The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
CHESTER BRANDON, III, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-00265
COMMISSIONER WILLIAM
K. MARSHALL, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiffs’ Verified Class Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive
Relief (Document 1), the Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary and Preliminary Injunctive
Relief (Document 2) and exhibit(s), and the Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs’ Emergency
Motion for Temporary and Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Document 3). On May 30, 2024, the
Court held a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, during which both parties
presented witness testimony. The Court has considered the facts presented in the verified
complaint, the exhibit attached to the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the testimony
presented during the hearing.
FACTS
The named Plaintiffs are Chester Brandon, III, and Harold Midkiff. The Plaintiffs bring
this claim on behalf of a class, defined to include:
all persons on parole under the authority of the WVDCR [West
Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation] who, after
having been previously approved by the Parole Board or their parole
officer to be housed at a non-West Virginia Alliance of Recovery
Residences (WVARR) certified recovery residence and not having
violated any element of their parole, have been or are being forced
by Defendants to vacate their previously approved housing by May
31, 2024.
(Compl. at ¶ 24.) The Defendants are William K. Marshall, Commissioner, the executive head of
the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR), Ronald Arnold, the Director
of Parole Services for the DCR, and Anne Thomas, the Assistant Commissioner of the DCR,
Bureau of Community Corrections. All are sued in their official capacities. This case arises in
response to a recent decision by the Defendants to require parolees who were released, in
accordance with approved home plans to recovery residences that are not certified pursuant to state
law, to vacate those residences and find other housing with limited notice.
Defendant Anne Thomas described the change in policy that led to the directive to move
parolees living in uncertified recovery residences. A state law passed in 2019 established a
process for certification of recovery residences and barred referrals from DCR, among others, to
non-certified recovery residences. Recovery residences are certified by the West Virginia
Alliance of Recovery Residences (WVARR). Legislation passed this year, Senate Bill 475,
amended that statute to provide that parolees may not be “released” to uncertified recovery
residences. She distinguished between “referrals,” which occur when staff find a place to send a
parolee, and “releases,” which includes anyone released on parole, including to residences they
identified for themselves. Ms. Thomas explained that DCR interpreted that change to be
retroactive, requiring all parolees currently in uncertified recovery residences to move. She
issued a memo on March 29, 2024, explaining the change to parole officers and other relevant staff
members, directing that all parolees be required to find alternative housing by May 31, 2024. The
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memo did not require the impacted parolees to be notified within a particular timeframe or describe
a process for finding such housing or addressing an inability to do so. She testified that
individuals who were unable to find alternative housing by May 31, 2024, would be able to remain
in their previously approved residences until they found an alternative.
Ms. Thomas testified that DCR intends to work with impacted parolees to find housing and
will not revoke anyone’s parole because of this change in policy. However, she also explained
that homelessness is not acceptable on parole, and individuals who become homeless may be
sanctioned with a jail sentence of up to 30 days while they try to secure housing. Plaintiff Harold
Midkiff testified that he was aware of someone who went to a Salvation Army shelter as a result
of the change in policy. Ms. Thomas also described a parolee who did have a revocation filed
because, after he had been informed that he needed to vacate his previously approved residence by
May 31, 2024, he moved without first obtaining approval of his new residence from his parole
officer.
The Plaintiffs presented testimony from Beverly Sharp, who runs a reentry nonprofit
providing resources and support to assist people in reentering society after incarceration. She
explained that there is a shortage of housing for previously incarcerated individuals in West
Virginia, regardless of certification, making it nearly impossible to find acceptable housing for a
large group of displaced parolees. In particular, she testified that people who had been convicted
of sex offenses and/or violent crimes lacked options, and no recovery residences currently certified
by WVARR accept sex offenders or people with lengthy violent criminal records. She and staff
members at her organization called every certified recovery residence in the state on behalf of
clients following the change in DCR policy, and found only two open beds, one of which they
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were able to secure for a client. Both Ms. Sharp and Robert Yost, the regional director for Hope
Center Ministries, where the named Plaintiffs were placed, described a chaotic scramble to find
housing for the displaced parolees, and both described conversations with DCR agents in which
they were informed that essentially any housing would be approved – a homeless shelter, a camper
at a campground, etc.
The two named Plaintiffs, and a third putative class member, David Patterson, were
released on parole to Hope Center Ministries near Parkersburg, West Virginia. Mr. Midkiff and
Mr. Patterson both provided testimony during the preliminary injunction hearing. The regional
director of Hope Center, Robert Yost, also testified. Hope Center is a religion-based spiritual
mentorship program that provides housing, substance abuse treatment, vocational training,
employment assistance, and other supportive services. Hope Center Ministries is a national non-
profit with locations across the country. The Parkersburg location has been open approximately
three years and has been receiving newly released parolees for about two years. It has national
accreditations as a recovery support specialist but is not WVARR certified. Hope Center is
currently seeking WVARR certifications but was told it could take several months because of a
backlog as uncertified residences seek to come into compliance with the new law. Mr. Brandon,
Mr. Patterson, and Mr. Midkiff were all doing well at the Hope Center and found the supportive
programming valuable, particularly in helping them maintain sobriety from controlled substances.
Hope Center was approved as their release residence in each of their Home Plans when they were
granted parole, and they had no parole violations or problems while there.
Their parole officer informed them on or about May 7, 2024, that they would need to leave
Hope Center by May 31, 2024. They, their parole officer, and Hope Center staff sought to identify
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similarly supportive housing with little success. Mr. Midkiff and Mr. Patterson were both moved
to the Union Mission, a men’s shelter in Charleston, West Virginia, on May 29, 2024. The Union
Mission offers a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program, which Mr. Midkiff
believes he will be able to join. Mr. Midkiff expressed concern that the disruption of his stable
housing and treatment program, with staff he found supportive, would increase his risk of relapse.
Mr. Patterson likewise expressed concern with being moved from Hope Center to a shelter. He did
not initially even recall the name of the shelter where he now resides. Mr. Patterson described
positive relationships with staff and volunteers at the Hope Center that he had developed over the
approximately nine months he had been there. They both stated that they wanted to remain at the
Hope Center. No other residence had been secured for Mr. Brandon at the time of the hearing,
and he remains at the Hope Center.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court withheld ruling on the broader motion for a
preliminary injunction but ordered that no additional parolees be moved from their previously
approved residences pending the Court’s ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 65(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a temporary restraining
order may be issued without notice
only if (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in
opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any
efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be
required.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). A preliminary injunction may be issued “only on notice to the adverse
party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). The Defendant has appeared and responded in this matter.
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“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Plaintiffs must satisfy all four requirements. JAK
Prods., Inc. v. Bayer, 616 F. App'x 94, 95 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished, per curiam opinion); Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 559 U.S. 1089, 130 S. Ct. 2371, 176 L. Ed. 2d 764 (2010), and adhered
to in part sub nom. The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. F.E.C., 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010).
The standard requires the plaintiff “to make a clear showing of likelihood of success on the merits.”
Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
The final two factors, “assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public
interest…merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435
(2009).
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiffs argue that a pre-certification class-wide preliminary injunction is appropriate
to prevent the Plaintiffs and putative class members from the loss of liberty and other “irreparable
harms, including loss of therapeutic and support relationships important to the ongoing fight
against relapse into substance abuse habits, and loss of employment obtained and pursued as part
of the rehabilitative process.” (Pl.s’ Mem. at 6.) They assert that un-approving previously
approved housing and treatment placement for parolees, without any change in conditions, is
arbitrary and capricious under these circumstances. They note that the newly enacted legislation
does not require removal of people already placed in non-certified homes. They contend that they
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are likely to succeed on their substantive due process claim because the state action is arbitrary,
unjustifiable, and outrageous, and threatens their liberty interest in continued release on parole.
The Plaintiffs stress the harm caused by removing them from supportive housing, where they have
built positive relationships and progressed in their recovery. They also argue that the balance of
equities and public interest favor preliminary relief because the DCR is in no way harmed by
permitting them to continue to reside in their previously approved recovery residences, ensuring
continued support and rehabilitation for parolees protects the public, and risking unnecessary
reincarceration into overcrowded jails and prisons harms both the parolees and the public. They
urge a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo.
The Defendants argue that there is no imminent threat of irreparable injury. They contend
that the parolees impacted by the policy change will have to have new home plans approved by
the agency, and those home plans will be designed to meet their needs. They emphasize Ms.
Thomas’s testimony that DCR will work with parolees who are struggling to find new housing,
and that there is no plan to revoke parole for those who cannot find new housing before the
deadline, and there is therefore no deprivation of liberty. They contend that parolees will still be
able to access treatment options and employment opportunities.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Plaintiffs bring this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violation of their
14th Amendment substantive due process right to liberty. 42 U.S.C. §1983 “imposes liability on
state actors who cause the ‘deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.’” Callahan v. N. Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, 18 F.4th 142, 145 (4th Cir. 2021)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects
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individuals from states that would ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.) “[A] plaintiff asserting a § 1983
substantive due process claim must allege both the deprivation of his life, liberty, or property
interest by a state actor, and that the deprivation of this interest was arbitrary in the constitutional
sense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Cases analyzing substantive due process rights
address two “strands” of the doctrine: one that “protects rights that are ‘fundamental,’” and a
“second [that] ‘protects against the exercise of governmental power that shocks the conscience.’”
D.B. v. Cardall, 826 F.3d 721, 740 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing and quoting Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City,
528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2008)). Generally, when the “claimed violation is by executive act,”
“the issue of fatal arbitrariness should be addressed as a threshold question, asking whether the
challenged conduct was so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience.” Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 738 (4th Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the liberty of a parolee,” though subject to
restrictions not applicable to the general public, “is valuable and must be seen as within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). In
Hawkins v. Freeman, the Fourth Circuit considered a substantive due process claim involving a
plaintiff who had been released on parole, despite his ineligibility under state law, then returned to
prison when officials realized their error. 195 F.3d at 737. In analyzing whether the
governmental conduct was fatally arbitrary, the court outlined descriptions of the type of conduct
that can support a substantive due process claim, noting that careful analysis of the specific context
and circumstances is necessary. Id. at 742. “It is conduct that involves abusing executive power,
or employing it as an instrument of oppression,” that is “more blameworthy than simple
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negligence,” and that is “intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest.”
Id. (internal punctuation and citations omitted). The court concluded that the decision at issue in
Hawkins could not meet that test, as “[n]othing about it suggests any element of vindictiveness or
of power exercised simply to oppress,” and “[t]here were legitimate governmental interest and
objectives a-plenty to justify the act.” Id. at 746.
The Defendants assert that they acted in an effort to comply with newly enacted legislation.
West Virginia Code Section 16-59-2, governing voluntary certification of recovery residences,
was amended this year to, inter alia, provide that:
A recovery residence without a valid certificate of compliance, as
provided in § 16-59-2 of this code, is prohibited from receiving a
referral or receiving a person released from prison for the placement
of any prisoner, parolee, probationer, or prospective, current, or
discharged patient, or client from the Division of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, the Parole Board, the county probation officers, day
report center, municipal courts, or a medical or clinical treatment
facility that receives funds for its operation from the State Treasury.
W. Va. Code § 16-59-2(j) (eff. June 7, 2024). Both the previous and updated versions of W. Va.
Code § 16-59-3 include language instructing the same entities not to “make a referral of any
prisoner, parolee, probationer, or prospective, current or discharged patient, or client to a recovery
residence unless the recovery residence holds a valid certificate of compliance….” W. Va. Code
§ 16-59-3(b) (eff. May 20, 2019 – June 6, 2024) and § 16-59-3(a) (eff. June 7, 2024).
As a general rule, retroactivity is disfavored. Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244,
264, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). A statute has retroactive effect if “it would impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new
duties with respect to transactions already completed.” Id. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In West
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Virginia, “[a] statute that diminishes substantive rights or augments substantive liabilities should
not be applied retroactively to events completed before the effective date of the statute ... unless
the statute provides explicitly for retroactive application.” Syl. pt. 2, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. First
Nat. Bank in Fairmont, 198 W.Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538, 540–41 (1996); see also W. Va. Code §
2–2–10(bb) (“A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made
retrospective.”). Further, “[t]he presumption is that a statute is intended to operate prospectively,
and not retrospectively, unless it appears, by clear, strong and imperative words or by necessary
implication, that the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive force and effect.” Syl. pt.
3, Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807, 810 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Nothing in Senate Bill 475, the legislation that amended the relevant sections of state code,
indicates that it has retroactive effect. As such, the change in state law provides no justification
for the Defendants’ actions. Therefore, the Court must consider whether the Defendants’ decision
to require the Plaintiffs, and the purported Plaintiff class,1 to vacate the uncertified recovery
residences, that were previously approved in their home plans, comports with due process. Based
on the testimony presented to the Court, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ liberty is meaningfully
at stake. First, although the Defendants indicated that they do not intend for members of the
Plaintiff class to become homeless or be revoked directly because of their inability to secure
alternative housing, there was testimony that parolees were transferred to homeless shelters as a
result of this policy, and that homelessness can result in incarceration for people on parole. Thus,
1 “[C]ourts may enter class-wide injunctive relief before certification of a class.” J.O.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 409 F. Supp. 3d 367, 376 (D. Md. 2019); Mullins v. Cole, 218 F. Supp. 3d (S. D. W. Va. 2016) (Chambers, J.)
(granting preliminary injunction based on class-wide harms prior to class certification).
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there is a direct risk that people rendered homeless because of the Defendants’ sudden insistence
that they vacate the homes, that they secured and had approved prior to their release, will be jailed
because no suitable housing is available to them.
In addition, there is a real risk that the Plaintiffs and putative class members will be revoked
because of relapse or other violations that are far more likely after they lose the stability and
support of their approved recovery residences. Mr. Midkiff testified that he tried multiple times
to get approval for a home plan prior to his parole but could not obtain approval until he had
identified Hope Center as a release residence. Presumably, the DCR requires certain parolees to
be released to recovery residences, even if uncertified, because it determines that they are more
likely to succeed on parole with the supports those residences offer, whether that is substance abuse
treatment, therapy sessions, general structure and assistance building positive relationships, or
vocational training and employment assistance. Suddenly removing parolees who are doing well
in those residences and transferring them—with little effort at a smooth transition—to shelters or
homes with less support risks interfering with their recovery and causing them to relapse, which
may result in revocation. Even parolees moved to places with similar supportive programming
available may suffer from the disruption. Adjusting to a new substance abuse treatment program,
new therapists or other treatment providers, new participants in group therapy, finding a new
vocational program or employer, if necessary, can all be particularly burdensome for formerly
incarcerated people, as this Court regularly sees in handling a criminal docket and as the witnesses
explained. Removing someone from a substance abuse treatment program that is working, with
no process or meaningful explanation, may well trigger a relapse into active drug abuse, which
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violates the conditions of release on parole. Thus, the Plaintiffs have demonstrated that this policy
may well result in re-incarceration.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has recognized that parolees have a liberty interest
in remaining free from unjustified re-incarceration. The Plaintiffs here have presented sufficient
evidence to show a likelihood of success in demonstrating that the Defendants’ actions threaten
that interest. The Court must next consider whether the Defendants’ actions are sufficiently
egregious and oppressive to be constitutionally arbitrary. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 845–47 (1998). The Defendants approved home plans and released the Plaintiffs and
putative class members to the uncertified recovery homes where they participated in assorted
supportive programming. Following amendments to a statute that, on the record before the Court,
did nothing to alter the Plaintiffs’ status or the legality of their release to these placements—release
which pre-dated the statutory amendment—the Defendants gave them approximately three weeks’
notice to leave those residences, despite a long-standing shortage of housing of any sort for
parolees. Despite previously requiring these individuals to secure housing in a recovery residence
in their home plans, the Defendants now encourage them to find anything with running water and
electricity, or simply transport them to a shelter. In short, the Defendants placed all the burden of
a crisis they manufactured on the shoulders of those most vulnerable and least able to weather it.2
Giving people already facing barriers to finding housing three weeks to move is outrageous.
Suddenly removing people with substance abuse disorder from treatment programs they are
progressing in and wish to continue, with the constant threat that relapse can result in revocation,
2 For example, there is nothing in the record suggesting efforts to facilitate or pressure WVARR to process
certification applications of recovery residences like the Hope Center before the June 7 effective date of the legislation,
rather than displacing residents.
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shocks the conscience. In ordering the Plaintiffs to leave their recovery residences without
sufficient time or any process to challenge the directive, the Defendants disregarded the interests,
and indeed the humanity of the affected parolees, even though they are in large part the group that
the certification requirement was designed to protect. Treating the parolees as though their lives
are of no consequence and cavalierly throwing away their hard work and progress in recovery and
rehabilitation supports a finding of oppressive ill-intent, not mere negligence.
The outrageousness of the executive action here is unmitigated by any countervailing
governmental interest. Certification of recovery homes is, of course, a valid legislative priority.
However, the legislation does not require disruption of existing placements, and the policy is not,
for instance, to transfer people from uncertified recovery residences into appropriate certified
recovery residences as space becomes available. Instead, the Defendants chose to unilaterally
displace vulnerable parolees, causing some to become homeless and risking the recovery efforts
of others. Therefore, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.
B. Irreparable Harm
The Court’s previous discussion touched on the harm caused to the Plaintiffs in the absence
of preliminary relief, and the Court will not belabor the point. Removing the Plaintiffs from stable
placements, which provide both housing and treatment, causes irreparable harm by interrupting
that treatment, disrupting positive relationships, and depriving them of stable housing. Although
programs with similar treatment availability were secured for some of the impacted parolees,
removing them from a consistent treatment program in which they were successful for the
uncertainty of a new program is harmful. Mr. Yost testified about the program phases at Hope
Center. Starting a new program will inevitably discard some progress, particularly progress that
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derives from relationships with treatment providers and fellow participants that develop over time.
Discontinuing a treatment program without any basis in the participant’s treatment goals, behavior,
progress, or needs, constitutes irreparable harm in these circumstances.
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
The Court further finds that the public interest supports an injunction. As the Supreme
Court explained:
The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional
liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of
restoring him to normal and useful life within the law. Society thus
has an interest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous
information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need to
revoke parole, given the breach of parole conditions. And society
has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair
treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601–02, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972) (internal
citations omitted). The Plaintiffs’ chances of successfully rebuilding their lives, overcoming
addiction and mental health problems, repairing family relationships, and securing gainful
employment are diminished when they are removed from the very programs designed to help them
accomplish those goals. The public has a strong interest in ensuring that people released on parole
are able to transition successfully into law-abiding, productive citizens. The injunction requested
in this case ensures that the Plaintiffs and putative class members cannot be needlessly removed
from supportive programs where they wish to remain.
The Defendants did not identify any harm they will suffer by continuing the status quo for
those parolees who were released prior to the amendment to W. Va. Code § 16-59-1 et seq. The
Court would also note that the certification issue appears likely to be temporary. DCR will no
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longer release parolees to uncertified recovery residences, those recovery residences that are
eligible for certification will presumably pursue it, as Hope Center is, and parolees currently
enrolled in uncertified recovery residences will presumably complete the programs within the next
months or year(s). The issue here is only whether the Plaintiffs and putative class members may
remain in the uncertified recovery residences to which they were released while WVARR
processes certification applications prompted by the 2024 amendments.
Finding that the factors relevant to a preliminary injunction each weigh in favor of the
Plaintiffs, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary relief should be granted.
D. Bond
Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court may issue a
preliminary injunction…only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers
proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained.” The Plaintiffs argue that the bond should be waived or nominal because they are
indigent, the public has an interest in the issues raised herein, and the preliminary injunction
requested will not result in monetary costs or damages to the Defendants. Finding that the
Defendants would sustain no damages should the injunction granted herein be found to be
wrongful, and in light of the public interest in this matter, the Court finds that no bond should be
required.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary and Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Document 2) be
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GRANTED. Specifically, the Court ORDERS that the following INJUNCTIVE RELIEF be
GRANTED:
1. The Defendants are DIRECTED to return to the status quo before the Defendants
began forcing individuals out of parole approved, uncertified recovery residences by
ceasing to force Plaintiffs and absent class members out of their parole approved
housing at recovery residences;
2. The Defendants are DIRECTED to permit members of the absent class who have
already been removed from their parole approved housing at recovery residences to
return to their prior housing arrangements, if so desired; and
3. The Defendants are DIRECTED to permit any member of the putative class who
has not yet been removed from their recovery residence housing to stay in that
housing—absent any unrelated change in circumstance—until such time as sufficient
recovery residence housing meeting the state’s certification requirement becomes
available for the class.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to
any unrepresented party.
ENTER: June 4, 2024
Dire. Benger’
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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