Opinion

Larry v. The Marion County Coal Company

Court
District Court, N.D. West Virginia
Filed
Jan 31, 2018
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 32.7%

questioning applicability of RIF prima facie formulation where the reduced “force” consisted of two people, and although the plaintiff’s position was eliminated, he was essentially replaced by another employee

How later courts described this case

  • questioning applicability of RIF prima facie formulation where the reduced “force” consisted of two people, and although the plaintiff’s position was eliminated, he was essentially replaced by another employee
  • applying Restatement when construing provision that it is unlawful “[f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden” under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
  • “Discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal sex discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-9(a)[1981].”
  • reaffirming use of the McDonnell Douglas standard in West Virginia

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

ALYSSA MOATE LARRY,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15CV212

(Judge Keeley)

THE MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY,

and MURRAY AMERICAN ENERGY, INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

Plaintiff Alyssa Moate Larry (“Larry”) was terminated from her

employment at defendant The Marion County Coal Company (“MCC”), a

subsidiary of defendant Murray American Energy, Inc. (“MAEI), after

returning from maternity leave under the Family and Medical Leave

Act (“FMLA”). Larry alleges that, by selecting her for layoff, MCC

denied her rights under the FMLA, and discriminated and retaliated

against her on the basis of her sex and her pregnancy in violation

of the West Virginia Human Rights Act and the Pregnancy Workers’

Fairness Act. She further alleges that MAEI aided and abetted MCC

in engaging in unlawful discrimination and retaliation.

Pending before the Court are the defendants’ motions for

summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS in

part and DENIES in part MCC’s motion (Dkt. No. 75), and GRANTS

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

MAEI’s motion (Dkt. No. 77).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. Larry’s Employment History with MCC

Beginning in September 2012, Larry was employed by the

Consolidation Coal Company (“CCC”) as a Mine Clerk at its Loveridge

Mine located in Marion and Monongalia Counties, West Virginia (Dkt.

No. 75-1 at 4-5). Larry was then one of two Mine Clerks at the

Loveridge Mine, where, along with Human Resource Supervisor Pamela

Layton (“Layton”) and Human Resource Coordinator Ilya Shlyahovsky

(“Shlyahovsky”), she was one of the four employees who formed the

entirety of the Human Resources Department at the mine. Id. at 6.

On December 15, 2013, following MAEI’s purchase of the

Loveridge Mine, MCC assumed operation of the mine and renamed it

the Marion County Mine. Id. at 7-8. Larry, Layton, and the other

Human Resources staff members were all hired by MCC and continued

to work in their same positions. Id. at 8.

In February 2014, Shlyahovsky was promoted to the Human

Resource Supervisor position at another MAEI mine, and left his

Human Resource Coordinator position at the Marion County Mine. Id.

at 11. Layton encouraged Larry to apply for the position and

2

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

supported her candidacy with Paul Piccolini (“Piccolini”), the Vice

President of Human Resources and Employee Relations of Murray

Energy Corporation, a related entity that provides certain human

resource related services to MCC and other MAEI companies. Id. at

12-13; Dkt. No. 75-5 at 1.

With Piccolini’s approval, Larry was formally promoted to

Human Resource Coordinator at the Marion County Mine on March 31,

2014 (Dkt. No. 75-8 at 1). However, she continued to perform her

prior Mine Clerk duties, together with her new responsibilities,

until a new Mine Clerk was hired in July 2014 (Dkt. No. 75-2 at 36;

Dkt. No. 75-9 at 1).

In October 2014, Piccolini authorized the creation of a second

Human Resource Coordinator position at MCC, and also at each of

four other mines owned by MAEI (Dkt. No. 75-1 at 16; Dkt. No. 76-6

at 11; Dkt. No. 75-10 at 1). On December 15, 2014, MCC selected

Eric Zuchowski (“Zuchowski”) for the second Human Resource

Coordinator position at the Marion County Mine (Dkt. No. 75-1 at

17; Dkt. No. 75-9 at 1). Like Larry, Zuchowski was promoted from

his prior position as a Mine Clerk, and continued to perform

certain of his prior Mine Clerk duties, as well as his new

responsibilities as Human Resource Coordinator, until a replacement

3

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

Mine Clerk could be hired and trained. Zuchowski formally assumed

the second Coordinator position on April 27, 2015 (Dkt. No. 75-12).

2. Larry’s Pregnancy-Related FMLA Leave and Accommodation

Following Leave

On February 6, 2015, Larry gave birth to a son (Dkt. No. 75-1

at 20). She sought and received FMLA-covered leave from February 6

until her return to work on March 23, 2015. Id. at 21.

Upon returning to work, Larry was required to express breast

milk using a mechanical pump three to four times each day, and

suggested to Layton that she be permitted to use a file closet

attached to their shared office for that purpose. Id. at 22-23.

Larry alleges that Layton responded “that wouldn’t be a good idea

in case someone was in the office.” Id. at 23. It was Larry’s sense

that Layton believed that it would be inconvenient for Larry to use

the office closet, where salaried employee files were kept. Id. As

a result, Larry began taking her lactation breaks in the women’s

restroom. Id. at 24.

3. MCC’s Reductions in Force and Larry’s Layoff

In May 2015, MCC decided to reduce production at the Marion

County Mine from seven to five days per week due to poor coal

market conditions (Dkt. No. 75-2 at 5). A corresponding reduction

4

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

in force resulted in layoffs of approximately 180 hourly workers,

as well as 34 salaried employees (Dkt. No. 75-9 at 2). Within the

Human Resources Department, Layton was required to reduce her four-

person staff by one member (Dkt. No. 75-2 at 6). Layton decided to

eliminate one of the two Human Resource Coordinator positions, and

ultimately selected Larry as the Coordinator to be laid off. Id. at

13, 17. Larry was notified of her layoff on May 28, 2015 (Dkt. No.

75-1 at 33; Dkt. No. 75-16).

At the time of Larry’s layoff from MCC, Shlyahovsky, her

predecessor, was employed as the Human Resource Supervisor at an

MAEI sister mine, The Monongalia County Coal Company (Dkt. No. 75-2

at 27). In July 2015, approximately two months after Larry’s

layoff, Shlyahovsky was transferred back to the Marion County Mine

and demoted to the position of Human Resource Coordinator there

(Dkt. No. 75-2 at 26-27; Dkt. No. 76-5 at 9-10). Shlyahovsky

remained in that position for approximately three months, when he

then was reassigned elsewhere (Dkt. No. 75-18 at 2). Shlyahovsky

ultimately was laid off in a December 2015 reduction in force (Dkt.

No. 75-6 at 10; Dkt. No. 75-19 at 1).

B. Procedural Background

On October 20, 2015, Larry sued MCC in the Circuit Court of

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LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

Monongalia County, West Virginia (Dkt. No. 1-2), asserting claims

of (1) sex discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Human

Rights Act, W. Va. Code §§ 5-11-1, et seq. (“HRA”); (2) pregnancy

discrimination in violation of the West Virginia Pregnant Workers’

Fairness Act, W. Va. Code §§ 5-11B-1, et seq. (“PWFA”); (3)

retaliation in violation of the HRA and PWFA; and (4) interference

with her rights and retaliation in violation of the Family and

Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”). Id. at 4-6.

She also sued MAEI for aiding and abetting MCC in engaging in

unlawful sex discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and

retaliation in violation of the HRA and PWFA. Id. at 4-5. On

November 10, 2015, the defendants removed the case to this Court

(Dkt. No. 1).

On January 9, 2017, the Court stayed the case pending receipt

of answers to two questions certified to the Supreme Court of

Appeals of West Virginia, which bore directly on the potential

damages available in Larry’s case (Dkt. No. 94). See Martinez v.

Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 803 S.E.2d 582 (W. Va. 2017). After

receiving the answers to the certified questions, the Court

conducted a conference with the parties on July 26, 2017, to

discuss the status of the case (Dkt. No. 97). After the Supreme

6

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

Court of Appeals of West Virginia entered the mandate in Martinez,

Larry filed a motion to lift the stay in this case, which the Court

granted on November 1, 2017. Now pending are the defendants’

motions for summary judgment, which are fully briefed and ripe for

disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on

a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews all the evidence

“in the light most favorable” to the nonmoving party. Providence

Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir.

2000). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining

its truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of

whether genuine issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the

Court of the basis for the motion and of establishing the

nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

7

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has made the

necessary showing, the non-moving party “must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” favoring the non-

moving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment; the

evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact could

reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248–52.

III. DISCUSSION

A. State Law Discrimination Claims Against MCC

In Count One of the complaint, Larry contends that MCC’s

decision to select her for layoff was substantially motivated by

her sex and her pregnancy, which constitute violations of the West

Virginia Human Rights Act and the Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act

(Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4).

1. Sex and Pregnancy Discrimination Under the HRA and PWFA

The West Virginia Human Rights Act (“HRA”), W. Va. Code §§ 5-

11-1, et seq., prohibits employers from discriminating against any

individual with respect to “compensation, hire, tenure, terms,

conditions or privileges of employment.” W. Va. Code § 5-11-9(c).

Discrimination “means to exclude from, or fail or refuse to extend

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LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

to, a person equal opportunities because of . . . sex . . . .” W.

Va. Code § 5-11-3(h).

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has long

recognized that discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes sex

discrimination under the HRA. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, Montgomery

Gen. Hosp. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 346 S.E.2d 557, 559 (W.

Va. 1986)(“Discrimination based upon pregnancy constitutes illegal

sex discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va.

Code 5-11-9(a)[1981].”)(quoting Syl. pt. 2, Frank’s Shoe Store v.

W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 365 S.E.2d 251, 258 (W. Va. 1986)). In

2014, the West Virginia Legislature codified the protections

afforded to pregnant employees with the adoption of the Pregnant

Workers’ Fairness Act (“PWFA”), W. Va. Code §§ 5-11B-1, et seq.,

which explicitly requires employers to reasonably accommodate their

employees’ “known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth, or

related medical conditions,” including lactation. W. Va. Code § 5-

11B-2(1); W. Va. C.S.R. § 77-10-2.

Discrimination claims brought under the HRA are governed by

the burden-shifting framework of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792, 802-04 (1973). See Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State

9

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

ex rel. State of W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 309 S.E.2d 342, 352

(W. Va. 1983)(reaffirming use of the McDonnell Douglas standard in

West Virginia). The PWFA provides that the procedures and remedies

regarding unlawful employment practices in violation of the Act are

the same as those for the HRA. W. Va. Code. § 5-11B-3.

Despite the fact that Larry has alleged separate claims for

sex discrimination under the HRA and pregnancy discrimination under

the PWFA, both claims are premised on the same allegation that

MCC’s decision to select her for layoff was substantially motivated

by her recent pregnancy leave and ongoing lactation breaks, and

thus ultimately are grounded in the same set of facts and

circumstances. And, as discussed, pregnancy discrimination clearly

constitutes sex discrimination under the HRA, and the procedures

and remedies regarding violations of the HRA and PWFA are the same.

Therefore, for the purposes of MCC’s motion, the Court will apply

the same analytical framework to determine whether Larry’s claims

under the HRA and PWFA survive summary judgment.

2. Applicable Prima Facie Formulation and Burden-Shifting

Framework

In order to set forth a prima facie case of impermissible

employment discrimination under the HRA or PWFA, a plaintiff must

10

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

establish the following: (1) that she is a member of a protected

class; (2) that the employer made an adverse employment decision

affecting her; and (3) that, but for her protected status, the

employer would not have made the adverse decision. Syl. pt. 3,

Conaway v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423, 429 (W. Va.

1986). In establishing the third element of the prima facie case,

the plaintiff must “show some evidence which would sufficiently

link the employer’s decision and the plaintiff’s status as a member

of a protected class so as to give rise to an inference that the

employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory

criterion.” Id. at 429-30. The plaintiff can establish this link by

any of the following methods: (1) an admission from the employer,

(2) unequal or disparate treatment between members of the protected

class and others, (3) the elimination of legitimate reasons for the

decision, or (4) statistics showing that members of the protected

class receive substantially worse treatment than others. Id. at

430.

While acknowledging that the prima facie case set forth in

Conaway applies to the large majority of discriminatory discharge

claims under the HRA, MCC argues that a different formulation

applies here because Larry was terminated as part of a larger

11

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

reduction in force (“RIF”) at the Marion County Mine.

In the context of larger RIFs, the Fourth Circuit has applied

a modified prima facie case formulation, requiring the plaintiff to

establish: (1) that she was within the protected category; (2) that

she was selected from a larger group of candidates; (3) that she

was performing at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest

level in the group retained; and (4) that the process of selection

produced a residual work force that contained some unprotected

persons who were performing at a level lower than that at which the

plaintiff was performing. Corti v. Storage Tech. Corp., 304 F.3d

336, n. 6 (4th Cir. 2002).

Although it appears that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West

Virginia has not yet been presented with the specific opportunity

to adopt the RIF test in Corti, the Court need not decide that

issue here. Although the May 2015 reduction in force at the Marion

County Mine resulted in the layoff of thirty-four salaried

employees, including Larry, the record is clear that only one

position was eliminated from the Human Resource Department, and

that the employee group from which Larry was chosen consisted of,

at best, Larry, fellow Human Resource Coordinator Zuchowski, and

the two Mine Clerks. It is undisputed that Zuchowski was retained

12

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

in the remaining Coordinator position.

Given these facts, the Court is not persuaded that this case

is properly characterized as a typical reduction-in-force suit, or

that the elements of the modified RIF test are applicable. See,

e.g., O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542,

546 (4th Cir. 1995), reversed on other grounds, 517 U.S. 308

(1996)(questioning applicability of RIF prima facie formulation

where the reduced “force” consisted of two people, and although the

plaintiff’s position was eliminated, he was essentially replaced by

another employee).

Rather, because “the complexities and difficulties of

determining what employee was replaced by whom in the typical mass

layoff case is simply not an issue here,” the Court will analyze

Larry’s claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination using the

traditional prima facie formulation. O’Connor, 56 F.3d at 546.

Under Conaway, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,

the burden shifts to the employer to advance a non-discriminatory

reason for the plaintiff’s dismissal. Conaway, 358 S.E.2d at 430.

“The reason need not be a particularly good one. It need not be one

which the judge or jury would have acted upon. The reason can be

any other reason except that the plaintiff was a member of a

13

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

protected class.” Id.

After the employer explains its decision, the employee may

rebut the employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Id.

The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the

facially legitimate reason given by the employer for the employment

decision was merely a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Eddy v.

Biddle, No. 1:11CV137, 2013 WL 66929, at *6 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 4,

2013) (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n,

696 S.E.2d 282, 293 (W. Va. 2010)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). At that point, “the issue of whether the plaintiff [has]

established a prima facie case . . . [becomes] irrelevant.” Skaggs

v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc., 479 S.E.2d 561, 583 (W. Va. 1996). “To

get to the jury, the employee must offer sufficient evidence that

the employer’s explanation was pretextual to create an issue of

fact.” Id.

3. Analysis

Under the Conaway framework, the first step in the Court’s

analysis is to determine whether Larry has sufficient prima facie

evidence of sex and pregnancy discrimination to survive summary

judgment. She has clearly established the first two elements of her

claim: She is a female, and accordingly, a member of the protected

14

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

class; further, MCC made an adverse employment decision when it

terminated her as a Human Resource Coordinator at the Marion County

Coal Mine in May 2015. At issue is the third prong of Larry’s prima

facie case. MCC argues that Larry has failed to present any

evidence of a nexus between her termination and her sex, pregnancy,

or pregnancy-related accommodations (Dkt. No. 87 at 9). Larry

contends, however, that MCC’s decision to terminate her was

“contaminated” by her recent pregnancy leave and ongoing lactation

breaks (Dkt. No. 84 at 1).

To establish the third prong of her prima facie case, Larry is

required only “to show some evidence which would sufficiently link

the employer's decision and the plaintiff's status as a member of

a protected class so as to give rise to an inference that the

employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory

criterion.” Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 457 S.E.2d 152, 161

(W. Va. 1995), holding modified by Dodrill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.

Co., 491 S.E.2d 1 (1996)(citing Conaway, 358 S.E.3d at 429-30). In

other words, the third prong is “merely a threshold inquiry,”

requiring only that Larry establish an inference of discrimination.

Id.

Here, sufficient facts exist to permit a rational finder of

15

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

fact to infer a discriminatory motive. After being promoted to

Human Resource Coordinator in March 2014, Larry had received back-

to-back pay increases in October 2014 and January 2015 (Dkt. No.

84-1 at 92). A performance evaluation completed by Layton on

January 23, 2015--just two weeks before Larry went on maternity

leave--indicated Larry was “meeting expectations” in all categories

assessed (Dkt. No. 84-18). In the same evaluation, Layton reported

that Larry was “function[ing] very well in HR coordinator role.”

Id. Approximately two months after her return from maternity leave,

and during the time when she was taking lactation breaks at work,

however, Larry was chosen for layoff while a newly promoted male

Human Resource Coordinator, who had obviously neither taken

maternity leave nor required lactation breaks, was retained in the

position. Thus viewed, Larry has satisfied the “threshold inquiry”

required under Conaway and Barefoot, and established a prima facie

case of sex discrimination under the HRA and pregnancy

discrimination under the PWFA.

The burden then shifts to MCC to establish a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for terminating Larry. MCC asserts that it

selected Larry for layoff because it no longer had confidence that

she would “carry out her duties professionally” and “maintain the

16

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

requisite confidentiality of the sensitive information entrusted to

her” as a Human Resource Coordinator (Dkt. No. 75 at 8). Layton

testified that she believed Larry was leaking confidential

information to hourly employees and union officials (Dkt. No. 75-2

at 10-11). Although she denied divulging confidential information,

Larry admitted that she made personal telephone calls to other

employees from her office, during which she discussed both

“personal stuff” and “stuff going on in the mine” (Dkt. No. 75-1 at

42-43). Layton testified that, during one such call, she overheard

Larry denigrating Marion County Mine Superintendent Brian

Frederickson (“Frederickson”) and Assistant Superintendent Brandon

Laxton (“Laxton”), behavior Layton viewed as potentially causing

friction between hourly workers and management (Dkt. No. 75-2 at

12).

Laxton himself testified that, on multiple occasions, hourly

employees or union officials learned through leaked information

that disciplinary action was to be taken by mine management before

those decisions had been announced or could be implemented (Dkt.

No. 75-15 at 3-9). He further testified that, in each instance of

leaked human resource information, Larry was believed to be the

source. Id. Based on this, MCC has offered a legitimate, non-

17

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

discriminatory reason for terminating Larry. Conaway, 358 S.E.2d at

430.

Given that, Larry bears the burden of establishing that MCC’s

reason for terminating her was pretextual. Id. She argues that

MCC’s assertions that she was leaking confidential information are

“baseless” and were manufactured to cover up its discriminatory

motives for her layoff (Dkt. No. 84 at 2). For example, Laxton

testified that he believed Larry advised a union representative of

pending disciplinary measures against two hourly workers (Dkt. No.

75-15 at 3-4), but Larry cites evidence that the information

conveyed to the union representative was known by people other than

Larry, that the fax machines likely utilized in communicating the

information were in public work areas, and that the events occurred

after Larry had left work for the day (Dkt. No. 84-12 at 19-21;

Dkt. No. 84-1 at 27).

Laxton also testified about a second incident in which Larry

was the only person, other than Frederickson, whom he told about

the hiring of 25 contract workers; nevertheless, the union

representative found out about the plan (Dkt. No. 75-15 at 6-7).

Larry pointed out in response that Laxton admitted that the need

for contractors was first brought to his attention by mine

18

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

employees, and that he did not tell Larry that the information was

confidential. Id. at 7-8.

Further, Layton testified that, other than counseling Larry

after overhearing the telephone call about Superintendents

Frederickson and Laxton, she had never discussed any

confidentiality concerns with her (Dkt. No. 84-4 at 23-24).

Tellingly, none of these concerns was mentioned in Larry’s January

2015 performance evaluation (Dkt. No. 84-18).

Larry also relies on evidence that Zuchowski, the male

employee retained as Human Resource Coordinator instead of Larry,

was less experienced in the role and may not have even been

considered for layoff in May 2015. Despite Layton’s testimony that

Zuchowski was among the candidates considered for layoff, the

“layoff list” generated by MCC did not include his name (Dkt. No.

84-4 at 15; Dkt. No. 84-9 at 1). And, while Zuchowski was permitted

to participate in meetings with Layton, Laxton, and other MCC

managers to discuss who would be laid off, Larry was not involved

in those meetings (Dkt. No. 84-4 at 6; Dkt. No. 84-1 at 38-39).

Finally, in an attempt to refute Larry’s evidence of pretext,

MCC argues that it is entitled to the “same actor” inference, that

arises when an employee “was hired and fired by the same person

19

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

within a relatively short time span.” Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796,

798 (4th Cir. 1991). Where present, this fact “creates a strong

inference that the employer's stated reason for acting against the

employee is not pretextual.” Id. The record in this case, however,

gives rise to no such inference.

MCC contends that Layton was solely responsible for the

decisions to hire, promote, and terminate Larry. Larry disputes

that contention, however, asserting that the decision to terminate

her was made jointly by Layton, Frederick, and Laxton. As

previously noted, Layton consulted with Frederickson and Laxton to

identify would be selected for layoff (Dkt. No. 84-4 at 6, 8).

Layton herself acknowledged that the decision to terminate Larry

was based on information provided by her “bosses,” Frederickson and

Laxton. Id. at 8.

On this record, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to

whether Layton can be wholly credited with the decision to

terminate Larry, and thus whether the same actor inference should

apply. See Burgess v. Bowen, 466 Fed.Appx. 272, 280 n. 4 (4th Cir.

2012) (same actor inference is not appropriate where a factual

dispute exists over who made the termination decision); Constellium

Rolled Prod. Ravenswood, LLC v. Rogers, No. 2:15-cv-13438, 2017 WL

20

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

1552325, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 28, 2017) (same). The Court

therefore declines to apply the same actor inference on summary

judgment.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Larry, as

it must (Providence, 211 F.3d 846 at 850), the Court concludes that

Larry has “offer[ed] sufficient evidence that the employer’s

explanation was pretextual to create an issue of fact.” Skaggs, 479

S.E.2d at 583. The Court thus DENIES MCC’s motion for summary

judgment on Larry’s claims for sex discrimination under the HRA and

pregnancy discrimination under the PWFA.

B. State Law Retaliation Claims Against MCC

In addition to claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination,

Larry also alleges in Count One that MCC terminated her in

retaliation for asserting her rights under West Virginia law, in

violation of the HRA and PWFA (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 4).

Under West Virginia law, Larry must establish the following

elements to state a prima facie claim for retaliatory discharge

under the HRA and PWFA: (1) she was engaging in protected activity;

(2) her employer was aware of the protected activity; (3) her

employer took adverse action against her; and (4) the adverse

action was retaliatory or, in the absence of such evidence, was

21

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

sufficiently temporally related to the protected activity to allow

an inference of retaliatory motive on the part of the employer.

Syl. pt. 10, Hanlon v. Chambers, 464 S.E.2d 741, 753 (W. Va.

1995)(citing Syl. pt. 1 Brammer v. Human Rights Comm’n, 394 S.E.2d

340 (1990)). Once Larry establishes her prima facie case, the

burden shifts to MCC to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for her termination. Cooper v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co.,

870 F. Supp. 1410, 1418 (S.D.W. Va. 1994). Finally, Larry has the

opportunity to rebut MCC’s proffered reason as mere pretext. Id.

At issue is whether Larry engaged in a “protected activity”

within the meaning of the HRA or PWFA, the statutes upon which her

state law retaliation claims rest. Under the HRA, it is unlawful

for an employer to “[e]ngage in any form of reprisal or otherwise

discriminate against any person because he has opposed any

practices or acts forbidden under this article or because he has

filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under

this article.” W. Va. Code § 5-11-9(7)(C). The PWFA contains

similar language prohibiting discrimination against an individual

who “has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this article

or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

22

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

hearing under this article.” W. Va. Code 5-11B-3(b).

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has interpreted

such protected activity to include “that which challenges any

practices or acts forbidden under” the statute. Hanlon, 464 at 753

(internal quotations omitted). In Hanlon, the Supreme Court

explained that the HRA prohibits

an employer or other person from retaliating against any

individual for expressing opposition to a practice that

he or she reasonably and in good faith believes violates

the provisions of the Human Rights Act. This standard has

both an objective and a subjective element. The

employee’s opposition must be reasonable in the sense

that it must be based on a set of facts and a legal

theory that are plausible. Further, the view must be

honestly held and be more than a cover for troublemaking.

Id. at 754 (emphasis added). It further commented that “[t]he

legislative purpose in including the anti-retaliation provision was

obviously to encourage people to come forward and expose unlawful

employment practices and to do so without fear of reprisal.” Id.

Citing Hanlon, the Supreme Court later applied the same

definition of protected activity:

Under Hanlon, “protected activity” includes opposition to

conduct that the plaintiff reasonably and in good faith

believes violates the provisions of the Human Rights Act.

Conrad v. ARA Szabo, 480 S.E.2d 801, 813 (W. Va. 1996). Thus, to

have engaged in “protected activity” under either the HRA or PWFA,

23

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

Larry must have challenged or otherwise opposed MCC conduct that

she reasonably and in good faith believed unlawful under those

statutes.

Here, Larry has failed to establish that she engaged in any

such activity. It is clear her claim is grounded in the assertion

that MCC retaliated against her because of her maternity leave and

lactation breaks following her return to work. As to her pregnancy-

related leave, it is undisputed that Layton approved Larry’s claim

for maternity leave, and that Larry was granted every day of leave

she sought (Dkt. No. 75-1 at 21). Larry conceded that, to her

knowledge, neither Layton nor anyone in management complained or

otherwise made negative comments about that leave. Id.

As to her ongoing lactation breaks at work, it is also

undisputed that Larry was permitted as many breaks as she needed.

Id. at 28. She testified that, other than her initial discussion

with Layton regarding where she might perform that activity, there

was no further discussion with Layton or anyone else regarding the

issue (id. at 24-25, 28), and she requested no alternate

accommodation. Id. at 31.

Because Larry has not demonstrated that she engaged in a

protected activity within the meaning of the HRA or PWFA, she has

24

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either

statute. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS MCC’s motion for summary

judgment on Larry’s state law claims for retaliation.

C. FMLA Claims Against MCC

1. Interference

In Count Three of the complaint, Larry alleges that, by laying

her off, MCC knowingly interfered with the exercise of her FMLA

rights (Dkt. No. 1-1). After MCC moved for summary judgment, Larry

withdrew her interference claim (Dkt. No. 84 at 23). The Court

therefore GRANTS MCC’s motion for summary judgment on Larry’s claim

for interference under the FMLA.

2. Retaliation

Although she has abandoned her interference claim, Larry

maintains that her layoff constituted unlawful retaliation under

the FMLA.

Under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), employers may not retaliate

against employees for exercising rights under the FMLA. See Dotson

v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir. 2009) Much like claims

brought under Title VII, under the FMLA, a plaintiff “must prove

three elements to establish a prima facie case of retaliation: (1)

she engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer took an adverse

25

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

employment action against her, and (3) there was a causal link

between the two events.” Adams v. Anne Arundel Cty. Public Schools,

789 F.3d 422, 429 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted)

(quoting Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281

(4th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). If, in response, the employer “advances

a lawful explanation for the alleged retaliatory action,” id., the

plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing that the employer’s

proffered explanation is pretext for FMLA retaliation.” Vannoy v.

Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2016).

Here, Larry has established a prima facie case of retaliation.

First, it is undisputed that she engaged in a protected activity by

taking FMLA leave. Second, it is undisputed that MCC terminated her

employment. Third, because Larry was terminated a mere two months

after returning to work from FMLA leave, the “close temporal

proximity between activity protected by the statute and adverse

employment action” demonstrates causation. Waag v. Sotera Defense

Solutions, Inc., 857 F.3d 179, 192 (4th Cir. 2017); see also

Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 551 (4th Cir.

2006).

In response, MCC has advanced the “lawful explanation” that it

terminated Larry because it “no longer had confidence that [she]

26

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

would carry out her duties professionally and maintain the requisite

confidentiality of the sensitive information entrusted to her” (Dkt.

No. 75 at 8). Therefore, to survive summary judgment, Larry bears

the burden to demonstrate that a material dispute exists as to

whether this explanation is merely pretextual. Vannoy, 827 F.3d at

304.

Of course, “[t]he FMLA does not prevent an employer from

terminating an employee for poor performance, misconduct, or

insubordinate behavior.” Id. at 304-05. As acknowledged above, MCC

has offered evidence that its decision resulted from Larry’s

perceived inability to maintain the confidentiality of sensitive

information, but the parties dispute whether MCC actually relied on

these alleged confidentiality concerns in selecting Larry for

layoff. While the law does not prevent MCC from terminating sub-par

employees as it sees fit, Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713,

722 (4th Cir. 2013), the law does prohibit it from basing such

decision on the exercise of a protected right. For the reasons

previously discussed, most notably the disputed evidence regarding

the alleged leaks of confidential information at the mine, as well

as Zuchowski’s involvement in the selection of employees for layoff

and his subsequent retention in the role of Human Resource

27

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

Coordinator, a reasonable jury could infer from the record that

MCC’s lawful explanation for Larry’s layoff is merely pretextual.

The Court therefore DENIES MCC’s motion for summary judgment on

Larry’s claim for retaliation under the FMLA.

D. State Law Aiding and Abetting Claim Against MAEI

MAEI has moved for summary judgment on Larry’s sole claim that

it aided and abetted MCC in engaging in unlawful discrimination and

retaliation against her “by assisting in selecting Larry for layoff

and/or by transferring a male employee from another of its mines to

replace [her],” in violation of the HRA and PWFA (Dkt. No. 1-1 at

5).

The HRA provides for a cause of action against individuals who

aid or abet an unlawful discriminatory act. Holsten v. Norandex,

Inc., 461 S.E.2d 473 (1995). The HRA provides, in relevant part,

that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice

(7) For any person, employer, employment agency, labor

organization, owner, real estate broker, real estate

salesman or financial institution to1:

(A) ... aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce any

person to engage in any of the unlawful

discriminatory practices defined in this section.

1 It is undisputed that MAEI qualifies as a “person” against whom

an aiding and abetting action may be filed under the HRA.

28

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

W. Va. Code § 5-11-9(7). As discussed earlier, the PWFA

incorporates the remedies available under the HRA. W. Va. Code § 5-

11B-3(a).

As an initial matter, the parties dispute the meaning of the

terms “aid” and “abet,” which the HRA does not define. Because this

court sits in diversity on Larry’s state law claims, it must apply

West Virginia state substantive law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins,

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Further, it “must apply state law as it

presently exists and may not suggest or surmise its expansion.”

McDaniel v. Travels Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 121 F.Supp 2d 508, 512

(N.D.W. Va. 2000)(citing Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 521 (4th

Cir. 1991)).

Where, as here, there is no relevant West Virginia state

substantive law defining the terms “aid” and “abet,” this Court

must predict how West Virginia state courts would decide the

question. Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 1994). In

predicting how West Virginia state courts would do so, the Court

must not expand upon the laws of West Virginia. Wade v. Danek Med.,

Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 1999)(citing St. Paul Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 48 F.3d 778, 783 (4th Cir. 1995)).

Consequently, “[t]he determination of the intent of the Legislature

29

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

of the State of West Virginia is solely within the province of the

West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and its subordinate courts,

not with the federal courts. It is not the role of the judiciary to

contradict the state courts on their law.” Jones v. Painter, 140

F.Supp.2d 677, 679 (N.D.W. Va. 2001).

Although the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not

construed “aiding and abetting” specifically within the context of

the HRA, other state courts and federal courts of appeals that have

addressed the applicable legal standard for aiding-and-abetting

claims under similar state statutes have adopted and applied the

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b). See, e.g., Ellison v.

Plumbers & Steam Fitters Union Local 375, 118 P.3d 1070, 1077

(Alaska 2005)(applying Restatement § 876(b) when construing

provision that “[i]t is unlawful for a person to aid, abet, incite,

compel, or coerce the doing of a[n unlawful discriminatory] act”);

Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 928-29 (N.J. 2004)(applying

Restatement when construing provision that it is unlawful “[f]or

any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid,

abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts

forbidden” under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination);

Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 157-58 (3d Cir.

30

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

1998)(adopting Restatement standard in the context of employment

discrimination and predicting that the New Jersey Supreme Court

would do the same).

Further, although not in a common law cause of action for

aiding and abetting, West Virginia’s highest court has previously

applied the Restatement standard in the civil context, holding that

“[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct

of another, one is subject to liability if he knows that the

other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial

assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.”

Syl. pt. 2, Barath v. Performance Trucking Co., 424 S.E.2d 602, 603

(W. Va. 1992); Syl pt. 5, Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 420

(W. Va. 1991)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b)).

Based on the consistent application by other courts of the

Restatement (Second) § 876(b) to aiding-and-abetting claims under

similar statutes, as well as West Virginia’s own application of the

standard in other civil causes of action, this Court is persuaded

that West Virginia would apply § 876(b) of the Restatement (Second)

of Torts when a construing a claim for aiding and abetting under

the HRA.

Here, pursuant to § 876(b), Larry contends that MAEI knew that

31

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

MCC’s layoff of Larry was discriminatory, and that it gave

“substantial assistance or encouragement” to MCC in accomplishing

that discrimination. MAEI refutes this, arguing that it was “in no

way involved in the development of procedures or criteria used by

MCC in connection with its determination of which salaried

employees would be laid off as part of the May 2015 reduction in

force,” and that it did not participate in MCC’s decision to select

Larry for layoff (Dkt. No. 78 at 5). As discussed, § 876(b)

concludes that aiding and abetting liability occurs when the actor

“knows the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives

substantial assistance or encouragement to the other.” Larry has

not satisfied that standard.

Notably, Larry does not specifically allege that MAEI “knew”

that MCC had discriminated against her, as required by § 876(b).

Rather, she alleges that MAEI did not sufficiently “question” or

review MCC’s decisionmaking process in selecting Larry for layoff

(Dkt. No. 85 at 13). This does not amount to “substantial

encouragement or assistance.” See, e.g., Failla, 146 F.3d at 159

(“Employees are not liable as aider and abetter merely because they

had some role, or knowledge or involvement. Rather the degree of

involvement, knowledge and culpability required as a basis for

32

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

liability is heightened by the standard that the Restatement sets

forth and we adopt. Only those employees who meet this heightened

standard will be aiders and abettors.”); Ellison, 118 P.3d at 1077-

78 (“We look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance,

which other courts have adopted in interpreting state statutes on

aiding and abetting discrimination . . . Ellison has made no

attempt to satisfy this standard. She points out that the stewards

had knowledge of discriminatory actions and did not report them,

but this does not amount to ‘substantial encouragement or

assistance.’”).

The other evidence on which Larry relies in support of her

aiding and abetting claim is MAEI’s transfer of Shylahovsky to the

Marion County Mine within two months of her layoff. While MAEI

concedes that it made the decision to demote Shlyahovsky and

transfer him back to the Marion County Mine as a Human Resource

Coordinator, it contends that the decision to select Larry for

layoff in May 2015 was made unilaterally by Layton, without any

input or approval from MAEI. Id. As discussed earlier, genuine

issues of material fact exist as to who made the decision to select

Larry for layoff. Those disputed issues of fact, however, relate to

who among MCC personnel and management–-namely, Layton,

33

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

Frederickson, and Laxton--were the decision makers regarding

Larry’s layoff.

Contrary to Larry’s contention that MAEI was involved in MCC’s

decision, Piccolini testified that, while he ultimately receives

and “reviews” layoff lists generated at MAEI mines, he does not

“evaluate” the lists because, in his role as Vice President of

Human Resources and Employee Relations of Murray Energy

Corporation, he has “no knowledge of” various mine employees’ work

performance and therefore relies upon personnel at each mine to

make those evaluations (Dkt. No. 77-3 at 13-14). He further

testified that layoff lists are generally sent to him for the

purpose of “keep[ing] [him] apprised of what’s happening at the

mine level,” id. at 13, and that in the case of the layoff list at

issue here, he was not aware that Larry had been selected for

layoff until he “received the final listing of everybody who was

involved” in the reduction. Id. at 14. Further, Piccolini’s only

prior involvement with Larry’s employment at MCC was his 2014

approval of her promotion to Human Resource Coordinator and the

accompanying increase in her salary.

Even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable

to Larry, no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding MAEI’s

34

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

involvement in the decision to lay off Larry, and a reasonable jury

could not find that MAEI was a decision maker regarding both

Larry’s layoff and Shylavoksky’s transfer back to the Marion County

Mine. For these reasons, the evidence is insufficient for Larry to

establish a claim for aiding and abetting discrimination against

MAEI. Furthermore, because the Court has granted MCC’s motion for

summary judgment on Larry’s claim for retaliation under the HRA,

Larry cannot maintain a claim against MAEI for aiding and abetting

such retaliation. The Court therefore GRANTS MAEI’s motion for

summary judgment.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, the Court:

! GRANTS in part and DENIES in part MCC’s motion for

summary judgment on Count One (Dkt. No. 75) and DISMISSES

Larry’s state law retaliation claim, WITH PREJUDICE;

! GRANTS MAEI’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 77)

and DISMISSES Count Two, WITH PREJUDICE; and

! GRANTS in part and DENIES in part MCC’s motion for

summary judgment on Count Three (Dkt. No. 75) and

DISMISSES Larry’s FMLA interference claim, WITH

PREJUDICE.

35

LARRY v. MARION COUNTY COAL, ET AL. 1:15CV212

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART

DEFENDANT MARION COUNTY COAL COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 75) AND GRANTING DEFENDANT MURRAY AMERICAN

ENERGY, INC.’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 77)

The case will proceed to trial as scheduled as to defendant

MCC on Larry’s claims of sex discrimination in violation of the HRA

(Count One), pregnancy discrimination in violation of the PWFA

(Count One), and retaliation in violation of the FMLA (Count

Three).

It is so ORDERED.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to transmit copies of this Order

to counsel of record and to enter a separate judgment order with

respect to defendant Murray American Energy, Inc.

DATED: January 31, 2018.

/s/ Irene M. Keeley

IRENE M. KEELEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

36

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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