The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
MACHIAVELLI FARRAKHAN SIBERIUS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 2:18-cv-01125
AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, INC.,
PRESSLEY RIDGE, and WEST VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On November 13, 2018, the plaintiff, Machiavelli Farrakhan Siberius,
proceeding , filed an excessively lengthy Amended Complaint [ECF No. 29]
against the above-named defendants, alleging various federal and state claims as
further addressed in section III below. Pending before the court are the defendants’
Motions to Dismiss [ECF Nos. 30, 32, and 34], the West Virginia Department of
Education’s (“WVDE”) Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Sur-reply (ECF No. 42), the
plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Joinder (ECF No. 44), and the plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
the WVDE’s Reply and Motion to Strike Sur-reply (ECF No. 45), all of which will be
addressed herein.
This matter was initially referred to the Honorable Dwane L. Tinsley, United
States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings and a recommendation
for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For reasons appearing to the
court, the referral of this matter to the Magistrate Judge is WITHDRAWN and the
undersigned will proceed to address the pending motions.
I. Standard of Review
The defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint or pleading. , 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th
Cir. 2008). A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard
“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” , 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
When “faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . courts must . . . accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true.”
, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting , 550 U.S. at 570). To achieve facial
plausibility, the plaintiff must plead facts allowing the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable, moving the claim beyond the realm of mere
possibility. Mere “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the
elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. , 550 U.S. at 555.
Because the plaintiff is proceeding , the court is obliged to construe his
pleading liberally. , 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). However, a district
court does not assume the role of an advocate to construct arguments or theories for
a plaintiff and the court need not comb through the pleadings looking for
potential claims. , 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978);
, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991). “Judges are not like pigs,
hunting for truffles buried in briefs.” , 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th
Cir. 1991).
II. Factual Background and Procedural History
As alleged in the 105-page Amended Complaint, Machiavelli Farrakhan
Siberius (hereinafter “the plaintiff”) who, at the time was known as “Adam Zane
Dotson,” was a student in American Public University System, Inc.’s (“APUS”) Post-
Baccalaureate Teacher Preparation Certification Program. In the spring of 2016, the
plaintiff was enrolled in EDUC697 Clinical Supervision, a student teaching course
required to receive his teaching certification, and he was placed at Pressley Ridge in
Wood County, West Virginia, for student teaching.
According to the Amended Complaint, on or about June 6, 2016, the plaintiff
was terminated from his student teaching position at Pressley Ridge for reporting a
staff member to the Wood County Sheriff’s Department for alleged physical abuse of
a student. As a result of his termination, the plaintiff did not complete the full 16
weeks of student teaching required by APUS for his certification, received a failing
grade for the Clinical Supervision course, and was not issued a certificate to teach in
the State of West Virginia.
On June 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in the Circuit Court
of Wood County. It was removed to this court by APUS, with the consent of the other
defendants. [ECF Nos. 3, 4, 5]. On September 28, 2018, United States Magistrate
Judge Dwane L. Tinsley granted the plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint. [ECF
No. 27]. On November 13, 2018, the plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on which
this matter is now proceeding. [ECF No. 29].
Count II of the Amended Complaint asserts a claim against Pressley Ridge and
the WVDE under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 ,
which was the basis for removal of the civil action to this federal court. Additionally,
buried within Count III of the Amended Complaint is a claim purportedly brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pressley Ridge and the WVDE alleging that the
failure to receive his teaching certification deprived him of a property right and, thus,
violated his right to due process. [ECF No. 29 at 53].
The remaining claims in the Amended Complaint are state law claims alleging
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel,
tortious interference, and conversion.1 The breach of contract claims are brought only
against APUS. The other state law claims are brought only against Pressley Ridge
and the WVDE.
1 In conjunction with the plaintiff’s FLSA claim in Count II, the convoluted Amended Complaint also
appears to assert violations of the West Virginia Minimum Wage and Maximum Hour laws and the Wage
Payment and Collection Act, W. Va. Code §§ 21-5-1 et seq. and 21-5C-1 et seq.
On November 27, 2018, each defendant filed a motion to dismiss [ECF Nos. 30,
32, and 34], with accompanying memoranda of law [ECF Nos. 31, 33, and 35]. On
December 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed responses in opposition to the motions to dismiss
[ECF Nos. 37, 38, and 39]. On December 11, 2018, the WVDE filed a reply brief [ECF
No. 40]. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an unauthorized sur-reply [ECF No. 41], which
the WVDE moved to strike [ECF No. 42], and the plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the
WVDE’s Reply and Motion to Strike [ECF No. 45]. Also pending is the plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel Joinder [ECF No. 44], in which he seeks a “joint trial” of defendants
WVDE and Pressley Ridge. This matter is ripe for adjudication.
III. Discussion
A. The Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim under the FLSA.
In Count II of his Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he was
employed by Pressley Ridge and the WVDE, and that the failure to pay him for the
hours he taught at Pressley Ridge violated the FLSA and the corresponding state law
provisions. However, as aptly noted by the defendants’ motions, the undersigned
FINDS that the plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient facts
demonstrating an employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and either
Pressley Ridge or the WVDE. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under the FLSA.
As recently noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in another case involving a student teacher, the FLSA conditions liability on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, and the employee bears the burden
of alleging and proving the existence of that relationship.
, 824 F.3d 62, 83 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing
, 180 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1999) and , 792 F.2d 1274, 1276
(4th Cir. 1986)). Whether or not a person is an employee within the meaning of the
FLSA is a question of law. The Court further noted:
FLSA defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in
the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a
public agency.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Employers include those with
managerial responsibilities and “substantial control of the terms and
conditions of the work of ... employees.” , 414 U.S. 190,
195, 94 S. Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973). To determine whether the
employer-employee relationship exists, courts apply the “economic
reality” test. , 466 F.3d at 304 (citing
, 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994)).
The economic reality test focuses on “whether the worker ‘is
economically dependent on the business to which he renders service or
is, as a matter of economic [reality], in business for himself.’” (quoting
, 41 F.3d at 570). Relevant factors include “whether the
alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2)
supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of
employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4)
maintained employment records.” , 172
F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting , 735
F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984)), modified by ,
355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003). Although no one factor is dispositive, not a
single factor weighs in favor of finding the existence of an employer-
employee relationship here. * * * The fact that Kerr did not ultimately
receive course credit does not convert her truncated educational
experience into unpaid labor. Given the economic reality of Kerr’s
position as a student teacher, the district court properly determined that
Kuhn was not an “employer” under FLSA and dismissed Kerr’s final
claim.
at 83-84.
In another case involving a student enrolled in a cosmetology teacher trainee
course to pursue her teaching license, our sister court in the Middle District of North
Carolina found that the teacher trainee was not an employee required to be
compensated under the FLSA because “the benefits to [the trainee] derived from the
teacher training program clearly outweighed the benefits to [the alleged employer
school]” and, thus, the trainee was not an “employee” under the FLSA.
, No. 6:90-cv-00108, 1992 WL 228868, *4 (M.D.N.C. July 2,
1992). The court specifically noted:
The Supreme Court has held that the definition of “to suffer or permit
to work” does not encompass persons “who, without any express or
implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage
on the premises of another. Otherwise, all students would be employees
of the school or college they attend, and as such entitled to receive
minimum wages.” , 330 U.S. 148, 152,
67 S. Ct. 639, 641, 91 L. Ed. 809 (1947).
at *3. The court considered factors including whether the trainee’s duties
and activities were part of the curriculum required for the educational program in
which the trainee was enrolled, the fact that the trainee was supervised and
evaluated by a licensed teacher, and the fact that the school did not displace any
employees of the school or forego hiring additional employees because of the presence
of the trainee and the work the trainee was doing. at 2.
The plaintiff does not allege that he had a pre-existing paid teaching position
at Pressley Ridge, or with any school operated by the WVDE; nor could he, as he
acknowledges that he was not a licensed or certified teacher. Rather, the Amended
Complaint merely alleges that the plaintiff was issued a student teaching permit.
Additionally, there is no indication in the Amended Complaint that the plaintiff
displaced any actual employees of the defendants.
Although the plaintiff alleges that a school secretary at Pressley Ridge kept a
sign-in log for the dates and times the he worked, such records were necessary to
confirm his fulfillment of the student teaching field hour requirements and were not
actual employer time records. The plaintiff acknowledges that he was not paid. The
plaintiff further alleges that, although he designed lesson plans and objectives,
graded papers, lectured students, and directed class activities, he was supervised by
a site teacher and benefitted from those duties as part of his academic program. [
at 46]. Thus, the Amended Complaint merely establishes that the plaintiff performed
duties that were required as part of his curriculum for the APUS student teaching
program, which were supervised and evaluated by a licensed teacher.
The undersigned FINDS that the plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish, under
the totality of the circumstances, that either Pressley Ridge or the WVDE had
sufficient operational control over the plaintiff in order to constitute an employer-
employee relationship for the purposes of the FLSA. Accordingly, the undersigned
further FINDS that the Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief
under the FLSA. Thus, dismissal of that claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted.
B. The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Pressley Ridge and/or the WVDE.
As noted above, the Amended Complaint also purports to raise a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pressley Ridge and the WVDE. [ECF No. 29 at 53]. Section
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, provides in pertinent part:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress
. . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. While not in itself a source of substantive rights, section 1983
provides a “method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts
of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.”
, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To successfully establish a section 1983
claim, however, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”
, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting , 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988)) (Emphasis added).
Neither Pressley Ridge, nor the WVDE, is “a person acting under color of state
law.” As alleged in the Amended Complaint, Pressley Ridge is a private corporation
that provides residential treatment, educational, and foster care services,
headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Thus, it was not acting under color of
state law. Likewise, the WVDE, an agency of the State of West Virginia, is not a
person with respect to section 1983. In , 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court held that, neither a State, nor its officials
acting in their official capacities, are “persons” under section 1983. Accordingly, the
undersigned FINDS that the Amended Complaint fails to state any plausible claim
against these defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, dismissal of that claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) is also warranted.
C. The undersigned declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s state law claims.
Having found that the plaintiff has not stated any plausible federal claim,
which was the basis of removal herein, and there being no diversity of citizenship,
the undersigned declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and REMANDS this matter to
the Circuit Court of Wood County.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motions to
Dismiss filed by the WVDE [ECF No. 30] and Pressley Ridge [ECF No. 34] are
GRANTED with respect to the plaintiff’s FLSA and section 1983 claims, but are
otherwise DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being re-asserted in the state court.
It is further ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by APUS [ECF No. 32] is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being re-asserted in the state court.
In light of the rulings made herein, it is further ORDERED that the WVDE’s
Motion to Strike Sur-reply [ECF No. 42], the plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Joinder
[ECF No. 44], and the plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Reply and Motion to Strike Sur-
reply [ECF No. 45] are DENIED AS MOOT. Finally, it is further ORDERED that
this matter is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Wood County for consideration of
the plaintiff’s state law claims.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and
Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party. The Clerk is further directed
to send a certified copy of the record of this civil action to the Circuit Court of Wood
County.
ENTER: September 13, 2019
G 6M
pe STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11