New v. Faris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

AT BECKLEY

DOTTIE J. NEW and

RALPH NEW,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:23-cv-00628

JUSTIN L. FARIS and

SUMMERS COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPT. and

SUMMERS COUNTY COMMISSION and

JOHN DOES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending is Defendants’ Justin L. Faris, Summers County Commission, and

Summers County Sheriff’s Department Motion to Dismiss [ECF 11], filed February 21, 2024.

Plaintiffs Dottie J. New and Ralph New (collectively “the News”) responded in opposition [ECF

13] on March 6, 2024, to which Defendants replied [ECF 14] on March 13, 2024.

I.

Sheriff Faris and Jane Does1 (collectively “Defendants”) are police officers

believed to be employed by either the Summers County Sheriff’s Department and County

Commission or a federal task force created to assist local law enforcement. 2 [ECF 1 ¶¶ 2, 12]. On

1The News assert discovery is necessary to ascertain the identities of the Doe Defendants

inasmuch as they were wearing masks during the incident and were unidentifiable.

2Despite naming the Summers County Sheriff’s Department and Summers County

Commission as Defendants, the News concede in their briefing they “have not asserted claims”

against either entity and only identified them in the Complaint “for the purpose of providing clarity

September 23, 2021, Defendants, acting under color of law, forcibly entered the New residence by

breaking the door. [Id. ¶ 2]. Upon entry, Defendants broke a lock on the bedroom where Ms. New

was sleeping. [Id. ¶ 1]. She was forced out of bed by Defendants while wearing only a nightgown

and denied access to her robe. [Id. ¶ 6]. Mr. New was on the toilet when Defendants entered the

residence, where he “was held at gunpoint and repeatedly threatened[.]” [Id.]. The News allege

Defendants employed excessive and unreasonable force by pointing their weapons at them and

continuously threatening them with physical harm and arrest. [Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 12]. Defendants allegedly

destroyed the News’ household items and left “the house and furniture in shambles.” [Id. ¶ 6]. The

News further allege Defendants lacked “a search warrant, or an arrest warrant for anyone residing

in the home or any other basis to enter [their] residence or to detain [them].” [Id. ¶ 1].

The News assert their unlawful detention by Defendants, Defendants’ use of

excessive and unreasonable force, and Defendants’ illegal entry into their residence all run afoul

of the Fourth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent Defendants were acting

as agents of a federal task force, the News alternatively bring the same Fourth Amendment claims

pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971).

On February 21, 2024, Sheriff Faris moved to dismiss. He first contends dismissal

is warranted inasmuch as the News have engaged in “impermissible group pleading” and have thus

failed to differentiate between the conduct allegedly committed by him and the Doe Defendants.

[ECF 12 at 6-9]. He asserts this style of pleading “is particularly troublesome” respecting the

excessive force claim inasmuch as “Plaintiffs fail to identify anyone actually responsible for the

regarding the employer of” Sheriff Faris and the Doe Defendants. [ECF 13 at 1]. Accordingly, the

Summers County Sheriff’s Department and Summers County Commission are DISMISSED. The

Court need not address Defendants’ substantive contentions respecting these entities.

alleged harms.” [Id. at 8]. Assuming arguendo the News have properly pled their claims, Sheriff

Faris asserts dismissal is yet warranted on the basis of qualified immunity. Respecting the alleged

unlawful entry, Sheriff Faris contends he had authority to enter the New residence inasmuch as the

Circuit Court of Raleigh County had issued a capias for the News’ son, Ralph Shaun New, whom

officers reasonably believed resided at the home. Respecting the alleged unlawful detention,

Sheriff Faris asserts the authority to enter the residence to execute the capias likewise permitted

officers “to detain not only the subject of the warrant, but also anyone else found in the residence

so the arrest could be conducted safely.” [ECF 12 as 13]. Respecting the alleged use of excessive

force, Sheriff Faris contends the pointing of weapons and use of threats was constitutionally

permissible under the circumstances and existing authority.

Should the Court reject Sheriff Faris’ grounds for dismissal, he alternatively moves

for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Respecting the

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, he asserts the group pleading nature of the Complaint prevents him from

determining his alleged actions from the Doe Defendants. As to the alleged Bivens claims, he

asserts the News “present no facts establishing [he] was acting as part of a federal task force” but

merely conclude he was doing so. While Sheriff Faris recognizes a law enforcement officer may

be both a local and federal officer, he maintains “an officer cannot be acting as both simultaneously

at the time of the conduct at issue.” [ECF 12 at 16]. He thus requests the News “be required to

submit a more definite statement outlining their claims, including who is alleged to have done

what, and whether [they] intend to pursue this matter as a § 1983 or Bivens action against [him].”

[Id.].

The News reject Sheriff Faris’ assertions and maintain his conduct is violative of

the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the News contend their son did not live at their residence,

nor did Sheriff Faris have probable cause to believe he did. The News hold firm that Sheriff Faris

entered their residence absent a warrant for anyone living therein which, if taken as true, supports

their claims. The News further contend dismissal of either their Section 1983 or Bivens claim at

this stage is unwarranted inasmuch as discovery is necessary to determine which claim to pursue.

II.

A. Governing Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleader provide “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing . . . entitle[ment] to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Rule 12(b)(6) correspondingly permits a defendant to challenge

a complaint when it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). The required “short and plain statement” must provide “fair notice of what the . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Twombly, 550

U.S. at 562-63); McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582,

585 (4th Cir. 2015). Additionally, the showing of an “entitlement to relief” amounts to “more than

labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. It is now settled that “a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555; McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585;

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2008).

The complaint need not “forecast evidence sufficient to prove the elements of [a]

claim,” but it must “allege sufficient facts to establish those elements.” Wright v. North Carolina,

787 F.3d 256, 270 (4th Cir. 2015); Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Stated another way, the operative pleading need

only contain “[f]actual allegations . . . [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting the opening

pleading “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). In sum, the complaint must allege “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly 550 U.S. at 570. The Supreme

Court has consistently interpreted the Rule 12(b)(6) standard to require a court to “accept as true

all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also S.C. Dep’t of Health & Env’t Control v. Com.

& Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 245, 255 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192

(4th Cir. 2002)). The court is required to “draw[] all reasonable . . . inferences from those facts in

the plaintiff’s favor.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).

2. Rule 12(e)

Rule 12(e) permits a party to seek a more definite statement when a pleading “is so

vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

Rule 12(e), however, must be read in tandem with the requirements of Rule 8(a) as outlined above.

Student A v. Liberty University, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 3d 901, 918 (W.D. Va. 2022) (citing Hodgson

v. Va. Bapt. Hosp., Inc., 482 F.2d 821, 822 (4th Cir. 1973)). “[C]ourts have held that a motion

under Rule 12(e) is designed to strike at unintelligibility rather than simple want of detail[.]”

Sherrer v. Fairhaven OPCO, LLC, 2022 WL 3570347, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 18, 2022) (internal

quotations omitted) (collecting cases). At bottom, such motions “will be granted only when the

complaint is so vague and ambiguous that the defendant cannot frame a responsive pleading.” Id.

“As a result, ‘the class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion under Rule 12(e) is

quite small.’” Id. (quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5C Federal Practice &

Procedure § 1376 (3d ed.)).

B. Group Pleading

“Group pleading . . . attributes allegations to a subset of defendants rather than to a

particular defendant.” Navient Sols., LLC v. Law Offs. of Jeffrey Lohman, No. 1:19-cv-461, 2020

WL 1867939, at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 14, 2020) (internal quotations omitted). So long as it is

“plausible that each defendant was involved in all of the facts alleged[,]” group pleading is

permissible. McPherson v. Baltimore Police Dep’t., 494 F. Supp. 3d 269. 280 (D. Md. 2020)

(internal quotations omitted). In the instant matter, the Complaint begins by alleging “Defendant

Justin Faris and John Does illegally entered [the News’] residence in violation of [their]

constitutional rights.” [ECF 1 ¶ 1]. While the allegations that follow refer to these individuals

collectively as “Defendants” or “officers,” it is apparent the News are alleging Sheriff Faris was

involved in the entirety of the alleged misconduct. Indeed, the News have alleged both Sheriff

Faris and the Doe Defendants (1) entered their residence without a search warrant or arrest warrant

for anyone residing therein, (2) lacked a lawful basis to detain them, and (3) utilized excessive and

unnecessary force by holding them at gunpoint and repeatedly threatening them with harm and

arrest. [Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 7, 11, 12].

Simply put, it is not implausible that both Sheriff Faris and the Doe Defendants

took part in the conduct alleged. The Complaint alleges sufficient facts to put Sheriff Faris on

notice of the claims against him, and the allegations contained therein are not so vague and

ambiguous to hinder a response. Sheriff Faris’ detailed briefings in support of his Motion reflect

as much. The News’ usage of group pleading is thus not a proper basis to support dismissal under

these circumstances, nor is there a basis to require them to submit a more definite statement

pursuant to Rule 12(e). To the extent Sheriff Faris contends the News’ pleading of both a Section

1983 claim and Bivens claim pursuant to the same underlying facts warrants a more definite

statement, such contention is meritless. Rule 8 permits plaintiffs to plead alternative theories of

liability, and it is apparent from the Complaint that the Bivens claim is alternatively pled should

discovery reveal Sheriff Faris and/or the Doe Defendants were acting as agents of a federal task

force, rather than local law enforcement at the time of the incident.

C. Qualified Immunity

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 governs actions against state officers arising from their

deprivations of constitutional rights:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State of Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action of law.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A state actor sued in his individual capacity for monetary damages generally

qualifies as a suable “person” under Section 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).

Nonetheless, he may be entitled to qualified immunity. “‘Qualified immunity shields government

officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right

that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’” Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th

498, 504 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “The immunity

balances two important interests: ‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise

power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability

when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009)). Qualified immunity is thus available only to those who do “not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson, 555

at 231 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Garrett v. Clarke, 74 F.4th 579,

583 (4th Cir. 2023). The qualified immunity inquiry is two-fold: the court must determine (1)

“whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged,” and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

200 (2001). The court has discretion to decide which of the two steps to address first based on the

facts and circumstances of the case at hand. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

A clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664

(cleaned up); see D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018); Garrett, 74 F.4th at 584. “To determine

if the right in question was clearly established, we first look to cases from the Supreme Court, th[e]

Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state in which the action arose.” Thompson v.

Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d 89, 99 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372

F.3d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 2004)); Franklin v. City of Charlotte, 64 F.4th 519 (4th Cir. 2023). Absent

“directly on-point, binding authority,” courts may also consider whether “the right was clearly

established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive

authority.” Booker v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corrections, 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017);

Owens, 372 F.3d at 279. In sum, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

While “[t]he question of whether a right is clearly established is a question of law

for the court to decide[,] . . . [t]he question of whether a reasonable officer would have known that

the conduct at issue violated that right . . . cannot be decided prior to trial if disputes of facts exist.”

Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 228 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir.

2015)). In other words, although “the purely legal question of whether the constitutional right at

issue was clearly established is always capable of decision . . . on a motion to dismiss, a genuine

question of material fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly violative of the right actually

occurred must be reserved for trial.” Id. (cleaned up) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” United States

v. Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV.). “In most cases,

a search or seizure is unreasonable unless authorized by a warrant.” Id. “The warrant requirement

carries special force when police seek to enter a private home, which is ‘afforded the most stringent

Fourth Amendment protection.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561

(1976)). “‘With few exceptions, the question of whether a warrantless search of a home is

reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.’” Id. at 383-84 (quoting Kyllo v. United

States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)). Nonetheless, “[i]n some circumstances, an arrest warrant can . . .

allow officers to enter a home in order to apprehend a suspect.” Id. at 384. When police officers

seek to enter a home armed with an arrest warrant, “the Fourth Amendment imposes specific and

different requirements for entry based on whether the home is the suspect’s own residence or

someone else’s.” Id.

Where officers are attempting to execute an arrest warrant at the suspect’s own

residence, the Supreme Court has held “for Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant

founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in

which the suspect lives where there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 100 (1980). Our Court of Appeals has interpreted Payton’s “reasonable belief”

standard as the equivalent of probable cause. Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 386 (holding “reasonable belief

in the Payton context embodies the same standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause.”)

(internal quotations omitted)).

When the home of a third party is involved, however, the Supreme Court has

deemed an arrest warrant insufficient to enter the third-party residence given the “two distinct

interests” implicated by the Fourth Amendment at issue: the suspect’s “interest in being free an

unreasonable seizure,” as well as the third party’s “interest in being free from an unreasonable

search.” Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216 (1981). Although an arrest warrant is

sufficient to protect the former interest, it fails to protect the latter’s “privacy interest in being from

an unreasonable invasion and search of his home.” Id. The Supreme Court thus “held that, absent

exigent circumstances or consent, the Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a search

warrant before trying to apprehend the subject of an arrest warrant in a third party’s home.”

Brinkley, 980 F.3d at 384 (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 216).

Against this landscape, Sheriff Faris contends he is entitled to qualified immunity

on the News’ warrantless search claim inasmuch as he possessed a capias for the arrest of the

News’ son, Ralph Shaun New, whom he reasonably believed resided at his parent’s residence, thus

rendering his conduct constitutional under Payton. In support of this contention, Sheriff Faris relies

on (1) the Circuit Court of Raleigh County’s November 21, 2020, Order issuing the capias given

Mr. New’s failure to appear and its July 29, 2021, Order Maintaining Capias, and (2) a January

21, 2015, Criminal Complaint from the Magistrate Court of Raleigh County against Mr. New for

domestic assault purportedly listing his parent’s address as his own, both of which Sheriff Faris

attaches to his Motion. [ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-2]. The News, of course, deny any assertion that their

son resided at their residence at the time of the incident3 and maintain Sheriff Fairs lacked “a

search warrant, or an arrest warrant for anyone residing in the home or any other basis to enter

[their] residence or to detain [them].” [ECF 1 ¶ 1].

Even assuming the Court could consider the documents relied upon by Sheriff Faris

at this stage, they are of little value inasmuch as the addresses provided thereon are redacted. [See

id.]. Moreover, it is noteworthy that while the Circuit Court of Raleigh County’s capias Orders

were issued prior to the date of the incident at issue, the actual capias attached thereto is dated

March 22, 2022, six months after Sheriff Faris’ entry into the New residence. [ECF 11-1 at 3]. It

is thus impossible to determine whether Sheriff Faris was acting pursuant to a valid capias and/or

operating under the reasonable belief that Mr. New resided at his parent’s residence when he

entered their home in attempts to execute the same. Accordingly, it is apparent that disputed facts

exist, precluding a grant of qualified immunity at this stage.

Furthermore, inasmuch as the reasonableness of Sheriff Faris’ actions respecting

the News’ unlawful detention and excessive force claims hinge upon the legality of his entry into

their residence, his entitlement to qualified immunity thereon is likewise inappropriate.

III.

Based on the foregoing discussion, Sheriff Faris’ Motion to Dismiss or Alternative

Motion for More Definite Statement [ECF 11] is DENIED.

3The News provided an affidavit to this effect, attaching the same to their response. [ECF

13-1].

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the written opinion and order to counsel of

record and to any unrepresented party.

ENTER: September 16, 2024

i 5

a 9 Frank W. Volk

“Tame Chief United States District Judge

12