State of Tennessee v. Gary E. Brown

11/04/2024

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 22, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GARY E. BROWN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

Nos. 122940, 125355 Hector Sanchez, Judge

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No. E2023-01562-CCA-R3-CD

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Defendant, Gary E. Brown, was indicted by a Knox County Grand Jury in case number

122940 for aggravated assault by strangulation, domestic assault, false imprisonment,

interfering with an emergency call, and two counts of violating a no contact order.

Defendant was later charged by information in case number 125355 with domestic

aggravated assault. In case number 122940, Defendant pled guilty to domestic assault and

was sentenced to 179 days for which he had credit. In case number 125355, Defendant

pled guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed-upon sentence of three years suspended to

probation, with the trial court to determine after a hearing whether Defendant would

receive judicial diversion. Following the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion,

Defendant appeals arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial

diversion. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable

law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM GREENHOLTZ and

KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Eric Lutton, District Public Defender; Jonathan Harwell, Assistant Public Defender (on

appeal); Heather Bosau, Assistant Public Defender (at pleas and sentencing), Knoxville,

Tennessee, for the appellant, Gary E. Brown.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard D. Douglas, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Sean Roberts, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

This case stems from two separate domestic violence cases. On November 11,

2022, the Knox County Grand Jury returned a six-count indictment in case number 122940

(“domestic assault conviction”) charging Defendant with aggravated assault by

strangulation, domestic assault, false imprisonment, interfering with an emergency call,

and two counts of violating a no contact order against Jeanette Marengo.1 On May 3, 2023,

while Defendant was on bond for the domestic assault conviction, he was arrested for

aggravated assault against Janna Ogle.

Following Defendant’s May 3, 2023 arrest, the State filed a motion to revoke or

increase Defendant’s bond for the domestic assault conviction, and the trial court

conducted a hearing on the motion on May 30, 2023. Defendant announced at the hearing

that he agreed to the revocation of his bond with the understanding that both cases would

be set for a plea hearing date. However, the trial court increased Defendant’s bond to

$1,000,000. Both cases were then set for a plea hearing on June 7, 2023.

At the June 7, 2023 plea hearing, the trial court rejected a proposed plea agreement

wherein Defendant would plead guilty to domestic assault for the domestic assault

conviction and aggravated assault in case number 125355 (“aggravated assault

conviction”) and ordered Defendant to serve a “one-year sanction” after which it would

reconsider the proposed plea agreement. On June 26, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to

Reconsider Court’s Decision to Reset Plea Date, arguing that the trial court “did not follow

the appropriate procedure in either accepting or rejecting the plea,” abused its discretion in

“reserving judgment . . . and setting the case out to 2024,” and that Defendant’s speedy

trial rights were “on the periphery of the actions taken by” the trial court.

At a hearing on that motion on July 7, 2023, the trial court stated that it had

incorrectly rejected the plea agreements at the prior hearing and advised Defendant that he

could withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(c)(5). Defendant chose to not withdraw his pleas. The State then announced that for

the domestic assault conviction, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to domestic assault in

exchange for receiving a “time-served sentence at the . . . sentencing hearing” and the

remaining counts being dismissed. Regarding the aggravated assault conviction,

Defendant agreed to plead guilty by information to aggravated assault with a “three-year

1

At Defendant’s sentencing hearing, Ms. Marengo indicated that her last name was “Marengo-Jimenez.”

For clarity, we will use Ms. Marengo’s name as it appears in the indictment.

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sentence with . . . six months split confinement.”2 As a condition of the pleas, Defendant

would be ordered to have no contact with Ms. Ogle and Ms. Marengo. The State

announced it would oppose Defendant’s application for judicial diversion. The State

presented the following factual basis for Defendant’s plea in the domestic assault

conviction:

On January 23 of 2022, Jeanette Marengo and [D]efendant were at . . .

Apartment 402, when they were in an argument that escalated when

[D]efendant shoved Ms. Marengo to the floor.

When she got up, [D]efendant shoved her to the ground a second time. Ms.

Marengo ran in the kitchen and [D]efendant pursued her. She threw a

packaged frozen dinner at him, and [D]efendant retrieved a vacuum cleaner

and struck Ms. Marengo in the back with it. Defendant then left the

apartment.

Shortly after that, [D]efendant returned to the apartment. Ms. Marengo asked

[D]efendant to leave. Defendant struck Ms. Marengo in the face with an

open hand and attempted to choke her, when [D]efendant grabbed Ms.

Marengo by the neck.

....

Defendant admitted to officers that he shoved Ms. Marengo to the floor twice

and struck her with the vacuum cleaner. Defendant was taken into custody,

and the proof would show that all those events occurred in Knox County,

Tennessee.

Regarding the aggravated assault conviction, the State announced if the case went

to trial, it anticipated that the proof would show the following:

As the proof at [D]efendant’s bond revocation hearing on May 30th, 2023

[for the domestic assault conviction] showed that on May 3rd, 2023,

[D]efendant was driving his red Nissan sedan with Janna Ogle in the

passenger seat.

2

At the October 26 diversion hearing, the trial court and the parties agreed that the judgment should

reflect a “pre-plea credit” rather than reflect six months’ confinement so that Defendant remained eligible

for judicial diversion. See T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(B)(iii)(b) (stating that “reasonable conditions”

includes requiring a qualified defendant to serve not more than thirty days’ confinement in the local jail).

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They started arguing about [D]efendant being late to a hair appointment and

[D]efendant raised his voice at her. Janna Ogle, demanded [D]efendant stop

the vehicle so she could get out. [D]efendant stopped the vehicle in the East

Town Mall area of Knoxville by Sam’s Club.

Defendant threw Ms. Ogle’s sunglasses out the vehicle window. Ms. Ogle

got out of the vehicle, walked away. Ms. Ogle was walking in the grass about

[ten] to [fifteen] feet off the road. Defendant placed his vehicle in reverse to

[] point the front end of the car at Ms. Ogle.

[D]efendant drove into Ms. Ogle while she was walking on foot. Middle of

the front end of [D]efendant’s vehicle made contact with Ms. Ogle, causing

Ms. Ogle to roll over the hood and the windshield briefly launching Ms. Ogle

into the air.

The vehicle initially made contact with Ms. Ogle’s left hand when it was

against her hip, causing a fracture of three bones in Ms. Ogle’s hand and arm.

Ms. Ogle also suffered abrasions on her face when she landed on the ground

after being launched in the air by [D]efendant’s vehicle. [D]efendant sped

away and drove back to the area after some time.

Chloe Brock was in the area when she observed [D]efendant’s red Nissan

stopped, and witnessed [D]efendant arguing with Ms. Ogle. Chloe Brock

stopped her vehicle and make sure everything was okay when she observed

Ms. Ogle exit [D]efendant’s vehicle, walk [a]way.

Chloe Brock observed [D]efendant back his vehicle up to align with Ms.

Ogle, and observed [D]efendant drive his vehicle [into] Ms. Ogle and as she

testified in the previous hearing on May 30th, she witnessed Ms. Ogle being

launched approximately [ten] feet into the air after [D]efendant hit her with

her car. 911 was called and KPD officers responded.

Officers observed damage to the hood of [D]efendant’s vehicle after he had

returned to the scene. Officers observed Ms. Ogle to have wrapped her left

hand and arm in her T-shirt and Ms. Ogle appeared to be in pain.

Officers also observed abrasions and redness to the side of Ms. Ogle’s face.

Ms. Ogle went to the hospital the next day where it was discovered that she

had fractures in three places in her left arm and hand. And the proof would

show that all these events occurred in Knox County Tennessee.

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Defendant agreed to the facts as announced by the State and following the plea

colloquy, the trial court accepted the plea agreements, but withheld entry of judgments

until the diversion hearing.

At the October 26, 2023 diversion hearing, the State introduced Defendant’s

presentence report which showed that Defendant had no prior criminal history. Defendant

reported his mental and physical health as “fair”; he had been diagnosed with ADHD as a

child but was not on medication at the time of the report. Defendant reported social use of

alcohol and marijuana. The validated risk and needs assessment resulted in a risk score of

“moderate” with high needs in mental health, moderate needs in education, residential,

attitudes/behaviors, family, and aggression, and low needs in alcohol/drug use,

employment, and friends.

Linda Brown, Defendant’s sister, testified and described Defendant as the

“definition of a good big brother[,]” “mild-headed[,]” and “motivating.” Defendant had

helped her and was a “shining light” while she recovered from an amputation after a car

accident. Jamar Hensley, Defendant’s childhood friend, testified that Defendant was his

“best friend because he’s that person that’s always there for [him] no matter what.” Joseph

Slack met Defendant in 2016 when they played semi-professional football together. Mr.

Slack said that Defendant was “like [his] little brother” and described Defendant as “a kind-

hearted person that wouldn’t hurt a fly.” Heather Chism met Defendant in 2015 or 2016.

She described Defendant as a “family person, love[s] everything that he does, [and a] very

kind-hearted person.” All of the witnesses were aware of the facts underlying Defendant’s

convictions and said they would act as a support system for Defendant.

Defendant then introduced two academic reports regarding the benefits of

expungement and the collateral consequences of permanent convictions. Defendant further

introduced certificates of completion from the Corrections Rehabilitation Institute for the

Entrepreneurship, Anger Management, Behavior Change, and Family and Community

Reunification programs.

Ms. Marengo provided a victim impact statement explaining that she had “been in

and out of therapy” and that the incident had impacted her “mentally, emotionally,

physically, spiritually, and financially.” Since the assault, Ms. Marengo had experienced

increased “anxiety and panic attacks” and had trouble maintaining relationships. She

explained that the incident had impacted her son because she no longer had transportation,

and Defendant had “practically” raised her son.

Defendant offered an allocution. He stated that the six months he spent incarcerated

were the “hardest thing of [his] life.” Defendant wanted to continue his education and

become a football coach, and he expressed that he was disappointed in himself. He

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explained that he lost someone and kept “stuff . . . bottled up instead of taking care of it[.]”

Defendant understood that he “put [him]self in this situation” but said it was important to

him to have a “clean record” because he did not want the “doors . . . to shut[.]” He stated

that he did not “want to ever have to come back here again.”

The State asserted that judicial diversion was inappropriate in both cases because of

the nature and circumstances of the offense, the need for deterrence for Defendant, and

because the interests of the public weighed heavily against granting judicial diversion. The

State noted that Defendant committed the aggravated assault against Ms. Ogle while on

pretrial release for the domestic assault against Ms. Marengo. The State asserted that

“[m]ainly, with the circumstances of the offense especially in the subsequent case . . .

[D]efendant had no hesitation before committing an act that could have resulted in the loss

of human life or serious bodily injury.”

Defendant argued that his lack of criminal history, strong social support, and his

amenability to correction, as evidenced by his certificates earned while incarcerated,

weighed strongly in favor of judicial diversion. He acknowledged that the circumstances

of the offense “likely does not weigh in his favor” but noted that he had accepted

responsibility by pleading guilty to both offenses. Defendant stated that he had willingly

met with a social worker and that the results of that assessment indicated that he would

benefit from mental health treatment, which could be handled in the community. He

asserted that the deterrent effect had already been felt by Defendant, and the general

deterrence would be minimal because the cases had not garnered public attention. He

further asserted that diversion would not “send a message that crimes against women are

not taken seriously” because Defendant had spent the prior six months incarcerated and

would continue to experience the consequences of the convictions. Defendant, relying on

the academic reports, argued that judicial diversion would serve the interests of the public

by reducing the collateral consequences of conviction, such as limited access to

employment, housing, and public assistance.

Pursuant to the plea agreements, the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years

on state probation for the aggravated assault conviction and time served for the domestic

assault conviction and ordered Defendant to undergo an alcohol and drug assessment, to

follow any recommended treatments, and to have no contact with either Ms. Ogle or Ms.

Marengo. The trial court found that Defendant was qualified for judicial diversion and

then considered and weighed the factors in State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211,

229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The trial court found that Defendant’s amenability to

correction and lack of criminal history weighed in favor of judicial diversion and stated

that Defendant appeared to be “genuine and sincere” regarding taking responsibility and

being remorseful. The court expressed its belief that Defendant was “someone who has on

a couple of occasions departed from their normal course of conduct and engaged in conduct

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that kind of led [him] to where [he] is today.” After recounting the witnesses who testified

on Defendant’s behalf, the trial court found that Defendant’s social history favored

diversion, noting that Defendant had “made some extraordinarily bad decisions that very

well, as I stated in your plea, could have ended in a homicide charge. I mean if that girl,

Ms. Ogle, landed incorrectly and broke her neck, we’d be hearing a whole different

situation. You’d be looking at a lot more time.” Regarding the circumstances of the

offense, the trial court found:

The second factor is the circumstances of the offense and that’s really what

the biggest problem for you is here, . . . is that you were on bond for a violent

offense against . . . somebody you were intimately involved with[.]

You were on bond after you strangled [Ms. Marengo], and then while you’re

on bond, you got into another fight with Ms. Ogle, and I don’t know what

got the best of you or for whatever reasons you decided that when she left

the car that you were going to accelerate at her and hit her with your motor

vehicle.

And I think the witnesses testified if I recall correctly that she looked like a

rag doll going through the air before she ultimately fell and broke three bones

in her arm. So that’s, that’s the circumstances of both of those offenses weigh

heavily against granting judicial diversion in this case.

The trial court gave “not much” weight to Defendant’s mental and physical health

because Defendant appeared to “be in good mental health as well as physical health”

although being in custody had “drained him[.]” The trial court noted that:

there’s no question [judicial diversion] would serve the interest of

[Defendant] having a clear record, obviously. [Defendant] cited to some

research and data and articles that support the fact that a clean record does

go a long way and folks who do get the benefit of diversion tend to do better

with regard to recidivism.

But . . . the other half to that inquiry is whether judicial diversion will serve

the interest of the public, and that’s really to basically not put the public on

notice that on two occasions you acted extremely violently towards women.

One occasion you armed yourself with a vehicle and hit that person, and

that’s the biggest hurdle for this [c]ourt to overcome is the circumstances of

the offenses.

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Had it been one offense. I think you would have a great argument for judicial

diversion. The [c]ourt probably would place you on diversion. But given

the circumstances that you were on bond for the first and you committed the

second and you kind of progressed with regard to your conduct and seriously

put a human being in peril of death or serious bodily injury, the [c]ourt does

make a finding that you are not an appropriate candidate for judicial

diversion.

Defendant’s timely appeal is now before this court.

Analysis

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion because it

based its denial on the potential injuries that Ms. Ogle could have suffered and a “flawed”

argument that the public’s interest would be served by denying diversion. The State asserts

that the trial court properly weighed the Electroplating factors, and did not abuse its

discretion in denying judicial diversion based on the circumstances of the offense and the

interests of the public. We agree with the State.

Following a determination of guilt by plea or by trial, a trial court may, in its

discretion, defer further proceedings and place a qualified defendant on probation without

entering a judgment of guilt. T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(A); State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d

918, 925 (Tenn. 2015). A qualified defendant is one who is found or pleads guilty to the

offense, is not seeking deferral for certain sexual offenses or an offense committed by an

elected or appointed person, has not been previously convicted of a felony or Class A

misdemeanor, and has not previously been granted judicial or pretrial diversion. T.C.A. §

40-35-313(a)(1)(B)(i)(a)-(e). If the defendant successfully completes the period of

probation, the trial court is required to dismiss the proceedings against him, and the

defendant may have the records of the proceedings expunged. T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a)(2),

(b); Dycus, 456 S.W.3d at 925. As an offender convicted of the Class A misdemeanor of

domestic assault and the Class C felony of aggravated assault, with no prior criminal

record, Defendant’s criminal history and convictions met the statutory requirements for

eligibility for judicial diversion. See T.C.A. § 40-35-313(a)(1)(B).

Mere eligibility for judicial diversion, however, does not entitle a defendant to

judicial diversion. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In

determining whether to grant diversion, the trial court must consider the following factors:

(a) the accused’s amenability to correction, (b) the circumstances of the offense, (c) the

accused’s criminal record, (d) the accused’s social history, (e) the accused’s physical and

mental health, (f) the deterrence value to the accused as well as others, and (g) whether

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judicial diversion will serve the interests of the public as well as the accused.

Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d at 229.

The decision to grant or deny a qualified defendant judicial diversion “is entrusted

to the discretion of the trial court.” State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Tenn. 2014)

(citation omitted). This court will apply a presumption of reasonableness to a trial court’s

decision regarding judicial diversion so long as the trial court considers the Electroplating

factors, identifies the relevant factors, and explains on the record the reasoning for its

decision. Id. at 326 (citing State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tenn. 2012)). In doing so,

this court will uphold a trial court’s decision denying or granting judicial diversion so long

as there is “any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.” Id. “‘Substantial

evidence’ is ‘[e]vidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a

conclusion; evidence beyond a scintilla.’” State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 280 (Tenn.

2014) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (9th ed. 2009)). A trial court is “not

required to utilize any ‘magic words’ or specifically reference the case names . . . when

discussing the relevant factors in order to receive the presumption of reasonableness.”

King, 432 S.W.3d at 324 n.8.

While the procedural history in this case is confusing and the record is somewhat

unclear, it appears that Defendant sought judicial diversion, and appeals the denial of

diversion, in both cases. The trial court specifically considered the Electroplating factors

and analyzed each in turn when providing its reasoning for denying Defendant’s request

for judicial diversion; thus, we will apply a presumption of reasonableness to the trial

court’s denial of judicial diversion.

The trial court found that Defendant’s lack of criminal history and social history

weighed in favor of granting diversion and placed minimal weight on Defendant’s “good”

physical and mental health. The court also found that Defendant was amenable to

correction, noting that he appeared to be genuinely remorseful for his actions. However,

the trial court found that the circumstances of the offense weighed strongly against

diversion because Defendant committed the offense underlying the aggravated assault

conviction while he was on bond for the domestic assault conviction. The trial court noted

that Defendant had “progressed” in violence, and struck Ms. Ogle with a car, putting her

“in peril of death or serious bodily injury” based on Ms. Brock’s testimony that Ms. Ogle

flew ten feet before landing on the ground. The trial court addressed Defendant’s interests

in receiving judicial diversion and considered the academic research presented at the

sentencing hearing; however, it found that the public’s interest in being aware of

Defendant’s repeated and escalating violence against women outweighed Defendant’s

interest in receiving diversion.

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Defendant argues that the trial court violated the “basic principle” that a defendant’s

punishment shall be “justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense” by

relying “on the facts that Ms. Ogle could have been more seriously harmed.” See T.C.A.

§ 40-35-102(1). He asserts that there was no evidence to support the theory that Ms. Ogle

could have broken her neck, and it was “inappropriate to make sentencing decisions on the

basis of speculation as to things that did not happen.” Regarding this issue, the trial court

stated:

So I think your social history supports the fact that ultimately . . . you’re a

good person.

You made some extraordinarily bad decisions that very well, as I stated in

your plea, could have ended in a homicide charge. I mean if that girl, Ms.

Ogle, landed incorrectly and broke her neck, we’d be hearing a whole

different situation. You’d be looking at a lot more time.

When the trial court’s statement is considered in the context of its analysis and

ruling, it is clear that the trial court did not actually consider the potential for harm as a

diversion factor, but commented on the circumstances of the offense, noting that Defendant

had made a bad decision that could have been much worse, despite his positive social

history.

Further, because the trial court did not deny diversion based solely on the

circumstances of the offense, it was not required to find that the circumstances were

“especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, offensive or otherwise of an

excessive or exaggerated degree.” State v. Sihapanya, 516 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tenn. 2014)

(concluding that the higher standard of review is inapplicable in cases where the denial was

based on more than one factor); see State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tenn. 2006).

In addition to relying on the circumstances of the offense in its denial of diversion, the trial

court also relied on the fact that Defendant committed the offense against Ms. Ogle while

on bond for his assault against Ms. Marengo, noting that Defendant “progressed” in his

conduct. See State v. Jackson, No. E2009-00852-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 1949147, at *4

(noting that our legislature has expressed disfavor for those committing offenses while on

bond to support a trial court’s consideration of the same in denying diversion); State v.

Myers, No. E2021-00841-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2903266, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. July

22, 2022) (noting that the trial court properly considered under the circumstances of the

offense that the offense “exceeded a mere attempt to elude arrest and could easily have led

to the death of the [d]efendant or the victim”).

Defendant next contends that the trial court relied on a “flawed” public safety

argument when determining that judicial diversion would not serve the interests of the

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public. He contends that “there is no easy mechanism by which women that [Defendant]

encounters will automatically become aware of his conduct due to the fact that he has a

conviction.” The State asserts that the public’s ability to become aware of a Defendant’s

convictions is relevant to whether judicial diversion would serve the interests of the public.

The interests of the public “may not be served where granting diversion would

depreciate the seriousness of the offense, or where the collateral consequences of a

conviction would protect the public[.]” State v. Sheets, No. M2022-00538-CCA-R3-CD,

2023 WL 2908652, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2023) (citations omitted). It may

be in the public’s interest to have a conviction remain on a defendant’s record. State v.

Allen, No. W2021-00673-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 842642, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar.

22, 2022) (upholding trial court’s finding that the public’s interest was served by a

permanent conviction to prevent the defendant from obtaining employment around

children where he could re-offend); see State v. Lampkin, No. W2019-00885-CCA-R3-CD,

2020 WL 1875238, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (“The denial of diversion was

based on the trial court’s determination that the interests of the public weighed in favor of

making it impossible for the [d]efendant to return to teaching, regardless of his current

intentions. We conclude that this did not constitute an abuse of discretion.”).

Defendant relies on State v. Hatfield, No. E2018-00041-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL

91542, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 3, 2019) in support of his position. In Hatfield, the

defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault by strangulation in exchange for a three-year

sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Id. at *1. The trial

court denied judicial diversion based on the circumstances of the offense, specifically

noting how dangerous strangulation was, the deterrence value to the accused and others,

and the interests of the public. Id. at *2. Noting that it was not “satisfied that the interest

of the public would be served if it were impossible to find out about this episode and this

damage to this woman in this domestic context,” the trial court found that the interests of

the public were served by denying judicial diversion. Id. A majority of a panel of this

court found this improper:

The trial court indicated that it did not believe diversion to be appropriate

because the public in general, and any future potential romantic partner of

the defendant, should be aware that the defendant had committed the offense

of aggravated assault against his girlfriend. The legislature, however, has

seen fit to make aggravated assault by strangulation, even of one’s romantic

partner, an offense eligible for judicial diversion. Consequently, the fact of

the defendant’s having committed that offense cannot support a denial of

judicial diversion.

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Id. at *4. Here, however, while noting that part of the inquiry of “serving the interests of

the public” is to “put the public on notice that on two occasions you acted extremely

violently towards women,” the trial court specifically noted that it was the repeated and

escalating nature of Defendant’s conduct underlying the convictions that the public had an

interest in being able to discover. In fact, the trial court stated that it likely would have

granted diversion had there only been one assault case against Defendant.

Because the trial court properly considered the Electroplating factors and the record

contains substantial evidence in support of its findings, we conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion when it denied diversion. Defendant is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

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JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE

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