The opinion
Filed 11/5/24 P. v. Marroquin CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B332581
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. BA224467)
v.
ARMANDO ANTONIO
MARROQUIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Shelly B. Torrealba, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Armando Antonio Marroquin appeals from a postjudgment
order denying his motion under Penal Code1 section 1473.7 to
vacate his conviction after a jury trial. The superior court denied
the motion without appointing counsel and without holding a
hearing on the merits, finding Marroquin was ineligible for relief
because his conviction was the result of a trial, not a plea.
Marroquin contends, and the People concede, that the superior
court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the merits pursuant to
section 1473.7, as recently amended. We agree. Thus, we reverse
the superior court’s order and remand for a hearing.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
In August 2002, a jury found Marroquin guilty of
continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years
(§ 288.5, subd. (a)), making a criminal threat (§ 422), and willful
infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5).
The trial court sentenced Marroquin to an aggregate term of 17
years eight months imprisonment, consisting of the upper term of
16 years for sexual abuse, eight months (one-third the middle
term) for making a criminal threat, and one year for the
misdemeanor count of inflicting corporal injury. We affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Marroquin (Apr. 13, 2004, B165641)
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, Marroquin filed a motion to vacate his convictions
under former section 1473.7, the denial of which motion we
affirmed on appeal. (People v. Marroquin (Nov. 18, 2020,
B299842) [nonpub. opn.].)
On June 21, 2023, Marroquin filed a second motion to
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
vacate his convictions under section 1473.7. He supported his
motion with a declaration confirming he was no longer in custody
and asserting he would not have rejected the prosecution’s offer
and gone to trial had he been advised of the adverse immigration
consequences he would face. Without appointing counsel or
holding a hearing, the superior court summarily denied his
motion on July 10, 2023, ruling that “[b]ecause petitioner’s
conviction was the result of a jury trial, he is ineligible for relief.”
Marroquin timely appealed.2
DISCUSSION
“Section 1473.7 permits noncitizens to vacate convictions
after they are no longer in criminal custody based on a failure to
understand adverse immigration consequences of their
convictions.” (People v. Singh (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 147, 151-152
(Singh).) Marroquin argues, and the People concede, that the
superior court erred in summarily denying Marroquin’s section
1473.7 motion without holding a hearing on the merits. We agree
that, based on a recent amendment to section 1473.7, Marroquin
was entitled to a hearing.
We review de novo whether the superior court followed
proper procedures in deciding a section 1473.7 motion. (People v.
2 The People note Marroquin did not provide transcripts
from the underlying trial proceedings, but such records need not
be provided when a defendant appeals from a postjudgment
order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(d).) Marroquin satisfied
the requirement to provide a transcript of the original sentencing
proceeding (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(d)(2)), and there was
no reported hearing on the section 1473.7 motion; it was denied
by the superior court in chambers. We granted Marroquin’s
motion to augment the record to include the information. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
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Fryhaat (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 976 (Fryhaat).) In addition,
“[t]he construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of
law that we consider de novo on appeal. [Citation.] ‘As in any
case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task
here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate
the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the
statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.
[Citation.] We do not, however, consider the statutory language
“in isolation.” [Citation.] Rather, we look to “the entire
substance of the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and
purpose of the provision.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 975-976.)
In 2016, the Legislature enacted former section 1473.7,
which authorized a defendant who is no longer in criminal
custody to file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence where
“[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to a prejudicial
error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere.” (Former § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1), Stats. 2016,
ch. 739, § 1.) From 2016 to 2021, the statute limited the category
of persons able to seek relief under section 1473.7, subdivision
(a)(1), to those whose convictions were the result of a “plea of
guilty or nolo contendere.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 5; Stats. 2018,
ch. 825, § 2; Stats. 2016, ch. 739, § 1.)
Effective January 1, 2022, by Assembly Bill No. 1259 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess., Stats. 2021, ch. 420, § 1), the Legislature
amended section 1473.7, replacing the phrase “plea of guilty or
nolo contendere” with the broader phrase “conviction or
sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) We agree with the parties,
and with our Third District colleagues, that “section 1473.7 now
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clearly permits relief to defendants who were convicted after a
trial.” (Singh, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) As the court held
in Singh, “[t]he language ‘conviction or sentence’ has no
qualifiers, so the plain language indicates an intent to apply
section 1473.7 to all defendants whose ‘conviction or sentence’ is
legally invalid, regardless of the source of the conviction.”
(Singh, at p. 152.) “[T]he legislative history also confirms the
Legislature’s intent to modify section 1473.7 to include
convictions after trial. (See, e.g., Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen.
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1259
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 24, 2021, p. 3 [‘This bill
expands the category of persons able to seek to vacate a
conviction or sentence as legally invalid, whatever way that
person was convicted or sentence[d], including a person who was
found guilty after a trial.’].)” (Singh, at pp. 152-153; accord
People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 5 [“Motions
addressing a conviction or sentence after trial first became
available on January 1, 2022, when an amendment expanded
section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) to reach misunderstandings of
the immigration consequences of ‘a conviction or sentence’
instead of just ‘a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.’ ”].)
The superior court did not address the merits of
Marroquin’s motion, and its summary denial was based entirely
on its determination that Marroquin was ineligible because his
conviction derived from a trial. “After Assembly Bill 1259, this
finding is no longer valid. [Marroquin] may file a motion to vacate
his conviction based on prejudicial error related to the adverse
immigration consequences of his conviction after trial.” (Singh,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)
Moreover, section 1473.7 provides that “[a]ll motions shall
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be entitled to a hearing.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (d); see Fryhaat, supra,
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 977 [“the plain language of section 1473.7,
subdivision (d), establishes that a moving party is entitled to a
hearing”].) “Upon the request of the moving party, the court may
hold the hearing without the personal presence of the moving
party provided that it finds good cause as to why the moving
party cannot be present.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (d).) The superior
court erred in summarily denying Marroquin’s motion.
“[W]e reverse the order denying [Marroquin’s] motion to
vacate his conviction and remand for the superior court to
consider whether [he] has set forth adequate factual allegations
stating a prima facie case for entitlement to relief under section
1473.7, to appoint counsel if appropriate, and to address the
section 1473.7 motion on its merits.” (Fryhaat, supra,
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. We remand for the superior court to
consider Marroquin’s motion in accordance with this opinion.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
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