The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
JEREMY SANGER,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:23-cv-00069
BRANDON DODRILL, et al.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document 8), the Defendants’
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss (Document 9), the Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Document 15), the Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s
Response to Their Motion to Dismiss (Document 16), all attached exhibits, and the Plaintiff’s
Complaint (Document 1). The Court has also reviewed the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Accept
Plaintiff’s Previously Filed Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Beyond the Standard Time
Frame Contemplated by the Local Rule 17.1(a)(7) (Document 17). For the reasons stated herein,
the Court finds that the motion to dismiss should be granted.
As an initial matter, the Court accepts the Plaintiff’s response, filed one day after the
applicable deadline. Plaintiff’s counsel explains that the deadline was inadvertently calendared
as March 29, 2023, rather than March 28, due to a clerical error. Although following deadlines is
important to ensure the efficient processing of court cases and avoid prejudice, a minor error of
this nature does not warrant striking the response.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Plaintiff, Jeremy Sanger, initiated this action with the Complaint (Document 1), filed
on January 27, 2023. He named as Defendants Brandon Dodrill and Tyler Hogan, both officers
in the Oak Hill Police Department, and the City of Oak Hill, West Virginia.
Defendant Dodrill was on patrol in Oak Hill on September 15, 2021. He observed Mr.
Sanger riding a black and orange motorcycle on Jones Avenue. According to his report, Mr.
Sanger was driving erratically, and at one point drove onto the sidewalk. Officer Dodrill
attempted to stop Mr. Sanger by activating his emergency lights. Mr. Sanger did not pull over,
and Officer Dodrill engaged in a high speed chase, reaching speeds in excess of 100 miles per
hour. Officer Dodrill inaccurately described Mr. Sanger as a black male driver on a black sport
bike. Mr. Sanger passed several vehicles, at times crossing double yellow lines. Officer Dodrill
observed him nearly crash at one point. He continued the pursuit for approximately seven miles,
even after dispatch for the Oak Hill Police Department ordered him to terminate the pursuit. The
pursuit ended only after Mr. Sanger crashed his motorcycle into a ditch at the side of WV-61.
Officer Dodrill stopped his patrol car at the wreck site, where Mr. Sanger was lying
unconscious in a ditch several feet away from the road. He called for EMS, then “improperly cut
and removed Mr. Sanger’s motorcycle helmet,” and, with the help of Defendant Hogan and two
bystanders, “dragged the unconscious Mr. Sanger, without any spinal immobilization, closer to the
edge of the roadway and rolled him onto his back.” (Compl. at ¶ 14.) Mr. Sanger regained
consciousness and called for help, stating that his neck hurt. He indicated that he did not feel
anything other than pain in his neck, “despite having severe and obvious injuries to his left arm
and left leg.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) The force used against Mr. Sanger in dragging him out of the ditch
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caused and/or exacerbated his injuries. Mr. Sanger suffered severe, permanent injuries including
a brain injury and a leg injury.
Officer Dodrill searched Mr. Sanger’s wallet before EMS arrived, then Defendants Dodrill
and Hogan searched his backpack, toiletry bag, and wallet while Mr. Sanger was being loaded into
an ambulance. Officer Dodrill told fellow officers that Mr. Sanger had been indicted that day.1
The Plaintiff suggests that the pursuit was motivated by the apparent mistaken identity.
The City of Oak Hill has a policy requiring officers to end pursuits if the risk to the safety
of the officer or others outweighs the danger if the suspect is not apprehended. The policy also
provides that officers are accountable for the manner in which they operate their police vehicles.
The Plaintiff alleges that the City of Oak Hill provided inadequate hiring, training, supervision,
and discipline of officers, including failing to require in-service training or retraining when officers
“were known to have engaged in misconduct” and failing to discourage repeat constitutional
violations. (Compl. at ¶ 52.) Further, the City failed to “properly interview, evaluate, and screen
Defendants Dodrill and Hogan prior to hiring,” failed to provide proper training, including training
related to vehicular pursuit and administering aid to injured persons, failed to properly monitor
and supervise Defendants Dodrill and Hogan, negligently retained Defendants Dodrill and Hogan,
failed to adopt appropriate policies, and implemented customs, policies, and procedures that
condoned, encouraged, or demonstrated indifference to the use of excessive force. (Id. at ¶ 56.)
The Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: Count One: Gross Negligence/Reckless
Disregard in Operation of a Motor Vehicle, as to Defendants Dodrill and City of Oak Hill; Count
1 The Plaintiff alleges that Officer Dodrill was mistaken in indicating that he had been indicted. In his response
brief, he concedes that he was indicted that day on two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, though he was unaware of the indictment at the time.
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Two: Deprivation of Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as to Defendant Dodrill; Count
Three: Assault and Battery, as to Defendant Dodrill; Count Four: Reckless Conduct in Violation
of Clearly Established Laws, as to the City of Oak Hill; Count Five: Deprivation of Rights in
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as to Defendant Hogan; and Count Six: Deprivation of Rights in
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as to all Defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint or
pleading. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521
F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Additionally, allegations “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(d)(1). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a complaint must contain “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, “a complaint [will not] suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The Court must also “draw[ ] all reasonable factual
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inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
244 (4th Cir. 1999). However, statements of bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Furthermore,
the court need not “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice . . . [because courts] ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In other words, this “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate more than ‘a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Francis,
588 F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A plaintiff must, using the complaint,
“articulate facts, when accepted as true, that ‘show’ that the plaintiff has stated a claim entitling
him to relief.” Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Determining
whether a complaint states [on its face] a plausible claim for relief [which can survive a motion to
dismiss] will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
DISCUSSION
The Defendants argue that the state law claims contained in Counts One, Three, and Four
are barred by W.Va. Code § 55-7-13d(c) because the damages arose out of Mr. Sanger’s felony
fleeing. They additionally argue that Count One must be dismissed against the City of Oak Hill,
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because state law provides that political subdivisions are immune from claims of negligence
resulting from the method of providing police or law enforcement protection. They also contend
that the Plaintiff failed to state a Monell claim against the City of Oak Hill in Count Six because
the complaint does not contain sufficient allegations to establish a policy or custom of the City led
to the alleged damages. The Defendants further argue that the § 1983 claims are not viable
because the Plaintiff was not seized by the Defendants and the Defendants did not use force on the
Plaintiff. They cite Supreme Court precedent suggesting that there is no seizure when a suspect
crashes during a police chase. The Defendants next contend that the Count Five bystander
liability claim as to Defendant Hogan must be dismissed because the complaint does not contain
factual allegations that the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated or that Officer Hogan
observed any such violation. They argue that the complaint as a whole relies on conclusory
allegations and cannot satisfy the applicable pleading standard. Furthermore, they assert that they
are entitled to qualified immunity for claims brought pursuant to § 1983, noting that a magistrate
found probable cause that the Plaintiff had committed the offense of fleeing. Finally, they
contend that the Plaintiff “was not in custody and, therefore, had no right to any medical care
contemplated under the 4th, 8th, or 14th Amendments.” (Def.s’ Reply at 9.)
The Plaintiff emphasizes that Officer Dodrill “initiated and continued a high-speed chase
of a motorcyclist who was hot-rodding down the street of the City of Oak Hill,” in violation of
policy and a specific directive to end the pursuit. (Resp. at 8.) He argues that W. Va. Code §55-
7-13d does not apply because he has not been convicted of a felony. The Plaintiff withdraws
Count One as to the City of Oak Hill but argues that his claim in Count Four as to Oak Hill is
viable because it contains sufficient allegations that the City of Oak Hill permitted unconstitutional
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behavior. The Plaintiff further argues that the high speed chase, terminating with his crash,
constitutes a seizure. He argues that the bystander liability claim as to Defendant Hogan is clearly
pled, based on her decision to assist, rather than prevent, Defendant Dodrill in moving the Plaintiff.
In addition, the Plaintiff argues that Defendants Dodrill and Hogan are not entitled to qualified
immunity because their actions were not reasonable and the rights at issue were clearly established.
A. State Law Claims
West Virginia law provides that a person may not recover damages in a civil action if “such
damages arise out of the person’s commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from
the commission of a felony; and that the person’s damages were suffered as a proximate result of
the commission…of a felony.” W. Va. Code § 55-7-13d(c). “The burden of alleging and
proving the defense set forth in subsection (c) of this section shall be upon the person who seeks
to assert such a defense.” Id. at § 55-7-13d(d). The felony invoked by the Defendants is felony
fleeing in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-5-17(f). That statute provides as follows:
A person who intentionally flees or attempts to flee in a vehicle from
a law-enforcement officer, probation officer, or parole officer acting
in his or her official capacity after the officer has given a clear visual
or audible signal directing the person to stop, and who operates the
vehicle in a manner showing a reckless indifference to the safety of
others, is guilty of a felony.
W. Va. Code § 61-5-17(f).
The Plaintiff relies in part on a prior decision from this district, in which Judge Goodwin
explained that “While Plaintiff has been charged with this offense, there has been no conviction.
And it is Defendants’ burden to prove that Plaintiff was committing a felony and that the felony
was the cause of his injuries.” Means v. Peterson, No. 2:20-CV-00561, 2020 WL 6702036, at *3
(S.D.W. Va. Nov. 13, 2020) (Goodwin, J.) In Means, the plaintiff alleged that the officer did not
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activate his lights or siren to initiate a traffic stop. Here, the facts establishing the defense
pursuant to § 55-7-13d(c) are apparent from the face of the complaint:2 Mr. Sanger alleges that
“Defendant Dodrill activated his emergency lights and gave chase to Mr. Sanger” after observing
him driving recklessly. (Compl. at ¶ 9.) He alleges that the chase reached speeds in excess of
100 miles per hour, that Mr. Sanger nearly lost control on multiple occasions prior to his crash,
that he passed multiple vehicles, including in curves and across double yellow lines, and that there
was a “clear danger presented to Mr. Sanger and the public” as a result of the high-speed chase.
(Id. at ¶ 11.)
It is rare for dismissal to be appropriate on a defense for which the defendant bears the
burden of proof, but in this case, there is no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged that would
fail to establish the applicability of § 55-7-13d(c). The core elements of felony fleeing are integral
to Mr. Sanger’s complaint. He claims that he crashed his motorcycle because Defendant Dodrill
engaged in a pursuit when he fled a traffic stop, and that pursuit violated police department policy
because it was dangerous. The facts alleged in the complaint, in contrast to Means, establish that
Mr. Sanger intentionally fled and operated his motorcycle in a manner showing a reckless
indifference to the safety of others during his flight. The complaint also establishes that the crash
and Mr. Sanger’s injuries were proximately caused by his flight and Officer Dodrill’s pursuit.
Therefore, the Court finds that state law claims are barred by W. Va. Code §55-7-13d(c), and
Counts One, Three, and Four must be dismissed to the extent they are brought under state law.
2 The Defendants argued that the Court should rely on the probable cause finding and arrest warrant for felony fleeing.
A magistrate’s issuance of an arrest warrant cannot establish the underlying facts for purposes of a motion to dismiss.
Therefore, the Court has given consideration only to the facts as alleged in the complaint.
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B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
The Defendants assert qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense
intended to shield public officials from civil suits arising out of their performance of job-related
duties. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009). Defendants asserting a
qualified immunity defense first bear the burden of “demonstrating that the conduct of which the
plaintiff complains falls within the scope of the defendant’s duties.” In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582,
594 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted.) The defense of qualified immunity is
available unless the official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within
his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (internal emphases omitted). Officials are
protected even if they make reasonable mistakes of fact or law, so long as they do not violate a
clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231–32. “A
constitutional right is ‘clearly established’ when its contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Cooper v. Sheehan, 735 F.3d
153, 158 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The reasonableness analysis is objective. Courts must “examine[] only the actions at issue
and measure[] them against what a reasonable police officer would do under the circumstances,”
but the inquiry “must be filtered through the lens of the officer’s perceptions at the time of the
incident.” Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1994). “[T]he officer's subjective
state of mind is not relevant to the qualified immunity inquiry but his perceptions of the objective
facts of the incident in question are.” Id. at 173.
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The Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to unreasonable seizure when Defendant Dodrill
engaged in a high speed pursuit that ended with his motorcycle crash, and to unreasonable seizure,
unlawful detention, excessive force, battery, improper medical treatment, and negligence when
Defendant Dodrill, assisted and observed by Defendant Hogan, pulled him from a ditch
immediately after the crash.
The Supreme Court has provided detailed analysis of the circumstances in which a Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs, holding that a seizure occurs “only when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. Cnty. of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original). In Brower, the Court held that there was
a seizure where law enforcement erected a roadblock crossing both lanes of a highway as a suspect
was involved in a car chase. Id. at 598. The suspect died when he crashed into the roadblock.
Id. The Court reasoned that a roadblock “is designed to produce a stop by physical impact if
voluntary compliance does not occur,” and thus involved a governmental termination of freedom
of movement. Id. The Court specifically contrasted the seizure in the facts presented from a
hypothetical situation in which no seizure could be found, where a fleeing motorist was stopped
by “his loss of control of his vehicle and the subsequent crash” but the “pursuing police car sought
to stop the suspect only by the show of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing
pursuit.” Id.
Mr. Sanger does not allege that the Defendants erected a blockade, made physical contact
with his motorcycle, or created the ditch into which he crashed.3 The Supreme Court has
3 The Plaintiff focuses, in part, on allegations that Defendant Dodrill’s pursuit violated both departmental policy and
a directive to end the chase. Such policies and directives may have some relevance in a § 1983 case, but policies
enacted by police departments do not define the contours of constitutional law.
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explained that the precise situation described in the complaint—a driver losing control and
crashing during a high speed chase—does not constitute a seizure. Thus, Defendant Dodrill
cannot be liable for the crash, given that there are no factual allegations that would permit a finding
that Mr. Sanger’s free movement was terminated by means intentionally applied.
There is likewise no allegation that Mr. Sanger was seized or placed in custody after the
crash. He instead alleges, on a legal theory that is not entirely clear, that Defendants Dodrill and
Hogan violated his rights “to be free from battery, improper medical treatment, and negligent
actions that caused and/or exacerbated the injuries received when the motorcycle wreck occurred.”
(Compl. at ¶ 70.) To the extent any Fourth Amendment right is implicated, the factual allegations,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, do not support a finding that the
Defendants acted in a constitutionally unreasonable manner, and their actions in attempting to
provide first aid following the crash are protected by qualified immunity.
There is no clearly established precedent establishing that officers must refrain from
moving an injured person prior to arrival of first responders with more medical training. Even if
the Plaintiff could specify a clearly established constitutional right at issue, qualified immunity
would protect their “reasonable but mistaken judgment” about how best to assist Mr. Sanger while
awaiting the arrival of EMS. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611
(2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). The Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Dodrill was aware that he had “sustained serious and life-threatening injuries.”
(Compl. at ¶ 48.) His injuries include “a massive brain injury that is expected to cause lifelong
neurological complications, and a crippling leg injury that to date has required more than ten
surgical procedures.” (Id. at ¶ 45.) After “Defendant Dodrill, with the assistance of Defendant
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Hogan and two bystanders, dragged the unconscious Mr. Sanger, without any spinal
immobilization, closer to the edge of the roadway and rolled him onto his back,” Mr. Sanger
complained of severe neck pain “despite having severe and obvious injuries to his left arm and
leg.” (Id.at ¶¶ 14–15.) The Plaintiff contends that his injuries were exacerbated because he was
moved before the arrival of EMS. The Court cannot find that the Constitution requires officers
arriving on the scene immediately after a severe motorcycle accident to guess correctly about
whether it is better to avoid moving the victim to avoid exacerbating any spinal injuries or pull
him to a safer location to assess his injuries and apply any available first aid to the “obvious and
severe” arm and leg injuries.
Because the allegations in the complaint do not state a claim as to any constitutional
violation, the federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be dismissed. The claim for
municipal liability cannot survive without an underlying constitutional violation. Without any
viable § 1983 claim as to Defendant Dodrill, the bystander liability claim as to Defendant Hogan
likewise fails.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Accept Plaintiff’s Previously Filed Response to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Beyond the Standard Time Frame Contemplated by the Local Rule 17.1(a)(7)
(Document 17) be GRANTED. The Court further ORDERS that the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Document 8) be GRANTED and that this matter be DISMISSED.
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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and to
any unrepresented party.
ENTER: June 5, 2023
IRENE C. G
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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