Hood v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

STEPHEN HOOD, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:22-cv-00265

CHRISTINA FARMER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court are two motions for summary judgment—one filed by

each remaining defendant in this case. [ECF No. 68 (Defendant Jeanette Frame);

ECF No. 70 (Defendant Christina Farmer)]. Because the motions raise substantially

similar arguments in favor of summary judgment, I will dispose of them together. For

reasons stated herein, the motions are GRANTED in part.

I. Background

A. Relevant Facts

Plaintiffs Mary and Stephen Hood are the biological grandparents, and now

adoptive parents, of the minor children J.H. and M.D. [ECF No. 1, ¶ 5]. This action

arises out of the allegedly unlawful removal of the minors from Plaintiffs’ custody for

several months in late 2020 and early 2021, following the birth of M.D.

Two years prior, on April 5, 2018, J.H. was born to Ms. Hood’s daughter,

Jessica Smith, who has a history of substance abuse. [ECF No. 70-1, at 12–18].1

When Ms. Smith was four months pregnant with J.H., she moved in with the Hoods,

who began taking her three times per week to receive treatment for her substance

use. [ECF No. 72-1, at 64:2–65:17]. When J.H. was born with controlled substances

in her system, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) was notified and investigated the

possible abuse and neglect of J.H. [ECF No. 70-1, at 14]. CPS made a substantiated

finding of maltreatment against Ms. Smith but ultimately concluded that J.H. could

safely remain in the home with her mother and grandparents. at 12–18.

Shortly after J.H. was born with controlled substances in her system, Ms.

Smith was kicked out of her treatment program. [ECF No. 72-1, at 69:12–17]. In May

2019, Ms. Smith was arrested for hitting Ms. Hood, who subsequently took out a

domestic violence petition against Ms. Smith. at 21:6–22:18. After her arrest, Ms.

Smith never returned to living with the Hoods, who became J.H.’s legal guardians in

September 2019. at 71:4–6, 73:11–75:21. At the time, CPS was not notified of the

domestic violence petition, the guardianship, or Ms. Smith’s resumed drug use. at

74:8–21.

1 The exhibits included with Defendant Farmer’s Motion for Summary Judgment were filed as a single

attachment and thus are not separately paginated. [ECF No. 70-1]. When citing to depositions,

the court uses the page numbers shown on the top-right corner of the reporter’s transcript. For all

other citations to the record, the court uses the page numbers assigned by the federal judiciary’s Case

Management/Electronic Case File system.

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M.D. was born on August 25, 2020. Upon admission for delivery, Ms. Smith

tested positive for controlled substances, and Fayette County CPS was notified of

possible abuse and neglect. [ECF No. 70-1, at 3–4]. The next day, Defendant Farmer,

a CPS worker, met with Ms. Smith at the hospital to conduct an interview. at 4.

During that interview, Ms. Smith admitted to continued substance abuse, including

in the Hoods’ home. at 21–22. Following the interview, CPS implemented a

temporary protection plan pursuant to which M.D. was placed with Ms. Smith’s

brother, Dylan Smith. at 4; [ECF No. 72-1, at 77:9–79:12]. While Ms. Smith noted

that J.H. was under guardianship with her mother, Ms. Hood, she “was unable to

identify whether or not this guardianship had taken place before a family court

judge.” at 22. Defendant Farmer conducted a search via FACTS—a computer

system used at the time by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human

Resources (“DHHR”) to document abuse and neglect findings—but did not locate any

custody or guardianship orders regarding J.H. [ECF No. 72-5, at 15:12–19]. On

August 31, 2020, Defendant Farmer reported her findings to Assistant Prosecuting

Attorney William Burdick. [ECF No. 70-1, at 20–23].

On September 9, 2020, Prosecutor Burdick filed a Petition to Institute Child

Abuse and Neglect Proceedings (the “Petition”) in the Circuit Court of Fayette

County, West Virginia. at 25–30. The Petition included both J.H. and M.D. but

did not name Plaintiffs as adult respondents. It did state: “The adult respondent

mother alleges [J.H.] is in a legal guardianship with the child’s maternal

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grandmother. However, the Department is unable to locate any legal document

stating the same.” at 15 n.1. Later that day, the Circuit Court granted the Petition

and entered an initial order transferring custody of both J.H. and M.D. to DHHR.

at 32–33.

That evening, Defendant Farmer and her supervisor, Defendant Frame,

effectuated the removal of J.H. and M.D. Earlier that day, Ms. Hood had visited M.D.

at Mr. Smith’s residence and took him to a medical clinic after noticing he was

suffering from thrush. [ECF No. 72-1, at 80:1–81:11]. While at the appointment, Ms.

Hood received a telephone call from Defendant Farmer, who asked her to bring the

children to the DHHR office because “she needed to physically look at them.” at

47:11–18. When the Hoods arrived, Defendants informed them that DHHR was

taking both children. at 49:12. The parties offer varying accounts of their

interactions at the DHHR office, but it is undisputed that the Hoods attempted to

prove their guardianship over J.H., and that Defendants tried to explain that the

guardianship could not prevent the removal. at 49:13–50:24; [ECF No. 73-2,

at 35:5–20]. Specifically, Defendants explained that they “didn’t have the power to

leave these children with [the Hoods]” because “the decision was already made by a

circuit judge.” [ECF No. 72-2, at 54:16–55:3]. Defendants also informed the Hoods

that their prior history—a CPS substantiation against Ms. Hood and Mr. Hood’s

arrest, both in the late 1990s—precluded them from keeping the children at that

time. at 54:5–55:11; [ECF No. 72-1, at 96:20–97:6].

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Ms. Hood, who had previously been unaware of her own CPS history, promptly

petitioned the DHHR Board of Review to reverse her prior substantiation. [ECF No.

70-1, at 106–11; ECF No. 72-1, at 140:23]. The Board agreed with Ms. Hood that the

substantiation had been made in error. [ECF No. 70-1, at 107–110]. Once the

substantiation was reversed, Prosecutor Burdick filed an Amended Petition in the

Fayette County Circuit Court. [ECF No. 1-3]. The Amended Petition named Plaintiffs

as adult respondents and recognized their legal guardianship of J.H., but still

requested that J.H. and M.D. be removed from Plaintiffs’ care and remain in DHHR’s

custody. Plaintiffs, by counsel, moved to dismiss the Amended Petition. [ECF No.

1-4]. Following a motions hearing on February 12, 2021, the Circuit Court entered an

order restoring legal and physical custody of J.H. to Plaintiffs and granting them

physical custody of M.D.

On July 3, 2021, Plaintiffs were granted legal guardianship over M.D. [ECF

No. 1, ¶ 69]. They legally adopted both J.H. and M.D. in February 2022. [ECF No. 72-

1, at 182:5–10].

B. Procedural History

In their Complaint, filed June 23, 2022, the Hoods initially brought thirteen

claims on behalf of J.H. and M.D. against five defendants. [ECF No. 1]. Defendant

Necco, LLC, was voluntarily dismissed from this action on August 5, 2022. [ECF No.

18]. Defendants DHHR and William Belcher each filed a motion to dismiss the claims

against them. [ECF Nos. 11, 13]. I granted DHHR’s motion in full, terminating the

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Department as a defendant. [ECF No. 45]. I granted Mr. Belcher’s motion in part,

[ECF No. 53], and Plaintiffs subsequently agreed to dismiss the remaining claims

against him, [ECF No. 63]. Defendants Farmer and Frame now move for summary

judgment on the ten claims still pending in this case: unreasonable seizure in

violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 (Count I); conspiracy to commit

unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 (Count II);

deprivation of substantive due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

under § 1983 (Count III); conspiracy to deprive of substantive due process in violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment under § 1983 (Count IV); negligence (Count V); gross

negligence (Count VI); negligence (Count VII); intentional infliction of

emotional distress (Count VIII); abuse of process (Count IX); and civil conspiracy

(Count X).

Before beginning the summary judgment analysis, I find it prudent to identify

the relevant facts and describe their evolution over the course of this litigation. In the

court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order ruling on Mr. Belcher’s motion to dismiss, I

reviewed the applicable immunity doctrines and explained the heavy burden they

create for plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on certain government actors. [ECF

No. 53]. Given that heavy burden, I found that Plaintiffs failed to state any viable

claim against Mr. Belcher on behalf of M.D., because the Hoods were not yet his legal

guardians and there was probable cause to suspect neglect by his biological mother,

Ms. Smith. With respect to J.H., however, I found it plausible that Plaintiffs could

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meet their burden as to some claims. In reaching that determination, I emphasized

two critical allegations, which I was required to accept as true: first, that J.H. and

M.D. were taken from the Hoods on September 7th, prior to entry of the September

9th Circuit Court order transferring custody to DHHR; and second, that Defendants

had no reason to suspect the plaintiffs of abuse or neglect. , at 13 (“Here,

the removal, , deprived J.H. of her clearly established Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by severing custody from her legal guardians without

a court order or any basis to suspect abuse by Plaintiffs.” (emphasis added) (citing

, 282 F. Supp. 2d 439, 464 (E.D. Va.

2003))).

The summary judgment record supports neither allegation. As Plaintiffs now

acknowledge, J.H. and M.D. were removed from the Hoods’ care on September 9,

2020. [ECF No. 75-1, at 43:1–4, 46:13–21]. The removal occurred in the evening,

the Circuit Court entered an initial removal order that afternoon. at 43:3–4.

Thus, a valid court order was in place at the time of the minors’ removal.

It is similarly undisputed that Ms. Smith accused Ms. Hood of drug use and

violence, and that Ms. Hood’s CPS history included a substantiation at the time. [ECF

No. 72-1, at 36:6–45:5]. Although that substantiation has since been reversed, and

Ms. Smith’s allegations may lack evidentiary support, there is no dispute that

Defendants had reason—however unfounded in hindsight—to suspect that J.H. and

M.D. could not safely be cared for by the Hoods.

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As these truths have come to light, Plaintiffs now refocus their arguments on

Defendants’ lack of diligence in verifying the existence of their guardianship over

J.H., and in securing kinship placements for J.H. and M.D. during their temporary

removal. But these alleged failures are similarly unsupported by the evidence and, in

any event, do not rise to the level of gross misconduct necessary to overcome the

defendants’ immunities. Thus, as detailed more fully below, the factual revelations

just described are ultimately fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims.

II. Legal Standard

To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “Facts are ‘material’ when they

might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue’ exists when the evidence

would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

, 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir.

2010). The moving party may meet its burden of showing that no genuine issue of

material fact exists by use of “depositions, answers to interrogatories, answers to

requests for admission, and various documents submitted under request for

production.” , 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). In

considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the evidence

and determine the truth of the matter.” , 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986). Rather, the court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying

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facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

., 475 U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986).

Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden

of proof on an essential element of their case and does not make, after adequate time

for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. ,

477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The nonmoving party must offer some “concrete

evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in [their] favor” and

must “set forth specific facts” that offer more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” in

support of their position. , 477 U.S. at 252, 256. Conclusory allegations or

unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of a

summary judgment motion. , 818 F.2d 1126, 1128

(4th Cir. 1987).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs assert a combination of federal constitutional claims and state tort

claims. Because the state and federal claims are governed by different immunity

doctrines and theories of liability, I address each set of claims separately, beginning

with those arising under federal law.

A. Federal Claims

In Counts I through IV, Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, including conspiracies to

commit the same. To ultimately succeed on any of their claims, Plaintiffs must show

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that Defendants violated a federal right, and, because both defendants assert the

affirmative defense of qualified immunity, that “the right was clearly established at

the time the violation occurred such that a reasonable person would have known that

[their] conduct was unconstitutional.” , 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015).

i. Fourth Amendment (Count I)

In Count I, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants violated the minors’ Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs

allege that “J.H. and M.D. were wrongfully detained . . . without authority,

jurisdiction, or probable cause,” and that they “were later seized . . . pursuant to legal

process without probable cause and under false pretenses.” [ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 86–87].

Plaintiffs now “acknowledge that a Court Order for the seizure of J.H. was in place

at the time she was taken from the Plaintiffs.” [ECF No. 72, at 10]. Nevertheless, they

insist their Fourth Amendment claim remains viable on the basis that “Defendant

Farmer utterly failed to conduct a proper investigation into the Guardianship Order

and the false allegations made against Mary Hood by Jessica Smith.”

Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims are “addressed according to a

‘reasonableness standard.’” , 105 F. Supp. 3d 592, 598 (W.D. Va.

2015). A seizure is reasonable—and therefore constitutional—if “(1) it is pursuant to

a court order; (2) it is supported by probable cause; or (3) it is justified by exigent

circumstances, meaning that state officers ‘have reason to believe that life or limb is

in immediate jeopardy.’” , 282 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (quoting

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, 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)). Here, Plaintiffs’ claim fails because the

seizure of the minors was reasonable.

As suggested in my prior Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendants cannot

be held liable for the removal of M.D., “who was not yet under Plaintiffs’ legal

guardianship at the time of removal, . . . because there was probable cause to suspect

neglect by M.D.’s biological mother.” [ECF No. 53, at 14]. In light of factual

developments, probable cause also existed to suspect J.H.’s caregivers of abuse or

neglect. The minors’ biological mother, Ms. Smith, admitted to CPS that she used

drugs in the Hoods’ home. [ECF No. 70-1, at 4]. Ms. Smith also “has had open CPS

cases while living in Mary Hood’s home.” at 51:4–8. Furthermore, Ms. Hood’s own

CPS history included a maltreatment substantiation from when Ms. Smith was a

child, [ECF No. 72-1, at 95:20–97:2; ECF No. 72-5, at 15:17–19], and Mr. Hood was

previously arrested on drug-related charges, [ECF No. 72-1, at 61:8–21]. Although

the maltreatment finding against Ms. Hood has since been reversed, probable cause

depends on the circumstances “as known to” the official at the time they effected the

seizure. , 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting

, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)). It is similarly immaterial that Ms. Hood’s

substantiation and Mr. Hood’s arrest “did not prevent the Family Court of Kanawha

County from appointing [Plaintiffs] as J.H.’s guardian[s].” [ECF No. 1, ¶ 36]. “DHHR

was permitted, in its discretion, to re-evaluate the appropriateness of [Plaintiffs]’

home as a placement for [J.H.] in light of its ongoing investigation into [her] best

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interests.” , No. 17-1087, 2018 WL

6040310, at *5 (W. Va. Nov. 19, 2018). This is especially true where, as here, DHHR

“wouldn’t have had any reason to know” about the guardianship prior to this incident.

[ECF No. 72-1, at 74:8–21 (Ms. Hood testifying that she never contacted CPS

regarding the guardianship, the domestic violence petition against Ms. Smith, or Ms.

Smith’s resumed drug use)].

Moreover, Defendants Farmer and Frame acted pursuant to a court order

when they effected the seizure of J.H. and M.D. [ECF No. 75-1, at 43:1–4, 46:13–21].

Acknowledging this fact, Plaintiffs now appear to challenge the validity of the court

order based on perceived failures in the investigation that ultimately led to the

minors’ removal. [ECF No. 72, at 10 (arguing the removal order “[d]oes [n]ot

[t]rump” the guardianship order)]. Namely, Plaintiffs take issue with Defendant

Farmer’s diligence, or lack thereof, in confirming the Hoods’ guardianship over J.H.

and in verifying the safety concerns about the Hoods. But even if Ms. Farmer could

have taken greater care, the “intervening acts of other participants,” such as an

exercise of prosecutorial discretion, will “insulate [her] from liability” unless she, for

example, “lied to or misled the prosecutor.” , 759 F.3d 343, 357 (4th

Cir. 2014) (quoting , 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012)). At least

two independent intermediaries—the prosecutor and the circuit court judge—ratified

Defendant Farmer’s investigative findings and concurred in her recommendation

that a petition was warranted. [ECF No. 72-2, at 56:19–57:7 (Defendant Frame

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explaining that it is “ultimately the prosecutor’s decision whether to file the petition”

and “then ultimately it’s the judge who makes the decision whether to enter an order

directing DHHR to take custody of the children”)]. A review of Ms. Farmer’s report to

Prosecutor Burdick reveals no material falsehoods or omissions. She informed him

that Ms. Smith indicated that J.H. “resides with” and “is in a guardianship with the

paternal [sic] grandmother, Mary Hood,” but that Ms. Smith “was unable to identify

whether or not this guardianship had taken place before a family court judge.” [ECF

No. 70-1, at 21–22]. Defendant Farmer further noted Ms. Smith’s “ongoing substance

abuse issues, as evidenced by continued infant exposure to drugs, as well as CPS

involvement, in which occurred in the paternal [sic] grandmother’s home, Mary

Hood.” at 22. Thus, Ms. Farmer communicated the relevant information to the

prosecutor, who independently decided to draft and file a petition for removal. If the

Petition itself or other aspects of the proceedings involved errors that delegitimize

the court-ordered removal, those errors were not caused by Defendants Farmer or

Frame.

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiffs’ claim derives from “allow[ing] [the]

Petition to be filed with incomplete and patently false information,” [ECF No. 72, at

10], Defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity,

, 884 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that social workers filing a

removal petition acted in a “prosecutorial, rather than an investigative or ‘policing’

capacity” and therefore “must be afforded absolute immunity from any liability

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arising from this conduct”). Accordingly, both defendants are entitled to summary

judgment on Count I.

ii. Fourteenth Amendment (Count III)

In connection with their substantive due process claim, Plaintiffs assert that

Defendants “invad[ed] their custodial, familial, and/or guardianship rights.” [ECF

No. 1, ¶ 117]. According to Plaintiffs, “Defendants interfered with their rights with

respect to J.H. by ignoring and failing to verify the Guardianship Order, and by

failing to perform any investigation into the well-being of J.H., who was legally in the

custody of Mary Hood.” [ECF No. 72, at 11].

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim “is a veiled

Fourth Amendment claim” and therefore substantive due process analysis would be

inappropriate in this case. “[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific

constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must

be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the

rubric of substantive due process.” , 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7

(1997) (discussing , 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)). Although Plaintiffs’

briefing is somewhat unclear, it does appear that their constitutional claims arise

solely out of the state’s seizure of J.H. and M.D. , [ECF No. 73, at 15

(summarizing the Fourteenth Amendment claim “in one sentence” as “using a

person’s position to ignore a Guardianship Order and remove a child from her home

with absolutely no evidence of abuse or neglect and without conducting any

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meaningful investigation”)]. As discussed above, that seizure was reasonable and

therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiffs do assert, in a section header, that “Count III Is Not A Fourth

Amendment Claim.” [ECF No. 72, at 11]. But nowhere in that section—or anywhere

else in their briefing—do they address how the claims differ. Regardless, to the extent

that Plaintiffs’ claims are distinct, they also fail to establish a substantive due process

violation.

“The touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual against

arbitrary action of government.” , 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (citing

, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889)). Where, as here, objectionable action

by a member of the executive branch is alleged, “only the most egregious official

conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’”

, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting , 503 U.S. 115,

129 (1992)). “Generally, an act must ‘shock the conscience’ in order to constitute a

violation of substantive due process.” , 282 F. Supp. 2d at 459–60 (citing

, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990)). “In the area of child

protection, ‘removal of a child in an emergency action from the custody of a parent

suspected of abusing him, ’ does not shock

the conscience.” at 460 (citing , 901 F.2d at 391). Here, the minors were

taken pursuant to a court order issued upon a finding of “imminent danger to the

physical well-being of the children.” [ECF No. 70-1, at 32]. As discussed above,

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Defendants had reason to believe that Plaintiffs could not provide a safe environment

for the minors, and they communicated all relevant information to the prosecutor.

Nothing Defendants did or said could reasonably be found to “shock the conscience.”

Thus, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim must be dismissed.

iii. Conspiracy (Counts II and IV)

In Counts II and IV, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to commit the

constitutional violations asserted in Counts I and III. To establish a civil conspiracy

under § 1983, Plaintiffs must present evidence that Defendants “acted jointly in

concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy which

resulted in [Plaintiffs]’ deprivation of a constitutional right.”

, 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing , 983 F.2d 570,

577 (4th Cir. 1992)). Because I have determined that the defendants’ actions in this

case did not result in the “deprivation of a constitutional right,” Plaintiffs’ federal

conspiracy claims must be dismissed. , 628 F.3d 140,

150 (4th Cir. 2010).

B. State Claims

Having dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3) (authorizing district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

after the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”).

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In making this discretionary determination, the court considers factors such

as “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying federal

policy, comity, or considerations of judicial economy.” , 430 F. Supp.

3d 146, 168 (N.D. W. Va. 2019) (quoting , 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th

Cir. 1995)); , 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)

(“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the

balance of factors . . . point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state-law claims.”).

Fairness concerns any prejudice to the parties. , 430 F. Supp. 3d at 169

(citing , 844 F. Supp. 258, 261 (E.D.N.C.

1993)). Under West Virginia law, for one year from the date of an order dismissing

an action, a party may re-file an action involuntarily dismissed for any reason not

based on the merits. (citing W. Va. Code § 55-2-18). Furthermore, the statute of

limitations for any claim over which this court had supplemental jurisdiction is tolled

while the case has been pending and for thirty days after the claim is dismissed.

, 415 F. Supp. 3d 20, 29 (D.D.C. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(d)). Thus, a dismissal without prejudice, although perhaps an inconvenience,

is not unfair. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of dismissing Plaintiffs’

state law claims.

As to the second and third factors, no underlying federal policy weighs in favor

of the court retaining jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. Indeed, the tort

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claims in this case involve issues of family law and state agency administration which

are “at the heart of state sovereignty.” , 430 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (quoting

, 396 F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]hat

which must be respected through ‘comity’ is identical to the traditional ‘areas of

paramount state concern,’ and also the same as the ‘important state interests’ test.”)).

The remaining claims all arise out of a petition and removal order filed in West

Virginia state court. It is therefore “clearly in the state court’s interest to interpret

and, if necessary, enforce its earlier rulings.” Thus, the second and third factors

weigh heavily in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction here.

Finally, because this case is in the summary judgment phase, no overriding

interest of judicial economy will be served by dismissing the claims. This factor thus

weighs in favor of retaining jurisdiction; “standing alone, however, it does not

outweigh the compelling fact that all remaining claims . . . involve quintessentially

state law causes of action.”

Given that all federal claims have been dismissed, the court concludes that the

balance of factors weighs strongly in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction over

the remaining state law claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), Counts V, VI, VII,

VIII, IX, and X will be dismissed without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment [ECF

Nos. 68, 70] are GRANTED in part. The Motions are GRANTED as to Counts I, II,

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III, and IV, which are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. The remaining state law

claims set forth in Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X are DISMISSED without

prejudice.

The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record

and any unrepresented party.

ENTER: July 28, 2023

G 6G

pe STATES D{STRICT JUDGE

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