pet., ¶¶14, 16-18. Talbert asserts that

this has deprived him of the ability to accrue new knowledge and will negatively

affect “his ability to adjust back into society” upon his release from prison in 2026.

Id., ¶¶15, 19. Accordingly, Talbert argues in Count I that this restriction violates

article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,2 and requests a preliminary

injunction barring those respondents “from depriving him [of] access to the

Internet[] and to thus allow him to research and print out lawful[,] up-to-date

information for his rehabilitation and reentry.” Id., ¶62, Count I Wherefore Clause.

Second, Talbert states that each carceral institution in our Commonwealth’s

prison system employs a correctional mail inspector supervisor (CMIS) to oversee

inmate mail services. Id., ¶¶20-24. Talbert also maintains that there is “a statewide

practice of encouraging and enabling . . . CMIS employees to [be] derelict [in

performing] their official duties by having non-mailroom correctional officers pick

up and deliver inmate mail.” Id., ¶25. According to Talbert, this has resulted in

“gross negligence, abandonment, and reckless indifference towards [his] incoming

2

Article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads as follows:

The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake

to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of

government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right

thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of

the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak,

write and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of

that liberty. No conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the

publication of papers relating to the official conduct of officers or

men in public capacity, or to any other matter proper for public

investigation or information, where the fact that such publication

was not maliciously or negligently made shall be established to the

satisfaction of the jury; and in all indictments for libels the jury shall

have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction

of the court, as in other cases.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.

3

and outgoing mail,” including “obstruction of his correspondence, by allowing

vindictive and unethical correctional officers to deprive him of his incoming mail

and/or to throw away his outgoing mail[,]” and “has also caused substantial

interference with contract agreements between [Talbert] and vendors that sell books

and magazines.” Id., ¶¶32-33; see id., ¶¶37-53 (alleged examples of interference

with Talbert’s mail). Accordingly, Talbert argues in Count II that this alleged

interference violates his constitutional right to free speech under the First

Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 Id., ¶¶63-66. He therefore requests a

preliminary injunction against Commonwealth Respondents that would prevent

them from “(a) delaying service of his incoming mail and publications; (b) allowing

anyone other than mailroom employees from picking up and delivering his mail; and

(c) depriving him of all his mail.” Id., Count II Wherefore Clause.

Third, Talbert claims that the Commonwealth, the Department, Governor

Shapiro, and Harry agreed to have Smart Communications process and scan

incoming inmate mail “under false and fraudulent pretenses[,]” specifically on the

basis that illicit and dangerous substances were being smuggled into prisons through

the mail and sickening Department employees. Id., ¶¶53-54. Talbert argues that there

is no proof that such substances were being mailed to prisoners, or that Department

employees were actually sickened as a result, and maintains that drugs are now even

easier to procure inside the Commonwealth’s prisons, in spite of this mail handling

policy. Id., ¶54. Further, Talbert alleges that this policy has resulted in

3

The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress

of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.

4

A. non-legal attorney mail taking approximately [two]

weeks to reach him from the date mailed, causing court

delays and interference with pending litigation[;]

B. unreasonable delays on other legal mail[; and]

C. confidential health care, family, and financial records

and mail being uploaded to a public scanning system, thus

depriving [him] of any privacy.

Id., ¶55. Accordingly, Talbert argues in Count III that those respondents and Smart

Communications have engaged in a civil conspiracy to commit fraud by handling

inmate mail in this manner. Id., ¶¶67-69. As relief, he requests a preliminary

injunction “enjoining them from having [his] incoming mail sent to [Smart

Communications] and [mandating that it be sent] directly to the institution(s) [at]

which he resides[,]” as well as unspecified monetary damages. Id., Count III

Wherefore Clause.

Finally, Talbert avers that he notified staff at the State Correctional Institution

at Forest (SCI-Forest) on December 5, 2023, that the 2 legal boxes he was allowed

to have under Department policy would be insufficient to store all the materials from

his 11 pending civil cases, and that he needed a total of 5 boxes to properly do so.

Id., ¶¶57-59. In response, SCI-Forest staff denied Talbert’s request and informed

him that he could instead request a “legal exchange”; this displeased Talbert because

it “would make things complicated even more by exchanging needed materials for

other needed materials.” Id., ¶60. This denial resulted in Talbert

A. throw[ing] away approximately $1,000.00 worth [of]

printing materials and publications[,] such as newspapers

and prison legal news[;]

B. stor[ing] all of his legal books, case law, and reference

materials in[] property storage without access[; and]

C. ship[ping] 2 boxes of legal records to the U.S. District

Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania[], seeking

for the Court to issue an order for the return of his legal

property.

5

Id., ¶61. Accordingly, Talbert asserts in Count IV that the aforementioned limit of

legal boxes violates his constitutional right under article I, section 11 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution4 to seek relief through the courts. Id., ¶¶70-73. He

consequently requests a preliminary injunction against the Commonwealth, the

Department, Governor Shapiro, and Harry, barring “them from depriving him [of]

all [of] his legal materials relevant to all of his legal matters.” Id., Count IV

Wherefore Clause.

Thereafter, Commonwealth Respondents and Smart Communications

contested the Amended Petition by filing their aforementioned, respective

preliminary objections, while Talbert presented his application for summary relief.

Each side subsequently responded to their opponent’s submission. As such, this

matter is ready for disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Preliminary Objections

We start off by considering respondents’ respective preliminary objections,

and elect to reorder and summarize their arguments as follows. First,

Commonwealth Respondents demur to each of Talbert’s claims by asserting that he

has not stated facially-viable constitutional claims based upon article I, sections 7

and 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, or upon the First Amendment of the United

States Constitution, as well as that he has not articulated a facially-viable civil

conspiracy claim. Com. Resps.’ Br. in Supp. of Prelim. Objs. at 8-16. In addition,

Commonwealth Respondents demur to Counts I through III of the Amended

4

Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution declares that “[a]ll courts shall be

open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have

remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits

may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as

the Legislature may by law direct.” PA. CONST. art. I, §11.

6

Petition, asserting that each of those claims must be dismissed as to specific

respondents (Governor Shapiro and Harry for Counts I and III, and Governor

Shapiro, Harry, Meukel, and Parks for Count II) on account of Talbert’s failure to

offer averments establishing that those respondents were personally involved in the

complained-of conduct. Id. at 4-7. Finally, Commonwealth Respondents demur to

Count II and request that we dismiss that claim as to the Commonwealth and the

Department, because those entities cannot be sued for violations of the United States

Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 Id. at 7-8. As for Smart Communications, it

both demurs to Count III, on the basis that Talbert has failed to articulate a facially-

viable civil conspiracy claim, and asserts in the alternative that the averments offered

by Talbert in support of Count III are insufficiently specific. Smart Commc’ns’

Prelim. Objs. at 6-15.

In ruling on preliminary objections, we must accept as true

all well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for

review, as well as all inferences reasonably deduced

therefrom. The Court need not accept as true conclusions

of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative

allegations, or expressions of opinion. In order to sustain

preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty that

the law will not permit recovery, and any doubt should be

resolved by a refusal to sustain them.

Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (cleaned up). “In addition,

courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts pled in the

[petition for review], but also documents or exhibits attached to it.” Lawrence v. Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 941 A.2d 70, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

5

Enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, this statute allows individuals to sue a

“person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or

Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

7

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer . . .

tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and

will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has

clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be

granted. When ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine

its analysis to the [petition for review].

Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

Count I

In Count I, Talbert asserts that Commonwealth, the Department, Governor

Shapiro, and Harry have violated article I, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

by arbitrarily and capriciously preventing him from accessing “current information

from the Internet[.]” Am. Pet., ¶¶14, 16-18, 62. Article I, section 7 states, in relevant

part: “The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable

rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject,

being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 7. Where, as

here, prison regulations and restrictions impinge upon an inmate’s constitutional

rights, the government must establish that those limitations are related to a legitimate

penological interest in order to defeat a claim regarding that impingement. Thomas

v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789, 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). In order to determine if the

requisite relationship exists, a court must consider:

(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between

the prison regulation and the legitimate, neutral,

governmental interest advanced to justify the regulation;

(2) whether the inmate has an alternative means of

exercising the right at issue; (3) the burden that the

accommodation would impose on prison resources; and

(4) “whether any ready alternatives to the regulation exist

that would fully accommodate the inmate’s rights at a de

minimis cost to valid penological objectives.”

Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)).

8

In this instance, Commonwealth Respondents fall far short of satisfying the

Turner test. Instead of attempting to address each of the test’s prongs, they instead

baldy assert that “[c]ourts have consistently upheld restrictions on inmate’s access

to computers and the internet, reasoning that access to internet resources jeopardizes

facility security.” Com. Resp’ts’ Br. in Supp. of Prelim. Objs. at 11. Beyond the

facial inadequacy of this response, Commonwealth Respondents fail to recognize

that both of the cases that they rely upon were decided at the summary judgment

stage and were based upon the particulars of each inmate’s situation. See Aguiar v.

Recktenwald, 649 F. App’x 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2016) (inmate did not have

constitutionally protected interest in using and maintaining Facebook account,

largely due to threat to institutional safety that would be imposed by allowing

unmonitored communication via social media and the monitoring burdens that

would be imposed upon prison staff); Solan v. Zickefoose, 530 F. App’x 109, 111

(3d Cir. 2013) (inmate did not have constitutional right to e-mail access, due to their

“knowledge . . . and . . . apparent inclination . . . to use e-mail for improper

purposes”). Here, there is nothing at this stage of litigation that clearly shows that

Talbert would pose a similar threat to institutional safety. Furthermore, by Talbert’s

own admission, he only seeks internet access that is properly monitored and subject

to appropriate access restrictions. See Am. Pet., ¶¶15-18. Thus, Talbert’s situation is

distinguishable from Aguiar and Solan on both the facts and the procedural posture.

Commonwealth Respondents also claim in passing that this issue is not ripe

because Talbert will be afforded internet access in the lead-up to his release from

prison in 2026. Com. Resp’ts.’ Br. in Supp. of Prelim. Objs. at 11-12. However, the

fact that Talbert may obtain such access in the future does not resolve the question

of whether he has a constitutional right to that access on an ongoing basis while

9

incarcerated. We are unpersuaded by Commonwealth Respondents’ argument that,

effectively, Talbert’s putative ability to access the internet at some point in the future

will cure any deprivations, constitutional or otherwise, that he is currently

experiencing.

Moreover, we are not swayed by Commonwealth Respondents’ argument

regarding the lack of averments about Governor Shapiro’s and Harry’s personal

involvement with the restrictions imposed upon Talbert’s internet access. The

entirety of Commonwealth Respondents’ argument on this point is based upon 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at 4-7. Section 1983 (as discussed infra) is a federal statute

that enables individuals to file suit based upon violations of the United States

Constitution. However, to state the obvious, Count I is premised upon a provision

contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution, not its federal counterpart.

Consequently, we are constrained to overrule Commonwealth Respondents’

demurrer to Count I.

Count II

In Count II, Talbert alleges that Commonwealth Respondents’ handling of his

mail has violated his First Amendment-based right to free speech. Am. Pet., ¶¶20-

25, 32-33, 63-66. We need only address Commonwealth Respondents’ second and

third arguments supporting their demurrer to Count II in order to dispose of this

claim.

It is beyond cavil that the Eleventh Amendment6 bars suit from “litigants who

seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties . . . unless the

6

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in

law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

10

State has waived its immunity, or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power

under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment[7] to override that immunity.” Will

v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress availed itself of

this authority over 150 years ago, by enacting Section 1983 as part of the Civil Rights

Act of 1871. This statute created an exception to the Eleventh Amendment, through

which individuals may sue a

person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 claims may be brought in the courts of this

Commonwealth and are not subject to state sovereign immunity defenses. A state or

state agency, however, is not a “person” under Section 1983 and cannot be sued

under Section 1983 for violation of federal constitutional rights.” Watkins v. Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 196 A.3d 272, 274-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (cleaned up). Furthermore,

“the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution shields states and state officials acting in their

official capacity from Section 1983 actions.” Heinly v.

Com., 621 A.2d 1212, 1214 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (citing

Will, 491 U.S. 58). This Court has explained that “[a]n

action against [a defendant] in his official capacity . . . is

the equivalent of an action against . . . a state

instrumentality.” Law v. Fisher, 399 A.2d 453, 456 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1979). Accordingly, state officials sued in their

official capacities are not “persons” under Section 1983.

See Verrichia v. Dep’t of Revenue, 639 A.2d 957 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1994). Notwithstanding, “a state official in his or

her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would

be a person under [Section] 1983 because official-capacity

7

This section vests “Congress [with] power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the

provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

11

actions for prospective relief are not treated as an action

against the state.” Verrichia, 639 A.2d at 962 n.11 (citing

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10). Further, “state officials are

‘persons’ under Section 1983 and as such, may be sued in

their individual capacities and found liable for damages for

violating protected rights while in the course of their

employment.” Schnupp v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty.,

710 A.2d 1235, 1238 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (emphasis

added) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)).

Murray v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 542 M.D. 2017, filed Aug. 8, 2018), slip op. at

2 n.2, 2018 WL 3747808, at *1 n.2 (cleaned up).8 In addition,

[i]t is well established that personal liability under Section

1983 cannot be imposed upon a state official based on a

theory of respondeat superior. It is also well settled . . .

that personal involvement of [respondents] in alleged

constitutional deprivations is a requirement in a [Section]

1983 case and that a [petition for review] must allege such

personal involvement. Each named [respondent] must be

shown, through the [petition for review’s] allegations, to

have been personally involved in the events or occurrences

upon which [the petitioner’s] claims are based.

Shick v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 583 M.D. 2016, filed Sept. 10, 2018), slip op. at

4-5, 2018 WL 4288663, at *2 (quoting Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540-

41 (M.D. Pa. 2008)); accord Rivera v. Silbaugh, 240 A.3d 229, 237 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2020) (petitioner fails to plead a viable Section 1983 against a state official or

employee if the petitioner does not offer sufficiently specific averments that the

official or employee was personally involved in violating the petitioner’s

constitutional rights). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of

personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of

participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with

8

Per Section 414(a) of this Court’s internal operating procedures, “an unreported panel

decision of this Court issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited for its persuasive value. 210

Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

12

appropriate particularity.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.

1988).9

With this in mind, we agree with Commonwealth Respondents that Talbert

has failed to state a viable Section 1983 claim in Count II.10 This is for two reasons.

First, neither the Commonwealth nor the Department can be sued pursuant to Section

1983. Watkins, 196 A.3d at 275. Second, Talbert only offers vague allegations

regarding Governor Shapiro’s, Harry’s, Meukel’s, and Parks’ putative involvement

in the handling of his mail, all of which amount to generalized assertions that each

of them have some sort of supervisory role in administering the inmate mail system

in our Commonwealth’s prisons. See Am. Pet., ¶¶20-53. Such allegations fall far

short of establishing, even on a facial basis, that any of those four state officials were

personally involved with handling Talbert’s mail and directly caused him to suffer

the issues with sending and receipt that he complains of in his Amended Petition, or

even that they were aware of the alleged problems and nevertheless acquiesced to

their occurrence. We therefore sustain Commonwealth Respondents’ demurrer to

Count II.

Count III

Under normal circumstances, we would now move on to considering the

merits of Commonwealth Respondents’ and Smart Communications’ preliminary

objections to Count III. However, we cannot do so in this instance, because we sua

sponte conclude that we do not have original or ancillary jurisdiction to consider that

9

“[T]he pronouncements of the lower federal courts have only persuasive, not binding,

effect on the courts of this Commonwealth[.]” In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1221 (Pa. 2012).

10

We read Count II as being a Section 1983 claim, even though Talbert does not expressly

characterize it in that way, due to the fact that he alleges therein that the Commonwealth and a

number of its appendages and officials have violated his First Amendment-based rights.

13

portion of Talbert’s Amended Petition.11 Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code states,

in relevant part:

The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction

of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government,

including any officer thereof, acting in his official

capacity, except:

....

(v) actions or proceedings in the nature of

trespass as to which the Commonwealth

government formerly enjoyed sovereign or

other immunity and actions or proceedings in

the nature of assumpsit relating to such

actions or proceedings in the nature of

trespass.

42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(v). “An action in trespass . . . lie[s] ‘for redress in the shape

of money damages for any unlawful injury done to the plaintiff, in respect either to

his person, property, or rights, by the immediate force and violence of the

defendant.’” Balshy v. Rank, 490 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. 1985) (quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1674 (4th rev. ed. 1968)). To that end, “all actions against the

Commonwealth or its officers acting in their official capacity for money damages

based upon tort liability fall outside the scope of the Commonwealth Court’s original

jurisdiction and are properly commenced in the courts of common pleas.”

Stackhouse v. Com., 832 A.2d 1004, 1008 (Pa. 2003). However, suits against the

Commonwealth government or its officials that seek purely declaratory relief or an

injunction restraining government action are not in the nature of trespass and, thus,

11

We note that neither Commonwealth Respondents nor Smart Communications have

challenged our jurisdiction over Count III. Nevertheless, this does not impede our authority to

address the jurisdictional defects present in that claim. “[Q]uestions of jurisdiction can never be

waived, and may be raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by [the] court.” Pennhurst Med.

Grp., P.C. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 796 A.2d 423, 425 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

14

may fit within the scope of our original jurisdiction. Fawber v. Cohen, 532 A.2d

429, 433 (Pa. 1987). Furthermore, Section 761(c) of the Judicial Code provides that,

“[t]o the extent prescribed by general rule the Commonwealth Court shall have

ancillary jurisdiction over any claim or other matter which is related to a claim or

other matter otherwise within its exclusive original jurisdiction.” 42 Pa. C.S. §

761(c). In sum, actions in the nature of trespass are expressly excluded from our

original jurisdiction and therefore stand outside our ancillary jurisdiction as well,

unless such an action relates to another articulated claim that does fall within the

scope of our original jurisdiction. Id., § 761(a)(1)(v), (c).

Here, Talbert requests declaratory and injunctive relief targeted at

Commonwealth Respondents and Smart Communications, due to his belief that they

have conspired to commit fraud by agreeing under false pretenses to have Smart

Communications process and scan incoming inmate mail. Am. Pet., ¶¶53-54, 67-69.

Nevertheless, it remains that he also desires monetary damages as a remedy for the

same putative violations of the law. Id., Count III Wherefore Clause. We conclude,

then, that Count III also sounds in trespass. Furthermore, we conclude the assertions

Talbert makes in Count III are entirely unrelated to the claims he makes elsewhere

in his Amended Petition.

In these circumstances, we do not believe the inclusion of

a [request] for declaratory or injunctive relief premised

upon the same events can properly be understood to

transform [Count III] from one sounding in trespass into

the type of matter contemplated by Fawber, or by the

Legislature, as belonging within [our] original

jurisdiction.

Stackhouse, 832 A.2d at 1008.

[A]lthough one might argue that what [Talbert] really

wants is [declaratory and injunctive relief] rather than

money damages, he is the one who included a request for

15

money damages in [Count III of] his [Amended Petition].

It is not our function to ignore a portion of his request for

relief so that original jurisdiction can be vested in this

Court, a court of limited original jurisdiction, rather than

in the common pleas court, a court of broad original

jurisdiction.

Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161, 165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). As such, we have no

authority to review Count III as an original jurisdiction claim or pursuant to our

powers of ancillary jurisdiction.

In line with the foregoing analysis, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to

consider Count III. Rather than dismiss that claim outright, however, we will transfer

it to Common Pleas, which shall treat that portion of Talbert’s Amended Petition as

a complaint filed in its original jurisdiction. Stedman v. Lancaster Cnty. Bd. of

Comm’rs, 221 A.3d 747, 760-61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019); 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a); Pa.

R.A.P. 751; see PA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b) (our courts of common pleas “hav[e]

unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by

law”). Subsequent to transfer, Common Pleas shall rule upon Commonwealth

Respondents’ and Smart Communications’ respective preliminary objections to

Count III, as well as Talbert’s application for summary relief regarding Count III,

which Common Pleas shall treat as a motion for summary judgment.12

Count IV

In Count IV, Talbert alleges that Commonwealth Respondents’ refusal to

allow him to have five boxes for storing his legal materials, rather than the two

allowed under Department policy, violated his right to seek relief through the courts

under article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Am. Pet., ¶¶57-61, 70-

“An application for summary relief is properly evaluated according to the standards for

12

summary judgment.” McGarry v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 819 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2003).

16

73. We, however, agree with Commonwealth Respondents’ assertion that Talbert

has failed to articulate a viable legal claim in Count IV.

To state a cognizable claim for violation of the right to

access to the courts, a prisoner must allege and offer proof

that he suffered an “actual injury” to court access as a

result of the denial. See Hackett v. Horn, 751 A.2d 272,

275-76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (observing that denial of

access to legal documents may constitute a violation of the

First and Fourteenth Amendments). “The Supreme Court

has defined actual injury as the loss or rejection of a

nonfrivolous legal claim regarding the sentencing or the

conditions of confinement.” See id.

Key v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 304 M.D. 2022, filed Mar. 22, 2024),

slip op. at 8-9, 2024 WL 1230802, at *4 (cleaned up). In this instance, Talbert does

not aver, either generally or specifically, that he has suffered the loss or rejection of

a nonfrivolous legal claim as a result of Commonwealth Respondents’ denial of his

storage request. See Am. Pet., ¶¶57-61, 70-73. He has therefore failed to state a

viable article I, Section 11 claim. Consequently, we sustain Commonwealth

Respondents’ demurrer to Count IV.

B. Application for Summary Relief

Moving on, we turn to Talbert’s application for summary relief.

Applications for summary relief addressed to this Court’s

original or appellate jurisdiction are authorized under Rule

1532(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure, which provides: “At any time after the filing of

a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction

matter the court may on application enter judgment if the

right of the applicant thereto is clear.” [Pa. R.A.P.

1532(b).] Summary relief is similar to summary judgment

under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, in that

the requested relief is only appropriate where there are no

disputed issues of material fact and it is clear that the

applicant is entitled to the requested relief under the law.

See Scarnati v. Wolf, 173 A.3d 1110, 1118 (Pa. 2017).

Moreover, we review the record in the light most favorable

17

to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts as to the

existence of disputed material facts against the moving

party. Id.

Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 216 A.3d 448, 458 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)

(cleaned up).

As Count I is the only portion of Talbert’s Amended Petition that has survived

preliminary objections and falls within the scope of our jurisdictional powers, we

confine our analysis and disposition of his application to summary relief to that

claim. Talbert asserts that he is entitled as a matter of law to judgment in his favor

on Count I because he has a “constitutional right [under article I, section 7 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution] to gain current information on legitimate subjects from

social media to enable his rehabilitation and enhance [the chances of] his reentry

success[.]” Talbert’s Br. in Supp. of Appl. for Summ. Relief at 5. However, it is well

settled that

“[p]rison inmates do not enjoy the same level of

constitutional protections afforded to non-incarcerated

citizens.” Bronson v. Cent. Off. Rev. Comm., 721 A.2d

357, 359 (Pa. 1998). As we have noted in the past,

“incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction

justified by the considerations underlying our penal

system.” Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9, 13 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1980).

Feliciano v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 50 A.3d 1269, 1274-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021). None

of the cases referenced by Talbert address whether inmates have a constitutional

right to access current information through the internet, nor does Talbert offer any

other substantive legal arguments in support of his claim that he is constitutionally

entitled to be provided with such access. See Talbert’s Br. in Supp. of Appl. for

Summ. Relief at 5 (citing and quoting Packingham v. N. Carolina, 582 U.S. 98

(2017); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S.

18

479 (1965)). It is therefore not clear that Talbert is entitled to judgment in his favor

regarding this claim.

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we overrule Commonwealth

Respondents’ demurrer to Count I and sustain their demurrers to Counts II and IV.

Additionally, we dismiss Counts II and IV with prejudice, and transfer Count III to

Common Pleas due to our lack of jurisdiction over that claim. Furthermore, we deny

Talbert’s application for summary relief as to Count I. Finally, we direct

Commonwealth Respondents to file their answer to Count I within 30 days.

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

19

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles Talbert, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 543 M.D. 2023

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Governor Josh Shapiro, Laurel Harry, :

Department of Corrections, Christine :

Meukel, Mindy Parks, and Smart :

Communications, :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 6th day of November, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Respondents Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro,

Laurel Harry, Department of Corrections, Christine Meukel, and Mindy

Parks’ (collectively Commonwealth Respondents) demurrer to Count I

of Petitioner Charles Talbert’s amended petition for review (Amended

Petition) is OVERRULED;

2. Commonwealth Respondents’ demurrers to Counts II and IV of the

Amended Petition are SUSTAINED, and those claims are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE;

3. Count III is TRANSFERRED to the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th

Judicial District-Forest County Branch (Common Pleas), due to lack of

jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Court’s Prothonotary shall transmit a

copy of the record of the above-captioned proceedings to Common

Pleas’ Prothonotary, together with a copy of this opinion and order, as

well as a copy of this matter’s docket entries. Subsequent to

transfer, the assigned Common Pleas judge shall rule upon

Commonwealth Respondents’ and Respondent Smart

Communications’ respective preliminary objections to Count III, as

well as Talbert’s application for summary relief regarding Count III;

4. Talbert’s application for summary relief is DENIED as to Count I;

5. Commonwealth Respondents will file their answer to Count I within 30

days.

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge