Watkins v. Lincare Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

HUNTINGTON DIVISION

JILLIAN WATKINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:22-cv-00109

LINCARE, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending is Defendant Lincare Inc.’s (“Lincare”) Motion to Compel Discovery

Responses from Plaintiff Jillian Watkins. (ECF No. 134). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to the Motion to Compel, (ECF No. 143), and Lincare has replied. (ECF No.

145). Therefore, the matter is fully briefed, and oral argument will not be necessary to

resolve the dispute.

This case involves the alleged wrongful termination of Plaintiff’s employment by

Lincare. On April 6, 2023, Lincare served Plaintiff with various discovery requests,

including Requests for Admission. Plaintiff responded to the requests, and the responses

triggered a discovery deficiency letter from Lincare. (ECF No. 135 at 4). After some email

exchanges between counsel, Plaintiff served Lincare with amended responses, which

resolved some of the issues; however, some disputes remained. (Id.). Lincare currently

challenges the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s answers to eight Requests for Admission, including

Request Nos. 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 28 and 29, and asks the Court to compel Plaintiff to change

the answers she has provided to the requests. For the reasons that follow, the Court

GRANTS, in part, and, DENIES, in part, the Motion to Compel, (ECF No. 134)..

I. Requests for Admission

Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] party may serve

on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the

truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to: (A) facts, the application

of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described

documents.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). Matters within Rule 26(b)(1) include: “any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to

the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the

amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties'

resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden

or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(1). The purpose of requests for admission is twofold: first, they are sought “to

facilitate proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated from the case”; and

second, they serve “to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

36, advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment.

When responding to a request for admission, a party must admit or specifically

deny it, or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). “A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the matter, and

when good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter,

the answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” Id. An answer to

a request for admission must not be evasive. Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., Inc., 285

F.R.D. 350, 368 (D. Md. 2012) (citations omitted). If the answering party asserts lack of

knowledge for failing to admit or deny the request, the party must confirm that it made a

reasonable inquiry and the information it knows or that was reasonably available was

insufficient to enable it to admit or deny the request. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). In

addition, the answering party may object to a request for admission, but must state the

reason for the objection and may not object solely on the ground that the request presents

a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(5). When the objection “applies only to

a portion of the request, the responding party must unambiguously answer the portion of

the request it can.” City of Ann Arbor Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Sonoco Prod. Co., No. CV

4:08-2348-TLW-SVH, 2011 WL 13199217, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2011). To summarize,

Rule 36 allows the following responses to a request for admission: (1) an admission; (2) a

denial; (3) a detailed explanation as to why the matter can be neither admitted nor denied,

which may include a lack of knowledge and insufficient information after reasonable

inquiry; (4) a good faith qualified response that admits certain matters, if possible, but

denies or gives a qualified answer to the rest; or (5) an objection on a clearly stated

ground—for example, on the basis that the matter demanded to be admitted is beyond the

scope of discovery permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See Rule 36(a)(4); also Michael

v. Wes Banco Bank, Inc., No. CIVA 5:04CV46, 2006 WL 1705935, *2 (N.D.W. Va. June

16, 2006).

The requesting party may move the court to determine the sufficiency of an answer

or objection to a request for admission. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(6). “The analysis into

whether the answers or objections are sufficient focuses on the specificity of the response

and not on whether the response is factually correct.” Bolick v. Thompkins, No. CV 5:20-

2888-RBH-KDW, 2022 WL 20016085, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2022) (quoting Auto-

Owners’ Insurance Co. v. Gordon & Assocs., Inc., 9:15-4063-RMG, 2016 WL 11509964,

at *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2016)) (internal marking omitted). As further explained in Mayes v.

City of Hammond, Indiana:

Typically, the ability to prove sufficiency hinges on the specificity of the

response; not the response's accuracy. A motion to determine sufficiency is

not an appropriate vehicle to litigate the correctness of a response as Rule

36 does not permit the court to determine whether a response is supported

by evidence before trial. If a party believes a response to a request to admit

is incorrect, the appropriate remedy under Rule 26 is to prove the matter at

trial, and then apply to the court for reasonable expenses, including

reasonable attorney fees, in making that proof.

Mayes, No. 2:03-CV-379-PRC, 2006 WL 2251877, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 1, 2006) (quoting

Climco Coils Co. v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc., 2006 WL 850969, *1 (N.D. Ill.

Mar. 28, 2006)). “Courts examining motions regarding the sufficiency of a Rule 36

response may deny relief where the responding party can provide some explanation that

contextualizes a challenged response.” Ball-Rice v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's Cnty.,

No. CIV.A. PJM-11-1398, 2013 WL 2299725, at *2 (D. Md. May 24, 2013). Unless the court

finds an objection to be justified, it must order that an answer be served. Id. If the court

finds that an answer to a request for admission does not comply with Rule 36, it may order

that the matter in the request be admitted, or it may allow the answering party to serve

an amended answer. Id. If an answering party fails to admit what is requested under Rule

36, and the matter is later proven to be true, the answering party may be subject to

sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2).

II. Discussion

Although Lincare titles its motion as one to compel, Plaintiff responded to all of

the challenged requests for admission. Therefore, the motion is properly considered as a

Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Answers or Objections to Requests for Admission

pursuant to Rule 36(a)(6). Accordingly, the relevant standards under that Rule shall be

applied. Each challenge is considered in turn.

A. Request For Admission (“RFA”) No. 2

RFA: Admit that Plaintiff changed a setting on a CPAP device for Lincare

Patient 161.

RESPONSE: Denied. Objection, vague and ambiguous as to the term

“changed”. Otherwise, consistent with Lincare’s training and expectations,

the directives of supervisors, consistent with Plaintiff’s regular work duties

and responsibilities, and using the username and password provided by

Lincare, Plaintiff accessed Care Orchestrator, Encore, and Air View to

remotely change settings based on a physician’s order. To be clear, Will

Reynolds and Sherry Robinson and others participated in training along

with Ms. Watkins during which Ms. Watkins was trained on how to use the

Lincare systems to change CPAP device settings per a physician order.

Lincare states that Plaintiff was terminated from employment, in part, because she

changed settings on this patient’s CPAP device in contravention of policy and law. (ECF

No. 135 at 6). Lincare argues that Plaintiff denies the request for admission, but then

proceeds to admit the substance of the request. (Id.). In essence, Lincare accuses Plaintiff

of being evasive in her answer to avoid the negative effect of the admission.

Plaintiff responds that she is not being evasive; rather, the word “change” requires

context. (ECF No. 143 at 8-9). Plaintiff explains that she did not “change” the settings in

the medical sense of the word. Instead, a physician decided that the settings on the CPAP

device needed to be changed as part of the patient’s treatment plan and wrote a

prescription ordering the settings to be changed. Plaintiff then remotely “reset” the CPAP

device in keeping with the physician’s order. In other words, she merely carried out and

documented the physician’s order as she was authorized and trained to do by her

employer, Lincare. Plaintiff accuses the request of being written to be intentionally

misleading and ambiguous in its use of the term “change,” which required her to provide

an objection, qualified answer, and denial.

In its reply memorandum, Lincare reiterates that Plaintiff has no justification for

denying the request for admission given that she admits she remotely “changed” the

settings. As such, the evidence supports an unequivocal admission, not a denial followed

by an objection to the request for admission. Lincare states: “Whether or not changing a

setting is proper or improper, permitted or not, is for another day.” (ECF No. 145 at 3).

While Lincare does not directly respond to Plaintiff’s argument that the word “change”

has two connotations in this case—one that could elicit an admission by Plaintiff and one

that could elicit a denial—Lincare’s statement suggests that Plaintiff’s argument has

legitimacy.

Although used during the discovery process, a request for admission is not a true

discovery device. As stated earlier, the purpose of requests for admission is to narrow the

issues for trial, not uncover new information. See, e. g., Montgomery v. Crothall

Healthcare, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-01154-JRR, 2022 WL 4537784, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 28,

2022) (“[R]equests for admissions are not a true discovery device as they are not designed

for discovery of facts, but rather to establish facts about which there is no real dispute.”)

(citing Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, et al, 272 F.R.D. 177, 183 (S.D.W. Va. 2010)).

When a party denies a request for admission and provides a reasonable explanation for

the denial, “[r]elief may be inappropriate where the request ‘breed[s] additional litigation

because one party is dissatisfied with the answer of another.’” Keralink Int'l, Inc. v.

Stradis Healthcare, LLC, No. CV CCB-18-2013, 2021 WL 1198150, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 30,

2021) (quoting Singhal & Co., Inc. v. VersaTech, Inc., No. JKB-19-1209, 2020 WL

6119325, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 16, 2020)). As clarified in Keralink, Int’l, “courts decline to

evaluate the bona fides or truthfulness of responses to requests for admission, which

would ‘encourage[ ] more litigation, the converse of the purpose behind permitting one

party to demand the other to admit the truth of a certain statement.’” Id. (quoting Nat'l

Semiconductor Corp. v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 265 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2003)).

In other words, when the answering party provides a clear and unequivocal response to a

request for admission, the court will not determine that the response is insufficient and

compel the party to change its answer simply because the moving party produces evidence

to show that the answer is unsupported by the weight of the evidence. Superior Sales W.,

Inc. v. Gonzalez, 335 F.R.D. 98, 102 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (“District courts across the country,

as well as preeminent treatises on federal civil procedure, agree that Rule 36 does not

authorize the court to make determinations on the accuracy of responses before trial.

Stated differently, if a responding party files a response that contains the proper detail,

the propounding party may not challenge the denial on the ground that it is unsupported

by the evidence.”) (internal markings and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated two different contexts for the request, which

would result in opposite responses. If Plaintiff was asked to admit that she remotely reset

or altered (“changed” in that sense of the word) the settings on Patient 161’s CPAP

machine based upon the written order of a physician, then she apparently would admit

the request. If she was asked if she unilaterally changed the settings, or changed them

without a written physician order, then she would deny the request. Accordingly, the

request for admission does not narrow the issues in this case in any useful manner. To the

contrary, all it accomplishes is to highlight the factual disputes between the parties. Rule

36 is not intended as a tool to elicit an admission on a statement that, “although

containing some truth, conveys unwarranted and unfair inferences, when placed out of

context of the whole truth.” Anthony v. Cabot Corp., No. CIV.A. 06-CV-4419, 2008 WL

2645152, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2008). In that situation, “qualifications” are “generally

permitted.” Id. Request for Admission No. 2 is just such a request.

Plaintiff denied the request. She also objected to the request and provided an

explanation for the objection. She then added a qualified answer that attempted to clarify

the basis of her objection and denial. While there is nothing inherently wrong or evasive

about Plaintiff’s response when the full explanation is given, the undersigned does find

the wording of the answer to be unnecessarily confusing; indeed, without the further

illumination supplied in Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum, the qualified answer would

have appeared hopelessly contradictory. Moreover, the answer contains information

regarding Plaintiff’s training with other employees that simply does not respond to the

substance of the request. Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s inartful wording of the answer, her

opposition memorandum sufficiently elucidates her point, and based upon that

explanation, the Court finds the objection justified and a qualified answer likewise

acceptable, because they point out how the “changing” of CPAP settings is a genuine

factual matter in dispute and not simply an evasive play on words.

Nevertheless, the undersigned agrees that the portion of the answer containing the

qualification must be amended to clearly convey the information contained in Plaintiff’s

memorandum regarding her statements that she remotely “reset” or “altered” the CPAP

machine settings pursuant to a physician’s order as instructed and authorized by Lincare,

but did not “change” the settings, as that is a physician function accomplished by writing

a prescription. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as to

RFA No. 2. Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve an amended answer to RFA No. 2 within ten

(10) days of the date of this Order that clarifies her denial, objection, and qualified

answer, as set forth above, and removes the extraneous information which does not

respond to the substance of the request.

B. Request For Admission No. 6

RFA: Admit that prior to January 8, 2021, Plaintiff allowed or directed

Danielle Davis to sign INR paperwork.

Response: Deny. See RFA No. 5.

Lincare states that it terminated Plaintiff, in part, because she did not properly

supervise employees under her direction. (ECF No. 135 at 7-8). As an example, Lincare

claims that Plaintiff supervised Danielle Davis, who was an unlicensed patient account

representative. Lincare contends that it learned during an investigation that Ms. Davis

had signed paperwork that was required by Lincare policy to be signed by a licensed

clinician, and that Plaintiff was either aware that Ms. Davis had signed the paperwork, or

Plaintiff specifically directed Ms. Davis to do so. (Id. at 7). Lincare acknowledges that

Plaintiff denied the request for admission; however, Lincare challenges the portion of the

response that refers to Plaintiff’s answer to RFA No. 5. In that response, Plaintiff stated:

“Ms. Davis executed INR paperwork on an interim basis subject to an RT’s signature. …

Plaintiff did not direct Ms. Davis to sign the INR paperwork. But Plaintiff did require that

if Ms. Davis was not permitted to sign the INR paperwork, then a respiratory therapist

would have to redo the appropriate paperwork and retrain the patient.” (Id.). Lincare

argues that these statements establish that Plaintiff was “aware of” and therefore

“allowed” Ms. Davis to sign the paperwork, even if she did not direct her to do so. Lincare

again labels Plaintiff’s response as evasive, indicating that it attempts to avoid the

substance of the admission. (Id. at 8).

In her memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff flatly denies that she “allowed” or

“directed” Ms. Davis to sign the INR paperwork. (ECF No. 143 at 10). She also objects to

the request as vague and ambiguous, stating that she was not given any instruction by

Lincare regarding how the paperwork was to be completed when no respiratory therapists

were on staff at the Lincare facility supervised by Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that there are

documents which support her version of the facts, as they corroborate that she never

allowed nor directed non-clinicians to sign paperwork or set up equipment. (Id.). She

argues that Lincare, not Plaintiff, “allowed” the situation to occur (non-clinicians signing

paperwork requiring clinician signatures) by serving thousands of patients out of the

facility supervised by Plaintiff without a single respiratory therapist on staff. (ECF No. 143

at 10). In its reply, Lincare continues to argue the evidence and submits various exhibits

to prove its point that Plaintiff was aware of and thus “allowed” Ms. Davis to sign INR

paperwork. (ECF No. 145 at 4-5). Lincare posits that Plaintiff’s denial is improper and she

should be compelled to answer the request correctly.

Once again, Lincare misunderstands the purpose of a motion to determine the

sufficiency of an answer or objection. “The court must … view motions for relief under

Rule 36 in light of the purpose of requests for admission: ‘to narrow the array of issues

before the court, and thus expedite both the discovery process and the resolution of the

litigation.’” Keralink Int'l, Inc., 2021 WL 1198150, at *5 (quoting Singhal & Co., Inc., 2020

WL 6119325, at *5). Plaintiff has denied the request, which is a sufficient response. As

noted, the sufficiency (or insufficiency) of a response refers to its specificity, not

whether it is correct or even in good faith. Foretich v. Chung, 151 F.R.D. 3, 5 (D.D.C.

1993) (holding that regardless of its accuracy, a denial to a request for admission is

“sufficient,” and the federal rules “do not allow the defendants to litigate, at this time,

whether the plaintiff was justified in denying their request.”). Rule 36 does not authorize

a court to make a factual determination about the denial. Operation Rescue Nat'l, 111 F.

Supp. 2d 948, 968 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (citing Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. American Home

Assurance, 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997) (“Rule 36(a) does not authorize a Court

to [render prospectively] determinations concerning the accuracy of a denial to a Request

for Admission, or to order that the subject matter of the request be admitted because the

opposing party's unequivocal denial is asserted to be unsupported by the evidence.”); also

Roe v. Bishop of Charleston, No. 2:21-CV-00020-RMG, 2021 WL 4272595, at *4 (D.S.C.

Sept. 20, 2021) (citing Lakehead Pipe Line Co., 177 F.R.D. at 458). Consequently,

Lincare’s Rule 36(a) motion cannot be sustained on the ground that Plaintiff’s answer to

RFA No. 6 is contrary to the evidence. A & V Fishing, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D.

285, 287 (D. Mass. 1993). Rather, the remedy for false answers lies in Rule 37, not in Rule

36(a)(6). Id.

While Plaintiff’s denial to RFA No. 6 is a sufficient response, the Court does have

a problem with Plaintiff referring Lincare to the response to RFA No. 5, although not for

the reasons raised by Lincare. RFA No. 5 asks Plaintiff to admit that she was “aware” that

Ms. Davis signed INR paperwork. After objecting to RFA No. 5, Plaintiff admits the

request, but then proceeds to provide extraneous information regarding her training, the

lack of respiratory therapists at Lincare’s facility, and what she required to be done if Ms.

Davis was not permitted to sign INR paperwork—none of which goes to the substance of

RFA No. 5. Similarly, with the exception of one line—“Plaintiff did not direct Ms. Davis

to sign the INR paperwork”—the remainder of the qualified answer to RFA No. 5 does not

respond to the substance of RFA No. 6. Indeed, the word “allowed” was not included in

RFA No. 5, and nothing in the qualified answer to RFA No. 5 actually addresses whether

Plaintiff “allowed” Ms. Davis to sign the INR paperwork.

The undersigned disagrees with Lincare that being aware of something is the same

as allowing it to happen. Regardless, even if there is merit to Lincare’s interpretation of

the objection and qualification in the response to RFA No. 5, the remedy is not for the

Court to change Plaintiff’s denial to RFA No. 6. Plaintiff’s reliance on the qualified answer

to RFA No. 5 cannot stand, however, as it does not respond to the substance of RFA No.

6, with the exception of the one sentence stating that: “Plaintiff did not direct Ms. Davis

to sign the INR paperwork.” If Plaintiff wishes to qualify her denial to RFA No. 6, then

she may amend her answer to add an objection/qualification that (1) complies with Rule

36, and (2) responds directly to the substance of RFA No. 6. It must not contain unrelated

and extraneous information added only to state her case. If she wishes to rely on her

denial alone, she may do so, as that is a “sufficient” response, but she should amend the

answer to make clear that it is an unequivocal denial. She should bear in mind the

sanctions available under Rule 37 if Lincare proves at trial that the request should have

been admitted and any objection asserted was not justified. Either way, the motion is

GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as to RFA No. 6. Plaintiff is ORDERED to

serve an amended answer to RFA No. 6, in keeping with the above, within ten (10) days

of the date of this Order.

C. Requests For Admission Nos. 7-10, 28, 29

These requests all concern the disciplinary practices and policies at Lincare and

ask Plaintiff to admit certain matters related to Lincare’s rights to discipline its

employees, as well as the forms of discipline used by Lincare.

RFA No. 7: Admit that Lincare is permitted to discipline an employee for

failure to discharge job duties in a satisfactory, professional, and/or efficient

manner.

Response: Objection. This Request does not call for the admission or

denial of a fact that is within her knowledge, but rather asks Plaintiff to

make a legal conclusion on a lawful termination. Further this Request is

inappropriate as Plaintiff is without knowledge as what Lincare believes to

be appropriate or within its purview to do relating to personnel issues. As

such, Plaintiff states: deny.

RFA No. 8: Admit that the discipline Lincare may impose on an employee

for failure to discharge job duties in a satisfactory, professional, and/or

efficient manner could include termination.

Response: See Request for Admission 7.

RFA No. 9: Admit that Lincare is permitted to discipline an employee for

operating beyond the scope of their duties or training.

Response: See Request for Admission 7.

RFA No. 10: Admit that the discipline Lincare could impose on an

employee for operating beyond the scope of their duties or training could

include termination.

Response: See Request for Admission 7.

RFA No. 28: Admit that receiving a written warning is a form of discipline

at Lincare.

Response: Objection. Plaintiff is without knowledge as to what is the

factual basis for what Lincare believes to be a “form of discipline” and by

extension Plaintiff cannot speak to whether a “written warning is a form of

discipline at Lincare.” As such, this Request is denied.

RFA No. 29: Admit that receiving a documented verbal warning is a form

of discipline at Lincare.

Response: Objection. Plaintiff is without knowledge as to what is the

factual basis for what Lincare believes to be a “form of discipline” and by

extension Plaintiff cannot speak to whether a “verbal warning is a form of

discipline at Lincare.” As such, this Request is denied.

Lincare asserts that these requests for admission seek information regarding

“Plaintiff’s knowledge of the disciplinary system at Lincare and their application to the

facts of this case.” (ECF No. 135 at 9). Lincare argues that as a long-tenured employee of

Lincare, Plaintiff should be familiar with the disciplinary process at Lincare and should

be able to admit that the grounds cited in her termination letter were in fact grounds for

discipline at Lincare. (Id.). Lincare disagrees with Plaintiff’s claim that Request Nos. 7-10

ask for legal conclusions; rather, in Lincare’s view, they ask Plaintiff to apply the law to

facts, which is clearly permissible under Rule 36. (Id. at 9-10). Lincare argues that

Plaintiff did not properly assert lack of knowledge or information in answer to Request

Nos. 28 and 29, because she failed to confirm that she had made a reasonable inquiry and

the information she knows or could readily obtain was insufficient to enable her to admit

or deny the request. (Id. at 10).

In response, Plaintiff states that she made clear in her answers that she did not

have sufficient knowledge to properly respond to these requests. (ECF No. 143 at 12-13).

She indicates that Lincare made equally clear to her that all disciplinary matters were

within the exclusive province of the company’s Human Resources Department, so

Plaintiff had no involvement in that aspect of the company’s activities. (Id.).

In its reply memorandum, Lincare disputes Plaintiff’s claim that she was not

involved in the disciplinary process. Lincare asserts that Plaintiff “sought” to have another

employee disciplined, and Plaintiff gave the employee both verbal and written warnings;

consequently, Plaintiff was well aware that those were measures used in Lincare’s

disciplinary process. (ECF No. 145 at 7). According to Lincare, the steps of the process

were explained to Plaintiff by the Human Resources Department, making it disingenuous

for Plaintiff to deny having knowledge of the types of discipline used by Lincare. (Id.).

Lincare claims the requests do not ask for “abstract legal conclusions” but rather seek

admissions about “permissible disciplinary processes under the policy of a company

where Plaintiff worked for several years.” (Id. at 8). Lincare attaches evidence, including

a portion of a deposition transcript, for the Court to review.

While Lincare is correct that requests for admission may seek the application of

law to the facts of the case, requests for admission involving “pure matters of law” or legal

conclusions are improper. As explained in 7 Moore's Fed. Prac. § 36.10[8] at 36-26 (3d

ed. 2008) (footnotes omitted):

Requests for admission may relate to the application of law to fact. Such

requests should not be confused with pure requests for opinions of law,

which are not contemplated by the rule. Nor are requests seeking legal

conclusions appropriate when proceeding under Rule 36.

See also 8A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller, & Richard Marcus, Fed. Prac. and Proc. §

2255, 534 & n.8 (2d ed. 1994) (citing cases). It is not always easy to distinguish between

a request seeking the application of facts to law and one seeking a legal conclusion, Gross

v. Guzman, No. 11-23028-CIV, 2013 WL 12091159, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2013)

(“Admittedly, the distinction between a request that impermissibly seeks the admission

of an issue requiring the application of the law to the facts of a case and a request that

impermissibly seeks the admission of a pure issue of law is not easy to draw.”) (internal

markings and citation omitted). However, if the request calls for a legal conclusion, even

when applied to the operative facts in the case, it is improper; particularly, when the facts

are in dispute. Lakehead Pipe Line Co, 177 F.R.D. at 458 (“Of course, requests for

admission are not to be employed as a means ‘to establish facts which are obviously in

dispute or to answer questions of law.’”) (quoting Kosta v. Connolly, 709 F. Supp. 592,

594 (E.D. Pa. 1989)).

Although Lincare represents in its motion and reply memorandum that RFA Nos.

7-10 seek admissions related to Lincare’s internal disciplinary policies, the RFA Nos. 7-10

do not make that clarification. To the contrary, the requests are vague as to who or what

is the person/body/agency judging Lincare’s employee discipline. Plaintiff assumed that

the requests were asking her to admit what discipline Lincare was legally permitted to

impose on the hypothetical employee under the circumstances stated in each request. The

undersigned finds that to be a fair assumption based upon the wording of the requests.

When employing that assumption, RFA Nos. 7-10 are improper because they ask Plaintiff

to provide opinions on what Lincare is legally permitted to do in the realm of employee

discipline. Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc., 124 Fed. Appx. 169, 172 (4th Cir.

2005) (holding that Rule 36 limits itself to “admissions regarding purely factual matters

or the application of law to facts, but not matters of law.”) (citing In re Carney,258 F.3d

415, 418 (5th Cir. 2001)). Lincare asserts that these requests ask Plaintiff to apply law to

the facts of this case, which is permitted by Rule 36. But that is incorrect, because the facts

that Plaintiff is asked to apply are not uncontroverted and established facts. To the

contrary, the parties have apparently developed a record during discovery, and they

strongly disagree over the operative facts. Requests for admission are not a vehicle to

establish disputed facts. Dowdy v. The Coleman Company, No. 1:11-cv-00045-DAK-EJF,

2012 WL 5450039, at *1 (D. Utah 2012). Moreover, they are not a device “to have [the

answering party] ratify what are, in essence, the legal conclusions that the [moving party]

ha[s] attached to the operative facts of the case.” Roe v. Bishop of Charleston, No. 2:21-

CV-00020-RMG, 2021 WL 4272595, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2021) (quoting Lakehead Pipe

Line Co., 177 F.R.D. at 458).

Lincare claims that it terminated Plaintiff’s employment for the reasons set forth

in the termination letter and that those reasons were valid. Plaintiff claims that the

reasons given in the termination letter were not valid because they were pretextual. So,

whether Lincare is “permitted” to discipline a hypothetical employee on those grounds

(or whether such discipline is legal) depends on key facts that are in dispute in this action.

As the court explained in Lakehead Pipe Line Co., “[t]he quintessential function of

Requests for Admissions is to allow for the narrowing of issues, to permit facilitation in

presenting cases to the factfinder and, at a minimum, to provide notification as to those

facts, or opinions, that remain in dispute.” Id. at 457-58. Because these requests do not

serve to narrow the issues and primarily seek Plaintiff’s ratification of the legality of

Lincare’s discipline based upon a fact scenario, which is vigorously disputed by the

parties, the motion is DENIED as to RFA Nos. 7-10.

With regard to RFA Nos. 28 and 29, these requests do not ask for a legal

conclusion. Instead, they simply test Plaintiff’s knowledge regarding Lincare’s

disciplinary process. Plaintiff’s answers to these requests are confusing. She states in the

answers that she lacks sufficient knowledge and thus cannot speak to whether written and

verbal warnings are forms of discipline used by Lincare, but then she denies both requests

in their entirety. In her memorandum, she reiterates that she lacks the knowledge to

admit these requests. (ECF No. 143 at 13).

Lincare is correct. If Plaintiff is asserting that she is unable to admit or deny the

requests because of a lack of knowledge or information, then she must explicitly state that

she has made a reasonable inquiry and the information she knows or can readily obtain

is insufficient to enable her to admit or deny the request. Plaintiff has failed to do this.

Whether or not Lincare was consistent in how it disciplined employees is not the question.

The requests simply ask if Lincare’s disciplinary process included written warnings and

documented verbal warnings as forms of discipline. If Plaintiff knows the answers, she

should unequivocally admit or deny the requests. If she does not, she should provide an

explanation of the steps she took to discover the answers and state why the information

is insufficient for her to provide a truthful admission or denial. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co.

v. Johnson, 272 F.R.D. 177, 183-84 (S.D.W. Va. 2010) (“Rule 36 requires the responding

party to make a reasonable inquiry, a reasonable effort, to secure information that is

readily obtainable from persons and documents within the responding party's relative

control and to state fully those efforts.”). However, to say that she does not have sufficient

information to answer the requests and then proceed to deny them is inconsistent and

confusing. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED as to RFA Nos. 28 and 29. Plaintiff is

ORDERED to serve an amended answer to RFA Nos. 28 and 29 within ten (40) days

of the date of this Order.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Order to counsel of record.

ENTERED: August 24, 2023

Uni ates Magistrate Judge

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