Lowe v. Williams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

KEITH LOWE,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-03929

RONNIE WILLIAMS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court is Plaintiff Keith Lowe’s renewed motion for judgment

as a matter of law and motion for a new trial. [ECF No. 253]. For the reasons below,

the motions are DENIED.

I. Background

This matter arises out of an incident in 2019 where Defendant Ronnie Williams

used pepper spray on Mr. Lowe, an inmate at Mount Olive Correctional Complex

(“MOCC”). Mr. Lowe, litigating pro se, claimed that Mr. Williams violated his right

to be free from excessive force under the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that Mr. Williams battered him. After a two-

day trial, the jury unanimously found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr.

Williams was entitled to the protection of qualified immunity with respect to Mr.

Lowe’s claims, insulating Mr. Williams from liability. [ECF Nos. 245, 246, 247].

Mr. Lowe presently argues that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

and a new trial due to the following alleged errors at the trial: 1) excluding depositions

of Steve Caudill and other MOCC officers that would have supported “an unwritten

practice of opening inmates[’] cell doors to fight them[;]” 2) “den[ying] [Mr. Lowe’s]

[j]ury instruction[;]” 3) prejudicing Mr. Lowe by requiring him to wear restraints

during the trial; 4) “not granting [Mr. Lowe] judgment as a matter of law[;]” and 5)

admitting evidence that was precluded by motions in limine. [ECF No. 253, at 1–2].

In response, Mr. Williams argues: 1) the depositions Mr. Lowe sought to admit

were not taken in this matter, but in a 2011 case, and their exclusion was fully

litigated at trial; 2) Mr. Lowe waived any argument on jury instructions because he

did not object to them as offered at trial; 3) Mr. Lowe represented himself in this civil

matter, had no right to be placed in street clothes, and has cited no authority for his

proposition that he was unfairly prejudiced by wearing restraints during trial; 4) Mr.

Lowe’s naked assertion of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law is a conclusory

statement without legal support; and 5) Mr. Lowe fails to specify the evidence that

was admitted in error, and any evidence admitted in violation of orders on motions

in limine was admitted on Mr. Lowe’s on motion. [ECF No. 254, at 1–2].

I first address Mr. Lowe’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law,

including his fourth assignment of error. Then I address Mr. Lowe’s motion for a new

trial with regard to his remaining assignments of error.

II. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) authorizes a party to renew his motion

for judgment as a matter of law after the return of the jury verdict. “[J]udgment as a

matter of law may be granted only if . . . the only conclusion a reasonable jury could

have reached is one in favor of the moving party.”

, 3 F.4th 605, 610 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting

, 475 F.3d 214, 218–19 (4th Cir. 2007)).

Courts reviewing a jury’s verdict must construe the facts—including all inferences

drawn from the evidence—in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and in

support of the jury’s verdict. , 530 U.S. 133,

150–51 (2000). The court must affirm if a “rational trier of fact” could have reached

the jury’s conclusion. at 153.

I conclude that a rational trier of fact could have reached the jury’s conclusion

here—a verdict for Mr. Williams. An inmate’s claim of Eighth Amendment excessive

force involves an objective component regarding the sufficiency of force used, which

was satisfied and not in dispute here, and a subjective component, upon which this

case hinged. , 984 F.3d 295, 302 (4th Cir. 2021). “The crucial question

under the Eighth Amendment’s subjective component is one of motive: whether the

officer acted ‘in a good faith effort’ to protect safety or maintain discipline, or

‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” at 308

(quoting , 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). Similarly, the defense of

qualified immunity involves a two-step procedure “that asks first whether a

constitutional violation occurred and second whether the right violated was clearly

established.” , 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011).

Whether there was a constitutional violation in this case depended entirely on

disputed material facts, so I denied Mr. Williams’s motions for summary judgment,

as well as Mr. Lowe’s motion for judgment as a matter of law after all the evidence

was entered at trial, and submitted the case to the jury. [ECF Nos. 136, at 6 (“[T]here

is no useful video evidence of the interactions between Lowe and Williams or the other

officers leading up to or during the use of the pepper spray.”); 185]. Construing the

facts and all inferences drawn from the evidence in support of the jury’s verdict, a

rational jury crediting Mr. Williams’s account reasonably could infer that he deployed

pepper spray into Mr. Lowe’s cell in a good faith effort to maintain discipline and

protect safety because Mr. Lowe had refused to comply with his commands.

Mr. Williams’s affidavit—which Mr. Lowe moved into evidence as Plaintiff’s

Exhibit 9—supports his account and provides a sufficient evidentiary basis for a

reasonable jury to return a verdict in his favor. [ECF Nos. 250-9; 254, at 2]. In it, Mr.

Williams states that he believed using pepper spray on Mr. Lowe was necessary to

gain compliance because Mr. Lowe “was refusing to follow loud, clear verbal

commands to show his hands . . . and appeared to be pulling something from under

his clothing[.]” [ECF No. 250-9, at 6]. On his cross-examination, Mr. Lowe admitted

that he was pepper sprayed as he was attempting to conceal a contraband cell phone

in his clothing, and he agreed that it was reasonable for Mr. Williams to believe that

Mr. Lowe was retrieving something, such as weapon, from his pants based on their

respective positions inside and outside of Mr. Lowe’s cell. On this evidence alone,

introduced by Mr. Lowe, a rational trier of fact could have returned a verdict for Mr.

Williams.

The jury was instructed that it is clearly established law in the Fourth Circuit

that using chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary, for the sole purpose

of inflicting pain, or on a docile or compliant prisoner each demonstrate malicious

behavior, satisfying the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation.

Nevertheless, the jury credited Mr. Williams’s testimony and the evidence supporting

that pepper spray was deployed in a good faith effort to maintain discipline and

protect safety, such that Mr. Williams was entitled to the protection of qualified

immunity. Finding this conclusion rational,1 I affirm the jury’s verdict and DENY

Mr. Lowe’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.

III. Motion for a New Trial

Rule 59(a) provides that courts may grant a new trial after a jury trial “for any

reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal

court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Under this standard, “[a] new trial will be granted

if (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or (2) is based upon

evidence which is false, or (3) will result in a miscarriage of justice, even though there

may be substantial evidence which would prevent the direction of a verdict.”

, 144 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Unlike the

1 , 19 F. App’x 97, 102 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding use of pepper spray twelve

times when inmate refused to comply with commands to move from his cell); , 77

F.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation where officer deployed pepper

spray after prisoner asked “Why?” in response to command); , 918 F. Supp. 977, 984

(N.D. W. Va. 1996) (upholding use of two blasts of pepper spray when inmate refused to return to his

cell during lockdown).

court’s restraint when considering a Rule 50(b) motion, in making this determination,

the court may “weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses.” .

(citation omitted). I address each of Mr. Lowe’s remaining assignments of error in

turn, but I find that even considering the alleged errors, Mr. Lowe does not meet the

standard for granting a new trial.

1. Excluding Depositions

At trial, Mr. Lowe sought to admit depositions of two individuals who were not

parties or witnesses to this matter that were taken in a 2009 excessive force case

brought by Mr. Lowe. He argued that the depositions were relevant to show an

“unwritten practice of opening inmates[’] cell doors to fight them.” [ECF No. 253, at

1]. Mr. Williams objected, arguing that the depositions were irrelevant because he

was not involved in the 2011 case in any capacity and that it was improper to admit

deposition testimony when Mr. Lowe had not shown that the deponents were

otherwise unavailable under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure. Mr.

Williams also argued that while evidence of an alleged policy or practice of depriving

inmates of their constitutional rights would be relevant to a claim, Mr. Lowe

did not bring such a claim in this action. I sustained the objection.

“[E]rrors in admitting or excluding evidence” are not grounds for a new trial

“[u]nless justice requires[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. An evidentiary error is harmless and

does not require a new trial when it does not affect a party’s substantial rights—in

this case, whether it can be said with a high probability that the error did not affect

the judgment. , 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015).

First, I do not find that the depositions were excluded in error, for the same reason I

held at trial: Depositions of nonparties which were not taken in this matter were only

admissible as evidence at trial if the standards laid out in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 32(a)(4) or Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) were met, and Mr. Lowe did

not show that they were.

Moreover, even if excluding the depositions was erroneous, I do not find that

justice requires a new trial because the alleged error did not affect Mr. Lowe’s

substantial rights or the jury’s verdict. Mr. Lowe sought to introduce the depositions

to show “an unwritten practice of opening inmates[’] cell doors to fight them.” [ECF

No. 253, at 1]. While evidence of an alleged policy or practice of depriving inmates of

their constitutional rights would be relevant to certain claims of supervisory liability,

Mr. Lowe did not bring such a claim against Mr. Williams in this action. Furthermore,

Mr. Lowe was informed that he was free to cross-examine Mr. Williams as to his

knowledge of any official or unofficial practices at MOCC, and Mr. Lowe was free to

testify as to his personal knowledge of the same. To the extent Mr. Lowe elicited any

testimony on the subject, the jury did not find it persuasive. I therefore find that

exclusion of the depositions did not affect Mr. Lowe’s substantial rights.

2. Jury Instructions

Mr. Lowe asserts he is entitled to a new trial because his jury instruction was

denied. However, Mr. Lowe never submitted proposed jury instructions to the court

prior to trial in accordance with the scheduling order [ECF No. 177], and he stated

on the record after reviewing the court’s proposed final jury instructions that he had

no objections. “A party may assign as error . . . a failure to give an instruction, if that

party properly requested it and—unless the court rejected the request in a definitive

ruling on the record—also properly objected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(B). I do not find

any error affecting the substantial rights of the parties within the jury instructions

as given. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2); [ECF No. 242] (granting in part Mr.

Lowe’s motion for spoliation instructions). Accordingly, Mr. Lowe is not entitled to a

new trial on this basis.

3. Restraints

Mr. Lowe asserts that he was prejudiced in front of the jury by representing

himself in full restraints and because he “could barely move [his] hands from his

[waist] . . . .” [ECF No. 253, at 2]. I first note that Mr. Lowe brought this case pro se

and did not move for appointment of counsel.2 The trial court has discretion to order

physical restraints on a party without depriving them of their right to a fair trial

“when the court has found those restraints to be necessary to maintain safety or

security; but the court must impose no greater restraints than are necessary, and it

must take steps to minimize the prejudice resulting from the presence of the

restraints.” , 44 F.3d 1118, 1122–23 (2d Cir. 1995) (collecting

cases). If the trial court has evaluated the safety and security concerns, has taken

steps to minimize the restraints and their prejudicial effects, and has given a

cautionary instruction to the jury, there is likely no denial of due process. at 1123–

2 There is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases, and the Fourth Circuit has instructed that

courts should exercise their discretion to appoint counsel for pro se civil litigants “only in exceptional

cases.” , 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975).

24; , 718 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1983) (“A trial judge must be given

wide latitude in arriving at his decision to impose restraints, and to base his decision

on the information available to him at the time of trial.”).

First, in evaluating the safety and security concerns presented by this trial,

and in consideration of Mr. Lowe’s violent criminal history, I found Mr. Lowe to

present a substantial threat to the security of my courtroom and a substantial risk of

attempting escape. Mr. Lowe was previously convicted of first-degree murder and is

serving a sentence of life without mercy. [ECF 123, at 1–3]. The federal marshals

apprised me of Mr. Lowe’s past attempts at escaping from state custody, informing

my conclusion that requiring Mr. Lowe to wear full restraints during the trial was

necessary to maintain the safety and security of the jury, the public, Mr. Williams,

counsel, my staff, and myself. , 5 F.3d 244, 248 (7th Cir. 1993)

(“[T]he trial court may rely heavily on the marshals in evaluating the appropriate

security measures to take with a given prisoner . . . .”). Additionally, this case was

brought by Mr. Lowe as an inmate against a prison official for an incident that

occurred in a maximum-security correctional facility. The jury certainly would be

made aware of the fact that Mr. Lowe was a prisoner no matter his appearance, thus

diminishing any prejudicial effect. at 249 (quoting , 957

F.2d 529, 530 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he shackles added nothing to the trial . . . [for] [n]o

prejudice can result from [the jury] seeing that which is already known.”)).

Second, I made substantial effort to mitigate any prejudicial effect of the

necessary restraints. I instructed the jury that Mr. Lowe, as a pro se litigant, had a

constitutional right to represent himself and that his decision to represent himself

had absolutely no bearing on the merits of his claims and should have no bearing on

the jury’s decisions regarding the facts. I further instructed the jury that the fact that

Mr. Lowe is incarcerated, as well as Mr. Lowe’s appearance in a prison uniform and

shackles, should not affect their consideration of his evidence or deliberation of his

case. I instructed the jury that they were to consider Mr. Lowe’s case the same as

they would any other party who brought a civil case before the court. I further

minimized any prejudice imposed by his appearance in restraints by allowing him to

argue and testify from behind counsel table, as well as allowing him the assistance of

court personnel and various federal marshals who provided Mr. Lowe’s exhibits and

other documents to witnesses, opposing counsel, and the court. Given these

mitigation efforts, I do not find that Mr. Lowe’s appearance during the trial

substantially contributed to the verdict obtained or any miscarriage of justice.

4. Motions in Limine

Finally, Mr. Lowe states that I erred “by allowing the Defendants to enter

evidence that was not allowed in, from Motion [in] Limine.” [ECF No. 253, at 2]. Mr.

Lowe filed two motions in limine [ECF Nos. 169, 170], and I granted his motions only

as to the issues in paragraphs 1–5 of his motion in limine to preclude Mr. Williams

from putting on certain evidence about Mr. Lowe’s criminal history. [ECF Nos. 170,

204]. Given that any information preliminarily excluded by my order on Mr. Lowe’s

motions in limine was later introduced at trial by only Mr. Lowe himself, I do not find

that any erroneous evidentiary ruling of mine affected a substantial right of Mr.

Lowe’s or the judgment reached in this case. See supra Section ITT. 1.

IV. Conclusion

Mr. Lowe’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a

new trial [ECF No. 253] are DENIED. The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send of copy

of this Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.

ENTER*4 October 7, 2022

pe STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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