The opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs May 14, 2003
RICKY FLAMINGO BROWN, SR. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
No. 84-F-1484 Cheryl Blackburn, Judge
No. M2002-02427-CCA-R3-PC - Filed June 13, 2003
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, J., concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. I question, though, the trial court’s reliance upon the
victim’s identifying the petitioner, her father, as the perpetrator to deny testing. The DNA Analysis
Act requires the court to determine if “[a] reasonable probability exists that the petitioner would not
have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA analysis.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-404(1). In other words, the Act requires the trial court to assume that the
DNA analysis will reveal exculpatory results in the court’s determination as to whether to order
DNA testing. To the extent that the trial court’s order implies that the fact that the victim identified
the petitioner as a perpetrator defeats the need for testing, I disagree. The Act was created because
of the possibility that a person has been wrongfully convicted or sentenced. A person may be
wrongly convicted based upon mistaken identity or false testimony. Thus, the fact that the victim
identified the petitioner as the perpetrator should not provide a basis for denying testing.
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JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE