“To determine whether the claim arises under federal law, we examine the ‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint and ignore potential defenses.”
How later courts described this case
- “To determine whether the claim arises under federal law, we examine the ‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint and ignore potential defenses.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
PRIEST DELON BUTLER,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 20-CV-1834-JPS
v.
GOOGLE LLC, YOUTUBE, and
ORDER
ALPHABET, INC.,
Defendants.
On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff Priest Delon Butler (“Butler”) filed a
pro se complaint against Defendants Google and YouTube, in which he
alleges a series of defamation and contract-related claims. (Docket #1).
Butler then filed two amended complaints, wherein he added Alphabet,
Inc. as the “parent company” of Google and YouTube, as a Defendant.
(Docket #19, #21). This Order addresses Google and YouTube’s (“Moving
Defendants”) motion to dismiss, (Docket #25).
1. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides for the dismissal of
complaints which, among other things, “fail[] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim, a complaint
must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, the
complaint must give “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
allegations must “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief,
raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago,
810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted). Plausibility
requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). In reviewing the complaint, the Court is required to “accept as
true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 480–81. However,
the Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555–56).
2. RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS
Butler filed his complaint in December 2020. (Docket #1). He sent a
copy of the complaint to Moving Defendants, along with a waiver of service
dated September 9, 2021. (Docket #9-1 at 2). Moving Defendants waived
service. (Id.) After Moving Defendants filed a corporate disclosure
statement, Butler amended his complaint to add Alphabet, Inc. as a
defendant. (Docket #19).1
It appears that Butler has a channel on YouTube, an online platform
that permits individuals to post videos that comply with its terms of service
and community guidelines. (Docket #19 at 2–3). YouTube also allows
individuals to earn advertising revenue through advertisers’ contracts with
1The Court will treat Butler’s First Amended Complaint, (Docket #19), as
the operative complaint in this matter. Although Butler filed a Second Amended
Complaint, (Docket #21), he did not obtain the Court’s leave or Defendants’
consent to do so, as required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Moving Defendants
proceeded with their motion using the First Amended Complaint as the operative
complaint. (Docket #26 at 8 n.2). Further, as Moving Defendants note, Plaintiff did
not change the substance of his allegations in his Second Amended Complaint.
YouTube. (Id.) Google owns YouTube, and Google is a subsidiary of XXVI
Holdings Inc., which is a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. (Docket #16).
According to Butler, from late 2016 to 2020, YouTube began flagging
his videos as “[n]ot suitable for most advertisers” or “18+ Adult Only
Content,” which prevented his videos from earning “a significant amount”
of ad revenue. (Docket #19 at 3–4). Butler also alleges that YouTube flagged
his videos as “[n]ot suitable for most advertisers” due to violence, but that
his videos did not contain violent content. (Id. at 3). Butler states that
“human reviewers” examined his videos and that Moving Defendants
relied on their recommendations as to whether Butler’s videos should be
flagged. (Id.)
In the present suit, Butler brings three claims. Count One, titled
“breach of contract/ad revenue theft/prevention of earned ad revenue,”
alleges that Defendants breached the parties’ “Ad Revenue Contract
Agreement” by strategically flagging his videos as not suitable for most
advertisers, with the purpose of preventing Butler from receiving ad
revenue. (Id. at 3). Butler states that the “not suitable for most advertisers”
flag appears on his videos “whenever spikes in video views or ad revenue
or both are detected;” he alleges that his videos are unflagged whenever
viewership or ad revenue drop. (Id.) Butler writes that “[t]he Defendants[’]
actions are making sure [his] videos will never honestly earn the agreed
upon 55/45 percentage split [in ad revenue].” (Id.)
Count Two, titled “defamation of character,” alleges that
Defendants’ flagging of Butler’s videos as “[n]ot suitable for most
advertisers” due to violence defamed Butler because his videos did not, in
fact, contain violent content. (Id.) He states that Moving Defendants have
“defamed [his] character as an honest and completely transparent YouTube
Channel Owner and Content Creator.” (Id.) He alleges that Defendants
would not allow him to appeal the human reviewers’ findings.
Count Three, titled “further act(s) to prevent earned ad revenue,”
alleges that Defendants restricted some of Butler’s videos, including a “PC
Software Showcase video,” and other similarly titled videos, as “18+ Adult
Only Content,” which prevented the video from earning ad revenue. (Id. at
3–4). As with Count One, Butler states that his videos are flagged as they
receive more viewership and ad revenue. (Id. at 4).
Butler’s written complaint ends there. However, he submitted two
flash drives to the Court containing screenshots and screen recordings of
his YouTube channel. (Docket #1, #5). In many of his screen recordings,
Plaintiff has inserted audio of himself narrating his version of events as he
clicks through pages on his YouTube channel; he also includes captions that
appear and disappear from the screen as the screen recordings play. He has
added descriptive (and often argumentative) file names to many of the
attachments (e.g., “Proof-Video a YouTube Human Reviewer Falsely &
Purposely Cited as Having Extreme Violence to Stop Revenue”). Some file
names include references to “Nude Mods” or “Key and Peele Sex Detective
Uncensored.”2 It is unclear which elements of these videos are as they
appear on Butler’s YouTube channel and which elements he edited into the
videos for purposes of this case. Without written explanation of why the
Court should parse through these videos and images—many with
2It appears that Butler included the “Key and Peele Sex Detective
Uncensored” video not as an example of a video on his page, but rather as an
example of a video that did not receive a flag, but which Butler believes should
have in comparison to his videos.
unseemly titles—the Court will not engage with them.? Even a pro se
plaintiff can be expected to know that this is not how one formats legal
allegations in a federal lawsuit:
© Men | MB Videos - YouTer X | + > - @ x
ER rr □□□
@eahorteOGOEs SCCHOSHPER AROERVSPHSRONF SCmr Leer Saher □□□ □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ »
FODTAES RECEDES Manay, AIAoS @EeEm > 7E4am VED FERTAEE
Assess Cred uty PE 05:000007 Ener Fe Windows 7,8 eo » . SDUPRMEW
Diiiieay ff com 6» TBAT GIP
Gaps) Ma Te ta A □□ WEEK
Tech ste] OF Tha Rice Wb i The Ev win PC axco00007% ror Foe Windows 7,28 10 e® ns REEVES
Or My Vikas To Gas if Any Ach Ware ex Amer os = BAERTWaBIEE,
Rng Fir te the Vikk@ ”
RANI CT Al ae SSS RTT ASEINE
SUTLAOLE TEESE rane ch reat oc = ABS, WAP FUNSIEN
TPES WSO FERAL
WEEE, hy 0 Se
299 views ie
AG EELESIED EAR, QUAKERS AEELIP
CHEN TEMAS MBATAL. Waaesewes
DETENTEMEEERLSe ues
Moving Defendants base their motion to dismiss on First
Amendment defenses and defenses allegedly available under the
Communications Decency Act, as well as on Butler’s failure to state a claim.
(Docket #26).
3. ANALYSIS
Generally, federal courts can preside over cases in two situations:
(1) where the action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States,” and (2) “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
’Butler provides an “evidence disclosure statement” in which he lists the
files and provides short explanations. However, this disclosure statement is no
more helpful than the file names. (Docket #1-2, #5).
Page 5 of 8
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
In the present case, Butler’s claims do not arise under federal law.
He brings contract and defamation claims, which fall under state law.
Further, while Moving Defendants’ defenses rely on federal law, the
presence of a federal-law defense does not supply subject-matter
jurisdiction under § 1331. Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003)
(“To determine whether the claim arises under federal law, we examine the
‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint and ignore potential defenses.”)
(citations omitted). Accordingly, § 1331’s federal-question jurisdiction does
not apply.
Thus, for the Court to have jurisdiction over this case, “the matter in
controversy [must] exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and [be] between . . . citizens of different States.” 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Based on Butler’s allegations, the parties appear to be diverse;
Butler is a citizen of Wisconsin and Defendants are headquartered in
California. But it is immediately evident on the face of Butler’s complaint
that this case might not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Butler’s only statement of damages is a request for $25,000,000 in
punitive damages. (Docket #19 at 5). “Where both actual and punitive
damages are recoverable under a complaint each must be considered to the
extent claimed in determining the jurisdictional amount.” Bell v. Preferred
Life Soc’y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943); see also LM Ins. Corp. v. Spaulding Enters.
Inc., 533 F.3d 542, 551 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, “where punitive damages are
relied upon to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, the court
must first determine whether punitive damages are recoverable under state
law.” LM Ins. Corp., 533 F.3d at 551 (citations omitted). Second, if punitive
damages are available under state law, “subject matter jurisdiction exists
unless it is ‘legally certain’ that the plaintiff will be unable to recover the
requisite jurisdictional amount.” Id. (citations omitted).
Moving Defendants did not consider subject matter jurisdiction in
their briefing. Their briefing instead focuses on federal-law defenses, such
as the Communications Decency Act and the First Amendment. (Docket
#26). It is paramount, however, that a federal court ensure it has jurisdiction
before it reaches the merits of a case that is better brought in state court.
Butler may be able to pursue punitive damages on his state law claims; such
punitive damages may also be able to exceed $75,000. But, without any
discussion by the parties—other than Butler’s seemingly steep request for
$25,000,000 in punitive damages—the Court is not convinced that it has the
authority to enter a merits-based order. Accordingly, the Court will order
the parties to brief the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.
4. SERVICE OF ALPHABET, INC.
In his amended complaint, Butler adds Alphabet, Inc. as a Defendant
in this matter. (Docket #19). It does not appear that Butler attempted service
on Alphabet, Inc. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint
is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the
plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a
specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the
failure, the court must extend the time for service for an
appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
The ninety-day deadline expired in February 2021. The Court will
require that, within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this Order, Butler must
provide evidence of service or otherwise explain why good cause exists to
extend the Rule 4(m) deadline. Failure to do so will result in dismissal of
Alphabet, Inc. from this action without prejudice and without further
notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
5. CONCLUSION
The parties are ordered to brief the Court on subject-matter
jurisdiction, as set forth in the schedule below. If the Court ultimately finds
that it has subject-matter over this case, it will revisit the pending motion to
dismiss, (Docket #25). The Court also orders Butler to submit proof of
service on Alphabet, Inc. within fourteen (14) days.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Moving Defendants submit a brief discussing
the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over this case by March 29, 2022;
Butler must respond by April 19, 2022; Moving Defendants may submit a
reply by May 3, 2022; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within fourteen (14) days of the
entry of this Order, Butler must provide evidence of service on Alphabet,
Inc. or otherwise explain why good cause exists to extend the Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(m) deadline for service.
Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 8th day of March, 2022.
BY THE¢COURT:
□□ AY Se
SBR cease)
J.R. Stadfraueller
U.S? District Judge
Page 8 of 8