Knouse v. Primecare Medical of West Virginia, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

HANNAH KNOUSE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-cv-01014

PRIMECARE MEDICAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court is Defendant James Chandler’s Motion to Dismiss

[ECF No. 91] and the plaintiff’s Motion to Seal [ECF No. 107]. For the following

reasons, Defendant Chandler’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,

the plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

I. Background

While awaiting trial, Dr. Charles Knouse was detained at South Central

Regional Jail (“SCRJ”) in Kanawha County, West Virginia, for various violations of

the Controlled Substances Act. At his detention hearing, Dr. Knouse explained to

Magistrate Judge Omar J. Aboulhosn his belief that the jail authorities at SCRJ were

not meeting his serious medical needs. Dr. Knouse was apparently concerned that his

heart would become arrhythmic if he did not receive his heart medication. He also

explained that withdrawal from a second medication would render the first

medication unable to control his heart rhythm, and he detailed the great pain he was

in because the jail authorities did not allow him to self-catheterize the first few days

of his detainment.

Perceiving a potential life-threatening situation, and choosing to err on the

side of caution until Dr. Knouse’s medical conditions could be verified, Magistrate

Judge Aboulhosn ordered the authorities at SCRJ “to immediately place and hold [Dr.

Knouse] in the medical unit . . . and to immediately resume [Dr. Knouse] on all of his

prescribed medications.” Order 2, , No. 1:17-mj-00046 (Aug.

4, 2017), [ECF No. 6]. A few days later, however, Dr. Knouse died while in custody.

Hannah Knouse, administrator of his estate, filed this lawsuit.

The plaintiff’s initial Complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendants were

deliberately indifferent to Dr. Knouse’s serious medical needs. On a Motion [ECF

No. 32], the court dismissed most of the Complaint but allowed the plaintiff’s § 1983

claim for deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to move

forward. The court noted the plaintiff’s lack of factual matter stating claims to relief,

conclusory statements, and inapposite legal theories. On October 23, 2018, with leave

of court, the plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 71], largely ignoring the

court’s guidance on pleading. The Amended Complaint continues to include irrelevant

state constitutional claims with no factual basis, contains even more conclusory

statements, and entails 275 pages of appended exhibits.

The Amended Complaint sounds in negligence, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, state and federal constitutional claims, and fraud. Specifically, it

alleges that Defendant Chandler was the officer on duty tasked with supervising Dr.

Knouse the night of his death and that, despite warnings and pleas from Dr. Knouse,

he and others were deliberately indifferent to Dr. Knouse’s serious medical needs. On

November 6, 2018, Defendant Chandler moved to dismiss the claims against him

[ECF No. 91]. On November 20, 2018, the plaintiff responded [ECF No. 108] and filed

a Motion to Seal [ECF No. 107] requesting that the court seal the plaintiff’s response.

On November 27, 2018, the defendant replied [ECF No. 112]. The Motions are ripe

for review.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a

complaint or pleading. , 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008).

Rule 8 requires that pleadings contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that

standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” ,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting , 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of [her] ‘entitle[ment] to

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” , 550 U.S. at 555. A court cannot

accept as true legal conclusions in a complaint that merely recites the elements of a

cause of action supported by conclusory statements. , 556 U.S. at 677–78.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

at 678 (quoting , 550 U.S. at 570). To achieve facial plausibility, the plaintiff

must plead facts that allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable, and those facts must be more than merely consistent with the

defendant's liability to raise the claim from possible to plausible.

III. Discussion

1. Motion to Seal

As a threshold matter, in response to the defendant’s Motion, the plaintiff

attached the defendant’s termination letter from the Jail Authority, which is

purportedly subject to a confidentiality agreement between the parties. The plaintiff

moved the court to seal its response and the attached letter.

Local Rule 26.4(c)(2) requires that

a motion to seal shall be . . . accompanied by a

memorandum of law which contains:

(A) the reasons why sealing is necessary, including

the reasons why alternatives to sealing, such as

redaction, are inadequate;

(B) the requested duration of the proposed seal; and

(C) a discussion of the propriety of sealing, giving

due regard to the parameter of the common law and

First Amendment rights of access as interpreted by

the Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals.

LR Civ. P. 26.4(c). Counsel failed to address these concerns or file a memorandum.

The plaintiff’s Motion to Seal is DENIED.

2. Section 1983 Qualified Immunity

The plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chandler was deliberately indifferent to

Dr. Knouse’s serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause. The defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity and

the § 1983 claim against him therefore should be dismissed

Officers are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless (1)

they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of

their conduct was “clearly established at the time.” , 566 U.S. 658,

664 (2012). “Clearly established” means that, at the time of the officer's conduct, the

law was “‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing’” is unlawful. , 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting

, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). In other words, existing law must

have placed the constitutionality of the officer's conduct “beyond debate.” at 741.

This demanding standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The court's

“first task is to identify the specific right that [the plaintiff] asserts was infringed by

the challenged conduct, recognizing that the right must be defined at the appropriate

level of particularity.” , 106 F.3d 525, 530 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

As discussed previously by this court in this case, “[t]he right to be free from

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is clearly established.”

, 333 F. Supp. 3d 584, 590 (S.D. W. Va. 2018);

, 841 F.3d 219, 236 (4th Cir. 2016). The next step is to consider whether

the plaintiff alleged sufficient factual matter to demonstrate a plausible claim of

deliberate indifference.

a. Deliberate Indifference

An officer is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to a detainee

when that officer “knows of and disregards” that risk. ,

372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994)). To be liable, “[d]eliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendants

actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious injury to the detainee

or that they actually knew of and ignored a detainee’s serious need for medical care.”

, 238 F.3d 567, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2001). Deliberate

indifference is “more than mere negligence,” but “less than acts or omissions [done]

for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”

, 511 U.S. at 835; , 841 F.3d at 226. It “lies somewhere between

negligence and purpose or knowledge: namely, recklessness of the subjective type

used in criminal law.” , 58 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995)

(citing , 511 U.S. at 835).

Liability under this standard thus requires two showings: “First, the evidence

must show that the official in question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of

harm. It is not enough that the officers recognized it; they actually must

have perceived the risk.” , 372 F.3d at 303 (citing 129 F.3d 336,

340 n.2 (4th Cir.1997)). Second, “the evidence must show that the official in question

subjectively recognized that his actions were ‘inappropriate in light of that risk.’”

“As with the subjective awareness element, it is not enough that the official should

have recognized that his actions were inappropriate; the official actually must have

recognized that his actions were insufficient.” (citing 240 F.3d

383, 390–91 (4th Cir. 2001)).

A plaintiff can make a prima facie case under this standard by showing “that

a substantial risk of [serious harm] was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented,

or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that

the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk

and thus must have known about it.” , 511 U.S. at 842; , 372 F.3d

at 303. “Similarly, a factfinder may conclude that the official’s response to a perceived

risk was so patently inadequate as to justify an inference that the official actually

recognized that his response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.”

, 372 F.3d at 303. Moreover, a prison official’s “[f]ailure to respond to an

inmate’s known medical needs raises an inference [of] deliberate indifference to those

needs.” , 896 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1990),

, 511 U.S. at 837.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to Dr.

Knouse’s serious medical needs, in part, because the defendant violated prison

protocol. Am. Compl. 13. The defendant argues that “any alleged violations of

purported state or internal regulations, rules, policies, and/or concerning the

purported ‘suicide watch protocol’ or any other matter is insufficient to defeat

Chandler’s entitlement to qualified immunity.” Mem. 13 [ECF No. 92]. The defendant

cites numerous Fourth Circuit opinions for support. But while an alleged violation of

internal policy does not necessarily amount to a constitutional violation, the

defendant could not seriously contend that conduct violating the Constitution could

not also violate internal prison policies. , No. 2:13-cv-19796, 2015

WL 6509131, at *9 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 28, 2015) (finding that while “policy directives

‘do not . . . establish constitutional minima’ and [while] a correctional officer’s

‘variance’ from policy directives ‘does not per se establish a violation of [an inmate’s]

constitutional rights,’ “policy directive[s are] instructive and indicate[] that [the

defendant’s actions] may have been inappropriate under the circumstances.”).

Here, on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleged enough facts to show that

Dr. Knouse’s risk of harm was “well-documented[] or expressly noted by prison

officials, and [that] the circumstances suggest that [the defendant] . . . had been

exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Two court orders stated that the Dr. Knouse needed

appropriate medical attention. Am. Compl. 6. Defendant Chandler was on duty to

supervise the plaintiff while he was housed in booking, i.e., suicide watch. Dr.

Knouse pleaded incessently that his medical wellbeing was deteriorating, and the

defendant had multiple contacts with Dr. Knouse. at 14. The Amended Complaint

also alleges that defendant Chandler failed to respond to Dr. Knouse’s known medical

needs. at 14–15. He was allegedly watching YouTube videos and allegedly told Dr.

Knouse to “shut up” throughout the night instead of conducting his rounds.

Defendant Chandler, despite his awareness of Dr. Knouse’s issues, failed to monitor

him to see that he was not in distress and that he was breathing or to see that medical

treatment be provided. at 16. As alleged, there is enough factual matter to suggest

that Defendant Chandler’s response “was so patently inadequate as to justify an

inference that the [he] actually recognized that his response to the risk was

inappropriate under the circumstances.” , 372 F.3d at 303. The plaintiff has

alleged “enough factual matter to state a plausible claim that the plaintiff is entitled

to relief for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.” , 333 F. Supp. 3d

at 591.

3. State Law Qualified Immunity

The court will next examine the plaintiff’s state law claims. The plaintiff seeks

relief under state law for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

fraud, and despite criticism from the court, again alleges “a confused assortment of

purported [state] constitutional violations.” , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 589. The

defendant argues that he is also intitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s state

law claims.

In West Virginia, “if a public officer is either authorized or required, in the

exercise of his judgment and discretion, to make a decision and to perform acts in the

making of that decision, and the decision and acts are within the scope of his duty,

authority, and jurisdiction, he is not liable for negligence or other error in the making

of that decision, at the suit of a private individual claiming to have been damaged

thereby.” Syl. Pt. 4, , 465 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995).

[T]he doctrine of qualified or official immunity bars a claim

of mere negligence against a State agency not within the

purview of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims

and Insurance Reform Act1 . . . and against an officer of

that department acting within the scope of his or her

employment, with respect to the discretionary judgments,

decisions, and actions of the officer.

at Syl. Pt. 6. “To determine whether the State, its agencies, officials, and/or

employees are entitled to immunity, a reviewing court must first identify the nature

of the governmental acts or omissions which give rise to the suit . . . .” Syl. Pt. 10,

, 766 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 2014).

“To the extent that governmental acts or omissions . . . fall within the category

of discretionary functions, a reviewing court must determine whether the plaintiff

has demonstrated that such acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person would have

known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive in accordance with

, 424 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1992).” at Syl. Pt. 11. “In absence of

such a showing, both the State and its officials or employees charged with such acts

or omissions are immune from liability.”

a. Negligence

The defendant argues that that the plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to

establish that the defendant did not engage in any discretionary acts, and the

plaintiff did not respond otherwise. I agree. In West Virginia, correctional officers’

functions “are characterized as discretionary, requiring the use of

discretionary judgments and decisions.” , 766 S.E.2d at 768. Because “[a] public

1 The parties do not dispute that the plaintiff’s claims against the Prison Defendants do not fall

within the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Act.

officer is entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary acts, even if committed

negligently,” the defendant is not liable for mere negligence. ,

781 S.E.2d 936, 949 (W. Va. 2015); , No. 16-0090, No. 12-0092,

2017 WL 383779, at *6 (W. Va. 2017) (“[S]imple assertions of negligence . . . as

explained in syllabus point 7 of are barred . . . .”). As such, the claim of negligence

against defendant Chandler is DISMISSED.

b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)

To state a claim to relief for IIED, the plaintiff must show the following:

(1) that the defendant's conduct was atrocious, intolerable,

and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed the bounds of

decency;

(2) that the defendant acted with the intent to inflict

emotional distress, or acted recklessly when it was certain

or substantially certain emotional distress would result

from his conduct;

(3) that the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to

suffer emotional distress; and

(4) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was

so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to

endure it.

Syl. Pt. 3, , 504 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1998).

As a threshold matter, I find that state officials are not immune from conduct

meeting the elements of IIED. In

, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that “false

light invasion of privacy claims . . . –plainly satisfy[] the requirement of ‘fraudulent,

malicious, or oppressive’ activity.” 788 S.E.2d 295, 305 (W. Va. 2016). A successful

“false light” claim requires that the actor “had knowledge of or acted in reckless

disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter.” , 504 S.E.2d at Syl.

Pt. 3. Similarly, in

, the district court found that common law battery, an intentional tort, is

both “malicious and in violation of a law of which a reasonable person would have

known.” No. 3:13-10176, 2014 WL 2973486, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. July 2, 2014). Notably,

battery in West Virginia requires that “the actor desire to cause the consequences of

his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result

from it.” , 413 S.E.2d 79, 82

(W. Va. 1991).

Comparatively, IIED can be committed with intent to cause emotional harm

by reckless conduct when the tortfeasor was “certain or substantially certain

emotional distress would result.” at Syl. Pt. 3. This is analogous to both the

intent and reckless requirements of false light and the intent requirement of battery.

Combined with the outrageousness of the conduct and the severity of the harm

required to be proved, I have no trouble finding that IIED, whether intentionally or

recklessly caused, is beyond “mere negligence” and plainly falls within the scope of

conduct that is “fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive.” , 424 S.E.2d at 600.

Next, the defendant argues that “failing ‘to conduct suicide watch protocol in

the final hours of Dr. Knouse life while he sat and watched YouTube videos’ does not

rise to level [sic.] of sufficiently outrageous conduct.” Mem. 8. (citation omitted). For

guidance on “outrageous conduct,” the West Virginia Supreme Court relies heavily

on the . , 461 S.E.2d

149, 156–57 (W. Va. 1995). As the explains, to be liable under IIED, the

conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly

intolerable in a civilized community.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d

(Am. Law Inst. 1965). In other words, liability “clearly does not extend to mere

insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”

On the other hand, the extreme and outrageous character of the conduct “may arise

from an abuse by the actor of a position . . . which gives him actual or apparent

authority over the other, or power to affect his interests.” § 46 cmt. e. “Whether

conduct may reasonably be considered outrageous is a legal question.” Syl. Pt. 4,

, 504 S.E.2d 419 (W. Va. 1998).

I find that as alleged, the defendant engaged in sufficiently outrageous

conduct. The plaintiff has asserted throughout the Amended Complaint that the

defendant knew of Dr. Knouse’s medical issues and the substantial risk of harm they

posed and alleges that instead of tending to Dr. Knouse, the defendant ignored him

and told him to “shut up.” Am. Compl. 14. She alleges that when Dr. Knouse asked

for help, the defendant told him “they had tried to wake him earlier [sic.] but he

wouldn’t, so go away now because they are busy” before proceeding with other

personal interests, which included watching videos on Facebook and YouTube.

14–15. She also alleges that the defendant failed to conduct suicide watches although

Dr. Knouse was “complaining incessantly about his lack of proper medication.” at

18. Furthermore, as the guard on duty, Defendant Chandler was in a position of

authority and had the power to affect Dr. Knouse’s interests. Taken as true, this

conduct encompasses more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty

oppressions, or other trivialities”; it is outrageous. As alleged, the claim for IIED

survives.

c. Fraud

To state a claim of fraud in West Virginia, a plaintiff must allege the following:

(1) that the act claimed to be fraudulent was the act of the

defendant or induced by him;

(2) that it was material and false; that plaintiff relied upon

it and was justified under the circumstances in relying

upon it; and

(3) that he was damaged because he relied upon it.

Syl. Pt. 1, , 280 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1981).

As the defendant points out, the only allegations of fraud involve other

defendants altering medical logs. The plaintiff fails, however, to allege that

Defendant Chandler, as opposed to PrimeCare defendants, altered any logs. In

response, the plaintiff argues that the fraud against Defendant Chandler is based on

paragraph 59 of the Amended Complaint and video surveillance. But the only

reference in paragraph 59 to Defendant Chandler is him telling Dr. Knouse to “shut

up” and return to his bunk and to “go away now because they are busy.” This is

insufficient to state a claim of fraud. Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to plead her

fraud claim against Defendant Chandler with particularity, as required by Rule 9(b)

of the .

d. State Constitutional Claims

The plaintiff, again, alleges that the defendant “violated Dr. Knouse’s

constitutional rights guaranteed under Article III, Sections 1, 5, 10, and 14, and

Article XII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution—five constitutional violations

in one paragraph.” , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 593; Am. Compl. 20;

Compl. 11 [ECF No. 1]. “To prove that a clearly established right has been infringed

upon, a plaintiff must do more than allege that an abstract right has been violated.

Instead, the plaintiff must make a ‘particularized showing’ that a ‘reasonable official

would understand that what he is doing violated that right’ or that ‘in the light of

preexisting law the unlawfulness’ of the action was ‘apparent.’”

, 479 S.E.2d 649, 659 n.11 (W. Va. 1996) (quoting

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Because a “particularized showing” is inherently lacking,

the plaintiff has failed to allege enough facts to state a claim to relief on any of these

claims.

While the plaintiff’s state constitutional claims fail because they lack a

particularized showing, Article III, Sections 1, 5, and 10 also fail as a matter of law.

First, Article III Section 1 does not independently give rise to a cause of action.

, No. 2:13-cv-15798, 2017 WL 4849113, at * 8 (S.D. W. Va. Oct.

26, 2017) (Goodwin, J). Second, “if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific

constitutional provision, . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard

appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due

process.” , No. 2:16-cv-0178, 2017 WL 440733, at *6 (S.D. W.

Va. Feb 1, 2017) (applying this federal standard to the West Virginia Constitution).

Thus, the plaintiff’s claim under Section 10 is properly analyzed under Section 5’s

prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.” , 2017 WL 4849113,

at *8. Under Section 5, however, money damages are unavailable.

, No. 3:17-1300, 2017 WL 3841894, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 1, 2017)

(collecting cases); , 2017 WL 4849113, at * 8 (Goodwin, J.); Syl. Pt.

4, , 271 S.E.2d 322, 324 (W. Va. 1980) (listing the kinds of relief

available under Article III, Section 5). Because the plaintiff strictly seeks monetary

damages under the West Virginia Constitution, his claim under Section 5 fails.

Accordingly, all state constitutional claims are DISMISSED.

4. Rule 11—Sanctions

As recently discussed by this court—in this case—in a published opinion—

Article XII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution reads as follows:

“The Legislature shall provide, by general law, for a

thorough and efficient system of free schools.”

W. Va. Const. Art. XII, § 1. Remarkably, the plaintiff alleged a violation of this

constitutional provision for a second time in the Amended Complaint. “To assert that

this constitutional provision applies to disputed medical treatment and the death of

a federal detainee is [ ] nonsense.” , 333 F. Supp. 3d at 592.

“By presenting to the court a pleading . . . –whether by signing, filing,

submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the

person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable

under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are

warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or

reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). “On its own,

the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct

specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3).

Consequently, the court ORDERS the plaintiff’s counsel who signed the Amended

Complaint to show cause as to why pleading violations of Article XII, Section 1 of the

West Virginia Constitution, in two separate pleadings in this litigation, does not

violate Rule 11(b).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Chandler’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF

No. 91] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Except for the § 1983 claim in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the IIED claim, all other claims against

Defendant Chandler are DISMISSED with prejudice. The plaintiff’s Motion to Seal

[ECF No. 107] is DENIED. Accordingly, the court ORDERS that the Motion to Seal

[ECF No. 107], the plaintiff’s Response [ECF No. 108], and its attachment [ECF No.

108-1] be unsealed.

Further, the plaintiff’s counsel is ORDERED to show cause why sanctions

should not be imposed in accordance with Rule 11. The plaintiff’s counsel has

FOURTEEN DAYS from the filing of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to file a

memorandum. The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.

ENTER: January 17, 2019

G 6A

ee STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18