finding that fact issues precluded the granting of summary judgment on state constitutional claims
How later courts described this case
- finding that fact issues precluded the granting of summary judgment on state constitutional claims
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
RICHARD CUMMINGS,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 5:19CV271
(STAMP)
CITY OF WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA,
a political subdivision and
HARRY MYERS, in his individual
capacity as a Wheeling law
enforcement officer,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. Background
The plaintiff in this civil action, Richard Cummings
(“Cummings”), originally filed his complaint (ECF No. 1-1) in the
Circuit Court of Ohio County, West Virginia, on August 5, 2019,
against defendants the City of Wheeling, West Virginia
(hereinafter, “City of Wheeling”) and police officer Harry Myers
(“Officer Myers”) in his individual capacity as a Wheeling law
enforcement officer (collectively “defendants”).
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he was asleep in his
own bed in the basement of his parents’ home when Ammo, a trained
Wheeling police dog handled by Officer Myers, was given a command
to search the basement and attacked and bit plaintiff’s hands,
legs, and body for a period of 45 to 60 seconds. ECF No. 1-1
at 1-4.
Stemming from this encounter, the complaint asserts a cause of
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count One), as well as a state
constitutional tort claim (Count Two) and a negligence claim (Count
Three). For relief, plaintiff seeks compensatory damages,
attorneys’ fees and costs, an award of punitive damages, and
equitable relief including additional training and education for
other similarly situated law enforcement officers to address the
issues raised in this action. Id. at 10.
Defendants removed this civil action to this Court on
September 19, 2019 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(1). ECF No. 1. In the notice of removal, defendants
assert that this Court has original federal question jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 1. Further,
defendants assert this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s asserted state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) in that plaintiff’s state law allegations are
inextricably tied to the facts of plaintiff’s primary federal
claim.
Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12b(6) and argue that Officer Myers is entitled
to qualified immunity, plaintiff’s state law claims are precluded
by statutory immunity, and that all intentional tort claims
asserted against the City of Wheeling should be dismissed as a
matter of law. ECF No. 3 at 1. Further, defendants assert that
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plaintiff’s state constitutional claims are moot and should be
dismissed, plaintiff’s municipal liability and failure to train
claims are insufficiently pled, plaintiff’s outrageous or
deliberate indifference claims are insufficiently pled, and
plaintiff’s excessive force claim is baseless under the facts as
contained in the complaint. Id.
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition. ECF No. 5.
Plaintiff asserts Officer Myers released a trained police dog to go
down in the basement where plaintiff was asleep, while Officer
Myers remained upstairs. Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends in his
response that defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied
because Officer Myers is not entitled to qualified immunity,
defendants are not entitled to statutory immunity, the City of
Wheeling is liable for the intentional torts of Officer Myers, the
state constitutional tort claim is not moot, allegations of
negligent supervision and custom, policy, and practice are
sufficiently pled, and the allegations support plaintiff’s claim of
excessive force. ECF No. 5. Because the complaint “raises
multiple factual issues that will need to be developed and
ultimately resolved by a jury,” plaintiff submits defendants’
motion to dismiss should be denied so the parties can develop all
of the relevant facts. Id. at 2.
Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 6) and argue that despite
plaintiff’s protestations to the contrary, pursuant to Federal Rule
3
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is required as there is no
meaningful path by which plaintiff can recover from the defendants
in this action.
Now before this Court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 3). The motion is fully briefed and
ripe for decision.
II. Applicable Law
In assessing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court must accept all well-pled facts contained in the complaint as
true. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc, 591 F.3d
250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). However, “legal conclusions, elements of
a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement fail to constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6)
purposes.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)). This Court also declines to consider “unwarranted
inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Wahi v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir.
2009).
It has often been said that the purpose of a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of the statement of the
claim for relief; it is not a procedure for resolving a contest
about the facts or the merits of the case. 5B Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (3d ed.
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1998). The Rule 12(b)(6) motion also must be distinguished from a
motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, which goes to the merits of the claim and is designed to test
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. For purposes
of the motion to dismiss, the complaint is construed in the light
most favorable to the party making the claim and essentially the
court’s inquiry is directed to whether the allegations constitute
a statement of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).
Id. § 1357.
A complaint should be dismissed “if it does not allege ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on is face.’”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Facial
plausibility is established once the factual content of a complaint
‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Nemet Chevrolet,
591 F.3d at 256 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but the facts alleged must be
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. Discussion
This Court has assumed the allegations alleged by Cummings in
the complaint to be true, resolved all doubts and inferences in
favor of Cummings, and viewed the allegations in a light most
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favorable to Cummings for the purposes of deciding the motion to
dismiss. In doing so, this Court finds that the complaint alleges
enough facts to state claims for relief under all three counts
asserted in the complaint that are facially plausible and make
sufficient factual allegations against the defendants to survive
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Upon review, this Court finds
that the plaintiff’s complaint asserts factual allegations
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In order to properly state a
claim for relief, plaintiff is required to provide a “short and
plain statement of the claim” that gives defendants “fair notice of
what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id.
Plaintiff has met this standard, and his claims, as asserted in
Count One pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Count Two pursuant to the
West Virginia Constitution, and Count Three alleging negligence,
are pled with sufficient specificity.
In support of the motion to dismiss,1 defendants assert that
Officer Myers is entitled to qualified immunity under the
circumstances alleged. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as
1In response to defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s failure
to train and outrageous or deliberate indifference claims are
insufficiently pled, plaintiff concedes that his complaint does not
seek to hold defendants liable for failing to train, outrage, and
deliberate indifference. ECF No. 5 at 2 n.1. Thus, this Court
will not address these arguments asserted by defendants.
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their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808,
815, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). In
Pearson, however, the Supreme Court also recognized “[w]hen
qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage, the precise
factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to
identify.” Id. at 238–39.
Aware of this possibility, in a recent opinion regarding a
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim brought pursuant to § 1983,
this Court found that a determination of whether or not a law
enforcement officer was entitled to qualified immunity at the
motion to dismiss stage of the litigation was not appropriate and
premature. See Hamstead v. Walker, et al., No. 3:18-CV-79, ECF No.
150 at 16 (N.D. W. Va. May 7, 2019) (Bailey, J.). Throughout its
analysis in Hamstead, the Court emphasized the fact specific nature
of § 1983 actions such as this, and noted that the Supreme Court of
the United States has held that the question of whether an officer
has used excessive force requires careful attention to the facts
and circumstances of each particular case. Id. (citing Graham v.
Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct.
1148, 1153 (2018).
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To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that
he was deprived of a right “secured by the Constitution and the
laws” of the United States, and (2) that the individual who
deprived him of the right was acting under color of state law.
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (internal
citations omitted). Here, plaintiff clearly pleads, with
sufficient specificity, that defendants violated the constitutional
rights guaranteed to plaintiff under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution including, but not
limited to, the use of excessive force, by Officer Myers giving a
command to Ammo and sending him downstairs to plaintiff’s bedroom
where Ammo proceeded to attack and maul plaintiff while he was
asleep. ECF No. 1-1 at 5. Upon review of the arguments presented
by the parties and a consideration of plaintiff’s allegations as
alleged in the complaint, this Court finds that this litigation is
only at the motion to dismiss stage, and without knowing the facts
of this particular incident, this Court cannot properly make a
determination of whether Officer Myers is entitled to qualified
immunity at this time.
All this Court must consider at this stage are the allegations
made in plaintiff’s complaint, which include Officer Myers giving
some command to Ammo and sending Ammo into the basement of the home
while Officer Myers remained upstairs. ECF No. 1-1 at 4. Without
considering the merits of plaintiff’s excessive force allegations
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as set forth in the complaint, this Court finds that the complaint
states a claim for relief that is sufficient on its face, which is
all that is required to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). This Court notes, as the Court noted in Raub v. Bowen,
960 F. Supp. 2d 602, (E.D. Va. 2013), a defendant can raise the
qualified-immunity defense at both the motion to dismiss and
summary judgment stage. Id. at 608 (citing Tobey v. Jones, 706
F.3d 379, 393–94 (4th Cir. 2013). As this Court permitted in
Hamstead, Officer Myers may reassert his claim of entitlement to
qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, at which time the
facts should be developed such that this Court can make a proper
determination. See Hamstead, No. 3:18-CV-79, (N.D. W. Va. May 7,
2019). ECF No. 150 at 20.
As to defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s state law claims
are precluded by statutory immunity, this Court finds that under
West Virginia Code § 29-12A-18(e), the West Virginia Governmental
Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act (hereinafter, “Tort Claims
Act”) is inapplicable to “[c]ivil claims based upon alleged
violations of the Constitution or statutes of the United States
except that the provisions of section eleven of this article shall
apply to such claims or related civil actions.” Here, as plaintiff
points out in his memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion to
dismiss, Count One of the complaint in this action alleges
violations of the United States Constitution and is filed pursuant
9
to 42 U.S.C. §1983, a federal statute. Count Two of the complaint
alleges violations of the West Virginia Constitution as well as the
United States Constitution. Thus, this Court finds that at this
stage, to the extent plaintiff asserts claims based upon alleged
violations of the Constitution or statutes of the United States,
the Tort Claims Act does not apply to Counts One and Two of the
plaintiff’s complaint.
Further, this Court finds that immunity from liability,
granted pursuant to West Virginia Code § 29-12(A)-5 to political
subdivisions and their employees, applies unless specific
allegations indicate that it should not. Hutchison v. City of
Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 148, 479 S.E.2d 649, 658 (1996).
Consistent with this Court’s analysis discussed above, this Court
finds that plaintiff clearly pleads, with sufficient specificity,
that defendants violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by
actions arising out Officer Myers’ handling of Ammo. ECF No. 1-1
at 5. At this time, this Court finds that this litigation is only
at the motion to dismiss stage, and without knowing the facts of
this particular incident, this Court cannot properly make a
determination as to the applicability of statutory immunity.
As to defendant’s argument that all intentional tort claims
asserted against the City of Wheeling should be dismissed as a
matter of law, this Court again notes that at this stage, to the
extent plaintiff asserts claims based upon alleged violations of
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the Constitution or statutes of the United States, the Tort Claims
Act does not apply to Counts One and Two of the plaintiff’s
complaint. As to Count Three, this Court notes, and defendants
concede, that West Virginia law provides that political
subdivisions may be liable for the negligent acts of their
employees, committed while said employees are acting within the
scope of their employment. W. Va. Code § 29-12A-4(c)(2).
In turning to defendants’ argument that “plaintiff’s state
constitutional claims are moot and should therefore be dismissed,”
(ECF No. 3-1 at 8), this Court must first restate the issue at hand
in its simplest form. Here, defendants’ argument, boiled down to
its most basic form, is that “any claim for money damages as a
result of these alleged state constitutional violations must be
dismissed” because “it is clear that no relief can be granted in
connection with this claim” as there is “no provision allowing
[plaintiff] to receive money damages in connection with this
claim.” ECF No. 3-1 at 8-9.
Upon consideration of this issue and the arguments presented
by the parties, this Court finds Spry v. W. Virginia, No.
2:16-CV-01785, 2017 WL 440733, (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 1, 2017)
(Johnston, J.) to be particularly useful.
In Spry, the Court thoroughly addressed a concern regarding
West Virginia constitutional claims and stated:
Whether the West Virginia Constitution gives rise to a
private right of action for money damages is a question
11
of some dispute among West Virginia’s federal courts. In
reliance on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals’
(“WVSCA”) decision in Harrah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d 322
(W. Va. 1980), this Court has repeatedly held that claims
for money damages are not available to remedy violations
of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution. See
Harper v. Barbagallo, No. 2:14-cv-07529, 2016 WL 5419442,
at *12–13 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 27, 2016); Howard v.
Ballard, No. 2:13–cv–11006, 2015 WL 1481836, at *4 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 31, 2015); McMillion-Tolliver v. Kowalski,
No. 2:13-CV-29533, 2014 WL 1329790, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
Apr. 1, 2014); Smoot v. Green, No. 2:13–10148, 2013 WL
5918753, at *4–5 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 1, 2013).
The WVSCA has never addressed the issue directly. In
Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 479 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va.
1996), however, the WVSCA held that “[u]nless barred by
[a recognized immunity], a private cause of action exists
where a municipality or local government unit causes
injury by denying that person rights that are protected
by the Due Process Clause embodied within Article 3, § 10
of the West Virginia Constitution.” Id. at 654. The
Hutchison court did not address whether its holding was
limited to § 10 or, alternatively, applied to other
rights enshrined in Article III. At least one West
Virginia federal court has suggested that Hutchison
generally “recognizes a private right of action for
violations of the West Virginia Constitution.” Ray v.
Cutlip, No. 2:13–CV–75, 2014 WL 858736, at *3 n.1 (N.D.
W. Va. Mar. 5, 2014) (“West Virginia recognizes a private
right of action for violations of the West Virginia
Constitution.”); see also Wood v. Harshbarger, 2013 WL
5603243, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Oct. 3, 2013) (finding
plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim
under Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia
Constitution and reserving the question of whether
monetary damages were an available remedy for another
day).
Given its ruling in Hutchison, the Court suspects that
the WVSCA would recognize a cause of action for money
damages for the violation of other Article III rights.
See, e.g., Pruitt v. W. Va. Dep’t of Public Safety, 664
S.E.2d 175, 182–84 (W. Va. 2008) (finding that fact
issues precluded the granting of summary judgment on
state constitutional claims). Given the unsettled state
of the law, and noting that Plaintiffs have alleged facts
sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim [], the
12
Court allows their state constitutional claim to proceed.
The parties are hereby put on notice, however, that the
Court intends to certify the question to the West
Virginia Supreme Court if Plaintiffs continue to proceed
against Defendants under this theory of liability.
Spry v. W. Virginia, No. 2:16-CV-01785, 2017 WL 440733, at *9 (S.D.
W. Va. Feb. 1, 2017) (Johnston, J.)(emphasis in original).2
Upon review of the Spry decision, this Court is inclined to
follow that approach and analysis in this civil action.
Accordingly, this Court denies the defendants’ motion to dismiss as
plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible
claim and allows plaintiff’s state constitutional claim as asserted
in Count Two of the complaint to proceed. Further, this Court may
certify that question to the West Virginia Supreme Court if
plaintiff continues to proceed against defendants under this theory
of liability.
2It is worth noting that the unsettled legal question
presented in Spry was never certified, as the Court found that
“[p]laintiffs fail[ed] to show a genuine issue of material fact on
the § 1983 and, by implication, state constitutional claims,” and
awarded summary judgment. See Spry v. W. Virginia, No.
2:16-CV-01785, 2017 WL 1483370, at *5 n.7 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 24,
2017) (Johnston, J.); see also Barcus v. Austin, No. 1:17CV122,
2018 WL 4183213, at *6 n.1 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 31, 2018) (Keeley, J.)
(noting “the unsettled question of whether monetary damages are an
available remedy for violations of Article III of the West Virginia
Constitution.”)
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 3) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to transmit a copy of this memorandum
opinion and order to counsel of record herein.
DATED: December 5, 2019
/s/ Frederick P. Stamp, Jr.
FREDERICK P. STAMP, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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