Reeves v. Meddings

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

HUNTINGTON DIVISION

KATRINA REEVES and

JAMES LEE REEVES,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-0423

WAYNE COUNTY;

HOWARD MEDDINGS, individually; and

DEPUTY HARRY SOWARDS, individually,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Howard Meddings’ Motion to Stay Pending

Interlocutory Appeal. ECF No. 303. Plaintiff Katrina Reeves1 filed a Response in opposition to

the Motion on December 22, 2021 (ECF No. 309), and Defendant Meddings filed his Reply on

December 24, 2021 (ECF No. 312). The Motion is now ripe for the Court’s consideration. For the

reasons herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In June 2020, Plaintiff and her husband sued Defendant Meddings and others on a variety

of federal and state law claims alleging wrongful conduct during a police investigation and a

subsequent malicious prosecution. After the close of discovery, Defendant Meddings moved for

1 The Court notes that there is a pending Motion to Substitute (ECF No. 298) Plaintiff

Katrina Reeves for her husband, James Lee Reeves, who passed away in November. The Court

has not yet ruled on the matter but will refer to her as “Plaintiff” in the singular for clarity.

summary judgment on all claims on the basis of qualified immunity. ECF No. 182. In December

2021, the Court denied the Motion. ECF No. 295. Following this denial, Defendant filed an

interlocutory appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit contending that

the Court erred in concluding at summary judgment that Defendant was not entitled to qualified

immunity. (U.S.C.A. Case No. 21-2391).

II. LEGAL STANDARD & ANALYSIS

In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that the denial of qualified immunity is immediately

appealable under the collateral order doctrine to the extent that the availability of this defense turns

on a question of law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). “This principle applies

whether qualified immunity was rejected at the dismissal stage (as in these proceedings), or at the

summary judgment stage.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Gov. Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 305 (4th Cir.

2006). Plaintiff’s argument is not that Defendant is not entitled to an appeal of the Court’s denial

of qualified immunity, but that Defendant’s appeal is frivolous, will harm Plaintiff, will not harm

Defendant, and that public interest requires trial.

Plaintiff argues that, in evaluating whether a stay is appropriate, the court must consider

the following factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely

to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)

whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding;

and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). See also

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (applying these factors to stay of immigration removal order

pending appeal). Defendant contends that this standard is inapplicable, given that it only applies

to cases seeking a stay of execution of a judgment, rather than a stay of trial. Def.’s Reply at 2,

ECF No. 312; see also Moore v. Equitrans, L.P, No. 1:12-123, 2015 WL 2129259 at *3 (N.D.W.

Va. May 6, 2015) (finding that the four-part Long test is inapplicable when a party is not seeking

a stay of the execution of a judgment while the case is being appealed). Plaintiff’s arguments center

around this standard, noting that Defendant’s appeal is frivolous. See Pl.’s Resp. at 4-5, ECF No.

309. Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Meddings will not be irreparably harmed by

proceeding to trial, but that Plaintiff will be harmed because the trial delay will “cause detriment

to her health condition.” Id. at 6-7. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that there is a public interest in

determining the claims at issue. Id. at 7.

Some district courts have used the four-part balancing test to determine whether a stay

pending appeal on the issue of qualified immunity is appropriate. See e.g., Campbell v. Sims, No.

20-2590, 2021 WL 4342039 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2021); Krell v. Queen Anne’s Cnty., No. 18-0367,

2020 WL 416975 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2020). Others consider the purpose of qualified immunity and

determine that stays should generally be granted. See e.g., Glover v. Hryniewich, 438 F. Supp. 3d.

625 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2020); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-03253, 2013 WL 12380290

(D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2013); White v. Chapman, No. 1:14-848, 2015 WL 13021744 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29,

2015). This Court generally agrees that it is appropriate to stay the case pending resolution of the

question of qualified immunity, where the Defendant would be subjected to the trial next month.

See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 143-144 (1993)

(“[A]bsent immediate appeal, the central benefits of qualified immunity -- avoiding the costs and

general consequences of subjecting public officials to the risks of discovery and trial - would be

forfeited ....”) (internal citation omitted).

However, to the extent the four-factor standard also applies to the stay of proceedings

pending interlocutory appeal, the Court finds that the factors weigh in favor of granting the stay.

Should the Fourth Circuit find that Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the benefit of it

will be “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial,” which would greatly harm

Defendant. Id. at 144 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Plaintiff generally

argues that she will be harmed because a delay to her trial will cause detriment to her health

condition. Of course, this is unfortunate, but when weighed against the other factors, it cannot

overcome them. Here, the case has proceeded as rapidly as possible. Although Defendant’s appeal

comes very shortly before trial, Defendant filed it promptly after the Court’s summary judgment

decision and only raised arguments that they have asserted throughout the entirety of this case. See

White, 2015 WL 13021744 at *2. Circumstances suggest that Plaintiff’s ability to recover will only

be delayed rather than permanently diminished by a stay, which weigh against finding irreparable

harm. See Krell, 2020 WL 16975 at *2-3.

Further regarding the public interest, should the appeal end this matter, the use of court

resources and tax dollars will be reduced. Also, though the Fourth Circuit has not accepted or

rejected a presumption that the public interest in resolving qualified immunity issues generally

supports a stay, given Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the public interest in protecting

officers from suits, this factor weighs slightly in favor of granting the stay. See, e.g., Crawford-El

v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590 (1998) (“[T]here is a strong public interest in protecting public

officials from the costs associated with the defense of damages actions.”).

Finally, in considering likelihood of success on the merits, Defendant’s appeal is a proper

interlocutory appeal. Further, it involves mixed questions of law and fact, which are appropriate

for the Fourth Circuit to resolve. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 221 (4th Cir.

2012) (en banc) (“Hence, insofar as an interlocutory appeal of a denial of immunity requires

resolution of a purely legal question (such as whether an alleged constitutional violation was of

clearly established law), or an ostensibly fact-bound issue that may be resolved as a matter of law

(such as whether facts that are undisputed or viewed in a particular light are material to the

immunity calculus), we may consider and rule upon it.”).

Ill. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Stay. ECF No. 303.

The action is STAYED pending the Fourth Circuit’s resolution of the issue of qualified immunity.

The Court SUSPENDS all dates pursuant to the scheduling order (ECF No. 290), including the

pretrial conference set for January 10, 2022, the final settlement conference set for January 18,

2022, and the trial set for January 19, 2022, and all related dates.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any

unrepresented parties.

ENTER: January 4, 2022

ROBERT C. CHAMBERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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