Hill v. Holiday

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

AT CHARLESTON

JERMAIN SANTELL HILL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00140

ASHLEY HOLIDAY, RON WEBB,

CORPORAL ROOP, and ANTHONY

LEONARD,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending are two Proposed Findings and Recommendation

(“PF&R”), filed October 18, 2021, as well as an objection to a

portion of one of the PF&Rs, filed by defendant Corporal Roop on

November 1, 2021.

Pro se plaintiff Jermain Santell Hill (“Hill”)

initiated this action in this court on February 25, 2019.

Compl., ECF No. 1. On May 28, 2019, Hill submitted supplemental

information to add to his original complaint. Suppl. Compl.,

ECF No. 8. The complaint arises out of disciplinary action

taken against Hill in the form of segregation while incarcerated

as a pretrial detainee at South Central Regional Jail in Kanawha

County, West Virginia. See Compl.; Suppl. Compl. Hill’s action

was referred to Dwane L. Tinsley, United States Magistrate

Judge, who submitted the pending PF&Rs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B).

In the first PF&R, the magistrate judge “recommend[s]

that [Hill’s] claims against Defendant Anthony Leonard . . . and

his equal-protection claims against all of the defendants be

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure

to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” First PF&R,

ECF No. 32 at 5 (emphasis omitted). Hill does not object to the

magistrate judge’s recommendation. The court therefore adopts

the first PF&R and incorporates it herein.

In the second PF&R, the magistrate judge “recommend[s]

that Plaintiff’s motion [for summary judgment] be granted in

part and denied in part and Defendants’ motion [for summary

judgment] be granted in part and denied in part.” Second PF&R,

ECF No. 33 at 14 (emphasis omitted). Specifically, the

magistrate judge recommends that Hill’s motion for summary

judgment be granted on his Section 1983 due process claim, which

is limited to Corporal Roop, and otherwise denied; and the

magistrate judge recommends that the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be denied on Hill’s Section 1983 due process

claim against Corporal Roop and otherwise granted. See id. at

7, 10-11, 14. Hill does not object to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation, and the defendants object only insofar as the

magistrate judge recommends granting Hill’s motion and denying

their motion on the Section 1983 due process claim against

Corporal Roop. See Defs. Obj. 1, ECF No. 34. For the reasons

set forth below, the court denies the objections, adopts the

second PF&R and incorporates it herein. See generally 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court shall make a de novo

determination of those . . . specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.”).

Corporal Roop lodges two objections to the PF&R.

First, he argues that “[Hill], as a matter of law, was not

entitled to any procedural due process because” the discipline

Hill received was insufficient to implicate Hill’s “liberty

interest.” See Defs. Obj. 3-5; see also Prieto v. Clarke, 780

F.3d 245, 248-49 (stating that “a plaintiff must . . . identify

a protected liberty or property interest” before entitlement to

procedural due process). Thus, Corporal Roop insists that it is

irrelevant that he did not provide Hill with a post-hearing

written explanation of his reasons for disciplining Hill, to

which Hill would normally have a procedural due process right.

See Defs. Obj. 3-5; see also Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246,

253 (4th Cir. 2016) (“An inmate . . . is entitled, . . . after

the hearing, to a written statement describing the reasons for

the disciplinary action taken.”).

Corporal Roop, however, is incorrect on one crucial

fact: Hill was a pretrial detainee, not an inmate. See Hill

Decl., ECF No. 3.1 As a pretrial detainee, Hill had “a liberty

interest in freedom from ‘punishment,’” or “discrete ‘punitive

measures.’” Dilworth v, 841 F.3d at 251. Because Hill was

unquestionably punished by a discrete punitive measure, Hill was

entitled to requisite procedural safeguards to his protected

liberty interest. See id. at 252-53 (citing cases). As the

magistrate judge found, Corporal Roop violated Hill’s right to

procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when he

failed to provide Hill with a post-hearing written explanation

of the reasons for discipline. Id. at 253.

Second, Corporal Roop argues that he is nevertheless

entitled to qualified immunity. Defs. Obj. 7. On the contrary,

the magistrate judge correctly explained that Hill’s right to a

post-hearing written explanation for discipline was clearly

established on the date Corporal Roop held the disciplinary

hearing, June 18, 2017. ECF No. 26-5 (June 18, 2017, hearing

date); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974) (“We also

hold that there must be a ‘written statement by the factfinders

1 Hill styles his declaration as an “Affidavit,” but the document

meets the requirements of an unsworn declaration in lieu of a

sworn affidavit allowable under 28 U.S.C. § 1746. See Hill

Decl.

as to the evidence relied on and reasons’ for the disciplinary

action.”);2 see also id. at 565.

Corporal Roop’s objections are without merit. The

court otherwise seeing no error in the two PF&Rs, the magistrate

judge’s recommendations are correct.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED

that:

1. The first PF&R (ECF No. 32) be, and hereby is, adopted and

incorporated herein;

2. Hill’s claims against defendant Anthony Leonard be, and

hereby are, dismissed;

3. Hill’s equal-protection claims against all defendants be,

and hereby are, dismissed;

4. The second PF&R (ECF No. 33) be, and hereby is, adopted and

incorporated herein;

5. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be, and hereby

is, granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein;

2 Wolff dealt with prisoners, i.e. those incarcerated following

conviction. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that

pretrial detainees “retain at least those constitutional rights

that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners.” 441 U.S.

520, 545 (1979) (citing, inter alia, Wolff, 418 U.S. 539).

6. Hill’s motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is,

granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein; and

7. Ashley Holiday, Ron Webb, and Anthony Leonard be, and

hereby are, dismissed from this action with prejudice.

The only issue remaining in this matter is the amount

of damages to which Hill is entitled as a result of the

violation of his procedural due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. ?

The Clerk is requested to transmit copies of this

memorandum opinion and order to all counsel of record, to any

unrepresented parties, and to the magistrate judge.

ENTER: November 24, 2021

sl Nihal eee

Jo . Copenhaver, Jr.

Senior United States District Judge

3 In response to the defendants’ objections, Hill discusses,

ostensibly for the first time in this case, alleged “deliberate

indifference” that “prison officials” showed to his medical

needs “for 37 months.” Compare Hill Resp., ECF No. 35, with

Compl., Suppl. Compl., and Hill Decl. That allegation and

associated misconduct is not the subject of this action.