The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
BECKLEY DIVISION
AMANDA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:16-cv-09002
WEST VIRGINIA STATE POLICE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment of the West Virginia State
Police, Colonel C.R. Smithers, Lt. Colonel T.D. Bradley, and Trooper M.W. Price (Document 48)
and Memorandum of Law in Support (Document 49), the Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 55), the Reply of the West Virginia State Police,
Colonel C.R. Smithers, Lt. Colonel T.D. Bradley, and Trooper M.W. Price to Plaintiff’s Response
to Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 57), and all attached exhibits. The Court has
also reviewed the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 50) and Memorandum of
Law in Support (Document 52), the Response of the West Virginia State Police, Colonel C.R.
Smithers, Lt. Colonel T.D. Bradley, and Trooper M.W. Price to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Document 54), the Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’ Response in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 56), and all attached exhibits. Finally, the
Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint (Document 26). For the reasons stated herein, the
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Court finds that the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted, and the
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Amanda Williams, initiated this action on September 20, 2016, naming the
West Virginia State Police, Colonel C.R. Smithers, Lt. Colonel T.D. Bradley, and Trooper M.W.
Price (“Trooper Price”) as defendants. Pursuant to the Court’s March 2, 2017 Memorandum
Opinion and Order (Document 25) granting the Plaintiff’s motion to amend, the Plaintiff filed her
amended complaint on that same date.
As the result of a criminal investigation regarding the illegal sale of narcotics, Trooper
Price and various members of both the Beckley/Raleigh County Drug and Violent Crimes Unit
and the West Virginia State Police executed a search warrant at the Plaintiff’s residence, located
at 115 Barnes Court, Crab Orchard, West Virginia, on September 29, 2014. (Defs.’ Mem. in
Supp., Ex. 7.) Throughout the course of the investigation, Trooper Price had arranged multiple
controlled purchases of narcotics from the Plaintiff and her husband and recorded the purchases
through video surveillance. (Id. at Ex. 6.) The video surveillance reveals that the Plaintiff’s
husband sold narcotics from a 2005 white Mercedes-Benz automobile and that this same
automobile was in the Plaintiff’s driveway during another controlled buy. (Id.; Defs.’ Mem. in
Supp. at 5.) When Trooper Price executed the search warrant on the Plaintiff’s residence, this
Mercedes was located in the driveway. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp., Ex. 5.)
In executing the September 29, 2014 search warrant, Trooper Price arrested the Plaintiff’s
husband and inquired of the Plaintiff concerning the white Mercedes automobile. (Defs.’ Mem. in
Supp., Ex. 5.) According to the investigation report, Trooper Price informed the Plaintiff that he
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intended to seize the automobiles used in the controlled buys. However, Trooper Price “spoke
with Amanda Williams, and obtained a Settlement and Disclaimer Form for the vehicle which
shows the owner, Amanda Williams, voluntarily forfeited the [white Mercedes] to the West
Virginia State Police.” (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp., Ex. 5 and Ex. 1.) Specifically, Trooper Price
“advised the Plaintiff that if she executed a ‘Settlement and Disclaimer’ agreement, signing title
to the [white Mercedes] over to the West Virginia State Police, then the West Virginia State Police
would not seize a second car owned by the Plaintiff.” (Pl.’s Amended Compl. at ¶ 12.) The
Plaintiff did indeed sign a Settlement and Disclaimer form, waiving her right, title, and interest to
the 2005 white Mercedes-Benz having VIN number W2DBRF40JX5F711827. (Defs.’ Mem. in
Supp., Ex. 1.)
On September 11, 2015, the Plaintiff filed a Petition for Preliminary Injunctive Relief in
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia. (Id. at Ex. 2.) The Plaintiff’s state court
petition was nearly identical to her amended complaint filed in this action, and specifically claimed
that Trooper Price and the other Defendants violated her civil and constitutional rights by all but
forcing her to sign over her title to her white Mercedes through the Settlement and Disclaimer
form rather than properly seizing her car pursuant to the West Virginia Contraband Forfeiture Act
(“WVCFA”). (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp., Ex. 2, at ¶¶ 10-12.) Similar to her amended complaint in
this case, the Plaintiff’s petition for injunctive relief alleged that Trooper Price “failed to provide
the Plaintiff with any Due Process protections . . . in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights
Violation), as the result of an alleged criminal violation committed by her husband.” (Compare
Pl.’s Amended Compl. at ¶ 15 and Defs.’ Mem. in Supp., Ex. 2, at ¶ 12.)
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An evidentiary hearing was held in Kanawha County Circuit Court regarding the Plaintiff’s
petition, and after the submission of briefs on the issue, the court denied her petition for injunctive
relief. (Id. at Ex. 3.) The court’s order described in great detail the events that occurred when
the Defendants executed the search warrant at the Plaintiff’s residence, and specifically explained
that “[Ms. Williams] was not deprived of any statutory due process rights under the WVCFA
because her automobile was not seized pursuant to that statute; rather, the automobile was obtained
pursuant to a written agreement voluntarily entered into by [Ms. Williams] in which she waived
all her rights under the WVCFA.” (Id. at Ex. 3, p. 8, ¶ 8.) The state court found that Ms.
Williams executed the Settlement and Disclaimer form, which is “a voluntary waiver of any rights
Ms. Williams may have had if the seizure had been conducted pursuant to the WVCFA.” (Id. at
p. 10, ¶ 12.) The court further found that Ms. Williams entered into this agreement willfully, not
under duress, was not underage, and was not under arrest or even detained at the time she signed
the agreement. (Id. at p. 10, ¶ 13.) In other words, the court found that Ms. Williams’ automobile
“was not ‘seized’ within the meaning of the [WVCFA], but rather was obtained pursuant to a
written agreement wherein Ms. Williams voluntarily surrendered the vehicle1 to the West Virginia
State Police.” (Id. at p. 9, ¶ 11.) Thus, the court found that Ms. Williams was “not entitled to
claim any due process rights…contained within the statute as they were effectively waived,” and
denied her petition for preliminary injunctive relief. (Id. at p. 11-13.)
1 The state court went on to find that, even if Ms. Williams’ automobile had been seized pursuant to the WVCFA
rather than by her own relinquishment of it, the Defendants would have had probable cause to seize the automobile
during the search and then institute a forfeiture proceeding after the fact. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp., Ex. 3, p. 11, ¶ 20.)
The court found that, because a confidential informant made a video-recorded purchase of narcotics from the
automobile in question, said evidence would have been sufficient to provide the Defendants probable cause to seize
the vehicle and not return it to the Plaintiff under the WVCFA. (Id.) Thus, the court concluded, even if the Plaintiff
had not voluntarily waived her rights and agreed to give the automobile away, the Defendants would have had the
statutory right to seize it.
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The Plaintiff did not appeal the state court’s November 20, 2015 order to the West Virginia
Supreme Court. She initiated this lawsuit nearly a year after the state court entered its ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The well-established standard in consideration of a motion for summary judgment is that
“[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a)–(c); see also Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Hoschar v.
Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 169 (4th Cir. 2014). A “material fact” is a fact that could
affect the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; News & Observer Publ’g Co. v.
Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). A “genuine issue” concerning
a material fact exists when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict
in the nonmoving party’s favor. FDIC v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 180 (4th Cir. 2013); News &
Observer, 597 F.3d at 576.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 322–23. When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must
view all of the factual evidence, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hoschar, 739 F.3d at 169. However, the non-moving
party must offer some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in
his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. “At the summary judgment stage, the non-moving party
must come forward with more than ‘mere speculation or the building of one inference upon
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another’ to resist dismissal of the action.” Perry v. Kappos, No.11-1476, 2012 WL 2130908, at
*3 (4th Cir. June 13, 2012) (unpublished decision) (quoting Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214
(4th Cir. 1985)).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not “weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, nor will it make determinations of
credibility. N. Am. Precast, Inc. v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 2008 WL 906334, *3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar.
31, 2008) (Copenhaver, J.) (citing Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 1986). If
disputes over a material fact exist that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,” summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250. If, however, the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,” then summary judgment should be
granted because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element . . . necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
When presented with motions for summary judgment from both parties, courts apply the
same standard of review. Tastee Treats, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 2008 WL 2836701 (S.D.
W. Va. July 21, 2008) (Johnston, J.) aff'd, 474 F. App'x 101 (4th Cir. 2012). Courts “must review
each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves
judgment as a matter of law,” resolving factual disputes and drawing inferences for the non-
moving party as to each motion. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Monumental Paving & Excavating, Inc.
v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Ass'n Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 794, 797 (4th Cir. 1999).
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DISCUSSION
The Defendants and the Plaintiff move for summary judgment on all of the Plaintiff’s
claims. The Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate based on the principles of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, and qualified immunity. According to the Defendants, the ruling
issued by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County regarding the Plaintiff’s state law claims satisfies
the elements of res judicata such that those claims are precluded from being re-litigated in this
Court, which is exactly what the Plaintiff is attempting to do. They further assert that, even if the
elements of res judicata are not satisfied, summary judgment is appropriate under the principle of
collateral estoppel because the same issue raised by the Plaintiff was litigated in the state court
proceedings. The Defendants also argue that summary judgment is appropriate because the
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, there is no supervisory liability regarding the West
Virginia State Police, Colonel Smithers, and Lieutenant Colonel Bradley in Section 1983 cases,
and because, under the West Virginia Constitution, there is no independent cause of action for
monetary damages.
The Plaintiff counters that the Circuit Court of Kanawha County’s order on the Plaintiff’s
petition for an injunction is without merit because it was a proposed order submitted by the same
Defendants here and objected to by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiff further argues that the petition
filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County only sought to enjoin the Defendants from
improperly disposing of the Plaintiff’s white Mercedes automobile, while her complaint in this
case states other constitutional, statutory, and common law claims that overcome summary
judgment on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds. The Plaintiff also counters that the
Defendants knew they were violating the Plaintiff’s civil rights when they took her automobile
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pursuant to the Settlement and Disclaimer agreement, and are therefore not entitled to qualified
immunity.
The Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on her own behalf. The Plaintiff almost
exclusively relies on the transcript of the evidentiary hearing on her petition in state court to argue
that the Defendants violated her due process rights by taking ownership of her car after she
executed the Settlement and Disclaimer form. The Plaintiff argues that because she “basically
was coerced into signing [her automobile] over to Defendants by being allowed to keep a second
vehicle,” she is entitled to summary judgment. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. at 8.) The Defendants
counter that the Plaintiff’s motion lacks evidentiary support, and further reiterate the arguments
from their own summary judgment motion that the Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata
and collateral estoppel.
The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, generally refers to the legal
principle that “preclude[es] re-litigation of the same cause of action.” Blake v. Charleston Area
Med. Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41, 48 (W.Va. 1997) (citing Christian v. Sizemore, 407 S.E.2d 668,
676 (W.Va. 1996)). Accordingly, “under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits
in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause
of action.” Blake, 498 S.E.2d at 48 (internal citations omitted). According to the West Virginia
Supreme Court, res judicata bars a lawsuit if the following three elements are satisfied:
First, there must have been a final adjudication on the merits in the prior action by
a court having jurisdiction of the proceedings. Second, the two actions must involve
either the same parties or persons in privity with those same parties. Third, the cause
of action identified for resolution in the subsequent proceeding either must be
identical to the cause of action determined in the prior action or must be such that
it could have been resolved, had it been presented, in the prior action.
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Moore v. Knippenberg, No. 1:15CV193, 2016 WL 6833999, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 18, 2016)
(citing Syl. Pt. 4, Blake v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 498 S.E.2d 41 (W.Va. 1997)) (emphasis
added). “A final decision is one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for
the court to do but execute judgment.” Moore, 2016 WL 6833999, at *3 (citing Tree Fin. Corp.
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000)). Further, “a cause of action is the fact or facts which
establish or give rise to a right of action, the existence of which affords a party a right to judicial
relief.” Id.
In this case, the Plaintiff has presented no evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact that negates the application of res judicata, and all of the elements of res judicata are satisfied.
As previously evidenced, the Plaintiff filed a petition for injunctive relief in the Circuit Court of
Kanawha County, West Virginia, that was nearly identical to her amended complaint filed here.
Both actions sought relief based on her allegations that the Defendants violated her due process
rights by taking title to her automobile after she signed the Settlement and Disclaimer form.
Concerning the first element, the court’s order denied her petition for relief and dismissed the case,
effectively ending the litigation and leaving “nothing more for the court to do but execute the
judgment.” Randolph, 531 U.S. at 86. Secondly, the Plaintiff and all of the Defendants currently
named were the parties in the Plaintiff’s state court petition.
The only remaining issue is whether the current cause of action is identical to the cause of
action in the Plaintiff’s state court petition. In both her state court petition and her amended
complaint, the facts relied on by Ms. Williams to establish her right to judicial relief are that the
Defendants’ actions in taking her car after she signed the Settlement and Disclaimer form violated
her constitutional due process rights. That the Plaintiff’s state court petition sought injunctive
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relief as opposed to damages does not change the facts establishing the relief she seeks, and those
facts are identical.
Therefore, because the lower court issued a final adjudication on the merits, because the
parties in both actions are identical, and because the cause of action in the Plaintiff’s state court
proceedings is identical to the cause of action presented in this case, the elements of res judicata
are satisfied. The Plaintiff is not entitled to a re-litigation of her claims, and the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment should be granted. Inasmuch as summary judgment is appropriate
on res judicata grounds, the Court need not address the Defendants’ arguments on collateral
estoppel, qualified immunity, supervisor liability, or issues concerning liability under the West
Virginia constitution.
With respect to the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, based on the previous finding
that the Plaintiff’s claims are barred from re-litigation in this court, the Court finds that the
Plaintiff’s motion should be denied as moot. Because the Plaintiff heavily quotes the transcript
from the state court evidentiary hearing and merely recites her allegations of an infringement of
her civil rights, the Court need not address the merits of what has previously been adjudicated by
the state court.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, after thorough review and careful consideration, the Court ORDERS that
the Motion for Summary Judgment of the West Virginia State Police, Colonel C.R. Smithers, Lt.
Colonel T.D. Bradley, and Trooper M.W. Price (Document 48) be GRANTED and that the
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 50) be DENIED. The Court further
ORDERS that any pending motions be TERMINATED AS MOOT.
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The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order to counsel of record
and to any unrepresented party.
ENTER: January 26, 2018
IRENE C. 2S q
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
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