Coleman, Sidney v. Sperry, Sam

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

SIDNEY L. COLEMAN,

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

21-cv-65-wmc

JIMMY VANG, COLE CONWAY,

ANTHONY BRISKI, DAVID MIKUNDA,

AARON SCHIEFELBEIN, and

SAM SPERRY,

Defendants.

In October of 2019, Eau Claire Police Department officers stopped plaintiff Sidney

Coleman for an alleged traffic violation, which ultimately led to a search of his car, the

execution of a search warrant on his temporary residence, and his arrest. Coleman filed

this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against six officers involved in those events and

his subsequent prosecution in Wisconsin state court, claiming that their actions were

motivated by his race and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants have moved

for summary judgment, denying Coleman’s arrest had any racial motivation and

contending that they did not violate his constitutional rights. Alternatively, defendants

assert entitlement to qualified immunity. (Dkt. #33.)

Because there are disputed issues of material fact as to the circumstances

surrounding Coleman’s arrest, the search of his car, and the search warrant executed on his

hotel room, defendants’ motion must be denied as to Officer Sam Sperry. However,

defendants Jimmy Vang, Anthony Briski, and Cole Conway are entitled to qualified

immunity on plaintiff’s claims with which they were personally involved. Moreover, it is

undisputed that defendants David Mikunda and Aaron Schiefelbein lacked personal

involvement with any of the events relevant to Coleman’s claims, as did defendant Conway

on plaintiff’s claims relating to the search of his vehicle and hotel room alone.

Consequently, summary judgment must be entered in favor of all defendants save Sperry.

FACTS1

A. Background

In October of 2019, Coleman resided with his wife and four children at The Regency

Inn and Suites (“Regency Inn”) hotel in Eau Claire, Wisconsin. The Regency Inn is known

to law enforcement in Eau Claire as a site of frequent and persistent criminal activity,

including illegal drug use and sales. At times, the sale and distribution of illegal contraband

involves a vehicle arriving at the hotel, briefly remaining in its parking lot while the

vehicle’s occupant has contact with someone staying at the hotel, and the vehicle then

leaving. Those vehicles are also often rented.

B. Initial Police Investigation

At approximately 10:30 p.m. on October 7, 2019, Eau Claire Police Officer Sam

Sperry was on patrol in a fully marked squad car monitoring traffic in the vicinity of the

Regency Inn when he noticed a parked sedan running with a passenger, but no driver.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are material and undisputed after considering the

parties’ proposed factual findings, responses, and the evidence of record in a light most favorable

to plaintiff. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We must ... construe the record

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoid the temptation to decide which party's

version of the facts is more likely true.”).

Sperry then observed Coleman exit the hotel and enter the driver’s side of the vehicle,

which had Illinois license plates of the type commonly used by rental car fleets. Coleman

contends, and Sperry disputes, that he was intentionally targeting African Americans while

on patrol and picked out his car because it had out-of-state plates. (Dkt. #54, at 3-4.)

While Coleman’s car was still parked and running in the hotel lot, Sperry completed

a records check on the vehicle, which showed that it was rented from Enterprise. Although

Sperry asserts his search showed the vehicle’s registration had expired on June 20, 2019,

Coleman points out that its registration was likely up to date since the car was rented.

(Dkt. #52, at 5-6.) More importantly, a Wisconsin Uniform Citation form that Sperry

completed the next day also stated that the vehicle’s plate registration expired in 2020.

(Dkt. #49-3.)

After the vehicle left the Regency Inn’s parking lot, Sperry began to follow it. While

Sperry states that he observed Coleman fail to stop at a traffic light before making a right

turn and make another improper right turn shortly thereafter, Coleman denies having

violated any traffic laws. Regardless, Sperry initiated a traffic stop of Coleman’s vehicle

allegedly based on his observations of his driving, the vehicle’s allegedly expired

registration, and his professional experience. (Dkt. #52, at 7.) Meanwhile, Coleman

contends that Sperry lacked probable cause to pull him over, “target[ed]” his vehicle, and

racially profiled its occupants. (Id. at 8.)

C. Traffic Stop

The parties’ versions of the facts diverge even further after Sperry pulled Coleman

over. According to Sperry, after activating his squad car’s overhead lights, the passenger

door of Coleman’s vehicle opened suddenly and an occupant -- later determined to be

Timothy Coleman, Sidney’s brother -- quickly exited the vehicle, ignored Sperry’s demands

to show his hands and get back inside the vehicle, and spoke rapidly while walking towards

the back of the car. Sperry contends that he only drew his service weapon from its holster

and pointed it at Coleman’s brother after he disobeyed his orders. (Id. at 9-10.) In contrast,

Coleman contends that after his car came to a full stop, his brother slowly exited the vehicle

(id. at 9), which prompted Sperry to draw his service weapon and point it at Timothy, who

had one hand on the car and another on his phone recording the situation. (Id.)

At Timothy’s urging, Sidney Coleman then also exited the car and locked its doors.

According to Coleman, Sperry immediately pointed his gun at him and yelled for him to

show his hands, which were already raised. (Id. at 12.) Sperry counters that Coleman’s

left hand was initially inside his coat pocket and while he briefly raised his hands over his

head, he placed them back into his coat pockets while asking why he had been pulled over,

at which point Sperry ordered Coleman to show his hands again. (Id.) Sperry then

requested emergency assistance from additional patrol officers.

After the backup officers arrived on the scene, Sperry directed Coleman to step back

from the vehicle and lift his jacket to allow officers to view his waist and determine if he

had any weapons. Seeing none, Sperry asked Coleman to walk backwards towards him

and the other officers, including Eau Claire Police Officers Anthony Briski, Jimmy Vang,

and Cole Conway. The other officers’ weapons were unholstered while assisting with the

traffic stop, and when Coleman reached Officer Briski, he patted down Coleman for

weapons. After confirming that Coleman did not have any weapons on his person, Briski

placed him into Officer Vang’s squad car. Eau Claire Police Officers David Mikunda and

Aaron Schiefelbein arrived on the scene after Coleman was already inside Vang’s car.

Sperry and the other officers then approached Timothy, determined that he also did not

have weapons after a pat-down, and placed him into a squad car as well.

D. Vehicle Search and Arrest

After Coleman and his brother had been detained, Officers Sperry, Vang, and Briski

approached Coleman’s car. Although the parties disagree on the officers’ motive for doing

so, they agree that the officers saw an open bottle of beer upon reaching the vehicle. (Id.

at 24.) Sperry, Vang, and Briski further claim, and Coleman disputes, that they smelled a

strong odor of marijuana as they reached the vehicle, as well as saw a pill bottle in addition

to the open alcohol container. (Id. at 23-24.) Based on the smell of marijuana, the open

container, and the pill bottle, Officer Sperry retrieved the car’s keys from Coleman, and he

and other officers searched the vehicle. During that search, officers further found an empty

hypodermic needle, a prescription pill bottle with marijuana, and a blue gem baggie

containing two MDMA pills. Officers also found a pocketknife and at least one empty

bottle of beer, as well as four cell phones and a tablet.

According to Coleman, his brother Timothy volunteered to officers that anything

found inside the car belonged to him, and Coleman lacked knowledge of the car’s contents

because he was merely driving him to the store. (Dkt. #54, at 15.) Because Coleman was

on parole at the time, Sperry placed him on a probation hold after the traffic stop.

Coleman was later arrested for possession of THC, possession of methamphetamine, and

carrying a concealed knife.

E. Search Warrant

After being arrested, Coleman informed Sperry that he was staying at the Regency

Inn and attempting to transfer his probation location there. Sperry then called the on-call

Eau Claire County Assistant District Attorney, Angela Beranek, to provide her with

information regarding Coleman’s arrest. After consulting Beranek, Sperry drafted an

application for a warrant to search Coleman’s room at the Regency Inn for further

information and evidence related to drug possession and distribution, for which he also

served as the affiant. No other officers participated in drafting or preparing the application.

That search warrant was signed by Eau Claire County Circuit Court Judge Sarah

Harless in the early morning hours of October 8, 2019. At approximately 1:54 a.m. that

day, Officers Sperry, Vang, and Briski executed the search warrant on Coleman’s room at

the Regency Inn. In the room, they found a marijuana grinder and a glass bong.

F. Criminal Prosecution

That same day, Coleman was charged with possession of a controlled substance,

possession of THC, and carrying a concealed knife. Coleman was also issued a Wisconsin

Uniform Citation for running a red light. Two months later, he appeared in court for a

preliminary hearing, after which the criminal charges against him were found to be

supported by probable cause and his case bound over for arraignment. (Dkt. #37-1, at 3.)

Although Coleman subsequently moved with his family to Alabama, he continued

to attend hearings in his case virtually. During the pendency of his criminal case, Coleman

claims that he suffered a decline in the sale of his books and greeting cards due to the

allegedly false charges. He also contends without proof that he was “denied acceptance

into desired universities,” apparently because of defendants’ charges (dkt. #54, at 20),

although the criminal and traffic charges against Coleman were subsequently dropped on

the prosecutor’s motion on September 25, 2020.

OPINION

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows “there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party makes this showing, the non-moving party must

then provide evidence “on which the jury could reasonably find for [them]” to survive

summary judgment. Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp., 573 F.3d 401, 406–407 (7th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). At summary

judgment, the court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir.

2017).2

Here, plaintiff was granted leave to proceed against six defendants on a series of

Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims. Defendants seek summary judgment on all

of plaintiff’s claims, or in the alternative, assert an entitlement to qualified immunity. The

2 Video evidence can sometimes “evaporate any factual dispute that would otherwise exist.” United

States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022). While plaintiff makes several references to

footage that his brother filmed during the traffic stop (dkt. #44, at 4), the Eau Claire Police

Department appears to have had dashcams on at least some of its squad cars as early as January of

2016, e.g., Lindsay Alowairdi, WATCH: Dashcam video released in Eau Claire officer-involved shooting,

WEAU 13 NEWS, June 30, 2016, https://www.weau.com/content/news/WATCH-Dash-cam-video-

released-in-Eau-Claire-officer-involved-shooting-385058271.html, and defendants’ own police

report (dkt. #40-1, at 12-13) suggests there was a dashcam recording of the incident, neither party

has submitted any video to the court. Footage of the events at issue -- particularly in the moments

leading up to the traffic stop -- could have helped resolve some, if not all, of plaintiff’s remaining

claims.

court will first address plaintiff’s claims arising before the initiation of criminal charges

against him, then turn to the malicious prosecution claim itself.

I. Search and Seizure Claims

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.

Const. amend. IV. Because Section 1983 “does not establish a system of vicarious

liability[,]” plaintiff must provide “evidence that each defendant, through her own actions,

violated the Constitution.” Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff claims that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights in four ways: (1)

by stopping his vehicle without reasonable suspicion that he had committed a traffic

violation or crime; (2) by unreasonably pointing a gun at him when he posed no danger to

them; (3) by searching his vehicle without probable cause that it contained contraband or

evidence of a crime; and (4) by using fabricated evidence to obtain and execute a warrant

to search his hotel room. The court addresses each of these claims below.

A. Traffic Stop

Plaintiff first contends that defendant Sperry violated his Fourth Amendment rights

by effecting a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime.

Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a stop for investigatory purposes if

the officer has particularized and reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in illegal

activity or involved in a traffic offense. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014);

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). Reasonableness requires “an objective

inquiry into all of the circumstances known to the officer at the time he stopped the

defendant.” United States v. Snow, 656 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant

[the] intrusion”).

While defendant Sperry contends that he witnessed plaintiff commit various traffic

infractions, plaintiff maintains that he followed traffic laws at all times before Sperry pulled

him over and Sperry is lying to justify a stop for other reasons. Although the relevant

question for the jury is whether Sperry had an objectively reasonable belief that Coleman

committed a traffic violation, not whether defendant actually committed a violation, this

appears to require the jury to decide who is telling the truth as to the events leading up to

the stop. United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 428 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v.

Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005)). Accepting plaintiff’s version of the facts as

true, nothing about his driving would give rise to a reasonable belief that he was breaking

traffic laws. Similarly, although Sperry maintains he had reasonable suspicion to conduct

an investigatory stop based on a report regarding the vehicle’s registration having expired,

United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2016), there is a basis

to undermine Sperry’s credibility on this as well.3

3 Although plaintiff also contends that it was unlawful for defendant Sperry to run a records check

on his rental vehicle (dkt. #44, at 3), a police officer’s check of a vehicle registration in a database

is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, nor are officers required to have reasonable suspicion

of a crime to run one. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d at 667-68.

On the other hand, plaintiff’s belief that Officer Sperry detained him due to his

race, while understandable, lacks any support in the record.4 At the same time, “race, when

considered by itself and sometimes even in tandem with other factors, does not generate

reasonable suspicion for a stop[.]” United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 596 (7th Cir.

2019) (quoting United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562, 569-70 (2d Cir. 2005)); Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement

of the law based on considerations such as race”).

Consequently, other than race, the only undisputed fact that Sperry could have

relied on to initiate a lawful investigatory stop was plaintiff’s mere presence at a hotel

known for persistent criminal activity and his brief exit and entry into a lawfully parked

rental vehicle. However, “mere suspicion of illegal activity at a particular place is not

enough to transfer that suspicion to anyone who leaves that property.” United States v.

Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 909 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Bohman, 683 F.3d 861,

864 (7th Cir. 2011)). Neither can observing someone sitting in a legally parked car,

without more, justify a traffic stop, either. Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 845-46 (7th Cir.

2010). Nor can an individual’s presence in a high-crime area alone provide the basis for a

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Oglesby, 597 F.3d 891, 894 (7th

Cir. 2010).

Taken together, when the undisputed facts are viewed in the light most favorable to

plaintiff -- and in the absence of an allegation that he fled upon seeing law enforcement --

at the time Sperry initiated the traffic stop, he lacked reasonable suspicion that plaintiff

4 Plaintiff has neither alleged, nor was he granted leave to proceed on, an equal protection claim.

was engaged in illegal activity of any kind. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-26

(2000). Without more, an officer does not have carte blanche to pull someone over

because he is driving a rental car in a high-crime area. Accordingly, defendant Sperry is

not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that he was unlawfully pulled over.

B. Use of Force

Plaintiff next alleges that defendant Sperry pointed a gun at both plaintiff and his

brother during his traffic stop without justification, thereby violating his constitutional

rights. The basic question for an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment is

whether the officer used “greater force than was reasonably necessary” under the

circumstances. Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2016); Gonzalez v. City of

Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 539 (7th Cir. 2009). This determination is made from the perspective

of a “reasonable officer” in light of the totality of the circumstances known to the officer,

without regard to his or her actual intent or subjective beliefs. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 397 (1989); Williams v. Indiana State Police Dep’t, 797 F.3d 468, 472-73 (7th Cir.

2015); Abbott v. Sangamon County, Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013). As a result,

“whether a particular use of force was objectively reasonable ‘is a legal determination rather

than a pure question of fact for the jury to decide.’” Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458,

464 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir.

2012)). Nevertheless, the grant of summary judgment on an excessive force claim may be

inappropriate when parties give materially different accounts of the relevant events. Cyrus

v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 2010); Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574

F.3d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 2009).

When an officer points a firearm at a person, the mere pointing of the gun can

qualify as a seizure. Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 345 (7th Cir. 2009). In the context

of a valid investigatory stop, it is not unreasonable per se for an officer to point a gun at a

suspect. Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989). However, “gun pointing

when an individual presents no danger is unreasonable and violates the Fourth

Amendment,” Baird, 576 F.3d at 345, particularly if officers lack probable cause to suspect

an individual has committed any crime and execute an unlawful seizure. Jacobs v. City of

Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Under existing Seventh Circuit and

Supreme Court precedent at the time the use of force occurred in this case, it appears to

be clearly unreasonable for the Defendant Officers to have pointed a loaded weapon at

Jacobs for an extended period of time when they allegedly had no reason to suspect that

he was a dangerous criminal, or indeed that he had committed any crime at all, Jacobs was

unarmed, and when Jacobs had done nothing either to attempt to evade the officers or to

interfere with the execution of their duties.”). To determine whether the amount of force

used during a seizure is excessive, the court must examine the totality of the circumstances,

including “the countervailing government interests at stake.” Id. at 773. Other relevant

factors include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight[,]” as well as “whether the citizen was under arrest or

suspected of committing a crime, was armed, or was interfering or attempting to interfere

with the officer’s execution of his or her duties.” Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397;

McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Certainly, if the jury credits Coleman’s version of his being pulled over under false

pretenses, that same jury could credit his version of events leading to his decision to pull

and train his weapon on Coleman and his brother, although the fact that Coleman admits

his brother immediately exited the vehicle is problematic. At the same time, the other

defendants argue that it was necessary to take out their firearms given the nature of a high-

risk traffic stop, even if the jury rejects their claims that Timothy refused to comply with

their orders or held an object in any kind of menacing way, which appears to have been

Timothy’s cell phone in his hand. Although the latter could have conceivably been seen

by defendants as a weapon, they do not contend that they feared he was holding a gun or

knife, but merely an “object.” (Dkt. #53, at 8.) Because all uses of force against plaintiff

must be justified, the court will analyze the reasonableness of each defendant’s challenged

actions. Dockery, 911 F.3d at 467.

When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendant Sperry

would have lacked reasonable suspicion that he and his brother had committed any crime

at all -- let alone a severe one. A jury may also find that Timothy was only holding up a

phone, which plainly would not pose any danger to him, while complying with all of his

orders. (Dkt. #46, at 3.) Similarly, there is no allegation that plaintiff was holding anything

at all, much less an object that could have put Sperry at risk. Moreover, plaintiff claims

that after exiting the car, he was always holding his hands up in accordance with Sperry’s

commands. Taken together, plaintiff’s contentions that he had not committed a crime and

that he and his brother complied with Sperry’s directions throughout the traffic stop may

be enough for a reasonable jury to conclude that plaintiff posed no danger to Sperry. If

true, it would have been unreasonable for Sperry to point a gun at him. There are genuine

issues of material fact as to defendant Sperry and his use of firearms on plaintiff during the

traffic stop that will require a trial to resolve.

Plaintiff’s claims that defendants Vang, Briski, and Conway used excessive force

against him present a closer question. Each of those defendants allegedly pointed their

guns at plaintiff after responding to the traffic stop at defendant Sperry’s request. Even

when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no evidence

suggesting that they had any reason to suspect Sperry was misrepresenting the high-risk

nature of the traffic stop for which he requested their assistance. Taken together, it seems

unlikely that a reasonable jury could find that it was unreasonable for defendants Vang,

Briski, and Conway to briefly point their weapons at plaintiff when they responded to the

traffic stop. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

However, plaintiff’s claims against defendants Vang, Briski, and Conway fail

because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has not pointed to a closely

analogous, binding case or a more general constitutional rule that applies “with obvious

clarity” to the defendants’ conduct, nor is the court aware of any such case. Cibulka v. City

of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2021). Unlike defendant Sperry, who lacked

any reason at all to suspect that plaintiff had committed an offense when the facts are

viewed in the light most favorable to him, it is undisputed that defendants Vang, Briski,

and Conway thought they were responding to a high-risk event. Accordingly, summary

judgment must be entered in their favor.

Finally, while plaintiff maintains that every defendant pointed a gun at him, he has

produced no evidence to dispute that defendants Mikunda and Schiefelbein only arrived

on the scene after he had been placed in defendant Sperry’s squad car, and that their focus

was Timothy instead. (Dkt. #54, at 12; Dkt. #52, at 21-22; Dkt. #39, at ¶ 5; Dkt. #38,

at ¶ 5.) Accordingly, they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s use of force

claim as well.

C. Vehicle Search

Plaintiff also contends that defendants unlawfully searched his vehicle after he and

his brother were detained. Because plaintiff concedes that only defendants Sperry, Vang,

and Briski played a role in searching his vehicle (dkt. #52, at 23-34), defendants Conway,

Mikunda, and Schiefelbein are entitled to summary judgment on that claim. As for the

remaining defendants, they justify their search by claiming that after approaching his car

to determine if it had any other occupants, they: (1) smelled marijuana from outside the

vehicle; (2) saw a pill bottle inside of it; and (3) could see open containers of alcohol inside

as well. Although plaintiff disputes the officers’ first two claims, he concedes that an open

container of alcohol was visible from their vantage point outside the car.5

The so-called automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement allows officers to conduct warrantless searches of cars if there is probable cause

to believe they contain contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Williams, 627

F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). However, for the automobile exception

to apply here, defendants need to have had reasonable cause to effectuate the traffic stop

5 Wisconsin law prohibits open containers of alcohol inside vehicles on public roadways. Wis. Stat.

§ 346.935(2).

and detain plaintiff. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“If probable cause

justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the

vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”) (emphasis added); see

also Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462-63 (2011) (“law enforcement officers may seize

evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amendment in

arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence is made.”). Even if

defendant Sperry had probable cause to search plaintiff’s car for evidence of an open

container violation -- which the parties do not ultimately dispute if plaintiff’s version of

the facts is taken as true -- a reasonable jury could find that he lacked authority to stop

him in the first place. Consequently, defendant Sperry cannot rely on the automobile

exception to justify the search.6

In contrast, defendants Vang and Briski had no basis to question Sperry’s claim that

he had grounds to stop Coleman, and they both had a basis to search the car based on the

undisputed open container seen from outside the vehicle and the presence of a marijuana

smell once the car door opened. Moreover, they are entitled to qualified immunity with

respect to the search of plaintiff’s vehicle as well. Specifically, plaintiff has neither

6 Though defendants do not explicitly invoke the exigent circumstances rule, their briefing suggests

that it could have provided an alternative justification for their warrantless entry into the vehicle

and subsequent seizure of contraband in plain view. (Dkt. #53, at 7.) Exigent circumstances

allowing a warrantless entry exist where police reasonably believe that their safety may be

threatened. United States v. Huddleston, 593 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2010). According to

defendants Sperry, Vang, and Briski, they approached the vehicle to determine whether any other

passengers were still inside for their own safety and only saw the open container of alcohol at that

point. However, where officers violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency, they cannot

rely on the exigent circumstances rule to justify a subsequent warrantless search. King, 563 U.S. at

469. When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, defendant Sperry lacked

reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, so the exigent circumstances rule would not have

permitted him to search the car, either.

identified nor is the court aware of any binding case law holding that an officer cannot

search a vehicle for contraband under the automobile exception after another officer pulled

the car over, even if that other officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Put

differently, in the absence of any evidence suggesting that Vang and Briski played a role in

violating plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in stopping the car (or evidence that they

had reason to doubt Sperry’s version of the events leading up to the stop), they are entitled

to qualified immunity for their subsequent actions. Cf. Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064,

1082 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding denial of qualified immunity after plaintiff involuntarily

consented to search of vehicle by officers who surrounded him), abrogated in part on other

grounds by Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754 (9th Cir. 2023).

D. Hotel Room Search

Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants fabricated evidence and statements against

him to obtain a warrant to search his hotel room, which resulted in the discovery of drug

paraphernalia that supported the criminal charges against him. As a threshold matter, it is

undisputed that “the Fourth Amendment extends to temporary dwelling places, such as

hotel and motel rooms.” United States v. Lewis, 38 F.4th 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2022).

However, in the absence of exigent circumstances, police officers are only entitled to search

a hotel room if they obtain a valid warrant. Cf. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382

(2014) (“[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence

of criminal wrongdoing . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial

warrant”).

Because it is undisputed that defendants Conway, Schiefelbein, and Mikunda were

not personally involved in supporting the search warrant application for plaintiff’s room

(dkt. #52, at 28) or searching the room itself (dkt. #36, at ¶ 10, dkt. #38, at ¶ 10, dkt.

#39, at ¶ 11), they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims relating to the

warrant and its execution.

1. Search Warrant Affidavit

Affidavits supporting search warrant applications carry a presumption of validity,

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978), but that presumption can be overcome --

and a warrant rendered invalid -- if there is evidence showing that officers knowingly or

recklessly made materially false statements to the judicial officer necessary for her

determination that probable cause existed. United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 504

(7th Cir. 2013); Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2003). Similarly, an officer

can violate the Fourth Amendment by intentionally or recklessly withholding material

information from a search warrant affidavit. Rainsberger v. Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th

Cir. 2019). The materiality of any alleged lies or omissions is determined by eliminating

the allegedly false statements, incorporating any allegedly omitted facts, and evaluating

whether the resulting “hypothetical” affidavit establishes probable cause. Id. (citing Betker

v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir 2012)).

Here, it is undisputed that defendant Sperry was the only officer who prepared the

application for and provided an affidavit supporting the search warrant for plaintiff’s hotel

room. (Dkt. #52, at 28.) Although plaintiff does not identify in his briefing Sperry’s

allegedly false statements in his supporting affidavit (dkt. #44, at 14), it can be inferred

that he would point to (1) the representation that plaintiff committed a series of moving

violations before being pulled over; (2) plaintiff’s alleged flight after being pulled over; and

(3) Sperry’s claim that he could smell marijuana emanating from outside plaintiff’s vehicle.

(Dkt. 40-2, at 2.)

If those disputed facts are stripped from the probable cause analysis, the issuing

judge would have had to rely on the drug contraband found in plaintiff’s car -- itself found

after Sperry’s allegedly unjustified stop and search -- to find probable cause existed for the

search warrant. However, probable cause cannot be based solely or primarily on illegally

seized evidence. United States v. Oakley, 944 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1991). As a result,

the issuing judge would only be left with Sperry’s observations of plaintiff’s conduct at and

after his stop at the Regency Inn, which as discussed above, cannot support a finding of

reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed, let alone provide probable cause

for issuance of a warrant. Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that Sperry violated

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in preparing the search warrant application and

supporting affidavit.

2. Search Warrant Execution

Even if an officer obtains a facially valid warrant that describes with particularity

the place to be searched and the items or persons to be seized, Guzman v. City of Chicago,

565 F.3d 393, 396 (7th Cir. 2009), officers can also violate an individual’s Fourth

Amendment rights if they execute a search warrant knowing “that the warrant was not

supported by probable cause.” Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 1992); see

also Taylor v. Hughes, 26 F.4th 419, 430 (7th Cir. 2022) (officer who procures a warrant in

violation of Franks cannot conduct a search in good-faith reliance on its validity).

Again, illegally seized evidence cannot give rise to probable cause. Oakley, 944 F.2d

at 386. For the reasons discussed above, when the undisputed facts are viewed in the light

most favorable to plaintiff, therefore, defendant Sperry at least has not established

probable cause to believe that a drug offense had been committed in the hotel’s parking

lot, much less that a valid stop of Coleman’s car and inspection of the car’s contents

occurred. As a result, a reasonable jury could credit Coleman’s version of events and

conclude that Sperry violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights in obtaining and

executing a search warrant that he knew to be unsupported by probable cause.

While it is also undisputed that defendants Vang and Briski searched plaintiff’s

room at the Regency Inn under a warrant obtained on the basis of Sperry’s supporting

affidavit, plaintiff again has not identified any evidence suggesting that either they knew

or had reason to suspect that the warrant had been obtained under false pretenses. In the

absence of evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Vang and Briski were

aware of Sperry’s misrepresentations, there is no basis for the jury to find that Vang or

Briski executed the warrant on plaintiff’s hotel room knowing that it was issued without

probable cause.

E. Sperry’s Entitlement to Qualified Immunity

Finally, as to the remaining Eighth Amendment claims against defendant Sperry, he

is not entitled to qualified immunity if the jury finds that Sperry affirmatively

misrepresented the reasons for his conducting a stop and search of plaintiff’s car, since

plaintiff’s right to be free from unreasonable stops and searches is “clearly established[.]”.

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (qualified immunity protects government

officials from personal liability provided that “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known”). A law is “clearly established” if “every reasonable official would understand” the

officer's conduct “is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). In

other words, “existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the officer’s conduct

‘beyond debate.’” Id. This doctrine balances “the need to hold public officials accountable

when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Thus, “[w]hen

properly applied,” this doctrine “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

As noted earlier, to overcome a defendant’s qualified immunity defense, plaintiff

must point to a closely analogous, binding case that was decided in his favor or a more

general constitutional rule that applies “with obvious clarity” to the defendants’ conduct,

Cibulka, 992 F.3d at 639-40, although defendants correctly note that protected rights

should not be defined at “too high a level of generality[.]” (Dkt. #54, at 18 (citing City

and Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015)).)

Although he does not highlight any cases by name, plaintiff notes his clearly

established constitutional “right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 613. Specifically, he argues that any reasonable police officer would

know he could not: (1) pull a car over without reasonable suspicion that a crime or traffic

violation had been committed; (2) use force excessive to the threat posed; (3) obtain a

search warrant with false statements; or (4) search his hotel room without a valid warrant.

(Dkt. #44, at 15.) In particular, all of those rights were clearly established within the

Seventh Circuit at the time plaintiff was pulled over in October of 2019. See Brendlin v.

California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 n.7 (2007) (collecting cases) (well-established that an officer

cannot stop a motorist without at least a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has

occurred); Baird, 576 F.3d at 347 (clearly established that it is unreasonable for an officer

to point a gun at a suspect when there is no hint of danger); McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 508

(clearly established that officers cannot obtain a search warrant “by deliberately or

recklessly presenting false, material information to the issuing judge”); United States v.

Foxworth, 8 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 1993) (clearly established that police may not enter a

hotel room without a warrant absent an exception to the warrant requirement).

In asserting an entitlement to qualified immunity, defendants consistently fail to

acknowledge the significant number of disputed material facts -- particularly in asserting

arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff -- and rarely, if ever, draw inferences in his favor.

The only cases defendants cite in an attempt to show their specific conduct may be

protected by qualified immunity are sufficiently distinct to underscore that plaintiff’s rights

are well-established. See Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 617 (7th Cir. 2017) (reasonable

for law enforcement to briefly draw firearms when executing search warrant supported by

probable cause); Hoeppner v. Billeb, 17-cv-430-bbc, 2018 WL 5282898, at *9-10 (W.D.

Wis. Oct. 24, 2018) (same in context of writ of execution). Although plaintiff has the

burden of defeating a qualified immunity defense once raised -- and is ultimately unable to

do so in the case of defendants Vang, Conway, and Briski for the reasons discussed above

-- there are substantial factual disputes in this case as to defendant Sperry’s alleged

misconduct. Regardless, legal boilerplate and a failure to engage with plaintiff’s version of

the facts alone cannot support summary judgment in Sperry’s favor based on qualified

immunity.7

II. Malicious Prosecution Claims

The Fourth Amendment also governs seizures that occur before and after the

initiation of a criminal prosecution. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 366-67 (2017);

Kuri v. City of Chicago, 990 F.3d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2021). Pretrial detention is unlawful

where either “the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a

criminal proceeding” or when “legal process itself goes wrong -- . . . for example, a judge’s

probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements.”

Manuel, 580 U.S. at 367.

Plaintiff contends that his detention beginning with the traffic stop and continuing

through his subsequent prosecution in Wisconsin state court violated his Fourth

Amendment rights. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022). Such claims of malicious

prosecution require proof that: the underlying prosecution was instituted without probable

cause; defendant’s motive in bringing the charges was “malicious”; and “the criminal

7 Defendants’ discussion of qualified immunity in their reply brief (dkt. #53, at 17-21) is a nearly

word-for-word copy of the qualified immunity analysis in their opening brief. (Dkt. #34, at 18-

22.) Although defendants are not forfeiting their qualified immunity defense, such perfunctory

drafting has not assisted the court in its analysis and strongly suggests defendant Sperry’s claim of

qualified immunity is woefully underdeveloped.

prosecution ended without a conviction.” Id. at 42, 49.8 Even if a defendant did not

personally detain or arrest the plaintiff, a malicious prosecution claim can lie where his or

her actions cause the plaintiff to be seized without probable cause. Id. at 42-43.

When analyzing such claims, courts consider whether probable cause existed when

the plaintiff was charged, not when he or she was arrested. Holland v. City of Chicago, 643

F.3d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 2011). In the context of a malicious prosecution claim, probable

cause exists where the facts alleged “would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to

believe or to entertain an honest and sound suspicion that the accused committed the

offense charged.” Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 759 (7th Cir. 2013). Because

it is undisputed that defendants Mikunda and Schiefelbein were not personally involved

in the events that led to plaintiff’s detention and prosecution, they are obviously entitled

to summary judgment on his malicious prosecution claim. Moreover, because plaintiff has

not identified any cases suggesting that defendants Vang, Briski, and Conway could not

rely on defendant Sperry’s reasonable representations in responding to a traffic stop or

searching plaintiff’s hotel room, all three are entitled to summary judgment or at least

qualified immunity on plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim for reasons already discussed

above.

However, for summary judgment to be entered in favor of defendant Sperry, the

8 Although both sides point to the elements of and remedies for malicious prosecution under

Wisconsin law for purposes of analyzing plaintiff’s § 1983 claim (dkt. #34, at 16 and dkt. #44, at

14), the court explicitly granted plaintiff leave to proceed on a Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution claim. (Dkt. #13, at 3.) In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson,

malicious prosecution is a federal constitutional tort standing alone. 596 U.S. at 42-44; see also

Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023) (noting distinction between elements of

state-law and Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims since Thompson).

court would have to accept his version of events as true and disregard plaintiff’s version

entirely. Because the court cannot do so based on the conflicting evidence at this stage in

the case, it must deny him summary judgment. Parker, 845 F.3d at 812. For the reasons

discussed above, in plaintiff’s telling, Sperry lacked: (1) a reasonable suspicion to pull his

car over or detain him; (2) probable cause to search his vehicle; (3) probable cause for a

warrant to search his room; and as a result, (4) probable cause to arrest him for the offenses

for which he was charged. Specifically, Sperry has pointed to no other evidence that the

judge presiding over plaintiff’s case could have considered when she determined there was

probable cause on December 10, 2019; or when plaintiff was arraigned on February 13,

2020. Nor does he dispute that the charges against plaintiff were dismissed on September

25, 2020. (Dkt. #37-1, at 1-3.) Moreover, malice can be inferred where, as a reasonable

jury could find here, “a defendant lacks probable cause and the circumstances indicate a

lack of good faith.” Holland, 643 F.3d at 255.

Finally, once again, defendant Sperry is not entitled to qualified immunity on

plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, since it was clearly established within this circuit

by the time of the events in question, that no reasonable officer could have believed it was

constitutionally permissible to: (1) arrest someone without probable cause, Harney v. City

of Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 922 (7th Cir. 2012); or (2) falsify the factual basis for a judicial

probable cause determination. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019).

Given the extensive disputes of material fact that remain in this case, plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claim against defendant Sperry must also proceed to trial.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that:

1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (dkt. #33) is DENIED in part and

GRANTED in part as follows:

• It is DENIED as to all alleged claims against defendant Sperry.

• It is GRANTED as to all of plaintiff’s claims against defendants Vang,

Briski, Conway, Mikunda and Schiefelbein.

2) At the close of this case, the clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in

favor of defendants Vang, Briski, Conway, Mikunda and Schiefelbein.

3) The court will issue separately a trial preparation order that confirms deadlines

and explains trial logistics.

Entered this 15th day of March, 2024.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

__________________________________

WILLIAM M. CONLEY

District Judge