“[A] genuine question of material fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly violative of the right actually occurred . . . must be reserved for trial”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] genuine question of material fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly violative of the right actually occurred . . . must be reserved for trial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
THOMAS F. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:20CV54
(Judge Keeley)
THE CITY OF PENNSBORO,
a West Virginia Municipal
Corporation, and R.T. DAVIS,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DAVIS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II OF SMITH’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 38]
On August 28, 2020, the plaintiff, Thomas Smith ("Smith"),
filed his second amended complaint asserting three causes of action
(Dkt. No. 36). Count I states a § 1983 claim of excessive force
against the defendant, R.T. Davis ("Officer Davis"). Count II
alleges state law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment
against Officer Davis. Count III asserts that, under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the defendant,
the City of Pennsboro is liable for Officer Davis’s conduct.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on
September 8, 2020, Officer Davis moved to dismiss Counts I and II
(Dkt. No. 38). At a scheduling conference held on January 7, 2021,
the Court DENIED Officer Davis’s motion to dismiss Count I and
HELD IN ABEYANCE the motion as to Count II. For the reasons that
follow, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss Count II.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DAVIS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II OF SMITH’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 38]
I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant
may move to dismiss a complaint on the ground that it does not
“state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” When reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint, the district court “must accept as
true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 2007). To
be sufficient, “a complaint must contain ‘enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Anderson, 508
F.3d at 188 n.7 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 547 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
II.
Smith has plausibly stated a claim for false arrest and false
imprisonment and material questions of fact preclude the Court
from determining whether Officer Davis is entitled to qualified
immunity at this stage of the litigation.
A.
A plaintiff may state a claim for false arrest if an arrest
occurs “when no reasonable officer could believe ... that probable
cause exists to arrest that person.” Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DAVIS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II OF SMITH’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 38]
318 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 290
(4th Cir. 2001). Courts review probable cause determinations
pursuant to the totality-of-the-circumstances test. Smith v.
Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2017). The probable cause
inquiry turns on the suspect's conduct as known to the officer and
the contours of the offense thought to be committed by that
conduct. Id. (citing Graham v. Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184 (4th Cir.
2016)). A court should objectively examine the information
available to the officer on the scene to determine whether a
reasonably prudent officer with that information would have
thought that probable cause existed for the arrest. Id.
“An action for false imprisonment may be maintained where the
imprisonment is without legal authority.” Riffe v. Armstrong, 197
W. Va. 626, 640 (1996). Moreover, “the detention and restraint may
be shown to be unlawful . . . even though the detention is carried
out under facially valid authority.” Id. at 477.
B.
Here, Smith has pleaded sufficient facts for the Court to
infer that a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s place did not
have probable cause to arrest Smith. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
According to Smith, he pulled off to the side of the road after
Officer Davis followed him in a police cruiser without
justification (Dkt. No. 36 at ¶¶ 6-7, 12-15). After Smith pulled
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DAVIS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II OF SMITH’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 38]
off, Officer Davis also pulled over and parked behind Smith. Id.
at ¶ 16. Smith’s inquiry as to why he was being followed apparently
angered Officer Davis, who got out of his cruiser and attempted to
grab Smith. Id. at ¶¶ 17-24. Then, as Smith was complying with an
order to present his driver’s license, Officer Davis grabbed his
weapon and arrested Smith. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. Smith was charged with
impeding traffic, obstructing an officer, and disorderly conduct.
Id. at ¶¶ 36-37.
As pleaded, these facts do not indicate that Smith violated
any traffic law or that Officer Davis pulled him over for a driving
infraction. Rather, Smith alleges that he voluntarily pulled over
to the side of the road and lawfully engaged with Officer Davis.
Although Smith initiated a conversation with Officer Davis, there
are no facts suggesting he violated any of Officer Davis’s orders
or was disruptive during this conversation. Taking the facts in
the light most favorable to Smith,1 and after objectively examining
the information available to Officer Davis at the time of Smith’s
arrest, the Court concludes that it is plausible that a reasonable
officer in Officer Davis’s position would not have had probable
cause to arrest Smith.
1 “In considering a motion to dismiss, the court should . . . view
the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DAVIS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II OF SMITH’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 38]
Smith has also sufficiently pleaded his false imprisonment
claim. In addition to asserting that he was arrested without
probable cause, Smith alleges that Officer Davis handcuffed him,
placed him in the back of the police cruiser, and transported him
to the Ritchie County Magistrate Court. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 31, 37. It
is therefore plausible that Smith was detained without legal
authority.
C.
At this stage in the litigation, Officer Davis is not entitled
to qualified immunity. Under West Virginia law, a public official
acting within the scope of his authority may be entitled to
qualified immunity from personal liability for official acts.
State v. Chase Sec., Inc., 424 S.E.2d 591, 599-600 (W. Va. 1992).
An official is not entitled to qualified immunity, however, if his
acts are “in violation of clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person would
have known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive.”
W. Va. Bd. Of Educ. v. Marple, 782 S.E.2d 75, 84 (W. Va. 2015);
see also Syl. pt. 11, W. Va. Regl Jail & Corr. Fac. Auth. v. A.B.,
766 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 2014). Where there is no dispute regarding
the foundational facts, the ultimate determination as to whether
qualified immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DAVIS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II OF SMITH’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 38]
to decide. Syl. pt. 1, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 479 S.E.2d
649, 654 (W. Va. 1996).
Similarly, under federal law, when evaluating whether a
complaint survives a motion to dismiss based on a defense of
qualified immunity, the Court must decide “(1) whether a
constitutional violation occurred and (2) whether the right
violated was clearly established.” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226
(4th Cir. 2020) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009)). Whether a right is clearly established is a question of
law for the court to decide; whether a reasonable officer would
have known the conduct in question violated that right, however,
cannot be decided prior to trial if factual disputes exist. Ray,
948 F.3d at 228-29; see also Hupp, 931 F.3d at 318 (“[A] genuine
question of material fact regarding whether the conduct allegedly
violative of the right actually occurred . . . must be reserved
for trial”) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the parties dispute the critical facts surrounding
Smith’s arrest. Among others, Officer Davis disagrees with Smith’s
description of his driving, his characterization of Officer Davis
as enraged, and his benign portrayal of his own behavior prior to
and during arrest. Officer Davis also contends that Smith’s version
of events omits important facts. Based on these factual disputes,
at this early stage of the litigation the Court cannot determine
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DAVIS’S
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS I AND II OF SMITH’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [DKT. NO. 38]
whether a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position would
have known that the arrest and imprisonment of Smith violated his
constitutional rights.
III.
For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Officer Davis’s
motion to dismiss Counts I and II of Smith’s Second Amended
Complaint (Dkt. No. 38).
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk SHALL transmit copies of this Order to counsel of
record by electronic means.
DATED: February 9, 2021.
/s/ Irene M. Keeley
IRENE M. KEELEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE