Owens v. The City Of Pennsboro

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

ERNEST L. OWENS, and

ANITA M. OWENS,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 1:20CV55

v. (Judge Keeley)

R.T. DAVIS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 81).

I. Factual Background

On a motion for summary judgment, courts “view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and refrain

from “weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations.”

Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th

Cir. 2015)). The Court therefore recites the following facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

On March 26, 2019, the plaintiff, Ernest L. Owens (“Owens”),

was driving in Ritchie County, West Virginia, when he noticed that

he was being followed by another vehicle (E. Owens Depo. 34).

Wanting to stop in an area with people, Owens pulled into the

OWENS v. DAVIS 1:20CV55

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

parking lot of a nearby grocery store. Id. The other vehicle

followed, and the occupants then complained that a pizza box had

flown out of Owens’s truck bed and damaged their vehicle. Id. After

some back and forth, one of the occupants of the other vehicle

stated that he was calling the police (Dkt. No. 34 ¶ 14). Because

Owens did not believe any of the allegations, he decided to leave

the scene (E. Owens Depo. 35-36).

But as Owens began to drive away, the defendant, R.T. Davis

(“Officer Davis”), the chief of police for the city of Pennsboro,

arrived on the scene and briefly turned on his siren to prevent

Owens from leaving the parking lot. Id. at 36. At that point, as

Officer Davis was pulling into the parking lot, Owens got out of

his vehicle and began walking toward the police cruiser. Id. at

36. Officer Davis then asked Owens for his license and

registration. After initially questioning why that was necessary,

Owens complied and provided Officer Davis with his license,

insurance card, registration card, and concealed carry weapons

permit (“CCW permit”). Id. at 36-37. During all this, Officer Davis

claims Owens was irate and made it difficult to conduct an

investigation (R.T. Davis Depo. 9-12).

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

While Officer Davis was speaking with the occupants of the

other vehicle, Owens called his wife, Anita M. Owens (“Mrs.

Owens”), to inform her of the situation (E. Owens Depo. 41). After

he told her the name of the company displayed on the side of the

vehicle that had followed him, id., she called the company, whose

owner told her he did not wish to make a claim against Owens,

stating he would send a company representative to the parking lot

to confirm that (A. Owens Depo. 9-10). Following that call, Mrs.

Owens decided to go meet her husband at the parking lot. Id. 10-

11.

After Mrs. Owens arrived, she and Owens walked over to Officer

Davis’s police cruiser, at which point Mrs. Owens attempted to

inform Officer Davis about her conversation with the owner of the

company (A. Owens Depo. 11-12; E. Owens Depo. 42-43). Exactly what

happened next is the subject of considerable dispute. The Owenses

contend that Officer Davis became enraged at them and threatened

to arrest them for obstructing an officer (A. Owens Depo. 12-13;

E. Owens Depo. 43). According to the Owenses, Officer Davis then

directed Owens to return to his vehicle (A. Owens Depo. 15; E.

Owens Depo. 43). But when Owens began to do so, Officer Davis and

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

another officer on the scene tackled him. The Owenses claim that

the officers slammed Owens against his vehicle, threw him to the

ground, kneed him in the back, and only then placed him under

arrest. (A. Owens Depo. 15-17; E. Owens Depo. 44-45). As for Mrs.

Owens, she too was arrested and claims that Officer Davis shoved

her into the side of his police cruiser and handcuffed her too

tightly (A. Owens Depo. 18-19; E. Owens Depo. 56-57).

According to the narrative attached to Officer Davis’s police

report, when he told Mrs. Owens that the decision of the company

owner not to file a claim was irrelevant, she became belligerent

toward him (Dkt. No. 82-3 at 26). He then instructed her that

further interference would result in her arrest for obstructing an

officer and disorderly conduct. Id. Owens subsequently began to

yell and used profane language. Id. Officer Davis contends that he

gave Owens the same instruction he had given to Mrs. Owens, but,

after Owens made another profane comment, he placed Owens under

arrest. Id. When Owens then began to move toward his vehicle, based

on their belief that Owens possibly had a weapon there, Officer

Davis and the other officer restrained him to gain control of the

situation. Id. at 27.

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

While the officers were attempting to restrain Owens, Officer

Davis’s report asserts Mrs. Owens came within six inches of them,

yelling that she was recording the incident. Id. When Officer Davis

instructed her to back away, she refused and that is when he placed

her under arrest. Id. When he subsequently asked Mrs. Owens to

place her hands behind her back to be handcuffed, she refused, and

he forcibly handcuffed her. Id.

Because of the distance and the lack of sound, the video of

the incident from a nearby security camera clarifies little about

the disputed facts (Dkt. No. 82 Ex. E). Indeed, it confirms only

that the two officers wrestled with Owens as he walked away from

them and that, as Owens was being brought to the ground, Mrs. Owens

rushed toward all three men. Id.

Following the Owenses’ arrests, Officer Davis filed a

criminal complaint in the Magistrate Court of Ritchie County, West

Virginia, alleging that they had committed the offenses of

(1) Obstruction, in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-5-17, and

(2) Disorderly Conduct, in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-6-1b (Dkt.

No. 34 ¶ 37). Later, another officer charged Owens with Littering,

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

in violation of W. Va. Code § 17C-14-14(a). Id. All three of these

charges were later dismissed by the magistrate judge. Id.

II. Procedural Background

Initially, the Owenses sued Officer Davis and the City of

Pennsboro, asserting that (1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Officer

Davis violated Owens’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him

without probable cause and using excessive force during the arrest;

(2) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Officer Davis violated Mrs.

Owens’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable

cause and using excessive force during the arrest; (3) under West

Virginia law, Officer Davis falsely arrested and falsely

imprisoned Owens; (4) under West Virginia law, Officer Davis

falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned Mrs. Owens; (5) pursuant

to Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S.

658 (1978), the City of Pennsboro was liable for failing to

discipline Officer Davis for his unconstitutional actions with

respect to Owens; and (6) pursuant to Monell, the City of Pennsboro

was liable for failing to discipline Officer Davis for his

unconstitutional actions with respect to Mrs. Owens (Dkt. No. 34).

Ultimately, the Court granted the City of Pennsboro’s motion to

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

dismiss Counts Five and Six pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

(Dkt. No. 55), thus only the four claims against Officer Davis

remain. These are the subject of the instant summary judgment

motion, which is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

III. Standard of Review

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and “[a] fact is

material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d

562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright et al.,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed. 1998)).

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the

nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an essential element of his claim or defense upon

which he bears the burden of proof. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). That is, once the movant shows an absence of

evidence on one such element, the nonmovant must then come forward

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with evidence demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for

trial. Id. at 323-24. The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence

supporting the nonmovant’s position is insufficient to create a

genuine issue; rather, there must be evidence on which a jury could

reasonably find for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Summary judgment “should be granted only in

those cases where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is

involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify

the application of the law.” Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597

F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson

Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950)).

IV. Discussion

A. Fourth Amendment

With respect to the Owenses’ Fourth Amendment claims, Officer

Davis argues that summary judgment is appropriate because those

claims lack evidentiary support; alternatively, he contends he is

entitled to qualified immunity (Dkt. No. 82 at 8-12). The Owenses

respond that summary judgment should be denied because the evidence

establishes that Officer Davis lacked probable cause for their

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arrests and used excessive force (Dkt. No. 84-1 at 5-12). Nor,

they argue, is Officer Davis entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

To succeed on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiffs must show that

(1) they were deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and

the laws” of the United States; and (2) the individual who deprived

them of the right was acting under color of state law. Lugar v.

Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (internal citations

omitted). Generally, a public employee acts under color of state

law “while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his

responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Conner v. Donnelly, 42

F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 50 (1988)). Section 1983, however, “‘is not itself a source of

substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, at 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

144, n.3 (1979)).

In this case, the Owenses claim that Officer Davis violated

their clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights by falsely

arresting them and by employing excessive force in the course of

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

the arrest. There is no dispute that Officer Davis was acting under

color of state law.

Because Officer Davis contends that there is a lack of

evidentiary support for the Owenses’ Fourth Amendment claims, he

argues that the Court can resolve his motion for summary judgment

without reaching the issue of qualified immunity. But because the

qualified immunity analysis necessarily involves an examination of

whether a constitutional violation occurred, the Court will

collapse the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the qualified immunity

analysis. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (10th Cir.

2010) (concluding that the legal analysis to demonstrate a

constitutional violation under § 1983 and with respect to qualified

immunity “is often related, if not identical”).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government

officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does

not violate clearly established constitutional or other rights

that a reasonable officer would have known.” Hupp v. Cook, 931

F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d

254, 260 (4th Cir. 2018)). Accordingly, “[a]n official is not

entitled to qualified immunity if he or she deprived an individual

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

of a constitutional right and that right was clearly established

at the time of the violation.” Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The qualified immunity analysis

therefore entails two determinations: (1) whether the plaintiffs’

rights were violated; and (2) whether those rights were clearly

established. Id.

1. False Arrest

“[I]f a person is arrested when no reasonable officer could

believe . . . that probable cause exists to arrest that person, a

violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be

arrested only upon probable cause ensues.” Hupp, 931 F.3d at 318

(quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 290 (4th Cir. 2001)).

“Probable cause is determined by a ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’

approach.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th

Cir. 2017)). However, that determination turns on two factors:

(1) the suspect’s conduct as known to the officer; and (2) the

contours of the offense of arrest. Id.

Here, examining the contours of the offenses, the Owenses

were arrested for obstructing an officer and engaging in disorderly

conduct (Dkt. No. 34 ¶ 37). In West Virginia, “[a] person who by

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threats, menaces, acts, or otherwise forcibly or illegally hinders

or obstructs or attempts to hinder or obstruct a law-enforcement

officer . . . acting in his or her official capacity is guilty of

a misdemeanor.” W. Va. Code § 61-5-17(a). The Supreme Court of

Appeals of West Virginia has confirmed that obstructing an officer

requires “forcible or illegal conduct that interferes with a police

officer’s discharge of official duties.” State v. Davis, 735 S.E.2d

570, 573 (W. Va. 2012) (quoting State v. Carney, 663 S.E.2d 606,

611 (W. Va. 2008)). In the absence of force, “the key to

determining whether conduct . . . constitutes the offense of

obstruction under [W. Va. Code § 61-5-17] is whether the conduct

at issue is illegal.” State v. Carney, 663 S.E.2d 606, 610 (W. Va.

2008). Consequently, “lawful speech will not support an

obstruction charge.” Id. at 611. Specifically, an individual who

speaks to an officer “without the use of fighting or insulting

words or other opprobrious language” has not committed the offense

of obstruction. Syl. Pt., State ex rel. Wilmoth v. Gustke, 373

S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1988).

A genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether

Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest the Owenses for

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obstructing an officer. The Owenses contend that they approached

Officer Davis and informed him that the company owner did not

intend to pursue a claim against Owens. The parties, however,

dispute the tone of this conversation. Moreover, after some back

and forth between Officer Davis and the Owenses, the parties

disagree about whether Officer Davis placed Owens under arrest or

directed him to return to his vehicle. Similarly, while video

evidence establishes that Mrs. Owens rushed toward her husband and

the officers, the parties dispute how Mrs. Owens behaved while her

husband was being restrained. Further, they disagree about Mrs.

Owens’s conduct after the officers placed Owens in the police

cruiser.

Regarding the arrest of the Owenses for disorderly conduct,

W. Va. Code § 61-6-1b states that

[a]ny person who, in a public place, . . . disturbs the

peace of others by violent, profane, indecent or

boisterous conduct or language or by the making of

unreasonably loud noise that is intended to cause

annoyance or alarm to another person, and who persists

in such conduct after being requested to desist by a

law-enforcement officer acting in his or her lawful

capacity, is guilty of disorderly conduct, a

misdemeanor.

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A genuine dispute of material fact exists where it is unclear

whether an individual’s conduct disturbed “others,” excluding law

enforcement officers. Maston v. Wagner, 781 S.E.2d 936, 951 (W.

Va. 2015).

Here, genuine questions of material fact abound regarding

whether others were disturbed by the Owenses when they raised their

voices. Without the disturbance of others, Officer Davis would

have lacked probable cause to arrest the Owenses for disorderly

conduct.

Accordingly, whether Officer Davis had probable cause to

arrest the Owenses is in dispute, and the Court therefore DENIES

summary judgment on these claims of false arrest.

2. Excessive Force

The Owenses next contend that Officer Davis violated their

clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights by employing excessive

force during their arrests. “A claim that a police officer employed

excessive force is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment under an

‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95,

100-01 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524,

531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). Specifically, an officer’s actions

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“do not amount to excessive force if they ‘are “objectively

reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

[him], without regard to [his] underlying intent or motivation.’”

Id. at 101 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).

Moreover, the facts and circumstances must be analyzed “at the

moment that the challenged force was employed.” Id.

In addition, the evaluation of an officer’s actions “requires

a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on

the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. (quoting

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A

court “must give ‘careful attention to the facts and circumstances

of each particular case, including’ three factors in particular:

‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

“Ultimately, the question to be decided is ‘whether the totality

of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . .

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seizure.’” Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9

(1985)).

Here, there are genuine questions of material fact in dispute

regarding whether Officer Davis’s use of force was objectively

reasonable under the circumstances. Turning to the Graham factors,

the Owenses were arrested for obstructing an officer and disorderly

conduct, both of which are misdemeanors. See W. Va. Code §§ 61-5-

17, 61-6-1b. Further, although Officer Davis may have had reason

to suspect Owens might have a gun in his vehicle, the Owenses

contend that Officer Davis ordered Owens to return to his vehicle.

Officer Davis, on the other hand, claims that Owens walked away

after he had been placed under arrest.

As to Mrs. Owens, the parties dispute her tone toward the

officers throughout the encounter. Further, they disagree as to

whether she disobeyed Officer Davis’s order to back up when Owens

was being arrested, and whether she resisted arrest. Based on such

disputed facts, whether Officer Davis’s actions were objectively

reasonable under the circumstances is a question for a jury to

determine. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment on the issue

of excessive force.

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B. State Law Claims

Officer Davis argues that the Owenses lack evidentiary

support for their state law claims (Dkt. No. 82 at 6-8). The

Owenses have not directly responded to this argument.

Under West Virginia law, “[p]robable cause to make a

misdemeanor arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and

circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer are

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that a misdemeanor

is being committed in his presence.” State v. Forsythe, 460 S.E.2d

742, 744 (W. Va. 1995). Moreover, “[a]n action for false

imprisonment may be maintained where the imprisonment is without

legal authority.” Riffe v. Armstrong, 477 S.E.2d 535, 549 (W. Va.

1996) (quoting Vorholt v. Vorholt, 160 S.E. 916, 918 (W. Va.

1931)).

For the reasons previously discussed, genuine disputes of

material fact exist regarding whether Officer Davis had probable

cause to arrest the Owenses and, as a result, whether he had the

legal authority to detain them. The Court therefore DENIES Officer

Davis’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the Owenses’

state-law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.

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V. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Officer Davis’s

motion for summary judgment.

It is so ORDERED.

The Clerk SHALL transmit copies of this Order to counsel of

record.

DATED: April 22, 2022

/s/ Irene M. Keeley

IRENE M. KEELEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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