Smith v. The City of Pennsboro

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

THOMAS F. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 1:20CV54

v. (Judge Keeley)

R.T. DAVIS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 83).

I. Factual Background

On a motion for summary judgment, courts “view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and refrain

from “weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations.”

Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting

Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th

Cir. 2015)). The Court therefore recites the following facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

On March 29, 2018, as the plaintiff, Thomas F. Smith

(“Smith”), was driving his motor vehicle through the city of

Pennsboro, West Virginia (Dkt. No. 36 ¶ 7), the defendant, R.T.

Davis (“Officer Davis”), the chief of police for Pennsboro, began

SMITH v. DAVIS 1:20CV54

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

following him in his police cruiser (Dkt. Nos. 36 ¶¶ 12-13, 64 ¶¶

12-13). Suspecting that Officer Davis was purposely following him,

Smith stopped his vehicle (Dkt. No. 36 ¶¶ 12, 15) and walked back

toward Officer Davis’s cruiser as it also stopped (Davis Depo. 40;

Smith Depo. 66-67). Smith inquired whether Officer Davis had been

following him, which Officer Davis denied (Davis Depo. 40; Smith

Depo. 68-69). At this point, the parties hotly dispute what

happened next.

According to Smith, when he asked whether Officer Davis was

following him, Officer Davis became enraged, exited his cruiser,

and attempted to grab him (Dkt. No. 36 ¶¶ 18-23). Smith told his

children, who were passengers in his vehicle, to begin recording

the interaction (Dkt. Nos. 36 ¶ 24, 64 ¶ 24). The parties

subsequently moved to the front of Officer Davis’s cruiser, where

Officer Davis demanded that Smith provide his driver’s license

(Dkt. Nos. 36 ¶ 26, 64 ¶ 26). But before Smith could do so, Officer

Davis arrested him (Dkt. Nos. 36 ¶ 28, 64 ¶ 28).

How Officer Davis placed Smith under arrest is also hotly

disputed. According to Smith, Officer Davis grabbed him by his

shirt, pushed him toward the police cruiser, and placed handcuffs

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

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on his left wrist (Dkt. No. 36 ¶ 28). Officer Davis then grabbed

Smith’s right arm and deliberately pulled it after Smith had asked

him to be gentle because Smith suffered from a pre-existing injury

to his shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Before Officer Davis placed

handcuffs on his right wrist, Smith claims he pulled Smith’s hands

apart and then quickly pulled them back together. Id. ¶ 31.

Smith next contends that although he informed Officer Davis

that he could not comfortably fit in the cruiser’s back seat

because he had a prosthetic leg, id. ¶ 35, Officer Davis

nevertheless pushed him into the side of the vehicle. Id. ¶ 36.

Using vulgar language, he then directed Smith to get inside and

shoved him into the police cruiser. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37. Officer Davis

generally denies these allegations (Dkt. No. 64 ¶¶ 27-38).

Although the video of the incident confirms Smith’s account

of Officer Davis’s actions while in front of the cruiser, it is

difficult to assess the amount of force Officer Davis actually

applied (Dkt. No. 84 Ex. C). And it further appears that, rather

than being forced into the back of the police cruiser, Smith may

have entered the cruiser on his own volition. Id.

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After arresting Smith, Officer Davis filed a criminal

complaint in the Magistrate Court of Ritchie County, West Virginia,

alleging Smith had committed the offenses of (1) Impeding Traffic,

in violation of W. Va. Code § 17C-6-3a; (2) Obstructing an Officer,

in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-5-17; and (3) Disorderly Conduct,

in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-6-1b (Dkt. No. 84-3 at 1-2). These

charges were subsequently dismissed, reissued, and ultimately

dismissed (Dkt. Nos. 36 ¶ 40-42, 64 ¶ 40-42).

II. Procedural Background

Smith sued both Officer Davis and the City of Pennsboro (Dkt.

Nos. 1, 5, 36). His second amended complaint alleges that (1)

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Officer Davis violated Smith’s Fourth

Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause and using

excessive force during that arrest; (2) under West Virginia law,

Officer Davis falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned Smith; and

(3) pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of New

York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the City of Pennsboro was liable for

failing to discipline Officer Davis for his unconstitutional

actions (Dkt. No. 36). The Court previously granted Pennsboro’s

motion to dismiss Count Three pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Dkt. No. 61), thus only the claims against Officer Davis remain.

These are the subject of the instant summary judgment motion that

is now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

III. Standard of Review

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” “A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and “[a] fact is

material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d

562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting 10A Charles A. Wright et al.,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 2728 (3d ed. 1998)).

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the

nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an essential element of his claim or defense upon

which he bears the burden of proof. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). That is, once the movant shows an absence of

evidence on one such element, the nonmovant must then come forward

with evidence demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for

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trial. Id. at 323-24. The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence

supporting the nonmovant’s position is insufficient to create a

genuine issue; rather, there must be evidence on which a jury could

reasonably find for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477

U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Summary judgment “should be granted only in

those cases where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is

involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify

the application of the law.” Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597

F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson

Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950)).

IV. Discussion

A. Fourth Amendment

With respect to Smith’s claim under the Fourth Amendment,

Officer Davis argues that summary judgment is appropriate because

Smith’s claims lack evidentiary support; alternatively, he

contends he is entitled to qualified immunity (Dkt. No. 84 at 6-

10). Smith responds that summary judgment should be denied because

the evidence establishes that Officer Davis lacked probable cause

to arrest Smith and used excessive force (Dkt. No. 86-1 at 4-12).

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Nor, Smith argues, is Officer Davis entitled to qualified immunity.

Id.

To succeed on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that

(1) he was deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and

the laws” of the United States; and (2) the individual who deprived

him of the right was acting under color of state law. Lugar v.

Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (internal citations

omitted). Generally, a public employee acts under color of state

law “while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his

responsibilities pursuant to state law.” Conner v. Donnelly, 42

F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 50 (1988)). Section 1983, however, “‘is not itself a source of

substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, at 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

144, n.3 (1979)).

Smith claims that Officer Davis violated his clearly-

established Fourth Amendment rights because he had no probable

cause to arrest Smith, and in the process of the arrest, employed

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excessive force. There is no dispute that Officer Davis was acting

under color of state law.

Officer Davis contends there is a lack of evidentiary support

for Smith’s Fourth Amendment claim and argues this Court can

resolve his motion for summary judgment without reaching the issue

of qualified immunity. But because the qualified immunity analysis

necessarily involves an examination of whether a constitutional

violation occurred, the Court will collapse the Fourth Amendment

inquiry into the qualified immunity analysis. Dodds v. Richardson,

614 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the legal

analysis to demonstrate a constitutional violation under § 1983

and with respect to qualified immunity “is often related, if not

identical”).

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government

officials from liability for civil damages when their conduct does

not violate clearly established constitutional or other rights

that a reasonable officer would have known.” Hupp v. Cook, 931

F.3d 307, 317 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d

254, 260 (4th Cir. 2018)). Accordingly, “[a]n official is not

entitled to qualified immunity if he or she deprived an individual

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of a constitutional right and that right was clearly established

at the time of the violation.” Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). The qualified immunity analysis

therefore entails two determinations: (1) whether the plaintiff’s

rights were violated; and (2) whether those rights were clearly

established. Id.

1. False Arrest

Smith first contends that Officer Davis violated his clearly-

established Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without

probable cause. “[I]f a person is arrested when no reasonable

officer could believe . . . that probable cause exists to arrest

that person, a violation of a clearly established Fourth Amendment

right to be arrested only upon probable cause ensues.” Hupp, 931

F.3d at 318 (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 290 (4th

Cir. 2001)). “Probable cause is determined by a ‘totality-of-the-

circumstances’ approach.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d

248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017)). However, that determination turns on

two factors: (1) the suspect’s conduct as known to the officer;

and (2) the contours of the offense of arrest. Id.

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Here, examining the contours of the offenses involved, Smith

was arrested for (1) impeding traffic, (2) obstructing an officer,

and (3) disorderly conduct (Dkt. No. 84-3 at 1-2). As to the charge

of impeding traffic, West Virginia traffic law provides that “[n]o

person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to

impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when

reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance

with law.” W. Va. Code § 17C-6-3a. There is a genuine dispute of

material fact regarding whether Officer Davis had probable cause

to arrest Smith for impeding traffic. Although the video evidence

establishes that Smith’s vehicle was parked on a portion of the

road, the parties disagree as to whether other vehicles could have

maneuvered around it. Accordingly, there remains a material

factual dispute over whether Officer Davis had probable cause to

arrest Smith for impeding traffic.

Regarding Smith’s arrest for obstructing an officer, in West

Virginia, “[a] person who by threats, menaces, acts, or otherwise

forcibly or illegally hinders or obstructs or attempts to hinder

or obstruct a law-enforcement officer . . . acting in his or her

official capacity is guilty of a misdemeanor.” W. Va. Code § 61-

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5-17(a). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has

confirmed that to obstruct an officer requires “forcible or illegal

conduct that interferes with a police officer’s discharge of

official duties.” State v. Davis, 735 S.E.2d 570, 573 (W. Va. 2012)

(quoting State v. Carney, 663 S.E.2d 606, 611 (W. Va. 2008)). In

the absence of force, “the key to determining whether conduct . .

. constitutes the offense of obstruction under [W. Va. Code § 61-

5-17] is whether the conduct at issue is illegal.” State v. Carney,

663 S.E.2d 606, 610 (W. Va. 2008). Consequently, “lawful speech

will not support an obstruction charge.” Id. at 611. Specifically,

an individual who speaks to an officer “without the use of fighting

or insulting words or other opprobrious language” has not committed

the offense of obstruction. Syl. Pt., State ex rel. Wilmoth v.

Gustke, 373 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1988).

There is a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether

Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest Smith for obstructing

an officer. To begin, the parties dispute the language used by

Smith and Officer Davis during their conversation; each contends

the other used profane language. Further, Smith contends that he

complied with Officer Davis’s directives, both to take out his

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driver’s license and also to put his hands behind his back when he

was placed under arrest.

Regarding Smith’s arrest for disorderly conduct, pursuant to

W. Va. Code § 61-6-1b

[a]ny person who, in a public place, . . . disturbs the

peace of others by violent, profane, indecent or

boisterous conduct or language or by the making of

unreasonably loud noise that is intended to cause

annoyance or alarm to another person, and who persists

in such conduct after being requested to desist by a

law-enforcement officer acting in his or her lawful

capacity, is guilty of disorderly conduct, a

misdemeanor.

A genuine dispute of material fact exists where it is unclear

whether an individual’s conduct has disturbed “others,” excluding

law enforcement officers. Maston v. Wagner, 781 S.E.2d 936, 951

(W. Va. 2015). Here, whether Smith was disturbing others by his

conduct is in dispute.

Accordingly, because there are material facts in dispute

concerning whether Officer Davis had probable cause to arrest Smith

for any of the three offenses charged, the Court DENIES Officer

Davis’s motion for summary judgment on this Fourth Amendment claim,

and turns next to consider Officer Davis’s motion regarding Smith’s

excessive force claim.

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2. Excessive Force

“A claim that a police officer employed excessive force is

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment under an ‘objective

reasonableness’ standard.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100-01 (4th

Cir. 2015) (quoting Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.

2011) (en banc)). Specifically, an officer’s actions “do not amount

to excessive force if they ‘are “objectively reasonable” in light

of the facts and circumstances confronting [him], without regard

to [his] underlying intent or motivation.’” Id. at 101 (quoting

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). Moreover, the facts

and circumstances must be analyzed “at the moment that the

challenged force was employed.” Id.

In addition, the evaluation of an officer’s actions “requires

a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on

the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. (quoting

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A

court “must give ‘careful attention to the facts and circumstances

of each particular case, including’ three factors in particular:

‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

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immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

“Ultimately, the question to be decided is ‘whether the totality

of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . .

seizure.’” Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9

(1985)).

Here, a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding

whether Officer Davis’s actions were objectively reasonable under

the circumstances. Turning to the Graham factors, Smith was

arrested for impeding traffic, obstructing an officer, and

disorderly conduct, all of which are misdemeanors under West

Virginia law. See W. Va. Code §§ 17C-6-3a, 61-5-17, 61-6-1b. While

it is undisputed that Smith stopped his vehicle and walked toward

Officer Davis’s police cruiser, the parties disagree about each

other’s respective tone in the subsequent conversation. Moreover,

it appears that Smith later complied with Officer Davis’s request

to provide his driver’s license and also to place his hands behind

his back to be handcuffed. Finally, Smith may not have resisted

arrest. On the video, he can be seen placing his hands behind his

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DENYING THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

back before Officer Davis places him in handcuffs. Despite Officer

Davis’s contention otherwise, there is also no video evidence that

Smith tried to leave the scene or evade arrest. Based on all this,

it is for a jury to decide whether, under the totality of the

circumstances, Officer Davis’s actions were objectively

reasonable. The Court therefore DENIES Officer Davis’s motion for

summary judgment on Smith’s excessive force claim.

B. State Law Claims

With respect to Smith’s state law claims, Officer Davis argues

that they lack evidentiary support (Dkt. No. 84 at 4-6). Smith

does not directly respond to this argument.

Under West Virginia law, “[p]robable cause to make a

misdemeanor arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and

circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer are

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that a misdemeanor

is being committed in his presence.” State v. Forsythe, 460 S.E.2d

742, 744 (W. Va. 1995). Moreover, “[a]n action for false

imprisonment may be maintained where the imprisonment is without

legal authority.” Riffe v. Armstrong, 477 S.E.2d 535, 549 (W. Va.

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1996) (quoting Vorholt v. Vorholt, 160 S.E. 916, 918 (W. Va.

1931)).

For the reasons previously discussed, genuine disputes of

material fact exist regarding whether Officer Davis had probable

cause to arrest Smith and, as a result, whether he had the legal

authority to detain Smith. The Court therefore DENIES Officer

Davis’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Smith’s state

law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Officer Davis’s

motion for summary judgment.

It is so ORDERED.

The Clerk SHALL transmit copies of this Order to counsel of

record.

DATED: April 22, 2022

/s/ Irene M. Keeley

IRENE M. KEELEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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