The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
JOSEPH TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-cv-00475
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
INCORPORATED, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed several motions in limine filed by each party in this matter, and
provides the rulings set forth below.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
1. Document 212
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff’s
Argument, Theory of Case, or Testimony Asserting that the Defendants’ MOUD Policy Was “If
You Did Not Have An Active MOUD Prescription At the Time of Incarceration, Then You Were
Precluded from Receiving MOUD Treatment (Document 212) and the Plaintiff’s Consolidated
Response to Defendants’ Joint Motions in Limine 1-8 (Document 227) (hereinafter, Pl.’s Resp.).
The Defendants argue that the evidence establishes that Wexford’s guidelines for treatment of
OUD (opioid use disorder) called for an individualized approach, and providers could start MOUD
(medication for opioid use disorder) for a patient who did not have an active prescription on intake
if the provider believed it to be medically indicated. Therefore, they request that the Court
preclude the Plaintiff from arguing or introducing testimony that the Defendants’ policy was to
provide MOUD only if patients arrived with an active prescription.
The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants seek to improperly relitigate the motions for
summary judgment and ask the Court to resolve a factual dispute, rather than an evidentiary issue,
through this motion in limine.
The Court finds that the motion seeks resolution of a disputed factual issue, as more fully
discussed in the Court’s opinion resolving the motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the
Court ORDERS that Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff’s Argument, Theory
of Case, or Testimony Asserting that the Defendants’ MOUD Policy Was “If You Did Not Have
an Active MOUD Prescription at the Time of Incarceration, Then You Were Precluded from
Receiving MOUD Treatment (Document 212) be DENIED.
2. Documents 213 and 218
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Lay Witnesses
from Offering Medical Opinions at Trial (Document 213), the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine
to Preclude Any Testimony or Argument That Plaintiff Overdosed After He Was Released from
Central Regional Jail (Document 218) and the Plaintiff’s Response. The Defendants argue that
some of the Plaintiff’s statements in his deposition, such as his testimony that he was withdrawing
from Suboxone when he was admitted to CRJ (Central Regional Jail) and that he overdosed on
opioids following his release, require medical expertise. They also contend that the Plaintiff’s
expert lacks a sufficient basis to testify regarding the Plaintiff’s alleged overdose.
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The Plaintiff argues that the rules permit him to testify as to his own experiences in going
through withdrawal and suffering an overdose, and also permit his wife to testify about observing
his overdose and reviving him. He emphasizes that the proposed testimony would be based on
the witnesses’ personal knowledge, and recognizing symptoms of drug overdose is within the
knowledge of a lay person. The Plaintiff further argues that Dr. Fingerhood’s opinion is
adequately supported, and that Dr. Mitcheff’s declaration, dated May 10, 2024, should be stricken
because it is untimely, covers a subject that was not properly disclosed pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2),
does not satisfy Rule 702, lacks supporting methodology and citations, and would cause prejudicial
surprise.
The Court finds that the Plaintiff and other witnesses should be permitted to testify as to
their own experiences and matters within their personal knowledge, including withdrawal and
overdose. Withdrawal and overdose are within the knowledge of laypeople, particularly
laypeople with a history of OUD or a close relationship with someone with OUD. Any objections
as to foundation can be made during trial, and the Defendants may challenge testimony on cross-
examination. The Court would note, however, that such testimony must be limited to that within
the knowledge of the witnesses. The Plaintiff has referred to the alleged overdose, for which he
did not receive professional medical care, as “near-fatal,” which, absent further evidence
establishing a foundation, may be outside the scope of knowledge of a layperson. Following
careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude
Lay Witnesses from Offering Medical Opinions at Trial (Document 213) and the Defendants’ Joint
Motion in Limine to Preclude Any Testimony or Argument That Plaintiff Overdosed After He Was
Released from Central Regional Jail (Document 218) be DENIED.
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3. Document 214
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff from
Arguing at Trial That Defendants Maintain a Policy of Not Prescribing Medications for Opioid
Use Disorder in Order to Save Money (Document 214) and the Plaintiff’s Response. The
Defendants argue that “[t]here is no evidence to support the allegations that Defendants financially
benefit by not providing inmates with MOUD and therefore force inmates with OUD, including
those already being treated with MOUD, into withdrawal.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 3) (Document 214.)
The Plaintiff concurs in this motion and contends that the Defendant should likewise be
precluded from introducing evidence or argument regarding the financial motivations underlying
the defendants’ MOUD policies.
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude
Plaintiff from Arguing at Trial That Defendants Maintain a Policy of Not Prescribing Medications
for Opioid Use Disorder in Order to Save Money (Document 214) be GRANTED as unopposed.
4. Document 215
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Testimony
That Plaintiff Was Withdrawing from Suboxone When He Entered Custody (Document 215) and
the Plaintiff’s Response. The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff should not be able to testify as
to what substance(s) caused his alleged withdrawal symptoms, and that his expert, Dr. Fingerhood,
lacks a reliable basis for any testimony that he was in withdrawal from Suboxone as opposed to
other substances.
The Plaintiff contends that “the nature, cause, and severity of Mr. Taylor’s opioid
withdrawal is a fact question that belongs to the jury.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 19.) He states that he does
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not contend that his withdrawal symptoms were solely from the termination of Suboxone
prescription, and withdrawal from multiple controlled substances does not preclude the admission
of evidence that he suffered from Suboxone withdrawal. In addition, he argues that his years of
experience with opioid use, treatment, and withdrawal provides a foundation for lay opinion
testimony regarding his experience. Ultimately, the Plaintiff contends that cross-examination,
rather than exclusion, is the appropriate method of challenging the evidence regarding the
Plaintiff’s alleged withdrawal from Suboxone.
The Court finds that the factual dispute regarding the extent of Mr. Taylor’s withdrawal
symptoms, the extent to which those symptoms were attributable to Suboxone, and whether
MOUD should have been prescribed to alleviate those symptoms, cannot properly be resolved on
a motion in limine. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine
to Preclude Testimony That Plaintiff Was Withdrawing from Suboxone When He Entered Custody
(Document 215) be DENIED.
5. Document 216
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiff from
Presenting Argument that Non-Receipt of Medication for Opioid Use Disorder While Incarcerated
Caused Him to Relapse After Release (Document 216) and the Plaintiff’s Response. The
Defendants contend that the Plaintiff’s relapse prior to incarceration casts doubt on any link
between the failure to prescribe MOUD and his post-release relapse. They also argue that there
is no basis to attribute a particular instance of relapse to treatment methods.
The Plaintiff argues that there is substantial evidence of a heightened risk of relapse and
overdose upon release when people with OUD are not treated with MOUD in jail, including
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evidence and testimony from the Defendants’ employees. He argues that the Defendants can
properly challenge causation and damages related to the overdose through contrary evidence and
cross examination, but that there is no basis for excluding the evidence at issue.
To the extent the Plaintiff has otherwise admissible evidence related to the causation of his
post-incarceration relapse and alleged overdose, the Court finds that such evidence should be
permitted. The Plaintiff’s expert may provide relevant evidence as to causation. The Plaintiff
may testify as to his history with MOUD, his experience with opioid use, relapse, overdose, and
cravings. If he is able to lay an appropriate foundation, he could be permitted to testify as to a
causal relationship between the denial of MOUD and his relapse, but the Court directs that any
such testimony be offered in a way that permits an objection and ruling as to foundation prior to
introduction of the challenged testimony. Following careful consideration, and as set forth in
more detail herein, the Court ORDERS that the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude
Plaintiff from Presenting Argument that Non-Receipt of Medication for Opioid Use Disorder
While Incarcerated Caused Him to Relapse After Release (Document 216) be DENIED.
6. Document 217
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Preclude Argument that
Plaintiff Had an ‘Active’ Suboxone Prescription When He Entered Custody at Central Regional
Jail, or that the Defendants ‘Removed’ Him from His Suboxone Prescription (Document 217) and
the Plaintiff’s Response. The Defendants argue that the evidence clearly shows that the Plaintiff’s
seven-day prescription for Suboxone, issued on December 20, 2022, was not active when he
entered custody on January 1, 2023.
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The Plaintiff argues that he should be permitted to offer evidence from Dr. Fingerhood and
Dr. Michael, his expert and his former treating physician, regarding their understanding of the term
“active prescription” and its medical usage (or non-usage). He argues that this issue, too, involves
a factual dispute to be resolved by the jury.
Following careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the Defendants’ Motion in
Limine to Preclude Argument that Plaintiff Had an ‘Active’ Suboxone Prescription When He
Entered Custody at Central Regional Jail, or that the Defendants ‘Removed’ Him from His
Suboxone Prescription (Document 217) be DENIED. The Plaintiff is free to present evidence
contrary to the Defendants’ position.
7. Document 219
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to
Inmate Grievance Logs Unless and Until the Same Are Admitted into Evidence (Document 219)
and the Plaintiff’s Response. The Defendants argue that there should be no discussion of the
Grievance Logs until they are admitted into evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence.
The Plaintiff argues that the grievance logs are important records that help establish the
Defendants’ pattern and practice of discontinuing patients from MOUD, and that Dr. Fingerhood
reviewed the records in formulating his expert report and should therefore be permitted to discuss
them. He contends that they are admissible business records, containing information submitted
for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment, and are therefore admissible for both the truth of
the matters asserted and to show that the Defendants had notice of the harmful effects of denying
MOUD to detainees without ‘active’ prescriptions.
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The Defendants do not argue substantively that the Court should find that the grievance
logs are not admissible at this stage. The Defendants’ motion appears to be focused on preventing
reference to the grievance logs in opening statements, and in reference to the Plaintiff’s expert.
The Plaintiff may use opening statements to preview evidence that they reasonably believe will be
admitted. The Plaintiff’s expert may discuss materials used to produce his report. Therefore, the
Court ORDERS that the Defendants’ Joint Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to Inmate
Grievance Logs Unless and Until the Same Are Admitted into Evidence (Document 219) be
DENIED.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine No. 1-14 (Document 222) and
the Defendants’ Joint Response to Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine No. 1-14 (Document 228).
1. First Motion
The Plaintiff seeks to bar evidence of his convictions, arrests, and disciplinary history,
asserting that only the fact that he is a convicted felon should be admitted under Rule 609 and Rule
403. The Defendants argue that his criminal record is admissible. They contend that his felony
conviction(s) are admissible pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2), that the fact of his incarceration and
conviction is a necessary element of his claim, and that his criminal record is relevant to damages.
They do not oppose the motion to the extent it requests exclusion of other criminal history. They
argue that his disciplinary history subsequent to the relevant time period that relates to diversion
of MOUD could prove relevant and ask the Court to hold the motion in abeyance on that portion
of the motion.
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Rule 609(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a witness’s character for
truthfulness may be attacked through evidence of a conviction “for a crime that, in the convicting
jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year,” subject to Rule
403. Thus, the Court finds that the Defendants should be permitted to question the Plaintiff on
cross examination about the existence of criminal convictions for felony offenses that occurred
within ten years, pursuant to Rule 609. However, the Court cautions counsel against delving into
the underlying factual specifics of the Plaintiff’s prior convictions, which could increase the risk
of prejudice, confusion, and wasting time. The Court finds that criminal history that is not
admissible under Rule 609 should be precluded, as should disciplinary history from periods of
incarceration. The Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s first motion in limine be GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part, as set forth herein.
2. Second Motion
The Plaintiff next seeks to bar jail and prison kiosk messages post-dating the events in the
complaint. The Defendants argue that certain messages specifically discussing this lawsuit may
be relevant, and request that the Court hold the motion in abeyance.
The Court finds that messages post-dating the events in the complaint have little relevance
to the claims presented, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and ORDERS that the
Plaintiff’s second motion in limine be GRANTED.
3. Third Motion
The Plaintiff further seeks to bar reference to convictions, arrests, or bad acts of his
witnesses. He argues that the Defendants failed to disclose any such convictions during the
discovery process, arrests that did not result in conviction are inadmissible, and prior bad acts
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evidence would be irrelevant to the proposed testimony. The Defendants do not oppose this
motion. The Court therefore ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s third motion in limine be GRANTED
as unopposed.
4. Fourth Motion
The Plaintiff next seeks to bar speculative testimony about accommodations and medical
care that ‘would have been’ provided to the Plaintiff. He notes that witnesses who indicated that
they do not have specific recollections of his treatment at CRJ have offered testimony that they
would have taken certain steps if Mr. Taylor required certain care or exhibited certain symptoms.
Specifically, the Plaintiff indicates that Nurse Practitioner Tamara Kessel testified that she “would
have contacted an addiction specialist for Mr. Taylor if his medical needs required MOUD,”
though she had no recollection of interacting with Mr. Taylor during his January through March
2023 detention. (Pl.’s Mot. at 14) (Document 222.) The Plaintiff argues that this evidence would
be mere speculation.
The Defendants argue that their policies, procedures, and customs are at issue in this case,
and they therefore should be permitted to testify as to their ordinary practices. They further contend
that they should be permitted to lay a foundation pursuant to Rule 406 to admit habit evidence so
that Ms. Kessel can testify that she acted in accord with her practice.
The Defendants’ policies and practices are at issue in this case. The admissibility of
evidence regarding habit or routine practice to show that the person or organization acted in
accordance with the habit or practice pursuant to Rule 406 will depend on the foundation and
context of the proposed testimony. “Habit evidence…can also be established by a witness’s direct
testimony of his general practice.” Howard v. City of Durham, 68 F.4th 934, 951 (4th Cir. 2023).
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The Fourth Circuit explained that, presented with evidence of a witness’s general practice or
routine, a jury may infer that the witness acted in accordance with that practice—or that the witness
did not follow that practice on the occasion at issue, or that no such practice existed. Id. “[T]he
weight to give this competing testimony is a credibility issue that should be left to the jury.” Id.
at 951-52. In order to allow the Court to evaluate the contested testimony in context, the Court
ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s fourth motion in limine be HELD IN ABEYANCE.
5. Motion Five
The Plaintiff asks the Court to bar any argument that an inference should be drawn against
the Plaintiff because third parties are absent at trial, as any such witnesses are not within the
Plaintiff’s exclusive power to produce. The Defendants do not object to this motion. Therefore,
the Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s fifth motion in limine be GRANTED as unopposed.
6. Motion Six
The Plaintiff further seeks to bar any undisclosed witnesses. The Defendants do not object
to this motion. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s sixth motion in limine be
GRANTED as unopposed.
7. Motion Seven
The Plaintiff next seeks to preclude undisclosed and improper Rule 26(a)(2)(C) expert
opinions. He asks the Court to prevent the Defendants from soliciting opinion testimony from
treating providers who have not been disclosed to offer expert opinions, to bar undisclosed
opinions from Tamara Kessel, and to bar improper opinion testimony from Dr. Michael Mitcheff.
They contend that Ms. Kessel should be permitted to testify as to opinions she reached during the
course of her treatment of Mr. Taylor, but not other expert opinions. In addition, they argue that
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Dr. Mitcheff should not be permitted to testify that the Plaintiff’s treatment was medically
appropriate or that he was not experiencing withdrawal from buprenorphine because he had no
involvement with the Plaintiff’s treatment during the relevant timeframe and did not provide a
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report.
The Defendants indicate that they do not intend to offer expert opinions from non-disclosed
witnesses but reserve the right to do so if the Plaintiff opens the door. They argue that Ms.
Kessel’s proposed testimony is appropriate based on her knowledge, skill, experience, training,
and education, and the fact that she was a treating provider. They contend that the Plaintiff’s
motion does not sufficiently identify the opinions he seeks to exclude. They also argue that Dr.
Mitcheff is “qualified to testify as to the standard of care pertaining to the treatment of OUD in a
correctional setting and how this standard of care translates into Wexford’s guidelines” and can
“opine as to whether the treatment rendered to Plaintiff fell within Wexford’s guidelines.” (Defs.’
Resp. at 9.)
The Court finds that undisclosed expert testimony is properly excluded. It is not clear that
there is any dispute with regard to the permissible scope of Ms. Kessel’s testimony. The Court
notes that the Defendants did not present Dr. Mitcheff as an expert witness, and testimony outside
the scope of his role as a 30(b)(6) representative will be excluded. During his deposition, counsel
for the Defendants vehemently objected to questions outside the scope of the Rule 30(b)(6) notice.
When counsel for the Plaintiff asked, “Can withdrawal from MOUD be dangerous?” counsel for
Wexford objected and instructed him not to answer, stating “He’s…not an expert witness. He’s
here to testify on Wexford’s policies and procedures and the things that went into creating their
guideline. That is – that is a question for an expert witness, and I’m instructing him not to
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answer.” (Mitcheff Dep. at 84::9-18) (Document 195-3.) While the parties remain able to offer
objections as to the specific scope of testimony by treating providers and Dr. Mitcheff, the Court
ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s seventh motion in limine be GRANTED to the extent it seeks
exclusion of expert testimony that was not properly disclosed.
8. Motion Eight
In his eighth motion in limine, the Plaintiff seeks to bar reference to the fact that some of
his attorneys are from out of town. The Defendants indicate that they do not intend to suggest
that the Plaintiff or his attorneys should be viewed as outsiders but contend that the jury will need
to be informed of Kaplan & Grady’s office location for voir dire. The Court agrees that the office
location will need to be referenced in voir dire but is otherwise irrelevant and should not be
discussed. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s eighth motion in limine be
GRANTED, without opposition, as set forth herein.
9. Motion Nine
The Plaintiff’s ninth motion in limine seeks to bar any appeal to the jurors’ interests as
taxpayers. The Defendants do not oppose this motion. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the
Plaintiff’s ninth motion in limine be GRANTED as unopposed.
10. Motion Ten
The Plaintiff next requests that the Court bar the Defendants from referring to the Plaintiff
or other witnesses by labels other than their names, such as inmate, felon, addict, etc. The
Defendants do not oppose this motion. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s tenth
motion in limine be GRANTED as unopposed.
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11. Motion Eleven
The Plaintiff’s eleventh motion in limine requests that evidence or argument about after-
acquired evidence unknown to medical providers at the time they treated Mr. Taylor be excluded.
He argues that the Defendants should not be permitted to present evidence or argument about pre-
incarceration lapses or non-conformances with his MOUD prescription or use of illicit substances
that were not known to providers during his January-March 2023 incarceration. Likewise, he
argues that evidence of the same from after the overdose he suffered in the few days following his
release should be excluded. He argues that there is no permissible use for evidence of his drug
use prior to December 2022 and after his March 2023 overdose.
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiff’s drug screen upon intake, in which he tested
positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and fentanyl, and did not test positive for
buprenorphine, together with his admission of use, placed staff on notice of his pre-incarceration
drug use. They further argue that his pre-incarceration relapse and non-compliance with his
MOUD prescription is relevant to his claim that failure to prescribe MOUD proximately caused
his post-incarceration relapse. The Defendants further argue that his pre- and post-incarceration
illegal drug use and nonconformity to his MOUD are admissible as evidence of comparative fault.
Evidence of the Plaintiff’s drug use and MOUD compliance that was not known to the
providers at the time they made any decisions regarding his treatment is not relevant to any claim
or defense and would be prejudicial and misleading to the jury pursuant to Rule 403. Facts that
providers were aware of, including his drug screen on intake, are admissible, however. The
Defendants’ argument regarding comparative fault is addressed in detail below. Following
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careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s eleventh motion in limine be
GRANTED as set forth herein.
12. Motions Twelve and Thirteen
The Plaintiff next seeks to bar reference to the supplier of illicit substances to Mr. Taylor.
He argues that who provided him with any illicit substances is irrelevant to his claims and any
defense. He further seeks to preclude any arguments against the Defendants’ liability that are
contrary to law, including any argument by DCR that it is not liable because the actions at issue
were taken by Wexford employees, and any argument by Wexford based on proportional fault
concepts.
Defendant DCR argues that it should be permitted to argue and provide evidence that it
was not involved in the medical decision-making at issue, and “it will be up to the jury to decide
whether a co-defendant’s conduct is to be imputed to the WVDCR or if the WVDCR’s conduct
itself was discriminatory.” (Defs.’ Resp. at 14.) The Defendants further contend that they should
be permitted to present evidence and argument that the individual who provided him with heroin
proximately caused his relapse and alleged overdose. They argue that West Virginia’s statute
regarding non-party fault, W. Va. Code § 55-7-13d(a), is not limited to state-law claims.
The Court finds that W. Va. Code § 55-7-13d is not applicable to the federal claims
presented herein. See, Isner v. City of Elkins, No. 2:21-CV-27, 2022 WL 1750630, at *6 (N.D.W.
Va. May 31, 2022) (“the West Virginia Legislature cannot limit Plaintiff’s recovery under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute”). Thus, non-party or comparative fault are not permissible
issues, and the identity of the person who supplied controlled substances to Mr. Taylor is irrelevant
to the claims and defenses. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s twelfth motion in
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limine be GRANTED. As the Court discussed in more detail in ruling on the motions for
summary judgment, vicarious liability is available in ADA and RA claims. It is not clear precisely
what argument or evidence the Defendants might seek to introduce that the Plaintiff challenges as
contrary to law. The Court finds that it will be helpful to hear evidence or argument of that nature
in context, and therefore ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s thirteenth motion in limine be HELD IN
ABEYANCE.
13. Motion Fourteen
Finally, the Plaintiff asks the Court to permit him to appear at trial in non-prison attire and
without restraints. The Defendants oppose this motion, arguing that the Plaintiff is currently
serving a sentence following his felony conviction for receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle.
They argue that “there is no inherent need for Plaintiff to deceive or camouflage himself before a
jury” because his criminal case has been resolved. (Defs.’ Resp. at 18.) They further argue that
“his incarceration is the very essence of his claim against these Defendants,” and any reference to
him as ‘inmate’ or ‘prisoner’ is “inconsequential.” (Id.)
The Court finds nothing deceptive or misleading in permitting the Plaintiff to appear
without handcuffs and in street clothes or requiring that he be referred to by his name, like everyone
else in the courtroom. The Defendant has presented nothing suggesting that the Plaintiff poses a
threat or constitutes a flight risk, such that restraints would be necessary. Courts have long
recognized that visible shackles are prejudicial and violate due process, in the absence of “a special
need” during criminal trials. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005). In a civil trial where
the claims presented make the jury aware that the Plaintiff is a prisoner, handcuffs are not as
inherently prejudicial, though there remains a risk that the jury will interpret the handcuffs to
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indicate that the plaintiff is “dangerous and violent.” Alexander v. Parks, 834 F. App’x 778, 781
(4th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). Absent any special security considerations that may be brought to
the Court’s attention in the future, the Court ORDERS that the Plaintiff’s fourteenth motion in
limine be GRANTED, and that the Plaintiff be permitted to appear in non-prison attire, without
restraints, and that he be referred to by name. Counsel for the Plaintiff will need to make
arrangements with the United States Marshal Service to coordinate providing him with attire prior
to court each day.
In addition to the motions in limine, the Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's Motion for Leave
to File Consolidated Replies in Support of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine (Document 232), the
attached Plaintiff's Consolidated Replies in Support of His Motions in Limine (Document 232-1),
and the Defendants’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Consolidated
Replies in Support of Plaintiff's Motions in Limine (Document 235). The Plaintiff requested leave
to file replies in order to respond to new arguments and clarify his positions. The Defendants
argue that the Plaintiff did not demonstrate good cause to file replies, given that the Court’s
scheduling order provides that briefing on motions in limine typically ends with responses. The
Court finds that replies to the motions in limine are not warranted. Therefore, the Court
ORDERS that the Plaintiff's Motion (Document 232) be DENIED.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to
any unrepresented party.
ENTER: June 21, 2024
Dike CO. Seageh/
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTER DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA